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THE
NEW MAP OF AFRICA

(1900-19 1 6)

A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN COLONIAL

EXPANSION AND COLONIAL

DIPLOMACY

BY
HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

Ph.D., F.R.Hist.S.

author of "the new map of europe," "the foundation of
the ottoman empire," "paris reborn," etc.

NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.

1916

rum

Published, November, igi6

>CI,A445G;J2
O-v-o I X

JAMES GORDON BENNETT

whose lifelong interest in
what before his day was

" The Dark Continent "

HAS been an important factor

in dispelling THE

darkness.

Semper aliquid noui Africam adferre.

Greek proverb, quoted by
Pliny, Hist. Nat. viii. §42

NOV 14 1916

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. Great Britain in the Sudan . . i
II. The Islands of Africa ... 31

III. The Last Years of the Boer War

AND the Period of Reconstruction

in South Africa .... 43

IV. The Two Independent States:

Liberia and Abyssinia . . . 92

V. British Policy in Somaliland . 106

VI. The Colonial Ventures of Italy . 115

VII. Algeria and Tunis: the Nucleus of

the French African Empire . 130

VIII. The Belgians in the Congo . . 147

IX. The First German Colony: South-
west Africa - . . . • 1 73

X. The Heritage of Livingstone and

Rhodes . . . . . 189

XI. The British in East Africa and

Uganda . . . . . 206

viii CONTENTS

PAGE

XII. The Germans in East Africa . . 228

XIII. The Problem of the Portuguese

Colonies 244

XIV. The British in West Africa . . 276

XV. The Germans in West Africa. . 299

XVI. The French in West Africa and the

Sahara . . . • . . 312

XVII, French Penetration into Central

Africa 335

XVIII. European Rivalry in Morocco before

Algeciras 355

XIX. France Gets Morocco . . . 374

XX. Egypt under the Last of the Khe-
dives ...... 391

XXI. Egypt Becomes a British Protecto-
rate ...... 421

XXII. The Creation of the South African

Union ..... 441

XXIII. The Rebellion in South Africa and

ITS Aftermath .... 454

XXIV. The Conquest of the German

Colonies ..... 470

CONTENTS ix

PAGE

XXV. African Problems for the Peace

Conference 481

Index 493

MAPS

FACING PAGE

, I. Africa at the Outbreak of the

War . . . . . Title-page

II. Africa about 1850 . . . . -32

^III. Africa in 1902 . . . .64

. IV. The Mediterranean Coast of Africa 128

V. Sketch Map Showing the German-
French Boundaries in 1912 . . 360

, VI. The South African Commonwealth 448

FOREWORD

WHEN The New Map of Europe was written,
at the beginning of the war, I had to
forego deahng in a comprehensive way
with colonial questions. Only the facts, concerning
^European expansion in Africa that seemed to have
direct bearing upon the diplomatic history of the
ten years preceding August i, 19 14 could be in-
cluded. But what has happened — and what has
not happened — in Africa during the past two years
revealed to me the necessity of reviewing the fifteen
years of colonial development, effort and rivalry
of European states in Africa, if I wanted to have a
clear understanding of the forces that had driven
Europe to war, of the issues that the war was bring-
ing into clear light, and of the problems that would
confront the Peace Conference.

The facts for a book on European colonization in
Africa I had been gathering for years. But I had
no idea until now how important these facts were,
and how essential a knowledge of them was to the
student of contemporary European history. This
book has been written not at all in the way originally
planned, but with the illumination that has come
through more than two years of living in the midst
of the great conflict and writing daily upon its

xii FOREWORD

various phases. However radically and vehemently
readers may differ from interpretations and conclu-
sions, I hope none will feel it a loss of time to go
with me through these pages that narrate the evolu-
tion of Africa from the Boer War to the completion
of the conquest of the last German colony by General
Smuts and the combined British, Belgian, and Portu-
guese armies in the autumn of 191 6.

I trust that none will think lightly of my work
because it is not accompanied by footnotes and a
bibliography. Primary sources are the govern-
mental "papers, " containing texts of treaties, official
correspondence and reports, consular reports, parlia-
mentary speeches and debates ; bulletins and reports
of proceedings of chambers of commerce and other
organizations interested in African colonization for
economic, financial, political, scientific, and socio-
logical reasons; and, occasionally, newspaper compte-
rendus of interviews and speeches. The books I
have consulted are legion. The more important
ones can be found in the bibliographical lists after
each colony in the Statesman's Year Book. To the
summaries of events from year to year in the London
Annual Register, I gratefully acknowledge constant
indebtedness. For the first half of my period, these
illuminating annals were written by Mr. H. Whates,
Statistics are taken from the Statesman's Year Book;
French, German, Belgian, and Italian publications
that come under the head of primary sources men-
tioned above; Augustin Bernard's Le Maroc, Angel
Marvaud's Le Portugal et ses colonies, and A. P.
Calvert's German African Empire. I have made

FOREWORD xiii

use also of my own correspondence to the New York
Herald and the Philadelphia Evening Telegraph.

I want to express my keen appreciation of the
hospitahty and precious help I received during a
visit to Africa in war time from H. H. Hussein Ka-
mil, G.C.B., Sultan of Egypt; General Sir Reginald
Wingate, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., etc., Governor- General
of the Sudan; Sir Henry McMahon, G.V.C.O.,
K.C.I. E., etc., H. M.'s High Commissioner for
Egypt; General Sir John Maxwell, K.C.B.,K.C.M.G.,
etc., Commanding the British Army . in Egypt;
Hussein Rushdi Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt;
Col. E. E. Barnard Pasha, C.M.G., Financial
Secretary of the Sudan; Ronald Storrs, Esq., Oriental
Secretary to the British Agency; Arakel Nubar Bey,
French Secretary to H. H. the Sultan; Major G. B.
Symes, D.S.O., Private Secretary to H, E. the
Governor-General of the Sudan; Gerald Delany,
Esq., Renter's Manager at Cairo; J. Edgar, Esq.,
sometime Professor in Cape Town University and
later Editor of the Johannesburg Star; and Walter
Harris, Esq., of Tangier, Times Correspondent in
Morocco. Mr. Edgar and Mr. Harris were good
enough to submit to the imposition of lengthy
questionnaires on South African and Moroccan
history, in which they have played an active and
important r61e. Many a glimpse into the inside
history of Egypt did I get from Artin Pasha, last of
the "elder statesmen" of Egypt, who went over
with me the books of Lord Cromer, Lord Milner,
and Mr. Dicey, and gave me a copy of his own work
on the Sudan.

xiv FOREWORD

To Mr. James Gordon Bennett and Mr. Rodman
Wanamaker I owe the privilege of a visit to Africa
in the early months of 191 6, and to Boghos Nubar
Pasha continuous and hearty encouragement to
undertake work in a field where his knowledge and
life-long experience make that encouragement worth
more than can be estimated.

Herbert Adams Gibbons

Villa El Farn, rue des Dunes

HouLGATE, Calvados, Normandy.

October, 1916.

THE
NEW MAP OF AFRICA

The New Map of Africa

CHAPTER I
GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

AFTER the failure of the Khartum Relief Expedi-
tion and the death of General Gordon, the
' British Government ordered Egypt and the
British army to drop the Sudan. The whole Gordon
and Sudan literature, which requires a separate bibli-
ography and is filled with sentimentalism, misrepre-
sentations, and party prejudices, is the historical
monument and record of the activity of Englishmen
at home and their interest in the problem of the Sudan
during the decade that followed the shameful fiasco of
1884. The Gordon legend alone was in the mind of
the Britisher who never left his tight little island,
and who considered that fact a kind of virtue. The
Mahdi reigned supreme in the Sudan, and after his
death, his successor, the Khalifa, continued to exter-
minate the tribes of the upper tributaries of the Nile.
Fpr all British Cabinets and the British public seemed
to care, the dervishes were welcome to keep the
Sudan, and the early eighties were "past history."

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

But some Englishmen did care and did not forget.
In fact, there was never a moment that the thought of
the eventual reconquest of the Sudan and of the re-
trieving of the honor of British arms was not before
them. They had the vision. They lived with eyes
fixed on the goal. The uninitiable never look back
of events to their causes. To them whatever of
fortune through achievement falls to the other
fellow is "luck." They believe that Lord Cromer
blundered to fame through twenty-five years of hit
and miss in Egypt, and that Lord Kitchener was
"made" by the battle of Omdurman, "after all, you
know, an easy butchery of crazy fanatics who had
no chance at all against his superior v/eapons."

The battle of Omdurman on September 2, 1898,
which made possible the reconquest and redemption
of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the foundation of
its present splendid government, was the culminat-
ing event of more than ten years of herculean ef-
fort on the part of a handful of men whose
enthusiasm was fortunately matched by their fore-
sight, patience, and ability. The victory won at
Omdurman was the beginning of a new era for the
British Empire in Africa and throughout the world.
History will give to those v/ho worked for it and
those who won it credit for far more than the
rehabilitation of the Sudan.

British colonial administrators have succeeded in
building an empire in spite of, rather than with the
help of, their Government and the great mass of their
fellow-countrymen. Problems confronting them in
their field of action have never been more difficult

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

than the problem of getting and keeping support
from home. London is the bete noire of the English
official overseas. Cablegrams from home cause more
trouble than native uprisings. In regard to foreign
policy, Conservative and Liberal Cabinets are very
much the same. They are guided by the fears and
the hopes of General Elections, and they hate hke
poison :

1. To spend the British taxpayer's money over-
seas.

2. To sanction any policy that is likely to cause
fighting in which British troops must be engaged.

3. To offend the nonconformist conscience.

Colonial administrators who keep in mind con-
stantly these three points, and who plan to get result?
without coming into conflict with the Government ou
any one of them, succeed in making for themselves
great careers, and gain honors, if not peace of mind,
Those who do not keep these points in mind never get
very far in a colonial career.

This is why the reconquest of the Sudan needed a
decade of preparation. There was never any hope
at all of convincing the British public of the necessity
of pouring out blood and treasure to get back to
Khartum. Unwillingness to pay the price had been
the cause of the debacle of 1884. The only other
possible way of accomplishing what they had in
mind was to put Egypt upon a sound financial basis,
and to recreate an Egyptian army that knew how
to fight and that would fight. The invasion of
the Sudan and the winning of the battle of Omdur-
man was possible only because Lord Cromer made

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Egypt's revenues exceed her expenditures and be-
cause Lord Kitchener got an Egyptian army into
good fighting shape. When this was accomplished
— and not before then — it could be pointed out
to London that Egypt could contribute both in
men and money very substantially to an expedition
against the Khalifa. There had to be an appeal
also to public opinion in England and to the
nonconformist conscience. So for years one can
read in Lord Cromer's annual reports the skilfully
introduced and skilfully emphasized leitmotiv of
the necessity to Egypt of the reclamation of the
Sudan. Never could there be security in Upper
Egypt until the dervishes were crushed. Never
would irrigation projects on a large scale be justi-
fiable or possible until the headwaters of the Nile
were under Anglo-Egyptian control. Never would
the African slave trafhc be stopped until the region
from the equator to Wady Haifa was policed by
Europeans. Common humanity and moral re-
sponsibility also demanded the reconquest of the
Sudan. For the native population was rapidly dying
out everywhere because of the dervish cruelties and
mismanagement. Last of all, from the standpoint
of European prestige, the Italian defeat at Adowa
must be counteracted.

Since Egyptian money and Egyptian lives were
largely instrumental in the reconquest of the Sudan,
and since the legal rights to the territories it would
comprise rested wholly upon those of the Ottoman
Empire and the Egyptian Khedives, it was impos-
sible— though it would have been desirable — to

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

establish an English colony or a distinct Protectorate
under direct British control. Then, too, the Sudan
was going to look for an indeterminable period to the
Egyptian army and the Egyptian budget for soldiers
and money to hold, to rehabilitate, and to develop
the vast regions which Mahdiism had so cruelly
oppressed and ruined. And was not the principal
reason for reconquest the political security and the
economic advantage to Egypt through possessing
the headwaters of the Nile? The problem was
exceedingly delicate, owing to Great Britain's an-
omalous position in Egypt, both from the inter-
national and the Ottoman point of view.

A convention signed at Cairo on January 19, 1899,
between the British and Egyptian Governments,
stated that the territory south of the twenty-second
parallel of latitude was to be administered by a
Governor-General, appointed by Egypt with the
assent of Great Britain. The British and Egyptian
flags were to be used together. No duties were to
be levied on imports from Egypt, and duties on im-
ports from other countries, by way of the Red Sea,
were not to exceed the Egyptian tariffs. As long
as it should be necessary, Egypt was to make good
the deficit in the Sudan budget. But the money
invested in the Sudan by Egypt would be considered
a loan, upon which interest would be paid as soon as
possible. A portion of the Egyptian army should
serve in the Sudan, under the command of the
Governor-General, himself an officer of the Egyptian
army with the rank of Sirdar. So long as the na-
tions who enjoyed the privileges of a capitulatory

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

regime in Egypt did not demand the extension of the
capitulations to the Sudan, and so long as Egypt
remained under effective British control, such an
arrangement, paradoxical as it seemed, was workable.
It has worked out all right. But it is important to
note that the exact status of the Sudan, both from
the international and the Egyptian point of view, has
not yet been determined. It will come up for settle-
ment in the Peace Conference, when the affairs of
the Ottoman Empire are liquidated, and international
sanction is asked for the British Protectorate pro-
claimed over Egypt since the opening of the European
War.^

Once the Sudan was reconquered, Cromer and
Kitchener still held to the policy of "sound financial
basis" that had made the conquest possible. For
they knew that the Home Government would take
little interest in, and do nothing for, the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan unless it was demonstrated to them
that the country could pay its way. Immediate use
could be made of almost unlimited sums of money,
and the temptation was great to enter upon and urge
London and Cairo to cooperate in ambitious develop-
ment schemes. Cromer and Kitchener were in
complete accord in not falling into this trap, and
when Kitchener was suddenly called away to South
Africa, Lord Cromer was fortunate in finding in his
successor. Sir Reginald Wingate, an administrator
fully aware of the danger of grandiose schemes of
rehabilitation and rapid development. The initial
financial policy laid down by Lord Cromer in his

' For the Egyptian point of view, see pp. 421-440.

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

address to the Sudanese chiefs at Khartum in Decem-
ber, 1900, to the effect that taxes were not to be made
burdensome, even if communications and develop-
ments had to wait, has been faithfully and consist-
ently carried out. To it more than to anything else
is due the marvelous success of the Sudan admin-
istration. For the Sudanese have had from the
beginning the contrast of the equitable taxation of
the British with that which ground them down and
ruined them under the Mahdi and the Khalifa: and
the British Government has not been wearied and pre-
judiced against the Sudan by unreasonable demands
for financial support.

The cost of the reconquest was L.E. 2,412,000,^
of which the British Government paid L.E. 780,000.
More money had, of course, to be invested in rail-
ways, in river transport, and in irrigation. The paci-
fication of the country and the rehabilitation of its
inhabitants depended upon means of transportation
and the cultivation of the land. Everything had
been destroyed or had fallen into decay during the
years of anarchy : so all kinds of public works needed
a substantial budget. Popular education had to be
thought of, and the expenses of the civil administra-
tion and a considerable military establishment pro-
vided for. But though the financial task looked so
formidable as to be almost hopeless, it was success-
fully grappled with, and the country saved from con-
cession hunters and insolvency by the adoption and
maintenance of the conservative policy of "go slow
and pay as you go. "

' L.E. = Egyptian pound, approximately five dollars.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

In 1903, the Egyptian Cabinet authorized an ad-
vance to the Sudan for railway construction of
L.E. 1,770,000 to spread over four years. This was
a sound financial investment. For it was soon de-
monstrated that the increased revenue through the
development of transportation facilities would cut
down Egypt's contribution to the annual deficit more
than the interest on this money. In 1906, the Su-
dan Railway administration yielded a net profit of
L.E. 52,000,^ and in 1907 the Sudan Government was
able to pay to Egypt, L.E. 45,000 interest on part of
the L.E. 3,000,000 advanced by Egypt for capital
expenditures up to the end of 1906. The Sudan
Government declared that it was now in a position
to assist the development of public works in the
Sudan. L.E. 100,000 was set aside for public works
in 1908 and L.E. 285,000 for the purchase of rails for
the Atbara-Khartum Railway. From January i , 1908,
the Sudan began to pay interest at 3 per cent, on
L.E. 1,500,000 of the debt to Egypt. The deficit in
revenue for 1908 was only L.E. 47,000, and in 1909 the

^ Over and over again in Africa the tremendous financial advantage
to a country accruing from state ownership of public utilities is
demonstrated. The Sudan, like South Africa, Egypt, and other
countries, gets a good share of its surplus revenue from railway profits
— a surplus that comes even though hundreds of miles of line are
built and operated at a loss for political reasons or for the ultimate
benefit of the people. One striking illustration of what the Sudan
has gained from keeping its transportation out of the hands of con-
cession hunters is found in the little Khartum-Omdurman tram,
which plies from Khartum to the ferry leading to Omdurman. This
tram line, carrying wholly natives, was begged for often at the
beginning by private groups. The Government kept it, and to-day
it brings a net profit of fifty thousand pounds per annum to the
treasury.

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

annual subvention from the Egyptian Treasury was
reduced by another L.E. 10,000. This encouraged
Egypt to advance L.E. 380,000 for railway extension
and improvement, and the completion of Port Sudan
town and harbor. In 1910, Sir Reginald Wingate
was able to report that the entire Civil Administra-
tion was paying its way and that the only deficit
was on the military budget. As more land came
under cultivation, trade would increase and the
deficit disappear. Three years later there was a
surplus of L.E. 40,000. The Sudan had made good.

Exports increased thirty per cent, in 19I i, owing to
the development of the cotton industry. In 1912,
the creation of Port Sudan and the linking of the Red
Sea with the Nile by railway made possible export
without prohibitive transportation charges. Cotton,
cattle, and sheep progressed rapidly. In 1913, the
trade output jumped again, owing to the extension of
the railway to El Obeid. Great Britain was supply-
ing thirty-nine per cent, of the imports, and took
twenty per cent, of the exports.

It is no surprise, then, that the British Parliament
showed itself willing to guarantee the interest on a
loan of £3,000,000 for cotton cultivation in the Sudan.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that this
outlay, in irrigation and railway extension, would
develop the cultivation of cotton of the finest quality,
greatly needed by England for the manufacture of
her unique grades of cotton goods.

A few months ago, I sat in the office of the Finan-
cial Secretary at 'Khartum. Colonel Bernard is a
type of officer one finds only in the British army. If

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

he were a Frenchman, he would never have left Paris.
If he were an American, he would be one of our
captains of industry, with a yacht and a summer
home at Newport or Bar Harbor, and wondering
how he could spend his money. We occasionally get
in our army and navy men with a genius for business :
but they do not stay. It may be partly due to the
fact that until the Spanish War there were no tasks
to challenge this type of man. But it is mostly due
to the entire difference in our social system from that
of Great Britain. The Colonial Empire under the
British flag has been built by men who have gone
into Government service for reasons of caste. Among
them there has naturally been a large number, like
Colonel Bernard, with marked aptitude for business.
In any other country most of these men would have
gone into business. In England they never dream
of such a thing. In order to enjoy the privileges
of caste, young men of good families are willing to
leave home and friends, to live separated from their
own children, and to spend the thirty to forty best
years of their life in exile. They are content with an
occasional visit to England and with little or no
money, if only they preserve their caste. This is
the secret of Great Britain's world empire. The
moment the Englishman of the upper classes con-
siders business as honorable a vocation as Govern-
ment service, Britain's Colonial Empire will resemble
France's or Germany's — or will collapse altogether.
All this passed through my head as I listened to
Colonel Bernard explaining, budget estimates before
him, the financial policy of the Sudan, with all the

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

enthusiasm and keenness and understanding of an
American trying to attract capital to his latest
enterprise.

Without the railway across the desert from Wady
Haifa to Atbara, Kitchener's task against the der-
vishes would have been tenfold more difficult, and the
victory of doubtful permanent value. As the in-
vaders proceeded to Khartum, it was essential to lay
ties and rails with unflagging haste. Only did the
re-occupation seem a reality and worth while when
through railway service was established from Khar-
tum to Wady Haifa. As the political success of the
reconquest was wholly dependent upon its proving
a financial success, and as serious economic develop-
ment was out of the question so long as the route
through Egypt was the only exit from the country,
the first task of the Government was to connect
the Nile with the Red Sea by railway. In 1902,
Lord Cromer pointed this out in his annual report,
and the following year he succeeded in getting the
Egyptian Government to furnish the money, as we
have seen above. After untold difficulties with
labor, and the construction of a bridge over the
Atbara River, the junction was completed in 1907.
Suakim was abandoned as the terminus on the Red
Sea, and a harbor built some miles farther north at
a hamlet which was renamed Port Sudan. The
Atbara railway shops were increased and improved,
and the Sudan Government itself bore part of the ex-
pense of remaking the line from Khartum to Atbara.
In 1908, telegraphic communication was completed
with Gondokoro, on the White Nile, two weeks by

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

steamer south of Khartum. The Blue Nile was
bridged at Khartum for a railway into the Gezira
district between the two rivers. El Obeid, the ter-
minus of this southern railway extension, was
reached in 1 91 3.

A glance at the map is necessary to realize what a
tremendous territory the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
covers and how impossible it is for the administra-
tors of the country to pacify and civilize it com-
pletely, much less to develop its resources, until more
railways are built, reaching into the heart of all the
different provinces.

The greatest appeal to the imagination of the Brit-
ish public in connection with the reconquest of the
Sudan was the fulfilment of the task for which it was
generally believed that Gordon had given his life,
the suppression of the slave trade. Although the
difficulty of this task was enormous, insurmountable
even, in so far as slavery within the tribes was con-
cerned. Lord Cromer felt it incumbent to mention in
his report almost every year the progress of the slave
suppression crusade. In 1903, he confessed his dis-
appointment that the slave trade was not extinct ; in
1904, he announced a marked decrease in the slave
trade; in 1905, he said that it was difficult to check
slave traffic in the Kordofan province; in 1906, he be-
lieved that there would still be great difficulty in sup-
pressing the slave trade; and in 1907 he attributed
most of the trouble in Kordofan to the anti-slavery
policy to which the Government was committed. The
road to abolition, he remarked in his last report, "is
a very long road, and it will take years to get to the

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

end of it." Improved communications, however,
and the advance of colonial enterprise in British,
German, Belgian, and French equatorial colonies,
helped to put a stop to long-distance slave-running.
The area of operations of slave merchants has been
gradually circumscribed until in 19 14 the official re-
port announced that slave traffic was "almost im-
possible" in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

British officials who have to deal with slavery at
close range, however, especially the judges, consider
this statement a bit too optimistic. Slave traffic
can be detected and frequently punished, when it is
carried on from district to district. But within
tribal limits, especially if the tribes be Moslem, even
where moral certainty of definite cases of slavery
exists, legal evidence is hard to obtain. Where
slavery is as established an institution as polygamy,
decrees bind only those who dare or who want to take
advantage of them. There are cases without number,
also, where the slaves are ignorant of the abolition
decree, and even if it were explained to them, they
would not know what it meant. ^ Education is a

^ One who has not traveled out of the beaten track has no
more conception of the ignorance of people in uncivilized countries
than the people of uncivilized countries have of our institutions. A
word is meaningless — unless you can grasp the idea the word stands
for. At the time of the proclamation of the Constitution in Turkey,
I was traveling in Asia Minor. Everyone, Moslem and Christian
alike, was enthusiastic about the new liberty. The Turkish word
for liberty is huriet. Villagers who were celebrating the huriet looked
at some photographs we had. One was a picture of an American
missionary school building in Tarsus. They asked, pointing to the
building, "Is this house the huriet we are so happy about? How
wonderful!" And yet, colonial administrators are continually

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

necessary prerequisite to the functioning and en-
joying of Occidental social and political institutions.
Enthusiasts and sentimentalists forget the fact that
our ancestors did not evolve, support, and use these
institutions until we conceived and desired them as a
result of education.

Lord Kitchener's first visit to the Sudan after the
Boer War was to open Gordon College in 1902, when
he was on his way to India. In his address he as-
serted his entire sympathy with the objects of the
college on the lines originally conceived, although he
admitted the necessity of using public funds for the
advancement of primary teaching. He expressed the
hope that he would be able to return in five years and
find that higher education was being given at Gordon
College. ^ Although Gordon College is not as yet in a
position to offer courses such as are given in Robert
College at Constantinople, the Syrian Protestant
College at Beirut, and several Indian and Chinese
universities, it is far ahead of any institution of

being taken to task by the people at home because a stroke of the
pen has not immediately brought home to the natives under their
charge "all the benefits of our civilization."

' Lord Kitchener did not return in five years, as he hoped. But he
visited Khartum again in 19 lo, and was promising himself a long
tour, after he went back to Cairo as H. M.'s Agent and Consul-Gen-
eral, when the present war broke out. Sir Reginald Wingate, writing
to me from Khartum in June, said : " . . . I think it fell to few to get
to know him as intimately as I did. Under his cold exterior beat a
very warm and kind heart, but he was most successful in keeping
this from the world. To this country he is a great loss, for I know
his heart was in it, and he was almost worshiped by the people, from
whom I have had hundreds of telegrams and letters of condolence
and sympathy. "

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

higher learning in Africa or Asia in the work of its
research laboratories and in the cooperation it gives
to the Government for the development of the
resources of the country, the betterment of public
health, and ethnological investigation.

Gordon College is a State institution, which works
with and for the Government. I wish it were pos-
sible to speak here of the wonderful things that are
being done by Dr. Chalmers and others in the Well-
come Research Laboratories. It is a revelation of
the ability and the devotion of the scientists to whom
the manifold problems of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
have been a challenge sufficiently engrossing to keep
them far from the great world and yet develop their
genius so strikingly that the great world's attention
is continually called to what they are doing and dis-
covering. But it is more than that. A visit to
Gordon College and the Wellcome Laboratories opens
one's eyes to the methods that are being pursued by
Sir Reginald Wingate and his associates, and the goal
they have before them. There is no highly civilized
country in the world where more constant attention
is being paid to means of developing resources and
better ability being invested in the study of those
means than in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

In addition to the research work of Gordon College,
the Department of Education has established a Cen-
tral Research Farm at Khartum North. Here field
experiments in growing what the Sudan might pro-
duce are tried out, and practical work is done in horti-
culture and forestry. At Gordon College and in three
other cities, industrial workshops teach boys trades.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

The criticism has frequently been made against the
British administration in the Sudan as in Egypt that
educational facilities are not as fully extended as they
ought to be, and that the British have neglected the
moral factor, and emphasized the material, in build-
ing up the country. This brings up one of the most
thorny problems that confront those who are en-
gaged in bringing Africa and Asia under European
control. On the one hand, in Egypt and the Sudan,
it can be argued that there must be money before
ambitious schemes of universal popular education
are undertaken. Before the money can be found, the
country must be developed economically. It is not
that public works and material benefits are more
essential than education, but that education for all
is so tremendously costly that only a country whose
resources are fully developed can maintain schools for
its population. It is pointed out, moreover, that
even if there were money, teachers would be lacking,
and that it takes a whole generation to train enough
teachers to meet even a portion of the needs of the
next generation. On the other hand, especially in
view of what we have said about the necessity of
education before our Occidental social and political
institutions can be wanted, understood, and taken
advantage of by natives, is it not true that primary
education is as necessary to a country's development
as railways and irrigation, and that if the people are
to benefit by material prosperity they must have a
moral preparation?

Although I have taught for some years in educa-
tional institutions in the Near East, and have seen

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

this problem at close range in half a dozen countries,
I do not profess to offer a solution. But we must
make a wide and determined start in primary edu-
cation, and that demands teachers. To get the
teachers, higher institutions are necessary. When
we put boys through the colleges, few of them want
to teach or do teach. They become dissatisfied — as
they have every reason to be — ^with existing con-
ditions. But their patriotism does not inspire in
them the will to make the sacrifice and to take up the
cross individually in order that their people may be
brought to enlightenment. Far from following the
only possible way they have of serving their country
wisely, they agitate for European institutions, for
social and political recognition, judging the feeling
and need of the race solely by their own exotic con-
dition. The curse of our Western education upon
Orientals is that we try to build where there is no
foundation of character. Instead, then, of having
wood that takes a polish, we get a veneer that cracks
at the first test. Missionaries and educators have
success only with boys whom they take away from
their families and bring under their home influence
very early in life. But they turn out young men who
are foreigners to their own people, and who have no
desire or ability to go back among their own people
and impart what has been given to them. Good
farmers and goatherds and blacksmiths and cobblers
are spoiled to make imitation * ' gentlemen. ' ' The edu-
cated Oriental will not work even if he is starving. ^

^ Several years ago I was preaching in a small inland city of Penn-
sylvania. The local department store proprietor told me that a
a 17

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Educating boys in trades, as the Sudan Education
Department has started to do, is an excellent thing.
But it ought to be done much more widely than is
being done. And money ought to be spent more freely
than it is being spent in primary education. The
Sudan boasts of fifteen hundred miles of railway in
fifteen years, and two thousand miles of regular river
steamship service, and five thousand miles of tele-
graph wires. But less than five thousand Sudanese
in schools of all grades, primary to college, is not a
very good showing, despite the difficulties.

After the Cairo Convention was arranged between
Egypt and Great Britain in January, 1899, the Brit-
ish Foreign Office was in a position to treat with other
nations and other British colonies concerning the
boundaries of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The
Anglo-French Convention of 1899 settled the local
difficulties raised by the Marchand expedition to
Fashoda. When French obstruction and ill-will
that stood in the way during the first few years of
reconstruction were removed by the epoch-making
Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, the frontiers with
Abyssinia and the Italian colony of Eritrea were
arranged by several successive agreements.

The only serious difficulty after Fashoda, where

Christian Arab boy from "a college somewhere out in Turkey" was
in town, and that he had somehow been unable to give the boy work.
He was puzzled, for the boy seemed to be strong and husky. He
brought him to me after church. I thumped the fellow on the
chest and back, and, turning to the merchant, said, "Put him in
your packing department." "Oh! no, sir," the boy cried out ago-
nizingly, "I could not. I do not want handful work. I want mind'
fid work."

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

Great Britain had once more to justify her presence
in the Sudan by claiming to act as agent for the
Egyptian Government, was when the Anglo-Egyp-
tian troops occupied, in June, 1901, certain portions
of the Bahr-el-Ghazal region, bordering on French
Equatorial Africa and the Congo Free State. In
Paris and Brussels it was contended that Great Brit-
ain had encroached upon territory leased to Belgium
and had exceeded her rights under the Convention
of 1894. The British counter-claim wholly de-
pended upon "the former rights of Egypt in the
Sudan."

The Sultanate of Darfur, between Kordofan and
Wadai, was placed within the British sphere by the
Anglo-French Agreement. Sultan Ali accepted the
British_ Protectorate, and agreed to pay a tribute.
But his country was never made a province of the
Sudan, like Kordofan. ^ This cannot be successfully

^ Owing to the absence of effective control, German and Turkish
agents were able to persuade Sultan Ali to cast in his fortunes with
them. He paid no tribute in 1915, and in the spring of 1916 declared
the " Jehad "[^ (holy war), stating that he had been ordered by the
Khalif of all the Moslems to attack the Sudan. The railway to El
Obeid made his threat of Uttle importance from the British point
of view. But General Sir Reginald Wingate decided to anticipate the
threatened attack, and promptly sent a column into Darfur, which
occupied El Fashr. It was the Sirdar's object to prevent the possi-
bility of AU making trouble for the French in Wadai: for the Elamerun
operations had depleted greatly the Wadai garrisons, and Sultan
Ali knew this. If the railway can now be extended from El Obeid
to El Fashr, the last unoccupied province of the Anglo-Egyptian
Sudan will be brought under effective administrative control, and
the cattle trade of the Sudan will be greatly increased. Darfur, up
to this last expedition, has been one of the few countries in Africa
without a European garrison.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

done until the railway from Lake Chad to the Nile is
built. Then Abeshr in Wadai and El Fashr in Dar-
fur will be the two important points between the
lake and El Obeid, which the Sudan Government
railway reached in 1913.

Very soon after the British and Egyptians went
back into the Sudan, the problem of irrigation began
to be studied. In 1901, Sir William Garstin reported
on the possibility of using the equatorial lakes as
reservoirs. Lake Victoria Nyanza was rejected be-
cause a rise in its level would flood shores which
were thickly populated, and half of which were
German territory. Although the German factor may
now be eliminated, the lake has become far more
important than at the time of this report through the
wonderful development of the colonies on its shores.
It is hardly possible to believe that the opinion of
Sir William Garstin will be revised. For the colonies
bordering the lake would never consent to having the
level raised and lowered for the convenience of
the Nile territories. Lake Albert Nyanza presented
similar difficulties, for Belgium owns the western
shore. Then, too, the utility of irrigating the White
Nile Valley is at the best questionable. For it
passes through unreclaimable swamp lands for
hundreds of miles. Irrigation in the Blue Nile
Valley, and the free navigation of that river result-
ing from a control of the water supply, would bring
a rich return. Lake Tana, in northern Abyssinia,
on the western side of Mount Gum^a, according to
Sir William Garstin, would make an ideal reservoir.
The surrounding country is uninhabited, and en-

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

gineering difficulties are much less than in the case of
Lake Victoria or Lake Albert.

By her treaties with Abyssinia, France, and Italy,
Great Britain became ten years ago politically in a
position to carry through the Garstin scheme. It
has not yet been done. Reports on the Sudan have
emphasized year after year the necessity and value of
irrigation, and in 1913, as we have seen above, the
Imperial Parliament guaranteed a loan, part of
which was to be spent in irrigating the Gezira district,
on the west bank of the Blue Nile south of Khartum.
The success of the Tayiba demonstration station, in
this district, in raising fine staple cotton proved, just
before the European War broke out, that this irriga-
tion scheme was a sound proposition financially.
A wonderful development in cotton growing may be
expected after the plan is carried through, and cotton
may before long surpass the gum of the Kordofan
forests as the premier export article of the Sudan.

In this necessarily incomplete survey of the Sudan,
I have saved the political aspect of Sir Reginald
Wingate's problem to the last, not because the task
of pacification has been any less difficult or less im-
portant than the solution of the financial problem,
but because the extension of civil administration
through military operations had to follow rather than
to go hand in hand with economic development.

The Khalifa escaped from Omdurman after the
battle of September 6, 1898, and had to be pursued
and put out of harm's way. When Sir Reginald Win-
gate succeeded in killing the Khalifa and his compan-
ions a year later, Mahdiism as a military menace

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

disappeared. But the country was vast and could
not be penetrated in a few months or even a few years.
The only policy with any chance of success was to
direct the efforts of the Government toward the
speedy amelioration of the unfortunate victims of the
dervish rule, and to win their allegiance through
lending them a helping hand. Their memory of
Egyptian rule was hardly of a nature to recommend
the new Government, and Egyptian soldiers were not
looked upon as redeemers — even from Mahdiism, to
which many of the most influential sheiks remained
profoundly attached as a religious dogma. The
British administration had to make itself known, not
by force, but by winning confidence through refrain-
ing from exploiting the people and giving them as
much material benefit as possible in as short a time
as possible. This was Sir Reginald Wingate's policy,
and I have been able to see with my own eyes the
magic that it has worked upon people who are fanati-
cal only if you provoke them to fanaticism, and
savage only if you give them reason to be. From
the very beginning of the new administration at
Khartum, the process of pacification has been dis-
turbed only by the ineluctable necessity of enforcing
prematurely a too drastic anti-slavery policy.

Not often during the fifteen years from the death
of the Khalifa to the outbreak of the European War
has Sir Reginald been compelled to show the mailed
fist. In 1903, a new Mahdi arose in southern Kor-
dofan. He was immediately pursued, captured, and
hanged at El Obeid. The criticism from England
against his summary execution was very hard to bear,

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

even though it was inspired by sentimentaHty and
total ignorance of the problem with which the officials
in the Sudan had to deal. From 1884 to 1 898 Mahdi-
ism had meant the extinction of nearly six million
lives. ^ The only way to prevent a return to the
most intolerable and cruel despotism the valleys of
the Upper Nile tributaries had ever known was to
snuff out at the beginning every pretendant to the
Mahdi's succession. In 1908, a body of ex-dervishes
attacked and killed the deputy inspector of the Blue
Nile province. This was just at the time the ' ' Young
Egypt" party was beginning to grow formidable,
and their emissaries were working everywhere in the
Sudan. A punitive expedition resulted in twelve
death sentences, which were commuted to life
imprisonment.

The pessimism of Sir Eldon Gorst's report for 1909
extended to his remarks on the Sudan. He declared
that the tenth year of the occupation was full of
tribal unrest, and that Mahdiism was not extinguished

^ The population of the Egyptian Sudan was believed to be
between eight and nine millions at the beginning of the Mahdi's
reign. Five years after the reconquest, it was still less than two
millions. In the last decade, the increase has been very rapid, so
that, in spite of sleeping sickness in the south, it now exceeds three
millions. The steady increase in population is the most striking
proof of the benefit of British rule. Intertribal warfare has ceased.
Security from raiding and Government aid in combating disease
make cattle-raising once more profitable. There has been immigra-
tion from Abyssinia and from West Africa. Only about four thou-
sand Europeans are in the Sudan. Aside from the officials and their
families, the missionaries and a very few Europeans interested in
development schemes and archaeology, the foreigners are Greeks and
Syrians, who lend money, engage in petty commerce, and sell spirits.
In Khartum street signs are in Greek.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

as a faith, and had to be carefully watched and
checked at every turn. There was also much law-
lessness along the Abyssinian border. The most
dangerous districts were so unhealthy that the only
means of maintaining order was to increase the Su-
danese battalions. In 1912, there was an expedition
into Mongalla, and an outbreak in southern Kordof an.
There were nine distinct military operations during
the course of 19 14.

If one had only reports to go by, one wotild gather
that fifteen years of Anglo-Egyptian occupation had
not brought peace to the Sudan. But one has to
consider the enormous extent of the country, and the
difficulties of communication. Punitive expeditions
and local uprisings stand out: for they are news.
When one reads the newspapers, he sees only reports
of divorces. Does he argue from this that marriages
are generally unhappy?

; Sir Reginald Wingate was at home on a vacation
when the European War began. He hurried back to
his post, and there were many who said that he
would have very severe days before him. The entry
of Turkey into the war was expected by the Germans
to have serious consequences throughout North
Africa. But especially did they hope for trouble in
the Sudan. When I was in Berlin, in December,
1914, the collapse of British power in the Moslem
portion of Africa and Asia was confidently prophesied.
There was much faith in the fetish of Pan-Islamism.

A year later, when it looked as if Germany was
planning the invasion of Egypt on a large scale, and
the newspapers were full of alarming reports, I

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

traveled all over Egypt, and went to Khartum to
see how matters stood in the Sudan. Although the
Turks were reported to be moving again against the
Suez Canal, and fighting with the Senussi was going
on in the West, my journey of four days by rail and
steamer south from Cairo was exactly as in time of
peace.

It was patent that no insurrectional movement was
anticipated or feared by the Sudan Government.
One-fourth of the British military and civil staff
(there were less than four hundred in all) had been
allowed to return home to rejoin regiments or volun-
teer. No increase in the British effectives had been
asked for, or was contemplated. For nearly a mil-
lion square miles there were less than a thousand
British soldiers.

At the beginning of the entrance of Turkey into
the war, the Sirdar received telegrams and letters
from all the principal chiefs of the Sudan, expressing
whole-hearted loyalty to the British Empire, and
condemning the action of the Young Turks. These
were published in a remarkable booklet called
The Sudan Book of Loyalty. Of all who came forward
at that time with declarations of sympathy and
loyalty, only two have since been put under formal
restraint by the Government for political intrigue
with the enemy.

Inside the Sudan there was only one revolt against
the Government, which had to be dealt with as a mili-
tary operation. It was that of a chieftain in the
Kadugli district of the Nuba Mountains, who had
been deceived by enemy agents into believing that the

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

power of the British in Egypt and the Sudan was on
the point of eclipse. He surrendered at the end of
191 5. There have been no others, and it cannot be
too strongly emphasized that the police and in-
spection work in the Sudan, from the internal point
of view, is only what is usual in time of peace. The
Khalifa's proclamation of the Holy War left the
Sudanese unaffected.

Seeing is believing. The Egyptians are so unwar-
like a race and so lacking in personal courage and
daring that it was easy enough to discount the Ger-
man stories about the storm that was going to break
in Cairo. I did not have to go to Egypt to reassure
myself on this point. But the Sudanese, from the
blackest of blacks to the most chocolate-colored of
Arabs, have no fear of death, and are heroes of many
a charge, in the face of desperate odds, that surpasses
Balaclava. The Sudanese, too, are fanatical Mos-
lems, with all the zeal and enthusiasm that belongs
to primitive races and neophytes. I had been living
for years in an atmosphere where Pan-Islamism was
the absorbing topic of conversation and the night-
mare of my British official friends. So I needed to
go to Khartum.

By pure chance the trip into the Sudan was well-
timed. I was there for the two important fetes of
the year, the birthday of the Prophet {Muled~el-
Nehi) and the anniversary of the visit of the King and
Queen of England, who had stopped at Port Sudan
on the way back from India, and held a review
at Sinkat, on January 17, 1912. King's Day was
celebrated by an impressive service at the Khartum

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

Cathedral. After the garrison left the church, they
stood on parade and Sir Reginald Wingate read a
cablegram from the King. It was a stirring sight to
see these few hundred British soldiers, the only mili-
tary evidence of British power in the midst of war in
one of the largest Moslem regions in Africa.

After dinner on the evening of King's Day, Sir
Reginald took me down into the Palace garden to see
the Sudanese band that had been playing during the
meal. We passed through the circle around the
conductor, and stood in their midst while they
played some Niam-Niam marches. The Sirdar was
in full-dress uniform, and bareheaded. A couple of
torches gave light. The black faces and weird music
made me feel that I was certainly surrounded by
savages in the heart of Africa. But they were
savages whose affection for their big chief was evi-
dent in the way they looked at him and the vim with
which they played. I thought back a year, and I was
in the Vaterland Cafe in Berlin. There was music,
too, and I was listening to an authority on the Near
East. "The Sudanese, you know," he said, "are
certainly coming in with us — when they realize that
the Sultan has raised the Green Standard. They are
devils, and the black pagan tribes will follow readily
the Moslems. They really hate the British rule.
"What happened to Gordon will seem little beside
this approaching tragedy, just as the Sepoy Rebel-
lion will seem little compared to what is going to
happen in India. "

Sir Reginald Wingate asked me to go to Omdurman
with him to the dervish celebration of the Prophet's

THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA

birthday. We were a party of about thirty: the
Grand Cadi, the Grand Mufti, several officers from
the British regiment stationed at Khartum, Mr. More,
the Civil Governor of Khartum Province, Sir Regi-
nald's associates in the Government, and his personal
staff. We left the Palace steps at nine o'clock in the
evening for the trip on the Blue Nile to Omdurman.
Our steamer was the Elfin, which was used by Gordon
in the old days more than thirty years ago.

At the landing-stage, about half a mile from the
city walls, a great crowd of white-robed dervishes
was waiting to form the guard of honor. Each
held a flaming torch. The Sudan women, harking
back to jungle days, greeted the Sirdar with a shrill
cry, which they make tremolo by pressing fingers on
their lips. Into the city past the Mahdi's tomb and
the Khalifa's ruined palace we rode to a large open
space, where innumerable tents were dressed for the
celebration. The Omdurman municipality, the im-
portant Omdehs (headmen) of the neighboring
villages and various tribes, and the sheiks of the
many religious orders all have their tents. With
untiring physical energy and good humor and
capacity for "pink lemonade" of the good old circus
variety, which was forced upon us in every tent. Sir
Reginald Wingate led us from place to place. No
tent was too humble to be omitted, no sheik too in-
significant to be passed over. One religious leader,
who received the Sirdar as an equal on this night, is
a cook in private life. "And a good cook, too, " the
Sirdar told me.

I had the good fortune to meet and talk with the

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

most revered of the religious chieftains, El Sayyed
Ali Morghani— now Sir Ali Morghani, K.C.M.G.,
for he received a knighthood from the King in the
last birthday honors. Sir Ali is a modest, unassum-
ing man of about forty, with a shrewd, keen mind.
He knows what is going on in the world, for he asked
me some searching questions about conditions in
France and the Balkans. Sir Ali, who is revered as
a "holy man" above all the religious leaders of the
Sudan, has no doubt whatever of the sincere attach-
ment of the Moslems of Africa to the cause of Great
Britain. I think that he believes exactly what he
told me.

When Sir Reginald Wingate explained to the sheiks
who I was and what I had come to the Sudan for,
they nodded] their heads with satisfaction, and
laughed. "Tell him to write what he sees," they
declared. "We are glad that he came for the feast,
for he can give the English and French and Americans
a good report of us."

The last tent we visited was the most important,
and around it gathered all the people of Omdurman
and the tribes who had come into the city for the
festivities. Thousands of white-robed howling or
barking dervishes were dancing and shouting, having
reached the point of frenzy. We sat sipping coffee
in the midst of a crowd of sixty thousand Moslems,
most of whom had been followers of the Mahdi and be-
lievers in the EZhalifa. The Sirdar's guard of honor
was four Sudanese lancers on horse. There were no
troops, either Egyptian or British. None of our
party was armed. The people of Omdurman, at the

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

moment of the greatest religious exaltation of the
year, had here in their power the Governor-General
and the chief representatives of British authority in
the Sudan.

I know what the feeling of Moslem fanaticism and
anti-Christian feeling is in an Oriental crowd. I have
experienced it more than once when I knew that I
was facing death. But that feeling was not here.
There was real love for the Sirdar — and no hostility
to the rest of us.

As we were leaving the tent, one of the turbaned
dervish chieftains who had followed the Sirdar to the
entrance, put his left hand on my shoulder as he
shook hands, and said, "I hope you have enjoyed
the feast at Omdurman and will come again. "

"Who is that sheik?" I asked Sir Reginald
Wingate.

"One of the Mahdi's sons, " he answered.

CHAPTER II
THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA

THE islands around Africa are owned by-
Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, and France,
and the title to their possession' generally
goes far back beyond the period of European
colonization of the mainland. In the old days
of sailing vessels, when the route to India was
around the Cape of Good Hope, islands had a
unique value. There were, of course, ports of call
on the mainland. But they were never free from
the attacks of the savages, and did not afford
security for the storing of supplies. Nor did the
mainland lend itself as well as islands to economic de-
velopment and the spread of civilization in the days
when colonial forces were small and colonists few.
Europe in Africa — on the large scale of administra-
tive possession and economic development — was
possible only after steamships and railways had
passed the experimental stage, and when the intense
production of the new industrial era created surplus
population and surplus goods for which an outlet
must be found. Europe did not take possession of
Africa as a result of the explorations of Livingstone,
Stanley, Peters, de Brazza, and others. The ex-

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

plorers were the pioneers of a Europe ready and need-
ing to follow the path they blazed.

Aside from the Madeira Islands and the Azores,
which are administratively regarded as integral parts
of the Republic, Portugal has the important Cape
Verde group, the Bissagos Archipelago off Portuguese
Guinea, and the two little islands of Sao Thome and
Principe in the Gulf of Guinea, which are treated in
the chapter on the Portuguese colonies.

The Canary Islands are administratively a portion
of the Spanish monarchy : so the minister of colonies,
who once had under his control an Empire that only
Britain has since been able to match, gives most of
the attention of his department to the one rich little
island of Fernando Po near the mouth of the Niger,
far in the Gulf of Guinea. The only interest of this
island, in the international scheme of things, is the
fact that it commands the approach to the German
colony of Kamerun, just as Zanzibar controls the
approach to Germany's principal port in her East
African colony. Spain has also, southeast of Fer-
nando Po, a foothold on the mainland, called Spanish
Guinea, which is an enclave in the Kamerun (just
as the British enclave of Walfisch Bay controls the
outlet of the Swakop and Kuiseb rivers in German
Southwest Africa). Should Spain ever desire to
part with one or all of her colonies, France has the
treaty right of preemption.

The British and French islands are most conven-
iently placed along the trade routes around the con-
tinent and across the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

Great Britain has, beside Walfisch Bay, the wee

Canaruldi

\^^

Cf>

-5-

CD
CD

EXPLO
BUT NOl
BY ANY

INOEP£,
STATE

THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA

HoUam's Archipelago and Possession Island off the
coast of German Southwest Africa. The latter is
at the northern end of Luderitzland, not far from the
port of Angra Pequena. Huge Madagascar lies off
the coast of Portuguese East Africa, almost parallel-
ing the entire stretch from Lorenzo-Marquez in
Delagoa Bay at the south to Cape Delgado on the
north. The distance is not great from the Portu-
guese port of Mozambique to Madagascar. In the
southern part of the canal between Mozambique and
Madagascar, France has the two small islands of
Bassas da India and Isle de I'Europe. Between Cape
Delgado, which marks the boundary of German East
Africa and Portuguese East Africa, and the northern
end of Madagascar, lies the Comores Archipelago, also
belonging to France. Great Britain has Zanzibar and
Pemba as sentinels between the German port of Dar-es-
Salaam and her port of Mombasa. Farther out into the
ocean, off the coast of German East Africa and north
of Madagascar, Assumption, Aldabra, Astove, Saint
Pierre, Providence, Cerf Islands, and the archipela-
goes of Cosmoledo and Farquhar fly the Union Jack.

On the way to India from Zanzibar, beyond the
islands just named, are Mahe, Felicite, the Amirantes
and others, which form the Seychelles. They are
under British rule. Five hundred miles east of
Madagascar is Mauritius, with dependent islands,
which England conquered from France in 1810.
In the Atlantic Ocean, on the way to South America,
are Ascension Island, St. Helena, and the Tristan
da Cunha group, convenient sentinels to keep the
ocean for the British.

3 33

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

From the standpoint of African colonial history,
British Zanzibar and French Madagascar have alone
influenced European colonial policy and the history
of African colonial expansion. We can eliminate
all the others. But brief mention must be made of
the recent history and development of Zanzibar and
Madagascar.

ZANZIBAR

Zanzibar and its small northern neighbor, Pemba,
are, like Somaliland, connected racially, historically,
and religiously with Arabia rather than with Africa.
They came under the control of Muscat when the
Portuguese Empire began to crumble. For twenty-
five years, in the early part of the nineteenth century,
Zanzibar was connected politically with Muscat. It
became an independent sultanate again in 1856.
Not until she found Germany installed on the main-
land of Africa, north of Portuguese Mozambique,
and France making plans for the conquest of Mada-
gascar, did Great Britain feel impelled to get posses-
sion of Zanzibar and Pemba. A treaty establishing
the British Protectorate was secretly made; and
France and Germany were confronted with a Jait
accompli. These two Powers w^ere placated by the
agreements of 1890. France was given a free foot
in Madagascar: and Heligoland was ceded to Ger-
many. France and Germany recognized the Zanzi-
bar Protectorate: and Germany paid one million
dollars to the Sultan of Zanzibar for his rights on the
mainland they had occupied six years earlier.

THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA

Since the rise of German naval power, Heligoland
has proved of far more importance than the British
Government ever dreamed it would be. In view
of what has happened since the outbreak of the war
in Europe, the British must have come to the opinion
that the price paid for Zanzibar was pretty high.

The importance of Zanzibar as a trading center has
diminished in recent years through the development
of the coast ports of French and Italian Somaliland,
and of German and British East Africa. The Ger-
man railway from Lake Tanganyika to the coast at
Dar-es-Salaam is the most important factor in pre-
venting the expansion that had been hoped for in
Zanzibar. The total trade has for soine years re-
mained stationary at about ten million dollars. The
most lucrative industry of the island remains clove-
raising.

In 1 90 1, the old Sultan was succeeded by Ali, a
youth of nineteen, who vacated the throne after ten
years of an uneventful reign. During this period,
however, British control became effective, and the
Pan-Islamic movement brought no serious problem.
In 1 91 3, the control of the island was handed over to
the Colonial Office by the Foreign Office, and a Brit-
ish resident given the title of High Commissioner.
Zanzibar had been separated from British East Africa
in 1904, although it had been included in the original
charter of the British East Africa Company.

A recent movement to bring the two Protectorates
under one control, as has been accomplished in
British West Africa, has not yet succeeded. The
problem of the Indians stands in the way. Indians

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

are numerous in Zanzibar. Since the abolition of
slavery, they have become the real possessors of the
land. As they ply the trade of money-lenders,
the Arab farmers and planters are in their power.
The majority of the Zanzibar Indians did not come
directly from India, but are of South African origin.
They left that part of the British Empire because
they could not secure there the rights of British
subjects. In their new home, they note the recent
measures taken, and the new measures agitated, in
British East Africa against Indians, and fear that
incorporation with the mainland Government will
once more make of them pariahs.

'The most interesting contribution of Zanzibar to
the experimental solution of European colonization
problems in Africa is the method of abolition of
slavery. It was a peculiarly advantageous field for
the tackling of this problem. Zanzibar and Pemba
are islands. The inhabitants are Moslems. Islamic
law is the law of the land. Mr. B. S. Cave, British
Agent and Consul-General, gave a valuable review
of the successive steps of the emancipation policy
in a report issued in 1909. It is well worth studying.
The Sultan issued a decree in 1897, ordaining that no
child thereafter born could be a slave, and made
provision by which slaves could obtain freedom. In
eleven years eleven thousand slaves were emanci-
pated. Voluntary emancipation went very slowly
at first. Older slaves were naturally unwilling to
accept freedom. But the gradual process of enfran-
chisement did not arouse Arab fanaticism; the eman-
cipated natives did not become demoralized by a

THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA

sudden change in their status for which they were not
prepared ; and local industries and agriculture suffered
scarcely at all. During that time, the general and
local problems arising from emancipation had been
met and examined. So the experience of eleven
years could be used to advantage in framing a gen-
eral emancipation decree that would neither violate
Moslem sensibilities nor upset the economic life of
the country.

In June, 1909, the Sultan signed a decree forbidding
recognition by the Courts of the status of slavery in
the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Compensation
was provided for slaves whose previous masters would
now refuse to support them because age, ill health, or
physical disability prevented them from earning a
living. The rights of concubines under Moslem
law would not be recognized, if concubines, taking
advantage of the emancipation decree, left their
former masters without consent. Nor would they
have the right of custody of their children by the
master whom they left.

One admires the sagacity and patient wisdom of
those who had to deal with the slave problem in
Zanzibar. Resisting the pressure brought to bear
upon them by thoughtless sentimentalists in England,
and enduring misrepresentation and vitriolic denun-
ciation on the part of those who had not the slightest
knowledge of the subject upon which they were
talking,^ the British administrators kept quietly

^ The French Abolition Decree of 1896 in Madagascar was held up
as the "only right and honorable step" for Great Britain to take.
The two cases were totally different, of course, Zanzibar being under

THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA

at their task. When the moment of reaHzation
arrived, the vindication of their conservative policy
was complete. Emancipation in Zanzibar has been
so strikingly successful that it has given heart — and
a potent argument — to others who are confronted
with the same perplexing task on the mainland, and
who have to bear all the while insult and impugnment
of motives from cranks in England. If any one
believes that the only way to effect a reform is to
make it immediately and sweepingly, and that the
British flag must mean freedom for all over whom it
is hoisted by the very fact of its being hoisted and at
the very moment it is hoisted, let him read Mr. Cave's
report.

MADAGASCAR

Madagascar is by far the largest Island depending
upon the continent of Africa. The area of France
is 207,000 square miles. Madagascar's 'area is
227,000 square miles. The population of the island,
which is nearly a thousand miles long, is 3,200,000,
of whom over 3,000,000 belong to the Malagasy race.
The people are of many distinct tribes, with different
languages. The most intelligent and numerous, the
Hovas, number nearly a million.

France got a foothold in Madagascar between 1882
and 1884, at the time when Germany and Great
Britain were feverishly putting under their flags all
that was left up to that time on the African mainland.

Islamic law, and the harem consideration complicating the problem.
Some of Zanzibar's most influential chiefs, in close connection with
Mecca, had been African slave-traders.

THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA

' As we have seen above, after Great Britain
seized Zanzibar, she agreed to leave a free field to
France in Madagascar. But the Malagasy, not
having been consulted, were of another mind. Queen
Ranavalona, loyally sustained by the Hovas, refused
to recognize the legality of "treaties" made by local
chiefs for the cession of bits of coast land to France.
What government would recognize a right acquired
in this way? By the same token, the Protectorate
was not recognized. France had to enter upon a
war of conquest, and annex the island without the
consent either of government or people. The Queen
was deposed and sent into exile. Madagascar was
declared a French possession. The Malagasy who
opposed were treated as rebels.

In the early days of French activity in Madagascar,
there was much opposition to France and criticism
of France in the British press. The agitation was
fed by Protestant missionaries, who claimed that
their work was ruined, and that the French were
acting with great cruelty towards natives, whose
only crime was love of country and liberty. But as
Great Britain was at the time meditating the gob-
bHng up of the Dutch republics in South Africa, the
official ear was deaf to the cry of outraged humanity.
The French went to Tananarive in the same year that
Jameson went to Johannesburg : and Queen Ranava-
lona was exiled to Algiers in the same year that Presi-
dent Kruger made his desperate personal appeal to
Europe. The French received Kruger with great
enthusiasm, and the English held meetings in Albert
Hall to wax indignant over the fate of the Queen

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

of Madagascar. But neither Government made the
other hold back from the poHcy of arbitrary conquest.
The friends of "liberty and justice and the freedom
of small nationalities" did what they always have
done — and no more than they always have done.
They protested, and cried out against the iniquity
in the world. No Government espoused the cause
of Boers or Malagasy.

The results in Madagascar, just as the results in
South Africa, have proved distinctly beneficial to the
people of the country. If the end has not justified
the means, it has at least caused the means to
be forgotten. The South African Commonwealth
brings credit upon the working out of British colonial
policy. Madagascar is a credit to France. There
was much initial suffering to native races, and a great
amount of injustice in the early years. This is
proved by the appeal of the Native Races Protection
Committee, issued in Paris in 1900, which declared
that the forced labor of the Malagasy was a crying
scandal; that they were in a condition of slavery
worse than that which the French Government had
abolished by proclamation four years before they
conquered the island ; and that the taxes amounted to
exploitation. It was asserted that forced labor on
roads was reducing the robust male population on the
island; that natives were arrested and imprisoned
without trial, and then compelled to work, because
they were prisoners, without pay. Similar condi-
tions have prevailed in all European colonies in Africa
at the beginning oj European administration. But
always in British colonies, and often in French and

THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA

German colonies, they have been remedied with the
change from military to civil administration.

Madagascar to-day has over two million acres
under cultivation. Although rubber is the principal
product, sugar, coffee, cloves, cotton, vanilla, and
vegetables are raised in considerable quantity.
Scientific development of forest products, govern-
ment initiative in cattle breeding, and the introduc-
tion of silk-worms have done much for the prosperity
of the natives. Mines are being opened up. There
are nearly nine thousand miles of telegraph and
telephone lines. Railway construction has advanced
slowly. But there are many good roads, and motor-
lorries are in use extensively. The revolution in
motor transport through the invention and develop-
ment of the automobile has changed remarkably the
problem of transport on islands. Where plantations
are large and the haul to the port is not more than
two hundred kilometers, it is a question whether the
public interest is not better served by good roads than
by railways. The planter can load the automobile
truck in the field, and unload directly at the steamer.
The haul is down to sea-level. The experience of the
French army at Verdun furnishes an excellent means
of computing wear and tear on roads, and expense of
upkeep.

France was beginning to find a return in Madagas-
car when the Great War broke out. There was
trade with France to the amount of seventy-five
million francs in 191 3. Of the ten thousand ships
that entered Madagascar ports during that year,
nearly seven thousand carried the French flag.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Some of France's most illustrious military men, of
whom notable examples are Generals Gallieni and
Lyautey, made their reputation and gained the
experience that has enabled them to serve their
country so well in the military and civil administra-
tion of Madagascar. With the different tribes and
languages, and no railways through the interior,
the task was arduous, and required unflagging
enthusiasm as well as tact and nerve. In Morocco
lately, and on the battlefields of the Marne and
Meuse and Somme, France has much to be grateful
for in having had Madagascar to train her chiefs.

Most important of all things is the fact that the
French, in spite of their bad start, have succeeded in
winning the natives. Second only to the Senagalese
have been the Malagasy in their zeal to serve France
in this war. I had been reading last April much that
condemned the French in Madagascar. Just then
General Gallieni died. I went with all Paris to pass
before his bier in the chapelle ardente that had been
made before the church door in the courtyard of the
Invalides. The guard of honor around the coffin
were Malagasy.

CHAPTER III

THE LAST YEARS OF THE BOER WAR AND
THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION
IN SOUTH AFRICA

BOTH from a military and political ' point of
view, the year 1900 brought great disappoint-
ment to the British Cabinet and to the
commanders of the British army in South Africa.
It had been confidently expected that the over-
whelming odds against the Boers would result in a
few months in the complete collapse of their power,
if not of their will, to resist. But the arrival of Lord
Roberts and the surrender of Cronje's army in Febru-
ary did not prove to be "the beginning of the end."
Although Ladysmith was relieved in March, and
Mafeking in May, the task seemed almost as formi-
dable as at the beginning. The British had to con-
tend with the undisguised sympathy of the Boers in
Cape Colony for the cause of the RepubHcs. As war
prisoners frequently escaped from Simonstown, Cronje
and his army were deported to St. Helena. Although
most of the Cape Colony rebels, after the withdrawal
of the Free State commandos in March, took advan-
tage of Lord Milner's amnesty proclamation, the Boers
of the Colony continued to use political weapons

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

against the British. There was a ministerial crisis
in June. Many members of the Cape Colony-
Assembly were under arrest for treason, and yet
the new Pregressive Government had only a majority
of six.

Lord Roberts sailed from Cape Town on December
1st, fully satisfied that he was leaving to Lord
Kitchener a guerilla warfare that could not last out
the winter. Five days after his departure, an
Afrikander Congress met at Worcester which passed
resolutions disapproving the attitude of Lord Milner,
denouncing the British conduct of the war, declaring
that the white population of South Africa would be ex-
terminated if peace were not soon made, and demand-
ing that the Repubhcs be allowed to retain their
independence. In Europe, French public opinion
was bitterly hostile to Great Britain. Queen Victoria
and the Prince of Wales, no less than Chamberlain
and other members of the Government, were sub-
jected in France to a campaign of caricature and
scathing criticism hardly less violent than that which
Kaiser Wilhelm, the Crown Prince, and von Beth-
mann-HoUweg have experienced since August ist,
1 9 14. President Kruger was received with hysterical
enthusiasm in Paris. In view of the changes of the
last fifteen years, it is curious to have to record that
it was Kaiser Wilhelm 's refusal to receive Kruger
that checkmated the Boer hopes of receiving sub-
stantial aid from Europe.

Early in 1901 martial law had to be declared
throughout Cape Colony. In Natal, as well as in
Cape Colony, Ministers, unable to depend upon

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

parliamentary support, were driven to the ineluctable
necessity of acting illegally. The Cape Parliament
was twice prorogued. Newspapers were suppressed,
and editors prosecuted. Trials for treason in Cape
Colony and Natal resulted, in some cases, in the
imposition of the death penalty.

On August 7th, Lord Kitchener issued a drastic
proclamation, which announced the annexation of
the Orange Free State and the "late South Afri-
can Republic." He declared that "Her Majesty's
Forces are in possession of the seats of government,
the whole machinery of administration, and the
principal towns and railway lines of these two terri-
tories; that only a few burghers are still under arms
and, being short of ammunition, are unable to carry
on regular warfare. Her Majesty's Government is
determined to put an end to a state of things which is
aimlessly prolonging bloodshed and destruction and
inflicting ruin upon the great majority of inhabitants,
who are anxious to live in peace and to earn a Hveli-
hood for themselves and their families." Therefore,
Lord Kitchener, under instructions from Her Majes-
ty's Government, declared that the leaders of the
Boer armies who did not surrender before September
15th would be permanently banished from South
Africa, and that "the cost of the maintenance of the
families of the burghers in the field who had not
surrendered by September 15th would be recoverable
from such burghers and be a charge upon their prop-
erty movable and unmovable in the two colonies."

Lord Kitchener was disappointed in the effect of
this measure. It only exasperated the Boers, and

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

strengthened their will to resist to the bitter end.
Ten thousand Boers were holding in check a British
army of over two hundred thousand. Their hatred
of the British was increased by the drastic step which
Lord Kitchener felt compelled to take of establishing
concentration camps, and of extending the area of
"pacified" territory by means of a chain of block-
houses. The terrible mortality among women and
children in these concentration camps called forth
a unanimous protest from the civilized world, which
was especially strong in England itself. Who does
not remember the bitter indictment of Miss Hobb-
house's pamphlets? In July, 1124 children died
from lack of milk; in August, 1525; in September,
1964. Many Boers who lost their loved ones in
these concentration camps, and of whom a striking
example is General Hertzog, have never forgotten
the wrongs inflicted upon innocent non-combatants
during those awful days. ^

' I was living in London at this time, and know that the stories of
Miss Hobbhouse, W. T. Stead, and others, were accepted as true.
But Lord Kitchener, when he finally left South Africa, did not
hesitate to state in his farewell speech: "The Commander-in-
Chief has special pleasure in congratulating the Army on the kindly
and humane spirit which has animated all during this long struggle.
Fortunately for the future of South Africa, the truth of this matter
is known to our late enemy, as well as to ourselves; and no misrepre-
sentation from outside can prevail in the long run against the actual
fact that no war has ever yet been waged in which combatants and
non-combatants on either side have shown so much considera-
tion and kindness to one another." The truth of the matter is that
women and children — all non-combatants for that matter — cannot
help suffering horribly as a result of the invasion of the territory in
which they live. If we condemn the fact of invasion, naturally
the responsibility for resultant suffering and mortality falls upon the

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

Lord Milner, speaking at Johannesburg in January,
1902, declared that the only possible way of ending
the war was to "squeeze" the Boers until they made
overtures of their own accord. So the line of block-
houses was remorselessly extended. Lord Kitchener
was aided appreciably in hastening the inevitable
end by enlisting the services of five thousand burghers
who had surrendered. Under the renegade General
Vilonel, these "National Scouts" ("handsuppers, "
they were contemptuously called by the other Boers)
contributed a skill in guerilla warfare and an in-
valuable typographical knowledge of the country
to the final efforts of the British army. For the im-
mediate purpose of finishing the war quickly, the use
of the "handsuppers" was eminently successful.
But it resulted in a bitter feeling, which has persisted

Government that ordered the invasion and the army that carried
out the order. But once that is said, is it not true that suffering
and death cannot be prevented, or even always mitigated, when
prevention or mitigation comes into conflict with military necessity?
Lord Kitchener spoke with a clear conscience as a soldier, whose
first duty was to accomplish his mission. Concentration camps
and the blockhouse system resulted in the British victory. No
other course of action was possible. Since all the cattle had been
driven off the farms, where could fresh milk have been obtained?
The children were victims of the war. It is not open to doubt that
the British authorities did all they could to make the suffering and
mortality as light as possible. If the concentration camps had not
been established, it is probable that all the women and children
would have died. The only direct responsibility that falls upon the
army which executed orders given to it by the Home Government
is from mistakes of judgment in placing some of the camps in un-
suitable and unhealthy locations. But even here military men
would argue that the exigencies of the situation necessitated the
establishment of the camps in such places.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

until now, against the men who sold out the cause.
The irreconcilables among the Boers have never
ceased to maintain that the treachery of the renegades
alone made possible British success. The "hands-
uppers" were excommunicated by the Dutch Re-
formed Church. Although the ecclesiastical ban
was afterwards lifted, they have been considered
ever since as outcasts even by those who are now
loyal British subjects.

General Delarey's success in defeating and taking
prisoner Lord Methuen in March was the last victory
for the Boers. In fact, when Delarey released Lord
Methuen, in order that he might receive proper
medical attention for his wounds, Boer magnanimity
could not be interpreted otherwise than as a confes-
sion that power of resistance had reached its end.
Negotiations were begun on March 23rd.

Kitchener and Milner had unequivocally stated
that the restoration of Boer independence was out
of the question. But the conference of burghers,
which met at Vereeniging on May 15th, made the
following proposals after three days of heated dis-
cussion: the relinquishment of foreign relations and
embassies; the acceptance of the protectorate of
Great Britain; the surrender of a portion of the
territory of the South African Republic; and the
conclusion of a defensive treaty with Great Britain
in regard to South Africa. When Kitchener and
Milner declined to discuss these proposals, or tele-
graph them to Mr. Chamberlain, and dictated terms
of unconditional surrender upon which the burghers
were to give a plain yes or no answer, General De

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

Wet urged the delegates to continue the war. But
"handsupping" had now become so prevalent that
common sense determined the burghers to submit
to the inevitable. As General Delarey put it, "If
the meeting insisted on a continuation of hostilities
the nation would be driven into 'handsupping'; thus
the war would end in dishonor and disgrace." The
terms dictated by Great Britain, and accepted at
Vereeniging, contained ten stipulations :

I. Unconditional surrender, and recognition of
Edward VII. as lawful Sovereign. 2. Burghers in
the field outside the limits of the two former Repub-
lics and all prisoners of war to be returned to their
homes as soon as transportation and means of sub-
sistence made this possible. 3. No burghers sur-
rendering or returning to be deprived of personal
liberty or property. 4. Immunity from legal
action, civil or criminal, of burghers for any acts in
connection with the prosecution of the war. 5.
The Dutch language to be taught in public schools,
where the parents of the children desire it, and to be
allowed in courts of law, when necessary for the
better and more effectual administration of justice.
6. The possession of rifles, subject to the taking
out of a license, to be allowed to persons requiring
them for their protection. 7. Military administra-
tion to be succeeded by civil government at the
earliest possible date, and, as soon as circumstances
permitted, the introduction of representative in-
stitutions, leading up to self-government. 8. The
question of granting the franchise to natives not to
be decided until after the introduction of self-govern-
4 49

THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA

ment. 9. No special tax to be imposed on landed
property in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony
to defray the expenses of the war. 10. The appoint-
ment of a commission, on which local inhabitants
would be represented, for assisting the restoration of
the people to their homes and their rehabilitation,
and for this purpose the granting of £3,000,000 to
compensate war losses suffered by the burghers:
but no foreigner or rebel to be entitled to the benefit
of this clause.

There were eighteen thousand Boers left to sur-
render. The war had cost Great Britain twenty-two
thousand in killed alone.

Lord Milner became Governor of the Transvaal
on June 21st, and two days later Lord Kitchener
left South Africa, having accomplished a task which
proved conclusively that there had been no mistake
in choosing the victor of Omdurman to solve the
most aggravating military problem that had ever
confronted a British general.

There may be conflicting opinions, which history
cannot reconcile, concerning the causes and the jus-
tice of Great Britain's war of conquest against the
Boers. There can be no doubt about the benefit
that has resulted from it for the Boers themselves,
for the British Empire, and for the whole world.

The Boer War marks a distinct step forward in
making Africa a white man's country. If we take
the attitude that the white man should leave to
indigenous elements the territories they have occupied
(or, to put it more accurately, partially occupied)
from the beginning of our knowledge of these terri-

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

tones, we deny that our civilization has a right to
exist and to prevail. We deny the logic and the
justice of the forces that have contributed to make
the worid what it is to-day. We deny that the Aryan
race has had and still has a mission, and that that
mission seems to have been peculiariy entrusted
to the Anglo-Saxon element of the white race. The
process of civilization is always painful, always
fraught with temporary injustice, always prejudicial
to the immediate interests of native races which
refuse assimilation and resist enlightening influences.

If we are going to denounce and deplore Anglo-
Saxon domination in South Africa, the conquest of
the aboriginal races on the North American continent
and the gradual absorption of weaker ' European
elements by the Anglo-Saxon must be denounced
and deplored. When we view and comment upon
events as they happen, we are ashamed to hold that
the end justifies the means. But when we review
and judge events with the perspective of years, is it
not human nature to approve whatever has happened,
when the results are unquestionably beneficial?

Only the man who would like to see Africa still
a "dark continent," completely out of touch with
Europe and America, can indulge in destructive
and vindictive criticism of European colonization in
Africa. In passing judgment upon the activities of
the different European states in Africa, there is
only one sensible criterion — the results. So I have
refrained from going into an appreciation of the
causes of the Boer War, and have limited my account
of the conflict between Boer and Briton to what was

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

strictly necessary in order to introduce the work of
evolution that has been going on in South Africa
since 1900. The same point of view, the same
method of treatment is adopted throughout this
book.

If the British Government, after the Boer War,
had tried to exterminate the Boers, or to assimilate
them violently and summarily, if they had denied to
the Boers either the economic or political liberty
they had enjoyed before, or that which they had a
right to expect as British subjects, the Boer War
would rightly be considered as a war of aggressive
conquest, harmful to the interest of South Africans
of all races, and would have resulted in a decade
or more of terrorism. But, from the very day
peace was signed, Great Britain began to work
constructively for the happiness and well-being of all
South Africans, irrespective of race. Local passions
and prejudices tried to frustrate this typically Anglo-
Saxon ideal. But generations of experience and of
training, inbred with excellent tradition, had made
the British Government uncannily wise in judging
and dealing rightly with colonial problems.

The first test came immediately after the peace
of Vereeniging. The British Cabinet refused to be
persuaded by South African "Imperialists" to
suspend the Cape Colony Parliament on the ground
that it would refuse to pass measures necessary for the
pacification of the country. Rather than start in
upon the delicate task of reconciliation and recon-
struction by adopting an unconstitutional policy
for expediency's sake, it was rightly believed to be

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

better to risk the overthrow of a ministry favorable
to the British Government. The ImperiaHst or
Progressive Opposition was guided by Dr. Jameson
rather more wisely than his past career would have
indicated. In the years of reconciliation, a great
deal is due to the wonderful growth, through re-
sponsibility, of this man who had led the Raid that
bears his name. It is curious how invariably radicals,
hotheads, and extremists become conservative when
power is placed in their hands. With each suc-
ceeding year. Dr. Jameson became more moderate
and charitable, and more able to impose moderation
on his followers, many of whom advocated in the
press and on the platform the policy of Prussia in
Alsace and Lorraine.

The problems that confronted the British Govern-
ment in South Africa were so many and so complex
that Mr. Chamberlain decided in the autumn of
1902 to go to the Natal, Cape, Transvaal, and Orange
River Colonies, so that he might investigate the post-
bellum situation firsthand. His ostensible reason
was to study the question of introdu'cing Chinese
labor on the indenture system. When the inter-
rupted work of the mines in the Transvaal was re-
sumed, it had been found that only fifty thousand
natives were willing to work, although three times
that number were imperatively needed. White
labor on an extensive scale was considered too costly.
But the underlying motive of the Premier's visit
was political rather than economic. It was his
ambition to bring together the Dutch and English
parties in Cape Colony, to discuss frankly with

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the defeated Boer leaders in Pretoria and Bloem-
fontein the practical questions involved in recon-
struction, and to appeal to the Dutch everywhere
"to let bygones be bygones."

During this visit in the winter of 1902- 1903, Mr.
Chamberlain found that the settlement of the
South African question had only begun with the
Peace of Vereeniging. There were all sorts of cur-
rents, and cross currents, involving the parliamentary
regime in Cape Colony; the economic relations be-
tween Natal and Cape Colony and the two newly
conquered colonies, especially in the way of railway
agreements and railway extensions; the introduction
of Chinese labor, to which all parties were opposed
(the only thing the British and Dutch were in ac-
cord upon in Cape Colony!); the repatriation of
the Boers upon the breaking up of the concentra-
tion camps, return of prisoners and distribution of
the three million pound grant; the settlem.ent of
Crown lands ; and the assessing of a war debt upon
the defeated republics.

Mr. Chamberlain was not sure that public opinion
in England would receive favorably the proposition
of Lord Milner to solve political difficulties by the
introduction of British settlers upon Crown land.
He found that the difficulty of pacification in South
Africa was mostly through hostility to the National
Scouts. The Boers insisted that it had not been the
understanding that any portion of the three million
pounds was to go to "handsuppers, " that any grants
to them would be open to the suspicion of payment
of promised bribes to traitors and renegades, as

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

the "handsuppers" were regarded. At Pretoria, in
answer to Mr. Chamberlain's plea for union, the
Boers pressed for claims and advantages far beyond
what the treaty had assured them. Mr. Chamberlain
warned them that future amnesty and self-govern-
ment would not come through pressure. At Bloem-
fontein a deputation of Boers headed by General
Christian De Wet told Mr. Chamberlain that there
were many irreconcilables among the Boers, especially
in what had been the Free State, and complained
that the terms of peace were not being carried out.
The real trouble was animosity against the National
Scouts. Mr. Chamberlain and General De Wet both
lost their temper, and a rather undignified scene
followed.

In connection with the labor question, the mine-
owners of the Rand^ declared to Mr. Chamberlain
that, as the immediate future of South Africa de-
pended upon the extension of the gold industry,
the importation of indentured Chinese was the only
thing that could save the situation. The possibility
of employing whites, they said, was out of the ques-
tion, not only on account of the high wages demanded,
but because whites could not do heavy manual work
in a country inhabited by people of an inferior
race without sinking to the economic level of the
blacks. Hindoos were not of the physical build
demanded for working in mines, and, if imported in
large quantities, would end by demanding the right,

' By the Rand is meant the mining area from Spring to Rand-
fontein, a gold reef of thirty to forty miles, including Johannesburg
and all the mining townships.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

as British subjects, to remain. For the blacks, on
the other hand, it was contended that the scarcity
of labor for the mines was due to the unwillingness
of mine-owners to pay wages that would compete
with the considerably higher wages offered for public
works and railway construction. The labor question
was serious, not only from the standpoint of
the mine-owners, but also from the standpoint of the
entire white population of the colony. Half the
stamps on the mines were idle for lack of labor. As
the mines used coal and furnished the principal
receipts for the railways, economic rehabilitation
and development could not be hoped for so long as
the mines were not being fully worked. Unless this
question could be solved, the Boer War would have
been fought in vain: for upon the Transvaal mines
depended the economic prosperity of the whole of
South Africa, and the justification of extensive rail-
way construction, which alone could develop the
agricultural resources of the four colonies and of
Rhodesia. It was fruitless to talk of a war loan,
unless the Transvaal was put in the position of
meeting the interest on the loan.

The task of the Home Government was compli-
cated by conflicting sentiments in the British electo-
rate. There was a universal feeling that the
tremendous sacrifice of treasure and of blood made
by England should not result in an additional burden
on the British taxpayer, while trade with South
Africa (which had increased in ten years from nine
million pounds to twenty-six million pounds) was
diminished. On the other hand, the nonconformist

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

conscience and labor sentiment were hostile to the
adoption of a program in South Africa that would
mean the infringement of personal liberty and the
denial of the principles which apologists had advanced
in justification for undertaking the war. No post-
factum substantiation must be given to the accusa-
tion so often made that the war had been instigated
by and fought for the mine-owners.

The general result of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to
South Africa was the adoption by the Imperial
Government of the only policy that would avoid
going from Scylla to Charybdis. The Cabinet
tried, with varying fortunes at first, but with ulti-
mate success at last, to base its South African policy
upon the principle that South African questions be
decided in the final analysis by South Africans, and
that London abstain from overriding colonial wishes
in regard to colonial interests. Extreme care, how-
ever, had to be exercised in finding out what really
was the opinion on all these questions. Imperialist
and Boer fanatics did their best to retard union,
although the former thought they were working for
it. For the extreme elements in both parties tried to
make the Cabinet believe that they voiced the
sentiments of the people, and to influence the Cabinet
to decisions inimical to the real interests of South
Africa.

Because the years between the treaty of Vereenig-
ing and the establishment of the Commonwealth
developed problems that are being faced or that will
have to be faced soon in all African colonies, it is
important to set each one of them forth in more

THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA

detail than would otherwise be justifiable in a book
whose scope includes the whole of Africa. Then,
too, it must be remembered that the formation of the
Commonwealth, which could come only after these
questions had been for years in the melting-pot, is a
justification of Great Britain's r61e in Africa, and the
goal towards which all the States who are colonizing
Africa must equally work.

For the sake of avoiding confusion and in order
to make these problems stand out beyond their
South African setting, I deal with each one of them
separately, and do not attempt to coordinate them
chronologically between 1902 and 1910.

THE MINES AND THE PROBLEM OF WHITE, BLACK, AND
CHINESE LABOR

The accusation against the mine-owners that
they were endeavoring to compel blacks to work for a
wage lower than could be obtained in the open market
does not seem to be substantiated by the facts. I
have been told by competent observers that the failure
to secure native labor in 1903 was mainly due to the
unsettled state of the country and the reluctance of
the natives to leave their krals until they had con-
fidence that order was restored. As they had been
very prosperous during the war and had saved money,
they did not feel the necessity of working. Where in
the world do negroes work when they have money?
If one bears in mind the fact that the Rand enter-
prises involved wholly " uitlanders, " and that the
Boers were exclusively agriculturalists, it is possible

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

to look for an economic motive underlying the
political one. Farmers who could afford to give the
blacks ten shillings a month at the most, regarded
mines, with the wage rate of two pounds fifteen to
three pounds with food, as the cause of their in-
ability to get sufficient labor. All along, since gold
was discovered in the Transvaal to the present day,
animosity against the "uitlander" has been kept
alive for this very patent reason. Far from sym-
pathizing with the contention that the mine-owners
were willing to give the blacks too little, the Boer
farmers have complained of the blacks being too well
paid. They have frequently tried to get the Govern-
ment to legislate in their favor, but without success.
When it comes to white labor versus black labor,
the cause of the failure to run the mines with white
labor is neither wages nor climate. It is a social
question. The white man will not work alongside
the black man. He is physically able to do as much,
if not more work, than the black, but he will not
do the same work. Labor leaders in South Africa
have failed utterly in their efforts to demonstrate
that mines could be worked by whites, for the simple
reason that white laborers, even when starving,
refuse to do "niggers' work." White men demand
positions in which there is not hard manual labor.
It seems amply demonstrated that there is no place
in South Africa for the white man who has no trade,
and no opportunity to develop his own land. The
poor white problem has become acute in South
Africa. Europeans without a trade or commercial
aptitude, and without money to develop land, are

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

discouraged from coming into the Commonwealth:
for the white man who has no other resource than his
hands is apt to become a charge upon the community
and a menace. The South African Labor Party has
now come to a position where it opposes only the
use of natives who are brought into the labor market
from outside the Commonwealth.

As to the rate of wages that it is possible for mine-
owners to pay, it must be remembered that practically
all the mines of the Rand are low grade propo-
sitions, and are worked sometimes to a depth of
seven thousand feet. Many miles of reef are now
unworked because the ore is too low grade to yield
a profit, even at the native rate of wages. Some
mines have paid nothing to their shareholders for
years, and others are just above the margin of pay-
ability. Even if it be admitted that the cost of
administration and the capitalization are in many
cases excessive, a sUght increase of wages would
wipe out the margin between profit and loss in the
most carefully run and most conservatively capi-
talized mine.

The sentiment against the introduction of Chinese
labor was greatly strengthened in England by the
resignation of Commissioner of Mines Wyebergh
and Mr. Monypenny, Editor of the Johannesburg
Star, who had been a brilliant advocate of the British
cause during the war. Mr. Wyebergh championed
the employment of white unskilled labor, denying
that it would be impracticable or excessively costly.
He charged that the financial houses on the Rand
had unduly influenced the policy of the Government.

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

Mr. Monypenny refused to use his pen "in the
interest of the mine-owners." There were un-
doubtedly two sides to the question, but when
one tries to view it from the standpoint of the immedi-
ate interest of the Transvaal, takes into consideration
the safeguards that it was proposed to put arouind the
introduction of this new element into South Africa,
and remembers that Chinese labor was proposed only
temporarily as an experiment, it is difKcuit to understand
the strong opposition that the suggestion aroused.

In the beginning of 1904, when Lord Milner saw
that the Transvaal and Orange River Colony budgets
were going to have a deficit of nearly seven hundred
thousand pounds, he cabled to London for permission
to introduce an ordinance to enforce Chinese labor,
stating that opposition to such a measure was dying
down, and declaring that white men would leave the
Transvaal if it were not done. The Legislative
Council passed the ordinance, and royal assent was
published on March 12th. The first shipload of one
thousand coolies sailed from Hongkong on May
5th. Australia cabled a protest to London. Public
opinion in Cape Colony was frankly hostile. The
influential Boers signed a statement to the effect
that the overwhelming majority of Boers was un-
alterably opposed to the introduction of Asiatics
under whatever conditions. Boer opposition, how-
ever, as one can gather from the statement of General
Botha, was largely dup to the fact that they believed
such a step should not be taken before the responsible
Government promised by the Treaty of Vereeniging
had been granted.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

At the beginning of 1905, there were 35,000 Chinese
on the Rand and by the end of July the number had
increased to 43,000. Strikes and assassinations in
the compounds were followed by many Chinese
breaking loose. White women were attacked.
Then the Boers demanded of Lord Selborne that they
be permitted to carry arms in defence against the
Chinese, and that the immigration cease. ^

The Chinese claimed that they had been imposed
upon, and did not realize that they were coming to
Africa to be virtual prisoners.

Immediately after the fall of the Balfour Cabinet
in December, 1905, Lord Elgin ordered by cable the
stopping of the importation of Chinese, pending
the decision to grant responsible government to the
colony. During that year, a thousand Chinese had
already been repatriated for violation of contract
or disorderly conduct. Repatriation continued in
1907 and 1908, as indentures expired. By the end
of July, 1908, only five thousand were left, and the
last left early in 1910.

If the intention of the experiment of Chinese labor
was merely to set the wheels of industry working
quickly so that the country could pay its way (as

^ The Boers were really In favor of Chinese labor, though for
sentimental reasons they professed not to be. Chinese recruitment
for the mines enabled the Boers to get cheap Kafhr labor for the
farms, which they never could do in competition with the mines.
There was actually a proposal made in Parliament by a Transvaal
member in 19 13 to re-introduce Chinese labor for the mines on the
ground that it would help the farmers to get Kaffir labor cheaper
than was then possible. It found universal support among the
Transvaal farmers.

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

practically the whole revenue of the Transvaal was
derived directly or indirectly from the mines), the
experiment was far from being a failure. Its warmest
supporters had not tried to defend it, or to establish
it as a permanent institution.

INDIAN COLONIST RIGHTS AND INDIAN IMMIGRATION

A bitter grievance of the British press against the
Kruger administration had been its treatment of
Indian British subjects. The British Government's
technical ground for coming into open- conflict
with the Transvaal Government was the violation
of the London Convention. For disabilities were
imposed upon British Indians as to residence and
freedom to pursue their legitimate callings in the
Transvaal. But after the Boer War the treatment
of British Indians was not remedied. Facts were laid
before Parliament to show that rights enjoyed under
Kruger had actually been curtailed by the new
British administration! In 1904 the Government
of India made a formal protest. Parliament was
reminded of the old grievance against Kruger,
and how the thesis at that time had been adopted
by the British Government in dealing with the
Transvaal, that the London Convention applied to
all British subjects, irrespective of race, creed, color,
or language, so that Indians had the right to enter,
travel, or reside in any part of the Transvaal, without
restrictions.

There has been no difference between Kruger's
treatment of the Indians and that of the Government

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

which ousted him. No protest from Calcutta, even
when backed by London and the press, had any effect.
Upon this question there is perfect soHdarity between
EngHsh and Dutch in South Africa. The thesis of
South Africa is that unrestricted right of entry to
Indians will lower the whole standard of living for
the white man and make his existence in the country
impossible. It is the same thesis as is adopted
regarding Asiatic immigration by California and our
other western States, by Canada and by Australia.
It has extended to the European settlers of British
East Africa. Questions of justice, fair play, higher
considerations of national interest fall on deaf
ears when the Anglo-Saxon is asked to let in the
Asiatic. He simply will not do it. There is no
argument. Only those who are far away from the
"yellow peril" and who would not be affected them-
selves by unrestricted Asiatic immigration espouse the
cause of Japanese, Chinese, and Indians. I am not
approving or condemning. I simply state the fact.

After nine years of futile protest, the British
Viceroy in India decided to give up the struggle.
All that is asked for now is liberal treatment of the
Indian already in the country. The South African
Commonwealth, no more than Kruger, has not ac-
cepted the London Convention. Nor will it ever do
so.

THE Transvaal's war "contribution"

One great question which Mr. Chamberlain went
to South Africa "to settle" was the financial situa-

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THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

tion of the new colonies. He announced at Johannes-
burg that the Imperial Government would submit
to Parliament a bill to guarantee a loan of thirty-
five million pounds sterling, secured by the assets
of the Transvaal and Orange River colonies, to pay
existing debts of the former governments, to provide
for expenditures for pubhc works, land settlements,
and new railways. There could be no reasonable
opposition to this bill. For it was imperative to put
a firm financial foundation as soon as possible under
the new colonies, and to make possible the develop-
ment of the territories through Government initiative.
This was to the interest of all the inhabitants of the
colonies.

But when Mr. Chamberlain added that a second
loan of thirty million pounds would be floated, to be
considered as a war debt secured on the assets of the
Transvaal, for the purpose of paying the conquerors
a portion of the expenditure of the conquest, and that
the first ten million pounds of this loan was to be
taken up by local mine owners, a howl of protest was
raised that never ceased. The Boers maintained
that their future could not be mortgaged in this
way, and pointed out that the question of a war
contribution was not mentioned in the stipulations
of the Treaty of Vereeniging, and was contrary to the
spirit, if not to the text, of Article 9. They said only
that if Great Britain thought it worth while to under-
take a war, which had not been of their seeking, in
order to conquer them, it was up to the British to
foot the bill, and look for compensation in pride over

s 65

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the extension of their sovereignty and in profit from
the development of their trade.

When it came to floating the first ten million
pound installment of the Transvaal war loan, Lord
Milner realized that the colony was in no position
to pay the interest even on this one-third. He let
London know clearly how much he feared the result
of the imposition of this obligation. He felt strongly
that the dissatisfaction resulting among the Boers
would be a serious obstacle to reconciliation and
reconstruction. The agitation was great at that
moment against the Chinese Immigration Bill. So
the British Government decided to postpone the
measure.

At a congress in 1905, General Botha, speaking
against the provisions of the proposed constitution,
declared that ten capitalists had imposed a war loan
upon the people without their consent. A day of
humiliation and prayer was appointed in the Dutch
churches. When responsible government was finally
granted to the Transvaal, Great Britain wisely
decided to forego entirely the war contribution
arranged by Mr. Chamberlain with the mining mag-
nates. Whenever it is a question of colonial prob-
lems, common sense eventually wins every time in
British Cabinet councils. They knew well that
one of the first acts of the Transvaal Government
would be to repudiate the debt. They were
happy enough to see the way clear to a solution of
the Transvaal problem without borrowing trouble
over the question of a few million pounds.

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

GRANTING RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT TO THE
TRANSVAAL AND THE ORANGE FREE STATE

We have spoken of the wise decision of the Home
Government to resist the demand of the extreme
EngHsh party in Cape Colony for suspension of the
Colonial Parliament on the ground that it would
refuse to pass measures necessary for the pacification
of the country, and also of the representations made
to Mr. Chamberlain at the time of his visit to the
Transvaal and the Free State during the winter after
the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed. Mr. Chamber-
lain told the Boers that the British Government
and the British people were in entire sympathy
with the principle of self-government, and that the
promise of the Treaty of Vereeniging concerning the
establishment of responsible government would be
fulfilled at the earliest possible moment. But he
warned the Boers that agitation and pressure would
retard rather than hasten the day when responsible
government would be granted.

Mr. Chamberlain's warning might have come
true had the Conservative Cabinet remained firmly
in power, and had not the advocates of the union of
the South African colonies felt that delaying re-
sponsible government menaced the success of their
plan.

From the very beginning the Boers did agitate
for responsible government, and they brought pres-
sure to bear — unrest and racial animosity in the
Transvaal and the Free State, political manoeuvering
in the Cape Parliament, economic threats in Natal,

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

and a powerful sentimental propaganda in England.
When one reads the history of the years between
the end of the Boer War and the downfall of the
Chamberlain-Balfour Ministry, and wades through
the mass of polemical literature on both sides, he
marvels at the courage of the decision to give in to
the Boers on this question when they were still
showing themselves bitter and intractable. The
Boers did not want responsible government under
the terms granted to them — it had to be all their way
or no way at all. The decision to give responsible
government is a notable proof of the intuitive genius
of the British as empire-builders.

The Boer agitation in both the conquered republics
had much to feed upon, and was skillful in grouping
itself around questions concerning which there was
the strongest sort of public sentiment in England.
In the stand they took on some of these "moral
issues," the Boers were undoubtedly insincere.
They were making a bid for support in England.
They opposed the introduction of Chinese labor;
the imposition of the war loan ; what they called the
running of the country by the mine-owners; Mr.
Chamberlain's scheme to increase the taxation of
blacks in order to make them work; the sacrifice of
agricultural interests to mining interests; the dis-
crimination against their language; the quartering
of a big garrison upon them; and the "mulcting" of
the Transvaal, especially in the matter of railways,
to help Cape Colony and Natal. Many of the claims
and assertions of the Boers were untrue. But they
won the electorate in England at a moment when

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

Liberalism, the Labor party, and the nonconformist
conscience were coming to their own. Nothing is
more admirable in the world than the intuitive
response of the Anglo-Saxon to an appeal for "fair
play." Anglo-Saxon public opinion, for fear that it
might not be "playing the game," demands that
Government officials lean over backwards in order to
do the square thing by a vanquished foe.

. The detailed history of the local struggle from
the end of 1902 to the end of 1905 is not material.
We need only to give the result. A step was made
towards changing the post-bellum regime in the
Transvaal early in 1905, before the Conservatives
had to quit the Government. On December 22,
1905, the new Liberal Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin
ordered by cable the suspension of Chinese labor,
importation, "pending the decision by the Imperial
Government as to the grant of responsible govern-
ment to the Transvaal Colony," In fairness to the
Conservative Cabinet, one must say that they had
every reason to feel perplexed during the summer
and autumn of 1905. For the 'Boers, moderates
and extremists, were united in demanding that the
Free State should receive responsible government
at the same time as the Transvaal, and in main-
taining that the constitution proposed for the Trans-
vaal by the Orders in Council of March 31, 1905,
was unsatisfactory in many of its details, and in its
entirety "a breach of the terms of peace." One of
the principal objections — and in this the Boers were
perfectly right — was that the proposed constitution
did not exclude from the franchise the Army of

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Occupation. The soldiers were contemptuously re-
ferred to in the Boer protests as "hired foreigners."
General Botha, upon whom Englishmen of clear
head and foresight were already placing their hopes"
of the future, denounced the constitution. He
claimed that the Free State had been a party to
the Treaty of Vereeniging on equal terms with the
Transvaal, and that ten capitalists had more in-
fluence with the British Government than all the
inhabitants of the Transvaal Colony.

Throughout the year 1906 — the first year of Liberal
Government in England — the agitation waxed strong.
Some Boers left for the Argentine, and others began
to trek to East Africa. General Beyers, campaigning
for Het Volk,^ said: "The tree chopped at Vereeni-
ging is sprouting again. A people bound together
by blood and tears cannot be lost." The contention
of Mr. Lyttleton, who drafted the constitution, was
that self-government meant party government,
and that if party government were conducted along
racial lines, the result would be disastrous. The fact
that the mining interests were lobbying in London for
the support of the constitution in its original form
alienated rather than gained English advocates.

The British Government gave in on the provisions

' Het Volk (the people) was the name of a newspaper published
in Pretoria long before the war. The political organization of that
name was the party in the Transvaal which began to agitate for
responsible government immediately after the Treaty of Vereeni-
ging, and which later spread to the other colonies. Het Volk is
frequently used as a general term to describe the Boer party in
politics.

70 . .

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

allowing British garrisons to vote and directing that
EngHsh alone be used in debates. The military
were excluded, and pariiamentary procedure was
made bilingual. It also yielded in the matter of the
Free State self-government. Responsible govern-
ment was granted to the Transvaal on December 6,
1906, and eleven days later Parliament was told
that the Free State also would receive responsible
government. The Free State was granted a con-
stitution on June 5, 1907.

The first elections under the constitution were held
in the Transvaal in January, 1907. Het Volk won.
A Johannesburg newspaper declared that the cabinet
would be almost an exact replica of the staff of the
Boer army. It was not quite that: but General
Botha was Premier and General Smuts, Colonial
Secretary. Although the local English residents,
blinded by prejudice, could not see it, the begin-
ning of responsible government under such splendid
leaders pointed to a future which was realized in a
most remarkable way in 1914. General Botha sent
a message to the English people in defense of Het
Volk. He declared that the Boers could not forget
the generosity and the token of confidence of the
British nation in granting them responsible govern-
ment, and said that the question of the flag and
sovereignty -had been settled for all time.

In November, 1907, the Dutch party gained a
sweeping victory in the first Orange Free State
elections. Thirteen of the thirty-eight members of
Parliament were returned unopposed by Het Volk.
There was no racial conflict outside of Bloemfontein.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

The Dutch gained all except eight seats in Parlia-
ment. Both in the Transvaal and in the Free State,
the Dutch pronounced themselves in favor of federa-
tion. But in the Free State they were much more
extreme and jealous on the question of the main-
tenance of the Taal language. The Free State
Boers were also determined that in the future South
African Commonwealth, Cape Colony should not
give the natives right to vote, and Natal should
withhold the franchise from coolies and other
Asiatics.

In the general election of 1908, the Dutch party
in Cape Colony secured a working majority. This
made the Dutch supreme in three colonies. The
Dutch of Cape Colony were quite at one with the
Opposition under Dr. Jameson in desiring federation.
In spite of the almost universal condemnation of the
policy by English residents of South Africa, granting
responsible government to the former Republics
was from the first a success. How it has worked
out is told in a later chapter.

THE TAAL AGAINST ENGLISH IN THE SCHOOLS

Nations cling to their language because they feel
that language is the sign of nationahty. As one
speaks, so one thinks; as one thinks, so one is. Great
nations, strong and advanced and numerous, prove
their belief in the essential importance of language
by the efforts they make as individuals and small
communities, when surrounded by foreigners, to

72"

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

maintain their language and pass it on as a precious
heritage to their children. They prove it by the
efforts they make as governments to ground and
solidify their political influence in .their possessions
by spreading their language as rapidly as possible
among subject races. Small nations demonstrate
their belief in the national importance of language
by the almost insane pride and jealousy they show-
in defense of their tongue. Subject races put their
faith in language as the medium for awakening and
sustaining national feeling, and keeping alive hopes
of future emancipation. Is it to be wondered at,
then, that the Dutch have put the language ques-
tion first and foremost in their political program
in South Africa? Are they to be blamed or to be
denounced as fanatics because they hold dear to the
living tangible sign that binds them to the past in
the land which their fathers colonized and conse-
crated by their blood?

The Anglo-Saxon is at his worst — is insufferable
even — when he is engaged in controversies where
his tongue is involved. He simply cannot see the
other man's point of view, and he does not want to
see it. He believes that he has the best language
God ever made just as firmly as he believes that his
is the best race God ever made. We have a perfect
right to our opinion (I say we because I am Anglo-
Saxon by blood and tradition just as much as any
Englishman), but have we a right to become im-
patient at and get angry with and look contemptu-
ously upon the man who does not agree with us for
the very good reason that he is not one of us ?

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

From the day the Treaty of Vereeniging was
signed, the language question received far more
prominence than it ought to have had. In standing
by his language, and insisting that it should be
preserved in legislative assemblies and courts and
schools, the Boer was acting by the instinct that
moves every man. He was led to make it a great
and bitter political issue, and to believe that it
loomed up as the most important thing on the
political horizon, because of the lack of considera-
tion of the English element in South Africa. Instead
of sympathizing with the Boer in his outspoken
expression of a natural instinct, his language was
ridiculed and his motive for maintaining it inter-
preted as purely political, with something sinister
in it and subversive of public peace. The attitude
of the English in South Africa (fortunately not offi-
cials representing the Home Government, but English
residents) toward the Boers on the language question
has been exactly the same as the attitude of the
Prussians and Russians toward the Poles.

There is not space to go into a history of the
conflict over the language question. It is very
much the same as that which one finds in many
parts of Europe to-day, and has the usual features:
espousal of the subject language by the Church;
establishment of schools supported by private sub-
scription, and taught largely by the clergy; refusal
to use the alien language in courts and public assemb-
lies; insistence upon the retention of the subject
language in public schools; establishment of institu-
tions of higher education — even to universities —

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

where the medium prescribed is the native lan-
guage.

As in everything else in South Africa, the extremists
on both sides failed to carry the day. Imperturbable
in the face of bitter criticism, High Commissioners
refused to embody in reports to London the assertions
of the Imperialists that the Boers were plotting
treason through their solicitude for their native
tongue, and the Home Government refused to give
credence to these assertions when they came through
other sources. The greatest credit in finding a
modus Vivendi is due to moderate Boer leaders, who
braved the criticism of their own followers in the
determination to follow a fair and intelligent policy
in the relation of the two languages. The result
has been as satisfactory as can be expected under the
exceedingly difficult and delicate circumstances of
two races living side by side, neither of which is
very good at reconciling itself to the idea of "live
and let live."

The Taal is used throughout the Union as the sole
medium for instruction, if it is the mother language,
for the first two or three years. Then English is
introduced as a language, not as a medium. In the
towns, English is the medium because it is the
mother language of the majority of the children,
and Dutch is optional and taught as a language.
Boer children when they leave school now under-
stand English, if they have gone through the sec-
ondary school course. English has gained greatly
everywhere in Dutch-speaking communities. Al-
though Dutch pastors foster the Taal, they cannot,

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

except in the "backwoods districts, " oppose English.
For in so doing they would fatally militate against
the possibility of higher education, which is not
obtainable in the Taal. And the maintenance of
Boer supremacy in South Africa depends wholly upon
the higher education of the younger Boers. The
danger from remaining ignorant is greater than the
danger of becoming denationalized through higher
education.

In considering the movement to make the Taal
a language for secondary and higher education, it
must be remembered that this patois, with its large
admixture of Kaffir and English words, is unfortun-
ately not enough akin to Dutch to make possible
the borrowing of Dutch literature and the use of
Dutch text-books. Having no extensive literature,
and the Afrikanders being without the financial
means and energy and ability to make text-books
in Taal for more than primary classes, it is easily
seen that secondary education is impossible for the
Afrikanders unless they learn some foreign language.
As their fortunes are now cast in with the English,
it is only common sense that secondary and higher
education be in the English language. It is just as
hard for the Afrikander to learn good Dutch as to
learn good English. He has a thousand uses for
English, and a wealth of literature to draw upon.
Learning Dutch, then, which he never has a chance
to use and whose literature is comparatively cir-
cumscribed, is sentimental folly — a protest that is
a boomerang, reacting upon him against his best
interests.

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

CONFLICTING LOCAL INTERESTS OF CONTIGUOUS

COLONIES UNDER THE SAME FLAG HASTEN

UNION

In colonies where the European population, outside
of military and civil officials, is very small, the
interests of contiguous colonies under the same flag
are easily adjusted. The French and British in
their West African colonies, and the British in ar-
ranging the boundaries and economic interests of
East Africa, Uganda, and the Sudan, had little
difficulty. Decisions were made in Paris and
London, and the colonists had no say in the matter.
If advice was asked, it was not necessarily followed.
France brought her West African colonies under a
common administrative control by a Presidential
Decree. ^ Great Britain incorporated Lagos in Nigeria
and later joined Northern and Southern Nigeria, by
Orders in Council. French Equatorial Africa had
to cede large and important parts of her territory to
Germany on word from Paris. Great Britain de-
prived Gambia and Nigeria of hinterland for the
sake of making a good bargain with France over
matters that concerned neither of these colonies.
In South Africa the situation was totally different.
Here the colonists were so numerous that they had
to be let alone to settle their own affairs.

Long before the Boer War, there was friction
between Natal and Cape Colony over many matters,
but principally over the carrying trade with the two
Dutch republics. When the Orange Free State and
the Transvaal became British colonies, the conflict

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

of local interests, instead of being remedied, became
more acute. To add to the difficulties of the Home
Government, Rhodesia, now contiguous British
territory on the north and very rapidly developing,
had interests that conflicted in many ways with the
four British colonies in the south.

One illustration alone will suffice to show the
particularism of the colonies, the judicious restraint
exercised by the British Cabinet in adopting a strict
non-intervention policy, and the lesson forcibly
taught that safety and strength for the future to all
the colonies lay in union alone.

The shortest haul from the Rand mines in the
Transvaal to the sea was through Portuguese East
Africa to the port of Lorenzo Marques on Delagoa
Bay. Portuguese territory formed the entire western
and seaward boundary of the Transvaal. From
Portuguese territory the Transvaal recruited annu-
ally an essential amount of native labor. When
Lord Milner, on December i8, 1901, signed with the
Governor of Portuguese East Africa a temporary
agreement, maintaining the former treaties between
Portugal and the Transvaal Republic, he took the
only course possible under the circumstances. The
surrender of the Boers was a matter of months.
For the rehabilitation of the Transvaal all the rail-
way outlets to the coast were necessary, especially
this shortest one through Portuguese territory; and
the Transvaal would need all the labor it could
recruit from every source. Lord Milner bound the
new colony in general to the terms established in
1875 for traffic between the Transvaal and Lorenzo

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

Marques. The former tariffs were maintained;
equal treatment in the Transvaal for merchandise
coming from Lorenzo Marques with that entering
by Cape Colony and Natal ports; obligation to
furnish to the Portuguese railway a fixed amount of
freight every day; application to civil traffic from
Lorenzo Marques to the Transvaal of the same
principles and rules which govern the traffic of
similar character coming from the Cape and from
Natal ; alcohol and liquors not to be taxed more than
if they came from the Cape and from Natal ; freedom
of recruiting native labor for the Transvaal in Portu-
guese territory and right of the Portuguese authorities
to supervise at Pretoria and Johannesburg the ful-
fillment of the contracts entered into with natives
thus recruited.

The Lorenzo Marques Railway had reached the
Transvaal frontier only in 1890 and Pretoria in 1894.
Before that time the Cape and Natal railways had
a monopoly of imports to and exports from the
Transvaal'. The profits were very great, and the
two colonies had only each other as rivals. Between
the time the Portuguese railway was opened and
the outbreak of the Boer War, the Cape Railway
saw its carrying trade with the Transvaal reduced
from eighty per cent, of the total trade to thirty-
seven per cent. Of this Durban in Natal received
only three per cent. The other forty per cent,
went to Lorenzo Marques. The loss was not only
in railway receipts. There were port dues, better
facilities of transport through the coming of more
ships, quay dues, warehouse dues, and large sums

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

made by longshoremen and others who handled the
freight from ships to railway.

Cape Colony and Natal both thought that the
incorporation of the Transvaal in the British Empire
would certainly mean the return to them of this
valuable traffic. They were terribly upset when
Lord Milner decided to maintain the treaty with
Portugal. Powerful influences were set in motion
in London to have Lord Milner's decision revoked.
But the British Government stood firm. They saw
clearly that if they allowed to be taken away from
Lorenzo Marques the carrying trade which was the
chief source of revenue for the whole Portuguese
colony, Portugal would retaliate by forbidding her
natives to go to work in the Transvaal. Pressure
could not be brought to bear on Portugal on this
point, because British colonies in Africa were doing
the very same thing in regard to each other in order
to conserve for themselves the labor of natives who
were willing to work. Almost half the native labor
in the Transvaal mines came from Portuguese East
Africa. To jeopardize this valuable source of native
labor was, in Lord Milner's opinion, a danger much
greater than that of offending Cape Colony and
Natal.

When the Transvaal received self-government,
the situation became worse for the two old British
colonies. From^:i902 to 1907, they had tried every
means of bringing the Transvaal to terms. But
what could be done against a simple fact of geography?
Lorenzo Marques is only about one-third as far from
the Rand as Cape Town. It is more than a hundred

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

miles nearer the Rand than Durban. Even with
equal tariffs, the sliortest route was preferable. By-
lowering their tariffs to meet those of Lorenzo
Marques, Cape Town would operate at a loss and
Durban with no gain. In order to meet the de-
ficit incurred in railway receipts by the Portuguese
competition. Cape Colony and Natal raised their
customs duties against the Transvaal. A tariff
war ensued. At this point, common sense pre-
vailed. The colonies got together, and discussed
their common interests. From this discussion was
bom the federation, the story of which is reserved
for a later chapter.

But even after the conferences for discussing federa-
tion were long under way, the Transvaal warned Cape
Colony and Natal that too high duties, or duties
against the Transvaal's particular interests, would
lead to a refusal to enter the Union. To show the
other colonies how independent she could be, a
delegate from Portuguese East Africa was invited
by the Transvaal to the conference of Pretoria. The
Transvaal was willing, if necessary, to trade entirely
through Lorenzo Marques!

Just on the eve of the Commonwealth, the Trans-
vaal signed a treaty with Portugal regulating the
recruitment of native labor, the railway and port of
Lorenzo Marques traffic, commercial relations, and
the customs question. The treaty guarantees to
Lorenzo Marques from fifty to fifty-five per cent,
of the maritime traffic of the Rand and other princi-
pal centers of the^Transvaal. In return, Portuguese
East Africa allows the Transvaal to recruit labor,
6 8i

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

The treaty caused a violent outburst in Natal.
The municipal council of Durban cabled to London,
demanding that the treaty be denounced. But
London turned a deaf ear. Salvation in this case,
as always, was for the Home Government not to
override decisions made by a colony for her own
interests. Such a course would be justified only if
the colony were acting in a way prejudicial to
imperial interests.

When they saw they could get no help from home,
the inhabitants of Natal, who had not the strong
racial feeling that was working for union in Cape
Colony, decided that the future lay in agreement
with and not in opposition to the rich and powerful
inland neighbor.

Union, as is often the case between nations as
well as between individuals, came from seeing the
folly of conflict rather than from feeling the desire
for harmony.

a flourishing colony with extensive semi-
independent native areas inconveniently
placed: the problem of natal

Natal ceased to belong to the Cape of Good Hope
over fifty years before the formation of the South
African Commonwealth, and after 1856, was a dis-
tinct British colony. It is separated from Cape
Colony on the south of Griqualand East, in which
the native population is very large. Between
Natal and the Orange Free State Hes Basutoland.
Between Natal and the Transvaal are Zululand and

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

Swaziland, which form the angle of the valuable
little Delagoa Bay comer of Portuguese East
Africa. From Durban, the port on the Indian
Ocean, a railway runs into Griqualand East, by way
of Pietermaritsburg. But it does not join up with
the Cape Railway. Another line, running north-
west, bifurcates at Ladysmith, one branch going
west into the Orange Free State, and the other
due north to Pretoria. The Orange Free State branch
makes a semicircular curve around Basutoland to
Bloemfontein, which is almost directly west of
Pietermaritsburg. The Transvaal branch skirts
Zululand and enters the Transvaal without passing
through the Free State.

Basutoland is a high plateau of nearly twelve
thousand square miles, broken by several mountain
ranges. It contains the headwaters of the Orange
River. The protectorate is not an integral por-
tion of the South African Commonwealth. Like
Bechuanaland, it is under the direct control of the
Crown. But its Resident Commissioner depends
upon the High Commissioner for South Africa. In all
this territory, larger than Belgium and as large as
Holland, there are hardly more than a thousand
Europeans among a native population of over four
hundred thousand. European settlement, in fact, is
prohibited. The native government is exercised
by chiefs, who owe allegiance to a paramount chief.

Swaziland, from 1903 to 1906, was controlled by
the Transvaal. But since 1906, its government is
like that of Basutoland. There are only a thousand
whites among a population of over one hundred

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

thousand. The British Crown has kept the authority
over these native regions because the whites of the
neighboring colonies have not shown that they are
capable of governing justly homogeneous native
populations. ^

Zululand, since 1897, has unfortunately formed
an integral part of Natal. Between the Tugela River
and the Swaziland and Portuguese boundary, the
population is practically all native. Except along
the coast and on the western edge, Zululand is
served by no railway.

The European population of Natal has grown
three hundred per cent, in the last forty years, while
the native population has increased only fifty
per cent. But even now among the million and a
quarter inhabitants of Natal, there are less than one
hundred thousand Europeans and about one hundred
and fifty thousand Indians and Chinese. The

* In 1907, taking heart at the interest and sympathy aroused in
England over the Zulu question, a deputation of native chiefs visited
London, although they had previously been informed that their mis-
sion would be fruitless, to expose the griefs and discontent of the
Swaziland natives. In 1909, when Lord Selbome visited Swaziland,
in reply to the protest of the native chiefs of their unwillingness to
enter the South African Union, the High Commissioner warned
them that amalgamation was inevitable. In the same year, Lord
Selbome opened the National Council of Basutoland. The as-
sembled chiefs told him that they were afraid of being incorporated
forcibly in the Union. Lord Selborne replied that Basutoland would
sooner or later have to come into the Union, but that the British
Crown would see to it that native rights inland and all other matters
would be fully guaranteed. There is no doubt about the fear,
resulting from Zululand's unhappy experience, among the natives
of the protectorates of coming under the Government of the South
African colonists.

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

native population numbers almost a million. Natal
has not only the largest proportion of black popula-
tion of the provinces of the South African Common-
wealth, but it is cut off from its neighbors by
territories wholly native, and in two of which the na-
tives have managed to maintain semi-independence.
Natal's Indian and Chinese problems, owing to the
long settlement of Asiatic elements in the colony
and their great number (as we have just said, they
outnumber the Europeans), have been all along
totally different from those of the neighboring
colonies. ^ Similarly, Natal's native problem has for
the British taken the place in Natal of the Boer
problem in the other colonies.

Zululand wars and "punitive expeditions" were
being carried on for twenty years before the in-
corporation of 1897. The troubles of Natal did not
end then. After a long lull, a revolt broke out in
northern Zululand in the beginning of 1906. The
natives refused to pay the poll tax. The attack of
armed natives upon police in February led to the
proclamation of martial law and a punitive expedi-
tion. Twelve natives, who had murdered a white
policeman, were sentenced to death by court martial.
Lord Elgin, Colonial Secretary, interfered by cable
to urge a retrial by civil court on account of public
opinion in England. The Natal Ministry at once
resigned. The colonists bitterly denounced the
interference of the Home Government. The Colonial

^ In 1908, the Indians of Natal subscribed the necessary funds
to carry on a campaign in the Transvaal and in England on behalf
of the Transvaal Indians.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Office withdrew its opposition, after learning that
the Governor of Natal approved the sentence, and the
natives were executed on April 2d. The incident,
however, led to the first important clash between
advanced Radicals and Imperialists in the New
Liberal Parliament. Just as in Germany, the
Socialists defended the natives, and claimed that the
authority of the British Crown, by means of British
troops, was being executed far away from the con-
trolling influence of public opinion in England, to
oppress and take vengeance upon a weak African
race for the benefit of colonists. The Government,
between two fires, declared that the matter of the
executions had been gone into thoroughly, that
the first telegram of Lord Elgin had not been in the
nature of a remonstrance but rather a request for
information, and that when full information was
received, the Cabinet realized the justice and
necessity of the sentence.

After the execution the Zulus renewed their re-
sistance to white authority. Several chiefs led the
rebels with great energy. The British troops,
seconded by Natal militia, carried on a ruthless war
of extermination against the Zulus, and killed without
mercy those who were found with arms in hand.
The Zulus lost three thousand five hundred in a little
over two months. When one criticizes the campaign
of the Germans against the Hereros, which was just
drawing to a close at this time, it must not be for-
gotten that the British campaign in Natal, in pro-
portion to the rebel effectives in the field, was just as
merciless and just as disastrous to the Zulus as the

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

German campaign to the Hereros. So disgraceful
was the conduct of the Natal troops that the Bishop
of Zululand felt impelled, much against his will, to
publish the information he had gathered of robbing
kraals and native women, stealing stock, and shoot-
ing natives and throwing their bodies out to rot.
By the end of July over three million dollars had
been spent in putting down the uprising.

A commission was appointed to inquire into the
reason for the growing gulf between whites and
blacks, and to find if the natives had just ground for
discontent against the whites. The report of the
commission in July, 1907, was unanimous in declaring
that the natives hated the "whites and distrusted the
Government. Government action seemed to have
done nothing at all to raise the economic and moral
level of the blacks. The rebellion was due to a
desire to return to the old mode of tribal and family
life. Was this not natural, especially as the whites
had not, by their new and different method of
government, done anything appreciable to benefit
the blacks?

In the autumn of 1907, it was believed that
Dinizulu and other chiefs were preparing a new
rebellion. Dinizulu, when the Natal Government
threatened to send an expedition against him,
surrendered voluntarily. A new Governor was sent
to Natal. Early in 1908 he pardoned the rank and
file of those who had been implicated in the rebellion.
But Dinizulu remained in jail. An English advocate,
who came out to defend him, found that the attitude
of the local authorities made impossible a fair trial

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

under English law. It was charged that the Natal
authorities continued martial law in Zululand to
protect local officials, who had been guilty of whip-
ping and shooting natives, and to prevent Dinizulu
from getting witnesses for his defense. In 1909,
after a long trial, Dinizulu was found guilty of
"harboring rebels," and sentenced to four years'
imprisonment. The Natal Government had been
unable to establish his complicity in the rebellion.

There was still disaffection of a serious character
in Zululand when the South African Commonwealth
was formed. Federation improved the chances of
the Zulus to receive fair treatment, which they
certainly never had had from the Natal colonists.
The geographical position of Natal, and the large
proportion of native tribes of semi-independent
character surrounding the colony, made the task of
government extremely difficult. But there can be
no doubt that the white men acted exclusively for
their own interest, and that when the natives pro-
tested against the collection of taxes, the benefit of
which was never proved to them, they were treated as
rebels, tracked down like wild beasts, and killed in
their own country.

In this brief review of Natal relations with the
Zulus, I have tried to be perfectly fair, and state
simply the facts. They are very sad. When one
considers the better fortune of the Basutos, neighbors
of the Zulus, and the favorable opinion held of their
Paramount Chief, Letsie, and his recent successor
Griffith, by the British authorities, the wisdom of
keeping native populations, where they are homo-

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

geneous and considerable in number, directly under
the control of the Crown, is clearly demonstrated.
British military and civil officials, who came out
from England and who bring to the treatment of
native problems and the management of the weaker
races splendid ideals of fairness and justice, have
always succeeded in keeping peace and winning the
respect, if not the affection, of native tribes, and the
confidence of their chiefs. But where natives are
put under the control of colonists, and at the mercy
of local militia officers and men, who are swayed by
prejudice and vengeance, the results are what they
were in the Zulu expedition of 1906 — a disgrace to
civilization and Christianity. One cannot insist too
strongly upon the difference between public school
and university men from England and men who have
risen to the top in the African colonies, often by
doubtful means. The latter are too frequently
"bounders" of the worst sort, intolerant and in-
tolerable when they have a little authority in their
hands.

The story of federation is reserved for a later
chapter. But this summary of the years of recon-
struction in South Africa would be incomplete
without a word about the two men who represented
the British Government in the delicate office of High
Commissioner during a period when courage and
insight and tact were the sine qua non of success in
piloting safely the four colonies to the harbor of
federation. It was a decade when recalcitrant
Boers and fanatical loyalists were doing all in their

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

power to obstruct the course. Lord Milner repre-
sented the British Crown until March 1905. He
resigned on the eve of the granting of responsible
government to the Transvaal. Lord Selborne was
High Commissioner during the four years before the
establishment of the Commonwealth.

Lord Selborne 's resignation, coming just before
the Union was formed, was not regarded in South
Africa as being due to his wife's health. The Liberal
Government was anxious to put Herbert Gladstone
in some suitable post outside of England, and Lord
Selborne fell in with their plans. Lord Selborne
was not at all of the same caliber as Milner. But
he was a new broom and had not been involved in
the Boer War or in the years of crisis and conflict
that followed. His popiilarity with the Dutch was
largely due to the great and intelligent interest he
took in agriculture, which led to an appreciable
promotion of the well-being of the Boers. He did
not make the mistake of considering railway and
other economic problems too largely from the
industrial point of view.

General Botha has probably since regretted saying
in 1908 that "Lord Milner's rule was the most
unfortunate thing that had ever happened to the
Transvaal." Many statements, due to the political
passion of the moment, cannot be fairly held as the
real judgment of the one who made them, even at the
time they were made. For the sake of assuring
the rallying of all elements to the Imperial program
that he kept constantly in mind, Lord Milner may
have used his official position too strongly against

THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

the Afrikander party, of which General Botha was
the leader. But the present soundly established
prosperity of the Transvaal is largely due to Lord
Milner's initiative. The German in him betrayed
itself sometimes in a political attitude that was open
to objection. But it enabled him at the same time
to lay the foundations for the educational, agricul-
tural, and industrial development of the Transvaal,
Lord Milner established a flourishing agricultural
school, with research laboratories and model farms,
which is changing the whole agricultural system.
In the face of great difficulties he inaugurated
educational reforms with the hand of a master.
He had the financial sense of a Cromer in studying
and taking lessons from the budget. His resig-
nation showed keen political insight and at the same
time self-abnegation, Just when the work of years
was coming to fruition, he left to others the joy
of realization. For he saw that his unpopularity
among the Dutch was retarding reconciliation. Botha
and Smuts and Merriman were ready to cooperate
with a British official. But, even if they had been
willing personally to work together with Milner,
they could not have drawn, their supporters with
them. So Lord Milner insisted that his resignation
be accepted, not because of ill health, or because he
had lost his grip, but because he knew that another
would find it easier to carry out the program he had
inaugurated.

CHAPTER IV

THE TWO INDEPENDENT STATES:
LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA

PRACTICALLY every part of Africa has been
brought under some form of European
administrative control, with fixed bound-
aries, during the last fifteen years. Only two
small states are still independent. Liberia in the
west and Abyssinia in the east have succeeded
in escaping "assimilation" or "protection." But
during the past twenty years neither has been with-
out its days of anxiety. Liberia owes her independ-
ence to the fact that she is the one protege of the
United States in Africa. Abyssinia was saved by the
courage of her late Emperor Menelik, who alone of all
African sovereigns was able to contest successfully
the armed invasion of a European Power. He had
the luck to try the fortune of arms with the unwarlike
Italians. Abyssinia has since escaped through the
mutual jealousy of Italy, Great Britain, and France,
whose colonies surround her on all sides. The two
independent states hold less than three and one-half
per cent, of the area, and about two and one-half per
cent, of the p6pulation of Africa.

LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA

LIBERIA

Liberia was constituted as an independent repub-
lic in 1847 by freed American slaves, the first of whom
had settled on the West African coast during the
administration of James Monroe, twenty -five years
before. The capital is called Monrovia in memory of
the initial settlement. Liberia is the only country
in Africa where electors must be exclusively of African
blood. The United States undertook, by the treaty
of 1862, to aid Liberia, when necessary, to preserve
her constitutional form of government and her
independent existence. In 1885, boundaries were
settled with Great Britain in regard to Sierra Leone
Colony on the north, and in 1892 with France for
the frontier with the Ivory Coast Colony.

For the first half -century of Liberia's existence,
little that was satisfactory and definite could be
established concerning the viability and success of
the experiment of a negro state. It was only when
Sierra Leone and other British West African colonies
began to develop, and when France began to organize
and consolidate her "spheres of influence" into col-
onies with local administrative and economic organ-
ization, that a comparison could be made, and a
conclusion reached. Events since 1 900 seem to prove
conclusively that Liberia, under negro control, has
little hope of becoming the rich and prosperous mod-
ern state that could exist on the West African coast.
For the country possesses, climatically and in wealth
of soil and forest, practically the same conditions that
one finds in British and French and German West

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Africa. The development since 1900 of Sierra Leone,
the Gold Coast, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea,
Togoland, Dahomey, Nigeria, and Kamerun are set
forth in this book. He who reads, sees !

There are about twelve thousand negroes of Amer-
ican descent in Liberia, and about fifty thousand of
the population of nearly two millions, including these
twelve thousand, can be said to be civilized, i. e.,
amenable to constituted authority. Liberians effec-
tively control twenty to twenty-five miles inland
from the coast. They have few good roads, and no
railways. In 1905, the Government was bankrupt.
The only portion of revenue not yet mortgaged was
the sale of postage stamps. The trade with Great
Britain was largely in spirits; and the drink traf-
fic was demoralizing the country. The spread of
drunkenness among the wild native tribes of the
hinterland was checked only by the opportune
appearance of the Mohammedan propaganda.

The lack of effective control of the natives in the
interior became a serious international question
when France and Great Britain began to penetrate
and organize administratively adjacent regions.
For recalcitrant natives took refuge in Liberian
territory, and year after year raiders from Liberia
seriously upset the normal conditions France and
Great Britain were working to establish within their
spheres. The anarchy of the Liberian hinterland
became intolerable between 1905 and 1910, and the
powerlessness of the Liberian Government to exercise
effective control over the interior tribes might have
led to the partition of Liberia, had not the United

LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA

States been willing, with the consent and goodwill
of Great Britain, France, and Germany, to send a
gunboat to Monrovia, and to offer to supervise the
reorganization of the Government on a solid financial
basis. In 1910, a commission sent out by the United
States recommended that the United States take
over the debt of Liberia, recreate the administration,
use good offices for settling frontier disputes with
France and England, and consider the question of
having a coaling station on the coast. Both Liberia
and the United States declared that there was no
question of an American protectorate. But the
United States undertook to reorganize the military
and frontier police forces, and an international com-
mission, under an American official, took charge of
the revenues of Liberia. The following year a loan
of nearly two million dollars was subscribed by Amer-
ican, British, French, and German banks to put
Liberia on her feet, and give her a fresh start.

But the anarchy of the interior and the raids across
the frontier had cost Liberia about two thousand
square miles of territory, which was taken over by
France in a new frontier agreement signed in 191 1.
A "rectification" of frontier on the north was also
made with Great Britain during the same year to the
advantage of Sierra Leone. The British colony had
already occupied the territory, which it was claimed
was essential to Sierra Leone's internal peace:
Liberia's compensation was a small sum of money.

In 1913, the British soap firm of Lever Brothers
leased twelve thousand square miles (about one-
fourth of the territory of Liberia) for five dollars a

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

square mile. The firm was to have the monopoly of
gathering and preparing the fruit of the oil palm, the
uncontrolled use of the land, and the exclusive priv-
ilege of trading with natives. Germany regarded
this agreement, which was a virtual transference of
sovereignty to British subjects, as an infringement
of treaty stipulations, and entered a protest against
it.

It seems perfectly clear that after the present war,
an effective American protectorate will be the only
means of keeping Liberia alive — unless Monroe's
doctrine prevents the salvation of Monroe's colony.

ABYSSINIA

The recent history of Abyssinia is a little more
encouraging than that of Liberia, thanks to the fact
that at the moment of peril from European encroach-
ment a fearless, intelligent, and energetic ruler was
at the head of the nation.

The Abyssinians are not a seafaring people, and the
territories to the north and east and south-east along
the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean
nominally acknowledged Turco-Egyptian sovereignty
before the British invasion of Egypt. They are
inhabited by Arabic Moslem tribes, in close contact
with Mecca, while the Abyssinians are mostly
Christians. After the rise of the Mahdi in the Sudan,
and the British withdrawal in 1884, Italy occupied
the Arabic-speaking territory on the north, and a
large piece of Somaliland on the south-east. France
made effective the occupation, instead of proclaimed

LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA

in principle some twenty years earlier, of the western
shore of the straits leading from the Gulf of Aden into
the Red Sea. England took over from the wreck of
the Sudan a portion of the southern side of the Gulf
of Aden. The fortunes of these territories, though
intimately bound up with Abyssinia, are treated in
another chapter.

Italy, new to colonial problems, felt that the mo-
ment was opportune to join her portion of Somaliland
with Eritrea by extending her power over Abyssinia.
In 1889 a treaty was signed with Emperor Menelik
in which Italian trickery introduced an all-important
discrepancy between the Italian text and the Am-
haric text. The Italian text bound Abyssinia to deal
with the European Powers through Italy : while this
was optional in the text that Emperor Menelik could
read. When he discovered how his good faith had
been imposed upon, Menelik protested against the
treaty in a powerful letter to Queen Victoria in 1893,
probably at the instigation of France and Russia.
But Abyssinia was given only "moral support" by
Europe. War with Italy resulted, and ended in a
disastrous defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896.
Italy was compelled to sign a new treaty at
Adis Abeba, recognizing the complete independence
of Abyssinia. This treaty afterwards received in-
ternational recognition. Menelik's reputation in
Europe was great. For he acted admirably towards
his vanquished enemy, and did not make the mis-
take of believing that all Europeans were like the
Italians, watching to take advantage of him — and
supported by a weak army ! :

7 97

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

During the trying period that followed the recon-
quest of the Sudan, he cooperated with the British
in their effort to reestablish order in the territories
contiguous to Abyssinia, gave a British syndicate a
gold-mining concession, and allowed Britivsh engineers
to inspect the Sobat region and the White Nile
sources as a possible route for the Cape-Cairo Rail-
way. In 1 901, he combined with the British in
military operations against the Mullah Mohammed
along the SomaUland frontier. He was always open
to suggestions as to ways and means of stopping
gun-running and slave-trading.

In the extension of European influence in Africa,
native rulers have come into conflict with European
Powers, and have lost their independence for two
reasons. First, they have not understood the im-
portance of fixing boundaries, and have lacked the
power or will to prevent raiding from their territories
into those under European control. European ad-
ministrators, in order to pacify the territories they
governed, had to look to the sources of disorder.
This led punitive expeditions on farther than origin-
ally intended. Native sultans and kings and tribal
chiefs who could not keep order in the European sense
of the word were compelled to accept "protection."
As no native sultan or king or chief could ever keep
order in the European sense, Africa gradually fell
under European control. Second, they had been
the enemies of "progress" in the European sense of
the word. Not wanting to develop their countries
themselves, they have refused to allow outsiders to
do so, and have resisted prospectors and concession-
ers

LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA

hunters and traders until complaints of the outsiders
have ended by embroiling them with the outsiders*
Government — which was generally just waiting for
the chance. The history of Kruger and Stein is
no different from that of a thousand petty native
rulers.

Menelik impressed his neighbors with his good
faith, and never gave them a loophole to encroach
upon his kingdom. He did his best to prevent
trouble arising for them from Abyssinian territory,
and he was always willing to have frontiers exactly
delimited. He welcomed civilizing influences, and
did not turn a deaf ear to concession-hunters. But
he made it the cardinal principle of his dealings with
foreigners to have concessions arranged by treaty
with governments and not with individuals. Thus
he put the Powers on their honor not to aUow
Abyssinia to be cheated!

In 1900, the northern frontier dispute with Italy
was settled by tacitly allowing Italy to occupy a
portion of the high plateau, without which Eritrea
would have been hardly worth while for Italy to
hold. In 1902, a treaty with the British fixed the
boundary of the Sudan, gave the British the right to
construct a railway through Abyssinian territory to
connect Uganda and the Sudan, and pledged Abys-
sinia to grant no concessions and undertake no works
that would obstruct the flow of tributaries into the
Nile. This made feasible Sir William Garstin's pro-
ject of utilizing Lake Tsana for irrigation, and se-
cured the fertility of the Blue Nile regions.

Dr. Rosen went to Adis Abeba in 1904 as special

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

envoy of the Kaiser. He was accompanied by an
escort of cavalry, especially chosen for their height
and clothed resplendently. The showiness of the
mission led all the world to suppose that its signifi-
cance was political rather than commercial. But
Germany did not then try, nor has she since tried, to
secure more in Abyssinia than equality of treatment
with other nations. The German and Austrian
comm^ercial treaties were signed the following year,
and have expired since the beginning of the present
war. As Abyssinia is surrounded on all sides by the
enemies of Germany, the question is bound to come
up at the Peace Conference, or very soon after,
whether the agreements entered into by Great Bri-
tain, France, and Italy compel the Abyssinians to
accept for transit and shipment at their ports goods
to and from Abyssinia irrespective of ownership and
destination.

The desire to extend into every sphere of colonial
activity the spirit of the Agreement of 1904 led
France and Great Britain to negotiate an Abyssinian
Convention, to which Italy adhered. The independ-
ence and territorial integrity of Abyssinia were
guaranteed by the three Powers, and the sovereign
rights of the Emperor were to be respected. No con-
cessions were to be granted to one Power prejudicial
to the interests of the other two. No matter what
internal complications might arise in Abyssinia, in-
tervention could come only as the result of a common
understanding, and limited to the protection of the
legations and the lives and property of foreigners.
The neighboring territorial interests of the three con-

100

LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA

tracting Powers, and the possible effect upon them
of Abyssinian internal disorders, were set forth and
mutually recognized. The railway line from Dji-
bouti to Adis Abeba should be owned by a French
company, but equal privileges over the line and at the
port should be given to the subjects of the other two
Powers. The railways that might be built west of
Adis Abeba were to be constructed by Great Britain,
and that connecting the two Italian colonies from
north to south by Italy. Great Britain was to be
allowed a railway through Abyssinia from her Somali-
land to the Sudan. Any of the contracting Powers
could veto any agreement made by one of the others
with Abyssinia, should the Power judge the' agree-
ment prejudicial to her interests.

This agreement, like many others that have been
made between European states concerning African
and Asiatic interests, has absolutely no international
or national sanction. Turkey, Persia, Morocco,
Egypt, China, Siam have had the same experience as
Abyssinia. Their present and their future have been
tentatively disposed of with no consideration what-
ever either for their wishes or their interests. Nor
have the agreements, as a general rule, been sub-
mitted for discussion and approval to the Parlia-
ments of the nations which have made them. What
is worst of all, nations that are not a party to the
agreements, and that have not been consulted in
their making, may find in some future emergency
that a situation of fact, with no legal or moral sanc-
tion, has been established that is wholly contrary to
their interests. So far as I know, the Anglo-Franco-

loi

THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA

Italian Agreement of 1905 has not injured the inter-
ests of any individual or nation in Abyssinia, or the
interests of Abyssinia herself. But it might easily
have done so. Perhaps it secretly has done so. It
certainly will do so after this war, unless the prin-
ciple of international sanction for agreements of
this character be established.

^'In October, 1907, Menelik issued a decree con-
stituting a cabinet on the European model, and
appointed ministers for the various departments.
The following month he enjoined free compulsory
education for all boys up to twelve. The State was
to provide schools and teachers. Cabinet councils
were begun, but the education decree could not be
very widely and effectively enforced. Ever since
that time there has been, in spite of internal troubles,
steady, even if slight, progress. ^

Just at the time of his ambitious projects, Menelik
had a stroke, and he gradually became paralyzed.
Frequent to the point of becoming a joke were the
newspaper reports, generally from Italy, during the
period 1907 to 191 3, announcing the death of Mene-

' The will of Lady Meux, who bequeathed her collection of
Ethiopian MSS. to Emperor Menelik and his successors, made a great
stir in 191 1. Scholars were indignant that the precious parchments
should go to a place where they would be inaccessible and in danger
of destruction (although they had been preserved there for over a
thousand years). But there is something splendid in the Puritanism
of the noblewoman who considered herself the holder of stolen goods
and under obligation to make restitution. The MSS. were part of
the plunder of the British Expedition of 1868. What would happen
to the British Museum and the Louvre and other "collections," if
the public conscience became as sensitive about enjoying the results
of thievery as did Lady Meux's!

102

LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA

lik. Each time they were contradicted, and when
he finally passed away in December, 191 3, many
newspapers refused to publish once more the familiar
biography.

Menelik's long illness was a great misfortune to
Abyssinia, and it is still too soon to estimate the
injury done by the anarchy of the regency to the
Kingdom surrounded by land-hungry neighbors.
In 1909, Lidj Yeassu, Menelik's grandson, who was
thirteen, and the husband of the seven-year-old
Princess Romaine, granddaughter of the old Emperor
Johannes, was chosen as the successor. He, by his
own blood and that of his wife, would reconcile
the rival factions of the Imperial family. Not-
withstanding the heralded harmony, civil war broke
out, and dragged on, with varying fortunes, for
several years.

Italy feared the breaking away from authority of
the tribes on her Eritrean frontier, especially after
the Tripolitan War began, and there was some ap-
prehension of raiding in the Sudan. The anarchy
caused no particular difference in the Somaliland
situation, because Great Britain already had her
hands full there, and the responsibility for the Mullah
could in no way be chargeable to Abyssinian unrest.
The troubles in Abyssinia seem to have been con-
fined to the rival court factions : for the country as a
whole remained quiet throughout the years of Mene-
lik's illness. However, there was apprehension in
Adis Abeba just before the outbreak of the European
War over the sudden and inexplicable strengthening
of Italian forces in Eritrea. Was Italy going to

103

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA '

"hold up" the young King for another slice— the
third it would be since the battle of Adowa — of the
northern plateau?

What effect the war is going to have on the fortunes
of Abyssinia is unknown. Certainly there is no
ground for attacking the territorial or political in-
tegrity of the country. For Abyssinia has not lent
herself to German intrigues, and given cause for the
Allies to punish her. What propaganda against the
British and Italians can be traced to Abyssinia, has
its origin in purely Moslem centers. The bulk of the
Abyssinians, still Christian in spite of the great wave
of Islam that has been sweeping over their country,
have not believed in the possibility of a Turkish
reconquest of Egypt and the Sudan. My dear friend,
the late Col. C. H. M. Doughty-Wylie, V. C, British
Consul at Adis Abeba, wrote me at the end of the
first winter of the war that conditions in Abyssinia
gave him absolutely no cause for present or future
alarm, and that he was "consumed with impatience"
so far away from the war. Two months later he fell
in the first landing at the Dardanelles.

At the end of September, 191 6, a movement that
had long been gathering force and popular support
came to a head. While Emperor Lidj, who is just
approaching his majority, was at Harar — probably
he had fled in fear of assassination — an assembly of
the principal Abyssinian chiefs at Adis Abeba voted
to dethrone him, and elected Uizorosso Uditu, a
daughter of Menelik, Empress of Abyssinia. The
patriarch of the Abyssinian Church, Mathias, sol-
emnly pronounced Lidj an apostate, and unbound

104

' LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA

all his chiefs and subjects and his army officers from
their oath of allegiance. The charge against Lidj
seems to be that he favors the adoption of Islam as
the religion of state.

If they had been inclined to listen to the Turco-
Germans, the Abyssinians could have made much
trouble for the Allies. It remains to be seen whether
their attitude will receive its proper reward.

105

CHAPTER V
BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND

SOMALILAND is the most eastern portion of the
African continent, comprising the coast lands
of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean in
the peninsula that ends in Cape Guardafui. It is in-
habited by nomad tribes of mixed Negro and Arab
blood. The Arab strain is marked in the tribes on
the north side in the French and British spheres. The
tribes become more African in the Italian sphere. The
inhabitants of the Juba region in the colony portion
of Italian Somaliland (Benadir) are black. But
throughout Somaliland the religion is Moslem, and
the tribal characteristics and customs are more akin
to those of the Arabian peninsula than to Africa.
This whole region was nominally a portion of the
Ottoman Empire, and fell to Egypt when the Khe-
dives threw off the authority of the Turkish Sultan.
The abandonment of the Sudan by Egypt in 1884
left Somaliland without legal political suzerainty.

Great Britain had too recently become Egypt's
protector, and was too uncertain of her own position
and authority in Egypt to lay claim to a vast, in-
choate and imperfectly known territory. She was
careful only to have to make sure that no "other

106

BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND

European Power should instal itseK along the shore
of the gulf opposite Aden. So Italy took the Indian
Ocean coast line, and France occupied the African
side of the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. Invoking a
treaty made with the ruler of Obock in 1862, she
extended her sovereignty around the bay to Zeila,
the western end of the British sphere. These three
Somaliland colonies, with their protectorates, and the
ItaHan colony of Eritrea, north of French Somaliland,
shut off Abyssinia from the coast. For twenty years
their hinterland boundaries were unsettled. But
after the Anglo-French accord of 1904, France, Great
Britain, and Italy arrived at an understanding con-
cerning their common frontiers, their boundaries with
Abyssinia, and their economic and political relations
with the inland Christian monarchy.

The French made a port at Djibouti in 1888, and
started to build a railway south to tap Abyssinia.
In the minds of French Imperialists Djibouti began to
assume a great importance in the last decade of the
nineteenth century: for they dreamed of a railway
across Africa from west to east, passing from Lake
Tchad, through Abeshr and El Fashr, by the Upper
Nile Valley and the Sobat River to Adis Abeba, and
ending at Djibouti. This dream was rudely shattered
by the Fashoda incident. Since then, French Somali-
land has become content to be an outlet for Abys-
sinia trade, and to develop its own resources. Owing
to its fortunate position, its very good harbor, and
its railway, the colony has prospered. There are
coast fisheries and important salt mines. In the year
before the War of 1914, over four hundred steamers

107

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

entered Djibouti, and the import and export trade
from Abyssinia reached eight million dollars. So
long as France remains friends with Great Britain
and Italy, the colony has no political importance.

Nor has Italian Somaliland been of international
political interest since Abyssinia was made inviolate
by Italy's 1905 agreement with France and Great
Britain. Italian Somaliland could have played
a r61e in African history, only had Italy remained
faithful to the Triple Alliance. For then, the Ger-
mans would have had a foothold to injure the British
in the Sudan and East Africa, and to oppose Franco-
British interests in Abyssinia.

British Somaliland, however, has had an interesting
history since 1900, which has not been without strong
influence upon the general colonial policy of Great
Britain. In narrating this history, we must remem-
ber that British policy in Somaliland had been guided
not by the advantages to be gained from developing
the Protectorate, but by the geographical posi-
tion of British Somaliland, which has given it an im-
portance far beyond its present or potential economic
value. It is not far from Aden, and its inhabitants are
in constant communication with the tribes of the
Arabic peninsula, both on the Red Sea and Persian
Gulf sides of the desert. Because of the position of
Imperial Britain as a Moslem Power, the British
have been anxious about their authority in Somali-
land, and have made great efforts and sacrifices, and
incurred great expense, to maintain it.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, there
arose in British Somaliland a menace to British

108

BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND

authority in the spreading political power of Mullah
Mohammed Abdullah, the son of an Ogdan shepherd,
who had founded a Mahdi sect near Berbera ten
years before. After Kitchener's reentry into the
Sudan, it was vital for the pacification of the
southern provinces that no source of Moslem
fanaticism find its way, through the Islamic pro-
paganda in Abyssinia, into the valleys of the Blue
and White Nile. So the suppression of the Mullah
was decided upon, and an agreement was made
between Great Britain and Abyssinia for, a com-
mon action, in which the frontier should be con-
sidered as non-existent. The Mullah's forces were
broken up, but he escaped. In 1902, he once more
appeared in British Somaliland with larger strength
than ever. A British force, which followed him into
the Haud Desert, was badly defeated. Troops had
to be sent from Aden and India, and the question
arose as to whether a serious expedition should be
undertaken to destroy the Mullah, regardless of
expense or of loss of life.

While the Foreign Office was debating, the Mullah
sent a message to General Manning, demanding a
recognition of his sphere of influence and removal
of restriction on the importation of arms. A hundred
National Scouts of the ostracized Boers volunteered
for service. Italy allowed the use of her territory for
the passage of British troops and patrolled her Somali
coast to prevent the importation of arms.

During the year 1903, the operations were incon-
clusive. The British had three severe setbacks, and
the Mullah raided at will. In some mysterious way

109

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the Mullah seemed to be getting all the arms and
ammunition he wanted ; Abyssinian cooperation was
strikingly ineffective.

In the face of bitter criticism, the Foreign Office
decided on a policy of "watchful waiting " throughout
1904. The Indian troops were sent home, and the
British and Italian Governments arranged to give
the Mullah grazing rights, in return for his pledge
to keep the peace. The Mullah agreed to allow
freedom of trade in his sphere, except in the case of
slaves and arms.

In 1905, the British Government laid down the
policy that there was no obligation to conquer the
Mullah, so long as he remained tolerably peace-
keeping. Great Britain would not allow tribes under
her protection to be molested, but they, on their side,
should do everything in their power to defend them-
selves. They could not, however, do this unless they
were given arms and ammunition. But would arm-
ing these tribes be a violation of the Brussels Con-
ference Act, which prohibited allowing arms to go to
natives who were not under effective administrative
control? The debates on the subject showed clearly
the unwillingness of the Cabinet to sanction the
expenditure required to organize administratively
territories from which there could be no reasonable
hope of financial return. The revenue for 1904 had
decreased nearly £5000, and the expenditure had in-
creased £25,000. The extension of the French railway
from Djibouti into Abyssinia had^seriously diminished
the trade through Zeila.

For several years the Home Government policy
no

BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND

seemed to be justified by the absence of serious incon-
venience or disturbance. In 1907, the country was
normal enough for two EngUsh ladies, accompanied
only by native servants, to spend several months
at big game shooting in the interior. But in 1909,
the Mullah again became active, and declared that
there could be peace between him and the British
only if his authority in the hinterland were not
threatened. Reinforcements were sent from India,
and a detachment of the King's African Rifles from
Mombasa. A Military Governor was appointed for
Somaliland. But Parliament was opposed to opera-
tions in the interior. Without sufficient forces to
insure safety, it seemed only inviting trouble to main-
tain the advanced posts. They were withdrawn.

In March, 1910, notwithstanding raids on friendly
tribes and several small victories for the Mullah, the
Government decided to withdraw to the coast. In-
terior posts were given up. Peace did not follow
this withdrawal. It was naturally interpreted as
a confession of weakness. The Mullah had more
prestige than ever. There was no more truth in the
reports of his death than in those of the death of
Menelik. A ferment of anti-European feeling drove
the natives who had shown themselves notoriously
Anglophile to the coast to seek protection.

When the report of Sir William Manning was
published in London, the Somaliland controversy
seized the public mind. Sir William said that the
friendly tribes were being armed to repel raids: for,
although the Mullah was certainly not organizing
his forces to invade the protectorate, there would

III

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

undoubtedly be raids against unarmed friendlies.
Lord Curzon complained in the House of Lords that
the friendly tribes, because of loyalty to Great
Britain, were now left to the mercy of their enemies,
that the difficulties of Italy's problem were increased,
and that British prestige had been greatly injured.
The Earl of Crewe and other members of the Upper
House contended that the only safe, honorable, and
far-seeing policy was to send out immediately a large
expeditionary force. Lord Lansdowne gave a re-
sume of the reasons of Imperial interest that had
prompted the occupation of Somaliland opposite
Aden. He showed how Great Britain had necessa-
rily been led from the coast to the interior, and as-
serted that the appearance of the Mullah imposed
obligations upon the British towards those who had
submitted to the protectorate. Members of the
House of Commons also denounced the evacuation as
ill-timed and premature.

' The debates in Parliament and the press revealed
that the underlying motive of British colonial policy
was to put nothing into a country that could not be
got out of it with interest. Colonial policy has a
financial basis. Colonies are a national investment.
The British tax-payer sanctions no expenditure where
future profit is not reasonably in sight. There were
only two justifiable reasons for a Somaliland expedi-
tion. The first was the probability of an economic
development that would bring back the money it
was to cost. The second was the defense of the
larger general interests of the Empire. Somaliland
did not seem likely to pay its way, or to help British

112

BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND

trade. The Government was not of the opinion that
the Mullah could make trouble in Africa for other
British possessions, or hurt British prestige in Arabia
and the Persian Gulf. The friendly tribes would be
provided with arms. Then they could defend them-
selves— just as they would have to do anyway, if
there were no British protectorate.

The financial argument of 1905 was still potent in
1910, and was reinforced by the report of 191 1, which
showed that expenses had amounted to three times
the revenue, although the administered area was now
limited to the Berbera, Zeila, and Burhar districts
along the coast . In 1 9 1 1 the ' ' political department ' *
was abolished, and some troops disbanded.

After two years of an anomalous regime, the crush-
ing defeat of a British camel corps, which was saved
from annihilation only through the attackers' shortage
of ammunition, showed how intolerable, from the
point of view of prestige, was the protectorate that
did not protect merely because it was a protectorate
that did not pay. In spite of protests and a wide-
spread agitation, the Cabinet refused to give up the
policy of "watchful waiting." Indian reinforce-
ments once more arrived from Aden. But no puni-
tive expedition followed.

Before many months it was realized that the defeat
at Dulmadoba was having serious consequences in
Somaliland, and that loss of prestige was jeopardizing
British interests. A state of war and anarchy pre-
vailed. There was fear that the Mullah, who had
again been raiding the friendly tribes of the interior,
might attack Berbera. The House of Commons

8 113

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

was asked in February, 1914, for £25,000 "to meet
additional expenses entailed upon Somaliland in
connection with the activity of the Mullah. The
camel corps was twice increased. Mr. Harcourt
explained to the House of Commons that Burao,
eighty miles inland, and an intermediate post were
to be re-occupied. But the Government did not
intend to attempt to pacify the interior, or to send a
punitive expedition against the Mullah. The Mullah
was old, and in an advanced stage of dropsy. He
could no longer lead the dervishes, and, having been
excommunicated by Mecca, was only a robber.
None regarded him longer as a prophet. The wise
policy was to go as far as Burao, and await the
Mullah's death.

But Mullahs, like Villas, are feline in their insolent
holding on to life. The Mullah's answer was to send
cavalry within firing distance of Berbera. More troops
were demanded from Aden in July. A few weeks later
there were other fish to fry. London's attention was
centered on the German advance towards Paris.

The dervishes were still on the offensive in Novem-
ber, 1 9 14. Cannon and naval aeroplanes were used
to put them to flight. It was their first experience
with shell fire. But the encounter must have taken
place pretty near the coast.

In spite of greater pre-occupations, there was
constant anxiety about Somaliland until the revolt
of the Sherif of Mecca against the Turks in the sum-
mer of 1 91 6 sounded the last stroke of the death-
knell that had long been tolling to the German hopes
of Mohammedan help against their enemies.

114

CHAPTER VI
THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY

PORTUGAL, Spain, England, and France had an
excellent start — a start of centuries — in Africa.
Because her energies were expended exclu-
sively upon the New World, Spain never got very far. ^
Portugal still holds two large colonies in Africa as the
inheritance of days of glory and enterprise. Great
Britain entered Africa by conquest and exploration.
From the beginning of her colonization there was the
strong motive that Africa was on the way to India
and Australasia. To France, Africa was neighboring
territory, just across the Mediterranean from her
own coast. Russia had vast adjacent territories in
Asia, and did not need to be interested in Africa.
The three States that formed the Triple Alliance
before the present war achieved their unity after the

^ Although the colonies of Spain in Africa represent to-day all that
is left of her vast colonial empire, they are not of enough interest to
warrant special mention. For the Canary Islands are considered and
treated as a part of Spain, just as the Madeira Islands are part of
Portugal. There remain the Rio d'Oro, which is the Atlantic end of
the Sahara desert; and two bits of mainland, very small, and five
islands, of which Fernando Po is the only important one, in the Gulf
of Guinea. France has the right of preemption, if Spain wants to
sell any of these colonies. The fortunes of Spain in the Rif are
treated in the chapter on Morocco.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

best of Africa had been preempted: and the choice
bits outside of European sovereignty or protection
were being gathered in by the two Occidental Powers
while the three Central Powers were finding them-
selves in the new status resulting from the events of
the decade 1 860-1 870.

Austria-Hungary, her hands always full at home,
has not aspired to colonies. United Germany was
slow to awake to the political and economic advan-
tages of a colonial Empire. But Italy, long before
her unity was established, was inspired by the hope
of a partial reincarnation of imperial Rome and
medieval Venice. One finds the Risorgimento
literature permeated with the idea that the new
Italy must become mistress of the Mediterranean,
with sovereignty over the north coast of Africa, and
predominant influence in the territories freed by
the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. ^

Italians had never given up intimate connection
with the African and Ottoman Mediterranean coast
line. Curiously enough, nearest home, they had
been largely supplanted in Dalmatia by the Slavs
and in the Ionian Islands by the Greeks. But they
still remained in ^gean and Levant ports. Al-
though the nineteenth century saw a marked cultural
conquest by France of the Near East, Italian has
survived as a language of communication with the
foreigner in all the Levant ports. Italians settled
in great numbers in Egypt, Tunis, and Algeria.
Everywhere they competed with Greeks for small
commerce and the carrying trade.

' See my New Map of Europe, pp. 123, 125-6, 241.

116

THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY

Unfortunately for Italian hopes, France and Great
Britain had no idea of allowing the new State to
become a menace to their hegemony in the Mediter-
ranean. Historic claims and economic considera-
tions are worth nothing, unless there is the force of
arms to make them good. In the early eighties Eng-
land installed herself in Egypt, and France took
Tunis. Italy's indignant protests fell on deaf ears.
She joined the Triple Alliance, and with Germany,
her companion in ill luck, started to see what scraps
she could pick up that had fallen from the Anglo-
French table.

The withdrawal of Egypt and Great Britain from
the Sudan gave Italy what seemed to be the only
possible opening for the planting of her flag in Africa.
A stretch of the Red Sea coast between Suakim
and the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb was occupied,
because Great Britain did not care enough about this
country to oppose the occupation. After the fall of
Khartum and the abandonment of the Upper Valley
of the Nile, the British had kept a garrison at Suakim
as a starting point of future reconquest. The French,
on the other hand, could prevent Italy from control-
ing the western bank of the passage from the Red
Sea into the Gulf of Aden by virtue of "prior claims, "
dating back to 1862, but which were not taken ad-
vantage of until 1884. The territory, with an unde-
fined interior occupied by nomad Arab tribes, was
organized in 1890 as the colony of Eritrea. Its
chief port, Massowah, is the natural port of northern
Abyssinia.

Farther to the east, the Italians entered Somali-
117

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

land, and gradually proclaimed and tried to extend
their sovereignty over the long stretch of coast land
from Cape Guardafui to the mouth of the Juba
River, a distance of one thousand miles. Not much
of the north side of the Cape, on the Gulf of Aden,
could be occupied, because the British were installed
at Berbera, and refused to allow the littoral of the
gulf opposite Aden "to fall into the hands of another
Power. " Most of this territory, which is now called
"Somaliland Colony and Protectorates," is still
under the actual control of several Sultans, who
nominally acknowledge the King of Italy — so long
as he does not bother them. The southern end, at
first called Benadir, is the colony. The port of
Mogadisho is the capital.

A glance at the map will show that these two
Italian possessions touch Abyssinia on the north
and on the south-east, where the colonial adminis-
tration is effective. It was the Italian ambition to
extend their influence over Abyssinia. In this way,
they would have had two possessions of great value,
and railways to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean
would have carried to and from the outside world the
trade of a rich and well-populated country. But
they tried to accomplish this by a shabby trick, the
disastrous results of which are narrated in the chapter
on Abyssinia.

The battle of Adowa in 1896 was a crushing blow
to Italian colonial aspiration in East Africa. Abys-
sinia remained independent, established friendly re-
lations with France and Great Britain, and by the
wonderful development of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

118

THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY

and the creation of the French port of Djibouti, with
its railway into Abyssinia, the two Italian possessions
have not developed as was expected before Adowa.

Two advantageous frontier rectifications since the
Treaty of Adis Abeba have given Eritrea a portion
of the high Abyssinian plateau, without which the
colony would have had no economic excuse for exist-
ence. As it is, the revenue is far below expenditures
for civil administration. Italy has to make good a
substantial deficit, and pay the charges of a consider-
able military force besides. Seventy-five miles of
railway had been completed when the Tripolitan
War broke out, and this was found to be very helpful
in keeping the colony quiet. Eritrea, being opposite
Arabia, was the nearest point of contact of Italy and
Turkey. Her ports in the Red Sea enabled Italy
to prevent much communication and gun-running
between the Senussi of the Tripolitan hinterland and
Arabia. The transit trade of Massowah has become
more important of recent years, though not at all
what it ought to be, if we compare the volume of
trade with that of other African ports whose hinter-
land is much less advantageous. Were it not for
pearl-fishing, palm nuts, and a little gold-mining near
Asmara, Eritrea would cost Italy more than the
voters of the colonial budget are probably willing to
pay. During the first year of the present war, the
Massowah hide exports (some coming from the
British Sudan !) were a very precious help to Germany,
who got them safely through the Mediterranean
under the Italian flag.

Owing to the intractability of the native Sultans
119

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

and the successes of the Mullah Mohammed in
defying the British in the neighboring colony, the
Somaliland Protectorate has never meant much more
than trouble and a valuable ground for wireless
telegraphy experiments. But the Benadir Colony in
the south has been organized and developed on sound
lines since 1908, and Italy is beginning to sell on a
large scale her cotton goods and other manufactured
products to the natives, and get commission and
transport profit out of a growing export cattle trade.

After the bitter disappointment on the confines of
Abyssinia, Italy began to concentrate her energies
upon Tripoli, the last Ottoman possession in Africa.
A policy of "pacific penetration" was begun, and
might eventually have been successful, had it not
been for the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the
starting point of a new era in the history of the
eastern Mediterranean.

At the beginning of the twentieth century Abdul
Hamid, engrossed in his pan-Islamic policy, looked
upon Tripo^ as the joyer of the renaissance of Turk-
ish influence in Africa. The religious propaganda of
Islam had been making rapid strides in Africa, and
the Sultan planned to use his position as Khalif to
counteract the political arrangements of the Euro-
pean Powers for the final partition of Africa. He
did not hope for much aid from Egypt. But in the
hinterland of Tripoli, the Senussi sect could be used
to resist, under his aegis, the spread of infidel rule
in the Sudan and the Sahara.

France and Great Britain, after the Fashoda in-
cident, had divided the interior of North Africa into

120

THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY

spheres of influence, and France had arrived at an
understanding with Italy, by which Italian ambitions
in Tripoli and French ambitions in Morocco were
reciprocally sanctioned. Acting upon his perfect
right, for he had not been consulted, the Sultan of
Turkey objected to the Anglo-French Sudanic agree-
ment, and refused to recognize it. When he lost
what he believed would be a valuable and active
local support by the death of the Grand Senussi in
1902, he showed the only possible means of effective
protest by putting a strong Turkish garrison at Bilma
for the protection of the Tripolitan hinterland, and
let it be understood that the Turks would proceed
immediately to extensive military operations for
bringing under effective control Turkish territory
up to Lake Chad.

As long as France and Great Britain were mutually
distrustful and suspicious of each other in North
Africa, and as long as Abdul Hamid could make
trouble for the French by his strong influence over
the Bey of Tunis, there seemed to be some hope of
Turkish ambitions being realized. But France and
Great Britain compounded aU their colonial rivalries
by the Agreement of 1904. The old Bey of Tunis
died in 1906, and was succeeded by a ruler who had
been brought up under European influence, and was
wholly loyal to the French. The Sultan's only hope
from that moment lay in superior military force.
This he did not have. So the Sudan, and later the
whole of Tripoli, was lost to the Ottoman Empire.

It was not a bad thing for French ambitions that
the Turks tried to get into the hinterland of Tripoli.

121

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

For it enabled France, without violating her Italian
agreement, to anticipate Italy, and to define what
had always been a vague boundary. In June, 1906,
the Turks sent a secret expeditionary force to occupy
the desert oases, of which Djanet was the chief.
France protested to the Porte, declaring that Djanet
was outside of Tripoli, which the French claimed
extended no farther than Ghat. The Sultan had to
issue an irade^ recognizing that Djanet was in the
French sphere, and countermanding the instructions
given to the Turkish army in Tripoli to penetrate
the Sudan.

But after the Young Turk Revolution, many irades
of Abdul Hamid were repudiated. When the French
Ambassador at Constantinople tried to get a clear
understanding about the hinterland 'of Tripoli, he
met with a rebuff. So he warned his Government
against the dangers to which the French in North
Africa might be exposed. The fear was soon realized.
In the autumn of 1909, the Turks began to show un-
wonted activity in the Sudan. It appeared that the
Senussi sect was taking great comfort in Turkish
promises. The Young Turks had an easy task in
arraying the Arab tribesmen against France. For
the only remaining outlet to the slave trade was by
way of Borku to Tripoli.

I was away from Turkey during that winter, and
was living in Paris. It was common knowledge there
that the French were meeting with serious opposition
in the hinterland of Tripoli, and that their losses were
heavy. But little was allowed to be published, for
France wanted to keep on friendly terms with Turkey,

122

THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY

and preferred to think that the Sudan opposition
was due to local causes. Ottoman troops, however,
occupied the oasis of Kafura, a Senussi center, and
there were reports from Constantinople of the Turk-
ish intention to cooperate with the Senussi to estab-
lish control over the caravan route across the eastern
Sahara from Lake Chad. There was an enormous
traffic of arms, the effects of which are still felt, from
Tripoli to the desert tribesmen. Italian intervention
could not have been looked upon by France with an
unfriendly eye: for it drew bellicose tribesmen into
the Turkish service in Tripoli, and left France a free
hand. Shortly after entering upon her war of aggres-
sion, Italy annexed the African province of Turkey.
But her politicians had no more idea than her soldiers
of the interior of the country, what its boundaries
ought to be, or what they were going to be. When
Turkey finally agreed to oppose no longer the Italian
occupation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, the British in
Egypt had occupied Solium, and France was firmly
established in the oases of the Tripolitan hinterland.
There was no intention of allowing Italy, any more
than Turkey, to enter the Sudan!

In the second Ottoman Parliament, I heard Nadji
Bey, deputy for Tripoli, pleading with the Young
Turks to follow the only policy that would save his
country. He said:

"Do not have any doubt about the fact that
Tripoli is to-day economically in the hands of the
Italians, and that we are traversing a period of
serious transition. Let me confine my illustration
to public instruction. The Italians have a dozen

123

THE NEW MAP OP APRICA

fine schools, and our Ministry has not known how to
establish a single one since the constitution. There
are four old schools, but they still lack professors,
because there is no money to pay them. The Italian
schools provide for the needs of thirty-two thousand
inhabitants, whose children receive an education
which has nothing in it of Ottoman. More than
twenty thousand Jews are to-day won over to Italy.
We have a population of a million and a half Mos-
lems, deprived of educational facilities. Instead of
establishing schools, you are occupied with forming
school districts on paper. Comrades, the Turkish
language is lost for our subjects in Tripoli. If you
were to compare our schools with those of the
Italians, you would weep. To-day "

Here Nadji Bey was interrupted by a loud clam-
our, and his speech remained unfinished. It had
no effect. Nothing was done. As we have seen,
the Young Turks were devoting their energies and
money to stirring up trouble in the Sudan, thus
playing into Italy's hands. Por France and Great
Britain would now welcome the realization of Italy's
ambition.

On September 27, 1911, Italy presented to the
Sublime Porte an ultimatum, demanding consent in
forty-eight hours to an Italian Protectorate over
Tripoli. Turkey naturally ignored the ultimatum.
Italy declared war, and sent an expedition to occupy
Tripoli. The war lasted for a year, and was confined
(since Italy feared getting the ill-will of the other
Powers) to Tripoli, with the exception of a futile
demonstration at the Dardanelles and the occupation
of Rhodes and other islands of the Dodecanese. The

124

THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY

formation of the Balkan League, in September, 1912,
and the inevitable approach of a new war, induced
Turkey to consent to the loss of her last African
province. By the treaty of Ouchy, October 15,
1 91 2, Turkey was not asked to recognize the Italian
conquest, but merely to grant complete autonomy
to Tripoli. The Turkish army was to be withdrawn
from Tripoli and Bengazi, after which Italy was
to withdraw her army from the ^Egean Islands.
Commercial and diplomatic relations were to be
resumed, and Italy was to take over Tripoli's share
of the Ottoman Public Debt. ^

The impotence of Turkey to resist Italy's occupa-
tion of Tripoli was due solely to the fact that Italy
had control of the sea. It was impossible to send
reinforcements and supplies of ammunition and arms.
But, in spite of this handicap, Italy did not have
brilliant success during the year of continual fight-
ing. She was not fighting Turkey, but the natives of
Tripoli, backed by powerful support from the Senussi
and Arab tribes of the hinterland. Italy signed the
Treaty of Ouchy in order to induce Turkey to use
her influence to reconcile the Arabs to the Italian
occupation. To accomplish this, Italy maintained
her occupation of the islands of the Dodecanese, on
the ground that Turkish officers were still in Tripoli,
organizing and keeping alive what Italy now called
the "rebellion" of the natives.

^ The story of the "pacific penetration, " the attempt of the Young
Turks to check it, the Italo-Turkish War, and the negotiations
which ended in the Treaty of Ouchy (Lausanne) is told in detail in
The New Map of Europe, pp. 241-262.

125

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

This was perfectly true. I know many Young
Turks who went to Tripoli, and never came home.
They are even now by no means all dead. Their
attitude was well expressed by one of them who went
out to Africa after the Balkan War was ended, in
May, 1 91 3. Like many of his friends, he was going
to Egypt, and if he could not succeed in getting
through there, knew how it could be done by way of
Tunis. He said to me, when I went down to Galata
to see him off: "I know that Turkey is dying, and
that Islam is dying. How can I do better than die
with my country and with my religion? And where
can I make the sacrifice more worth while than in
Tripoli against the Italians?"

The Turks have affection for the French, and re-
spect for the English. They have great faith in the
ability of the Germans, and more or less sympathy
with the German way of going about things, and
getting things done. They have too much in com-
mon with the Russians, in blood and nature, not to
be rivals. But the Italians they regard in the same
light as the Greeks, untrustworthy morally and weak
physically. They may accept as a social and military
equal the Englishman, the German, the Frenchman,
the Austrian, the Hungarian, the Pole, and the Rus-
sian— but never the Italian. It is necessary to make
this statement, and to add that the Arabs adopt
practically the same view, in order to explain how
difficult is Italy's task in Africa. If a man re-
spects you, you can conquer or ignore his hate.
Italy will never make a success of African coloniza-
tion unless she effaces the impression of Adowa,

126

THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY

which her four years in Tripoli have tended only to
confirm.

While progress in Cyrenaica was too slow in 191 3
to admit of organization of the new colony, for the
tribes were uncompromisingly hostile and uncon-
quered and the Italians had to stick to the coast,
much was done in Tripoli to make a good impression
at home and on the outside world. The city itself
was transformed in a few months, and it was esti-
mated that eleven thousand Italians, outside of the
military forces, were already in the new colony. The
country was being explored for mines and other
possible ways of exploitation, and railways along
the coast to the Tunisian frontier and inland to
Ghadames were being surveyed.

Shortly before the European War broke out, Italy
reported that quiescent conditions were prevailing
on the other side of the Mediterranean, and the re-
vised Treasury statements showed that the acquisi-
tion had cost up to 19 14 over two hundred and
twenty -five million dollars. The army losses have
never been completely compiled. If Tripoli had
really been acquired, and if Italy were quit of the
problem of conquest with even a huge sum of money
and heavy loss of life, perhaps some would think the
game worth the candle.

The articles that have appeared in European and
American reviews and newspapers about the value
of Tripoli have aroused a great deal of interest, and
resulted in much speculation. Directly opposite
views have been set forth, and argued with plausi-
bility. Tripoli supported a large population and was

127

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

a source of much wealth to ancient Rome. Why not
to-day? Is it in Tripoli, as throughout the territories
of the Ottoman Empire, the blight of Islam? Or was
wealth and fertility magnified and exaggerated in
classical history? Did what seems to us of no
account appear to the Romans and Greeks a great
deal? But we have refutation of this in our actual
knowledge of their wealth: and, if architecture is a
criterion, would a little seem much to those who built
Baalbek and Palmyra? Or is Tripoli a hopeless
proposition because of the truth of the theory of
climatic changes?

Out of the confusion of opinion one does gain,
however, a pretty good idea that Tripoli is to-day
the least promising portion, potentially as well as
actually, of the north African coast. Again we see
strikingly illustrated the handicap that confronts in
the twentieth century the Powers who achieved unity
and ability for extra-European expansion after the
best of Asia, Africa, and the islands had already been
occupied.

Considering the colonial activity in these later
Powers, we must add to the handicap of having to
take the leavings the fact that we are too prone to
judge the ability and qualifications of these new-
comers by comparison with what the "old hands"
are able to do after generations of experience. In
writing this very chapter the thought has occurred
to me that I have been judging Italy by what France
or Great Britain could have done under similar cir-
cumstances. But let it be remembered that when
France first entered upon her African Mediterranean

128

^J^ ^

<?-

<</

THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST OF AFRICA

SHOWING CHANCES BETWEEN l^ll AND ipi4-

THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY

conquest in Algeria, it took her fifteen years to get
from Algiers to Constantine, and certainly half a
century to accomplish what we have expected of
Italy in four years.

The repercussion of the war in Europe, which
had no serious effect in Egypt or Timis, hit the Ital-
ians hard, and proved that they had not conquered
Tripoli at all. Native troubles were supposed to
be the result of German intrigue, and the German
Consul in Tripoli was arrested, together with other
Germans who were under suspicion of being army
officers conspiring with the natives. But even if this
be true, it can be pointed out that German intrigues
fell flat everywhere else in Africa. The unwelcome
truth was forced upon Italy in a striking way
when in the spring of 191 5 the news reached Rome of
the disastrous defeat of Colonel Miani, who lost
nearly half his European troops and some gims by a
sudden mutiny of native troops near Sidera. After
killing a thousand Italians, four thousand native
troops, with all their equipment, joined the rebels.

By the end of 191 5 the Italians were back again on
the coast, where they had started in October, 1912.
What the end of 191 6 will bring no man knows. But
Italy has yet before her the task of conquering and
colonizing Tripoli.

129

CHAPTER VII

ALGERIA AND TUNIS: THE NUCLEUS OF
THE FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

THE establishment of the French Protectorate
over Morocco in 19 12 was the culmination of
eighty years of effort in North Africa. The
French African empire, with the exception of Somali-
land and Madagascar, is made up of contiguous
territories, extending over a quarter of the continent,
with numerous ports on the Mediterranean and the
Atlantic. In this empire is included the Sahara
Desert, a large part of the Sudan, the entire valley of
the Senegal, two thirds of the Niger, and a portion of
the Congo valley. All the colonizing European
states, Italy, Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Por-
tugal, and Spain are somewhere France's neighbors.
By her little colony in Somaliland, French territory
touches Abyssinia in the east. Liberia is a neighbor
in the west. In Madagascar France holds the one
large African island.

The French African empire started on the Mediter-
ranean under Louis Philippe, was spread to West
Africa under Napoleon III., and across the Sahara
and through the Sudan to Central Africa under the
Third Republic. Algeria was the nucleus on the

130

ALGERIA AND TUNIS

Mediterranean, and Senegal on the Atlantic. It has
been a curious combination of foresight and luck, the
building of this empire, and, as in the case of every
other African colony and every other Power, more
the latter than the former. Luck deserted the
French only twice in all the nineteenth century — •
when they let the British get a foothold in the delta
of the Niger, and when they failed to push their
expedition into the headwaters of the Nile before
Kitchener started to reconquer the Sudan.

In studying the history of French colonial expan-
sion, to which four chapters of this book are devoted,
one is struck with several outstanding facts: the
fewness of the men who dreamed dreams and thought
the dreams could be realized ; the peculiar suitability
of Arab and desert warfare to the military genius of
the French ; the beginning of the solution of adminis-
trative problems and the realization of economic
return only in the twentieth century. As with the
British, generations passed of hit and miss, of blunder
and improvisation, before government and people
were converted to the wisdom and necessity of a
colonial policy through placing before their eyes the
goal of financial benefit. British imperialism, as a
national and popular program, began with the recon-
quest of the Sudan and the Boer War. French
imperialism, as a national and popular program,
began with the humiliation of Fashoda. The new
map of Africa was made during the fifteen years
preceding the present war.

The late Europe'anization of the Mediterranean is
the great enigma of modern history. While remote

131

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

regions of the globe were being transformed and
brought under the segis of European civilization,
the Mediterranean remained under the shadow of
Islam, a closed sea, whose waters washed nations in
the embryo and vast coasts where anarchy had reigned
for fifteen centuries since the disappearance of the
Roman Empire. France went into Algeria in 1830,
and inaugurated the modem era of the Middle Sea,
not because of a conviction that the time had come to
do away with the pirates of the Barbary Coast, but
because of a trivial dispute between the Dey of Al-
giers and the French Consul over a question of grain !
It was an auspicious moment, however. The sea
power of the Ottoman Empire had been irrevocably
destroyed three years before at the battle of Nava-
rino. Mohammed Ali was severing in Egypt the
essential link of the chain that bound Africa to
Turkey. Christian civilization was being reestab-
lished in the Hellenic peninsula. Italy was at the
threshold of the generation which was to bring na-
tional unity.

It took almost the entire reign of Louis Philippe
to conquer Algeria. The Second Empire, although it
made a beginning of West African conquest in Sene-
gal, had no other policy for Africa than the intangible
dream of reestablishing an Arab empire. Napoleon's
energies were occupied in Turkey, Italy, Syria, and
Mexico. France turned to Africa after the disas-
trous war with Prussia in order to find consolation
for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. But there was
no certain goal. Energies and money and men were
dissipated in Indo-China and Madagascar. Siam

132

ALGERIA AND TUNIS

received more attention than Algeria. Sentimental-
ists clung persistently to the hope of "getting back"
Egypt. Even the imperialists who had faith and
conviction in the colonial future of France groped
blindly in the dark.

Fashoda was the awakening. This humiliation
had to come. For the first time since 1870, France
asked herself, ''Quo vadis?^* It aroused in the
French nation a determination to hold and develop
properly the heritage of whose possession the France
of slippers and dressing-gown was scarcely aware.
It pointed out clearly to the statesmen and empire-
builders of France the one course that would give
practical results. There must be complete under-
standing and cooperation with Great Britain. Hence
the agreement of 1899 concerning spheres of influence
in the Sudan, and, five years later, the soHd, perma-
nent foundation for empire-building in the agreement
of May 8, 1904. In the meantime an agreement was
signed with Italy providing for the future of Tripoli.

These international arrangements assured France
a free hand and support in Morocco, sanction of her
occupation of Tunis, the territorial changes and
economic stipulations necessary for the proper organ-
ization and development of her West African and
Equatorial African possessions. In return, Egypt
was left to the British and Tripoli to the ItaHans.
With aims definitely centered on definitely assured
territories, the builders of the colonial empire were
able to proceed to administrative organization along
lines that would bring financial results. The money
needed for economic development could then be

133

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

solicited and obtained from Parliament and from
private capital.

But it would be a mistake to ignore what had been
accomplished during the first three decades of the
Third Republic. Three achievements prepared the
way for the Aladdin's lamp transformation that has
been wrought since 1900. One of the "keys to the
house "^ was secured between 1881 and 1883 by the
invasion of Tunis and the establishment of a French
Protectorate over the territory lying between Algeria
and the Turkish vilayet of Tripoli. Intrepid explor-
ers and brilliant soldiers carried the French flag from
the Senegal to the Niger, to the coast through Kong
and Dahomey, and from Gaboon to the Congo.
Most important of all, the conquered of Sedan be-
came the conquerors of Northern Africa through
learning how to fight natives with natives and by
using native methods.

West Africa, the Sahara, the Sudan, and Equato-
rial Africa are treated in later chapters. It is not my
intention to give an historical outline of Algeria and
Tunis, but to indicate the changes and problems and
development of the north African coast under the
French flag, in order to show the place and impor-
tance of what has happened recently in Algeria and
Tunis in the building of the French colonial empire
and in the general history of the spread of European
civilization in Africa. For here we find the secret and
the impetus of the movement that has established in
fifteen years the pax Gallica from the Mediterranean

'Jules Ferry called Tunis and Morocco the keys to France's
house in Africa.

134

ALGERIA AND TUNIS

to the Congo, from the Atlantic to the Anglo-Egyp-
tian Sudan, over territories inhabited by twenty-
five millions, and that has doubled in the last ten
years the commerce of these countries,

Algeria was completely conquered during the reign
of Louis Philippe. For sixty years it was governed
directly from Paris. After 1870, the French en-
deavored to make Algeria an integral part of France.
The idea was to colonize this country with French
colonists, and to make of it the panacea and compen-
sation for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. The
problem was exceedingly difficult, more dijSicult, in
spite of its nearness to the mother country, than any
other colonial enterprise ever undertaken by a
European Power, except, perhaps, the Dutch coloni-
zation of South Africa. In America and in Australia,
French, Spanish, and English found vast territories
with rich possibilities and sparsely inhabited. The
natives were primitive and rarely settled on lands
indispensable to their support. They were not firmly
rooted to the soil. They were not bound together
by social and political organisms that had developed
with the exploitation of the land on which they Hved.
Aboriginal inhabitants were driven into the interior,
and gradually exterminated or assimilated. In
Algeria, after 1870, the French attempted to implant
a new element in a country whose lands were owned
and Hved upon by a race that possessed political and
social institutions. They were institutions, too, of
a highly developed character, and the antithesis of the
institutions brought by the colonists. The French
were tackling a problem that European Christians

135

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA ,

have never been able to solve, the problem of recon-
ciling Islam and Christianity. It was altogether a
different problem from that of colonizing a pagan
country. It could not be compared at all to most of
the colonizing attempts in Africa, and to the British
in India or the Dutch in Java, where the idea is not
to implant the ruHng race in the country ruled, but
merely to administer the country and exploit its
foreign commerce by means of officials and traders.
The French tried to make Algeria a part of France,
inhabited by Frenchmen and other Europeans and
assimilated natives, speaking the French language
and governed by French laws.

Napoleon's idea of an Arab empire was abandoned.
The natives could not be assimilated. Algeria could
not be held indefinitely as a vast military camp. A
European element — for the most part French — must
be introduced, given means of acquiring land, and
encouraged to come and stay by the granting of
privileges not enjoyed by the natives. The first
step was the law of 1873 concerning native property.
It resulted in the unjust and wholly indefensible
eviction of thousands of proprietors from their lands.
Then followed the suppression of the Moslem system of
administering justice through kadis, which resulted in
the oppression of the natives and the awakening of,
religious antagonism. The third step was the exten-
sion to Algeria of the new French municipal law.
This put the government of communes into the hands
of minor officials and white colonists, who became
legally the masters of the destinies of the natives
among whom they lived. All sorts of advantages

136

ALGERIA AND TUNIS

were granted to colonists to bring them and to keep
them in Algeria: partial exemption from miUtary
service, partial exemption from taxation, and a gift
of lands of dispossessed natives. At the same time,
the process of governing from Paris resulted in
arrested economic development and administrative
confusion. The Governor of Algeria had no control
over the mihtary authorities. Administrations, de-
pending upon ministries in Paris, were directed by
considerations and governed by rules totally con-
trary to the interests of Algeria and unsuited to its
different economic and political situation aiid its pe-
culiar problems. There was no coordination of poHcy
and effort between branches of the Government. Fi-
nances were managed from Paris, revenues collected by
Paris, and credits voted in the general French budget.
Algeria did not prosper. The natives regarded the
French, as they had every right to do, as gendarmes
and merchants whose one thought was to exploit
them and to treat them unjustly. They resented
bitterly a regime which forced intruders upon them,
gave the intruders exemption from military service
and taxation, and imposed upon them the burdens
from which the intruders were free. The colonists
felt that they had exchanged the orderly civil admin-
istration at home for a half-baked, improvised un-
certain regime that was neither military nor civil, and
under which they did not know exactly where they
stood. They did not enjoy all the rights of French
citizens, especially in the matter of voting upon how
the money they paid in taxes and the revenue from
the wealth they created should be spent.

137

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Essential reforms were enacted after Fashoda,
reforms that have brought wealth and prosperity, and
make the days of the nineteenth century seem like an
ugly dream.

In 1898, three delegations, to be elected separately
by French citizens, tax-payers other than citizens,
and natives, were established to decide upon the
expenditure of the tax-payers' money. This was the
beginning of self-government. But it had no real
importance until the law of December 24, 1900,
separated Algerian from French finances, and estab-
lished a distinct Algerian budget. The Algerian
delegations, now masters of their finances, discussed
and decided how their money should be spent. The
result was magical. Immediately there was an ex-
tension of public works. Natives as well as colonists
began to take an interest in their country. Let one
illustration suffice. Before 1900, the forests of
Algeria brought in only several hundred thousand
francs, which represented fines collected from natives.
To-day there are practically no fines. But forest
products figure in the budget for more than five mil-
lion francs.

Since 1900, Algeria has become, after Great Britain,
Germany, Belgium, and the United States, the best
client of France. Eighty per cent, of her trade, which
amounts to nearly $250,000,000 per annum, is with
the mother country. Railways have been extended
so that Algeria, whose means of transportation were
limited fifteen years ago, has now two thousand miles
in exploitation. This has meant a rapid develop-
ment of mineral wealth, and the possibility of using

138

ALGERIA AND TUNIS

forest produce, especially cork. The great prosper-
ity of Algeria, however, is in agriculture, where dry
farming has brought under cultivation cereal-bearing
areas that the natives never utilized. The most
remarkable phenomenon in Algeria, from the stand-
point of the colonists, is the way the soil takes to
vines. Algerian wine has become a factor in the
French markets, and brings to its producers financial
returns far beyond their dreams. Algeria is also
looked upon as a most important source of mutton
for French markets.

Popular education was established in Algeria in
1892, and is more extended than anywhere else in
Africa except in the South African Commonwealth.
Since the inhabitants received the privilege of voting
the budget, sums are allotted that would make
possible primary education everjrwhere were it not
for the unfortunate system of communal responsibil-
ity.^ There are still a hundred thousand boys in
populated centers who have no school facilities, and
little has been done to educate girls. But it is the
will of the Government to give education to all, and

^ The commtines, under French law, collaborate in the creation
and construction of schools, and nothing can be accompUshed without
local cooperation. Since 1908, the Government has been giving from
eighty to one hundred per cent, of the funds needed, but many com-
munes in Algeria have not availed themselves of the sums appro-
priated for their local school uses. The reform urgently needed, now
that the Government can pay out of the general budget the entire
expense of native schools, is to have the control taken out of the
hands of the communes and vested in a central board at Algiers,
which shall appropriate the money, build the schools, and manage
them. C/. M. Augustin Bernard, in L'Afrique du Nord (Paris, 1913),
pp. 52-3.

139

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the funds for that purpose are provided. In the
matter of schools the French in Algeria have felt
much more keenly their stewardship than the British
in Egypt. The effort they are making in all their
colonies is rivaled only by what the United States
is doing in the Philippines.

But education brings its problems, especially in
old Moslem countries where the natives believe that
they are superior to their rulers. In their attitude
socially toward natives, the French are found by
subject races to be far more pleasant to live with
than the British. Especially among the upper
classes life is happier and richer for French than for
British subject races. The moment a Moslem is
educated, he becomes reasoningly a more bitter
enemy of the Englishman than he was instinctively
before. He hates him with all his heart and soul.
This revelation has come to me many a time, at a
dinner table or in a home where the Moslem, urbane
and charming, was guest or host. His eyes tell the
story his lips keep back. The Moslem knows that
the Englishman denies him — and always will deny
him — social equality, whether he be Sultan or peasant.
The Frenchman feels no racial antipathy for the
native and the native knows it. So the Frenchman
has not as much to fear from Moslem education as
the Englishman. His political interest does not
suffer greatly by the spread of primary education.
Higher education of native races is not a nightmare for
him. He can conceive of the day when the native
holds the franchise, full and free, of French citizen-
ship. What he asks is that the native learn to speak

140

ALGERIA AND TUNIS

French and become impregnated with French ideals.
His only fear is being too greatly outnumbered in the
midst of a native population.

Between 1901 and 1905, the territory of Algeria was
greatly extended into the hinterland. By the decree
of August 14, 1905, Southern Algeria was organized.
It includes the oases on the northern edge of the
Sahara. The extension of the railway to the desert
and the pacification of the Sahara enabled the civil
authorities to take over much sooner than was antici-
pated the administration of the Algerian hinterland.
Not many years ago, a deputy declared in the Palais
Bourbon that France would never hold Southern
Algeria in any other way than by military posts, whose
garrisons would be afraid to go out for a walk unless
they were all together and all armed. Garrisons are
few to-day, especially since they are needed more in
France than in Algeria. The savages they were
fighting fifteen years ago are now their comrades-in-
arms before Verdun. Were Tartarin de Tarascon
to return to-day ^^chez les tueurs'^ he could go right
into the desert, and still not find his lions.

Tunis was invaded in 1881. The treaty establish-
ing the French Protectorate was signed in 1883. The
European Powers and Turkey were confronted with a
fait accompli. Great Britain's protests were loud
and violent at first, but died down after the occupa-
tion of Egypt. Italy alone felt the full force of the
blow of seeing France so close to her shores, in a
territory historically Italian, and whose European
inhabitants were mostly Italian. The "perfidy" of
France drove Italy into the Triple Alliance. Only in

141

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

1 90 1 did the breach begin to be healed by France
giving tacit permission to Italy to do likewise some
day in Tripoli. The family that had been reigning,
under the suzerainty of Turkey, since the beginning
of the eighteenth century, was wise enough to bow
to the inevitable, and has been maintained on the
throne. Tunis is controled by a Resident, who is
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the cabinet of the Bey.
: The progress of Tunis began to be marked before
that of any other French colony. Its railways in-
creased far more rapidly than those of Algeria, and
its economic prosperity began early enough to con-
found in active public life those who opposed the
acquisition of the Protectorate and the grants of
money in the eighties and early nineties. A network
of excellent railways stretches along the coast, and
serves the interior. 'Sfax has become a marvelous
center of olive culture. Wheat, barley, and oats are
grown on large plantations. Lead, zinc, and iron
are mined extensively, and the phosphates production
is of mondial importance.

The reasons for the more rapid development of
Tunis than of Algeria are mostly political. Tunis
was administered from the beginning through the
French Foreign Office. Italians in the colony were
plentiful, and Italy took the French occupation to
heart. It was imperative for France to show both
the Italians of Tunis and the whole world how much
better off the country was under the French flag, and
to reconcile the Tunisians themselves to their loss of
independence. Sums were voted for railway building
and port construction and the development of indus-

142

ALGERIA AND TUNIS

tries, steamship communications were established
and freight rates arranged, that would never have
been put through on so large a scale on the ground of
purely financial return. Budget estimates for Tunis
were railroaded through the Chamber of Deputies
year after year on the plea of the urgent necessities
and considerations of foreign policy and national
defense.

Fortunately, French energy and push and skill,
and a masterly way of handling the native ruler and
Moslem religious leaders, have enabled French
officials to make excellent budget returns,' and to
report each year a remarkable agricultural and com-
mercial development. Lands that Islam had ren-
dered sterile were returned to the old prosperity of
Roman days, not slowly and laboriously, but rapidly
and as if by magic. The economic reward France
gets from Tunis has nothing of luck in it. It is
richly deserved.

At the same time the political advantages of hold-
ing Tunis are incalculable. The other "key to the
house," Morocco, being off in the farthest comer of
the African continent, with Algeria and the desert
between it and the rest of Islam, never meant — even
potentially — more than local disturbances for France.
Tunis, independent or under the control of another
Power, would have destroyed the possibility of a
strong and easily defended French African empire.
The importance of its possession by France was de-
monstrated when the Pan-Islamic propaganda began
to be agitated by Abdul Hamid, and taken up by
Germany. Without Tunis, France could not have

143

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

pacified the Sahara and installed herself in the Sudan. ^
Tunis, also, has offset for France the advantage
gained after the Napoleonic wars by Great Britain
in the possession of the island of Malta. To wrest
in the future from Great Britain the naval supremacy
of the Mediterranean, France needs only the ships.
She has in Bizerta the base looking westward, and
the Tunisian coast line lends itself easily to another
base looking eastward.

If the French are to realize their dreams of making
Algeria and Morocco and Tunis true pays de France,
the very crux of their problem is building up French
communities all along the Barbary coast from Sfax
to Agadir. Ten million Moslem natives can never
be French-speaking and French-thinking unless they
are in constant daily contact with Frenchmen — not
officials and soldiers, but colonists whose fortunes
are as much bound up in the country as theirs. Any
other method of making these Mediterranean coun-
tries French is bound to meet with dismal failure.
Colonization cannot stand where it is. The native
problem, the economic problem, the pacifying prob-
lem all depend upon one and the same thing — sl
great and widespread increase of the European ele-
ment. The peculiar nationalistic ideal of the French
owners demands that the new colonists be in over-
whelming proportion French families.

According to the last census, Algeria has five and a
half million inhabitants, and Tunis nearly two million.
In Algeria there are seven hundred and fifty thousand
Europeans, of whom three hundred thousand are

' See above, pp. 121.

144

ALGERIA AND TUNIS

French. Tunis contains two hundred thousand Euro-
peans, of whom less than fifty thousand are French.
With all the increase of wealth of these two posses-
sions, the French element has not greatly increased
since 1 900 . French capital and French enterprise have
doubled, but the Europeans employed in minor un-
official positions are generally Italians or Spaniards.
They become often French citizens — but that does
not make them French, It is in vain that the French
flag flies over Tunis. Its European civilian element
is distinctively Italian. Every Frenchman who visits
Tunis sees this with a sinking of the heart. ^ In
Morocco, France is dependent on Spaniards. During
the past twenty-five years the native population of
Algeria and Tunis has increased thirty per cent.'i In
the same period the demographic chart of France
has been very nearly stationary. It is no reflection
on the work of the best soldiers in the world and
brilliant administrators, models of patriotism and
self sacrifice, to say that their work has not brought —
from the standpoint of permanency and hope for the
future — what it should have brought. The fault lies
with their fellow-countrymen. The work of those
who go out with the sword and the pen into Africa
cannot be worth what it should be to France as long

'The 191 1 figures for Tunis (official French census) give 46,044
French, exclusive of the Army of Occupation but inclusive of civilian
officials; 109,143 Italians; and 12,410 "Anglo-Maltese." The last
category is, of course, also Italian. This means that nearly 125,000
Italians are settled in Tunis. In Algeria there are nearly the same
number of Spaniards. Figures have not yet been published for the
French Protectorate of Morocco. The French, however, are in a
minority to other Europeans all along the Barbary coast.
10 145

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

as the French nation refuses to rear children to take
possession of the heritage.

The warning to France, especially at this moment
when the best of her young manhood is being sacri-
ficed on the battlefield, is one of poignant force.
Military victories and the great colonial empire
mean nothing unless there is a new generation to
benefit by the sacrifices, the glory, and the success of
those who are giving their blood. If after the fathers
come not the children, nothing comes.

146

CHAPTER VIII
THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

STANLEY'S Congo River trip resulted in the
establishment, in 1882, of the Congo Free
State, which was placed under the sovereignty
of its founder, Leopold IL, King of the Belgians. Its
neutraHty and independence were guaranteed by the
Berlin Act of 1885, and during the next decade, as
knowledge of Central Africa became more precise,
its boundaries were defined by treaties with Great
Britain, Germany, Portugal, and France, who hold
the neighboring territories. With the exception of
the small British Protectorate of Uganda, and a spur
of German East Africa, which stands between the
Belgian Congo and Lake Victoria, this vast colony
of over nine hundred thousand square miles may be
said to cover the heart of Africa. For over two
thousand miles it is the territory comprising the
Congo River and its tributaries, and might have
continued to include both banks of the Congo, had
not the French explorer de Brazza anticipated Stan-
ley by planting the French flag on the north bank
of the river opposite Leopoldville. Like the Niger,
although on a far larger scale, the Congo finds its
way to the sea in a most unusual course, due north

147

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

for half its length through the very center of Africa,
then west for five hundred miles, and then almost
south for the last thousand. In the central bend, for
a stretch of considerably over a thousand miles, the
Congo is navigable. Steamers can run also on its
principal tributaries. This has facilitated the pro-
blem of communication, and as in the Niger, Nile,
and Zambesi valleys, has made less expensive and
more rapid the work of developing and colonizing.

The larger portion of the boundary with German
East Africa is formed by Lake Tanganika, and the
completion of the German railway from the lake to
Dar-es-Salaam has given the eastern portion of the
Congo an excellent outlet to the Indian Ocean.
Southward there is railway communication through
Rhodesia to Beira on the Indian Ocean coast of
Portuguese East Africa and through the Common-
wealth of South Africa to Cape Town and Durban.
The southern region of the Belgian Congo will soon
be connected with the Atlantic Ocean, also by the
railway from Katanga to Benguela in Portuguese
West Africa.

Since the readjustment of territory between France
and Germany after the Agadir crisis of 191 1, German
Kamerun touches the northwestern boundary of the
Congo at two points. Belgian Congo shares with
British Uganda, Lake Edward and Lake Albert, and
touches the Nile at the northern end of Lake Albert.
Until the death of King Leopold, the Belgians held
also the Lado Enclave which had the west bank of
the Nile for some distance north of Lake Albert.
On the Atlantic coast, the Congo is hemmed in north

148

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

and south by Portuguese territory, but has a free
outlet to the Atlantic at the Port of Boma near the
mouth of the Congo River.

Belgian Congo is inhabited by about fifteen mil-
lion natives of numerous tribes and dialects, the
great bulk of whom are pagan. Mohammedanism
and Christianity have made little progress in Belgian
territory.

The history of the Congo during the first ten
years of the twentieth century is one of the saddest
and most revolting pages of modern history. Were it
not for the fact that it has so essential a part in the
study of European colonial problems in Africa, one
would gladly pass it over in silence. For at the
present moment the wrongs and sufferings of Belgium
have awakened the indignation and sympathy of the
whole world. Neutral nations may be divided in
their attitude toward many things the Allies are
fighting for and hope to win. But they are united
in their desire to see the Belgians restored to inde-
pendence, and compensated for what they have
endured and are enduring. But one who under-
takes to set forth a historical record, especially when
it is his object to establish facts and principles that
must serve as a guide for the solution of problems
which the near future is going to bring into the lime-
light, cannot allow himself to be swayed by senti-
mental or partisan considerations.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the
convention of 1890 between Belgium and the Congo
Free State was about to expire. The question of
annexation was raised in Belgium, and in the rest of

149

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the world that of the Belgian's fitness to he the stewards of
so large and important a part of the African continent.
There had long been a suspicion that Livingstone's
dream of Central Africa for Christ had been super-
seded by the actuality of Central Africa for rubber,
and that European penetration of the Dark Con-
tinent, far from bringing civilization and happiness
to the natives, had brought them barbarism and
misery. In 1901, while the press of Brussels was
discussing the conflict between King Leopold and
Belgian politicians over annexation, the London press
was full of statements of English travelers about
scandalous management, tribal troubles, and coer-
cion of natives by traders and Congo officials. In
1902, Morel's book, The Affairs of West Africa,
brought the agitation in England to such a point
that the British Foreign Office sounded the signato-
ries of the Berlin Act as to the advisability of a com-
mon move to put an end to the maladministration of
the Congo Free State. Failing to secure agreement
among the Powers, the British Government in 1903
decided to act independently, and made strong
diplomatic representations at Brussels. Belgium
was told that this action was prompted not by tales
of travelers and missionaries, but by reports from
British consuls, one corroborating the other, in such
a fashion that the evidence could not be controverted.
The Belgian public took this move in very bad
part. There was a strong feeling throughout Bel-
gium that England's motive was the desire to appro-
priate the fruit of the work which had converted the
Congo into a rich domain. Discoveries of gold

150

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

had just been reported from the Congo basin. The
analogy emphasized by the Belgians between this
coincidence and the British treatment of the Trans-
vaal Boers makes very curious reading now, and goes
to show how Belgium, just as Russia and France,
have awakened only recently — when it was their in-
terest to do so — to the fact that the British are cham-
pions of liberty and right and the freedom of small
nationalities. In fact, one can find less than ten
years ago editors of serious Belgian newspapers
declaring that Germany par excellence of all the
Powers was free from suspicion of interestedness in
her dealings with small nations! All the Belgian
parties, with the exception of the Socialists, concurred
in supporting King Leopold's management of the
Congo Free State. In the face of indubitable testi-
mony of horrible cruelties and barbarity of Belgian
officials, the Chamber voted by ninety-one to thirty-
five the following motion: "The Chamber, confiding,
in agreement with the Government, in the normal
and progressive development of the Congo Free
State, under the segis of the King, passes to the order
of the day."

In February, 1904, the British Foreign Office pub-
lished the report of the investigation made at its
command by Mr. Casement, consul at Boma. Mr.
Casement said that the Congo Free State had failed
to govern according to the provisions of the Berlin
Act, that the officials were deficient in their control
of subordinates, that the suffering of the natives,
through the unchecked commercial greed of the
Europeans, was terrible beyond words. Mr. Case-

151

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

ment had the advantage of being able to make a
comparison of present with former conditions from
previous personal knowledge of the country. In one
district where he had seen five thousand people in
1887, there were less than six hundred in 1903.
Towns and villages on Lake Mantumba had dimin-
ished sixty to seventy per cent, in ten years. In six
months on the Momboya River the lowest estimate
of people killed or mutilated by having their
right hand cut off was six thousand, and this did not
include the children, whom the soldiers were in-
structed to kill with the butt of their rifles so as
not to waste cartridges.

One loses all patience with the blind partisans who
declare to-day that subsequent events have proved
the falsity of this report, simply because Mr. Case-
ment, afterwards Sir Roger Casement, conspired
against the British in Ireland, and was hanged as a
traitor. None who ever came in contact with Sir
Roger Casement — whether they agreed with him on
the Irish question or not — can possibly impugn the
sincerity of his motives, or regard him in any other
light than as a patriot of unimpeachable character.
Like Battista and Sauro, whom the Austrians re-
cently executed and whom the Italians are mourning,
Sir Roger was a victim of the inevitable forces that
have been awakened during the present transforma-
tion of the world. But even if one throws out the
Casement report, what is he to do with the memo-
randum of Lord Cromer, published by the British
Government at the same time? When Lord Cromer
visited the Upper Nile early in 1903, he saw the horror

152

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

of Belgian rule with his own eyes. He declared that
the population of the Belgian bank of the Nile was
practically extinct, that the Belgians were hated and
feared so that no Belgian officer could move outside
of the settlements without a strong guard, that the
natives fled from the Belgian officials, that the Bel-
gian soldiers were allowed full Uberty to plunder and
rarely made payment for supplies. To quote exactly
the opinion of Lord Cromer, I give the conclusion of
his observations in his own words: "It appears to me
that the facts which I have stated afford sufficient
evidence of the spirit which animates the Belgian
administration, if indeed it can be called adminis-
tration. The Government, as far as I could judge, is
conducted almost exclusively on commercial prin-
ciples, and even judged by that standard, it would
appear that those principles are somewhat short-
sighted."

In the debate in the House of Commons on the
Casement and Cromer reports, many members in-
sisted that England was bound, by her signature
attached to the Berlin Act, to intervene, and one
member (Lord Edmond Fitzmorris) believed that
the Belgian reply to the British representations justi-
fied naval action against Boma. But what Govern-
ment in the history of the world has ever intervened
by force to honor its signature to a treaty except
when its own interests were vitally at stake? ^ Sir

^ One searches history in vain for a single precedent of the action
that political opponents of President Wilson declared he was bound
by The Hague Convention to take when Germany violated Belgian
neutrality. I wrote at the time, and have since written and still

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Edward Grey, who was then of the Opposition, sup-
ported the policy of the Government on the floor of
the House of Commons, and agreed that Great Brit-
ain could act only in common with all the Powers.
He said that the Berlin Act ought to be revised.

Indignation in Belgium over the Casement and
Cromer reports and the House of Commons debate
was even greater than in the previous year. The
Belgian public persisted in believing that the British
were not at all moved by " the fair fame of European
civilization at stake, " as Lord Percy had said. They
scouted the cruelty charges. They denied in toto
Lord Cromer's observations, and believed that Eng-
land wanted to grab the Congo as she had grabbed
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

Another book written by Mr. Morel, called King
Leopold's Rule in Africa, proved from comparing
the value of exports and imports that there was no
fair trade between natives and their task-masters.
From 1898 to 1902 considerably over thirty-five
million dollars of exports, chiefly rubber, were offset
by only seventeen million dollars of imports. The
figures of 1903 showed a worse exploitation: exports
nearly eleven million dollars and imports less than
four million three hundred thousand dollars. As
much was being imported for construction and devel-

believe, that it would have been a great and wise move, for the sake
of humanity, if Mr. Wilson had protested. But that he was bound
to protest is nonsense. The statement that he brought dishonor
and shame upon the United States by not protesting, when not made
by an ignorant man or a man unaccustomed to think, is hysteria
pure and simple.

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

opment purposes and for the use of Europeans, what
did the natives, who were paid in goods, receive in
exchange for the rubber they brought in? The
cynical and heartless exploitation of the natives could
be possible only through the connivance of the Bel-
gian officials. It was a more serious question than
that of a weak and incapable administration. The
provisions of the international agreement by which
King Leopold had been entrusted with the Congo
Free State were ignored. There was not even the
pretense of living up to them.

Public opinion throughout the worid was now so
thoroughly aroused that a Commission of Inquiry,
with unlimited powers, was appointed, composed of
a high Belgian Magistrate, the President of the Court
of Appeal in Boma, and a Swiss. Its report, issued
in November, 1905, after the Government had
braced up the administration as a result of the recent
disclosures, emphasized the suppression of slave
trade, cannibalism, and human sacrifices, the exten-
sive establishment of railways, steamers, and tele-
graph, and the wonderful development of LeopoldviUe
as a trading center, and remarked that the Congo
villages "recalled seaside towns in Europe, with their
schools and hospitals." On the other hand, there
were abuses, certain "unfortunate populations"
being subjected to forcible porterage of enormous
burdens. They were "menaced with partial de-
struction." There was oppression in the collection
of rubber, although it had been much reduced in
the King's private domain. Female hostages were
imprisoned when villages did not bring in the stipu-

155

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

lated amount of rubber; defaulters were lashed;
black sentinels were placed over rubber gatherers;
and military attacks — by Government troops — on
defaulting villages were reported officially as if they
were expeditions into an enemy's country. Some
companies, which held extensive concessions, were
openly denounced. By "defaulter" is meant a
native who does not bring in the amount of rubber
arbitrarily allotted to him.

The sum and substance of the report of the Com-
mission is identical with that of Casement and other
British consuls and of travelers and missionaries, to
wit: The Congo Free State allowed the natives of
Central Africa, in defiance of the obligations under-
taken at the time of the constitution of the country,
to be held in slavery worse than anything they had
ever known. Not only did the Government counte-
nance the compulsion and oppression practiced by the
companies who held concessions and in the King's
private domain, but they aided in putting down
"rebellions" when the natives arose in desperation
against their white task-masters ; or refused, without
violence, to work as hard as they were asked to; or
even were unable, through lack of rubber, to find
the amount imposed upon them. The natives were
allowed to be tortured and maimed and slaughtered
wholesale.

King Leopold, upon the publication of the report,
said that from the beginning his motive in Africa
had been philanthropic rather than commercial, that
he was glad "abuses" had been exposed, and that
he intended to appoint a new commission to devise

156

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

practical measures for carrying out the recommenda-
tions of the Commission of Inquiry for reforming the
administration and ameliorating the lot of the natives
whose interest he had always had at heart. There
was little faith in King Leopold's sincerity, and in the
desire of the Belgian Government and the will of the
Belgian people to put an end to the scandal. When
concessions were granted to American syndicates, it
was interpreted as an effort on the part of the King
to anticipate interference from the United States
Government.

On December 4, 1907, the Belgian Government
presented to the Chamber a treaty between King
Leopold and Belgium, ceding the Congo Free State
to Belgium. After some modifications the treaty
was accepted by the Chamber and the Senate in the
summer of 1908. Belgium took over the Congo,
agreeing to pay allowances to Princess Clementine
and Prince Albert and ten million dollars to the King
in fifteen annual payments,^ but refused to be re-
sponsible for the Congo Free State debt of nearly
twenty-three million dollars. At the same time,
the status of the colony was established by a

' The sum guaranteed to King Leopold and his successors was to
be spent "for the benefit of the Congo," and the allowances to Prin-
cess Clementine and Prince Albert to cease on the marriage of the
former and the accession of the latter. In the original treaty, King
Leopold had made unacceptable reservations about the way the
revenues of the Crown domains were to be spent. He wanted to
establish, at the expense of the Congo, a sort of combined Rockefeller
and Carnegie Foundation, for the promotion of scientific knowledge
and the good of the inhabitants of Belgium and the Congo, which
would have been a serious drain on the resources of the new colony.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

special law, and provision made for its government.
Europe was faced with a fait accompli. But did not
the signatory powers have to recognize the validity
of this transfer? In 1885 they had constituted a
free and independent state, and guaranteed its perpetual
neutrality.

The British Government published a parliamen-
tary paper on November 1st, by which Sir Edward
Grey is shown to have stated the unwillingness of
Great Britain to recognize the annexation until
assurances were given concerning the future. She
had neighboring territories, which could be affected
by a continuance of weak and unjust government in
the Congo. The government of the Congo Free State
had been notoriously different from that of all contiguous
colonies for many years. Belgium was pressed for
definite assurances with regard to native rights and
commercial privileges of other nations in the Congo.
On December 23d, the London newspapers con-
tained a memorandum, signed by the most prom-
inent men in England, expressing approval of Sir
Edward Grey's stand and declaring that Great
Britain must insist that Belgium give a definite
guarantee for the assurance of native rights in land
and in collection of forest produce.

In sharp contrast to the British attitude, Germany
recognized immediately the transfer. Foreign Secre-
tary von Schoen told the Reichstag on January 23,
1909, that Germany had been the first of all the
Powers to recognize the transfer of the Congo to
Belgium, and that though her acquiescence to the
annexation did not imply approval of existing con-

158

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

ditions, Germany assumed, and was convinced, that
under Belgian rule a cleansing process would ensue.
Herr von Schoen stated explicitly that Germany had
not considered herself entitled by treaty to interfere,
as Great Britain had asked her to join in doing, to
secure the introduction of Congo reforms. He gave
an outline of the two treaties (that with the inter-
national Congo Association and the Congo Articles
in the Berlin Conference Act), and showed that the
signatory Powers had no right to a voice in the mat-
ter. In Belgium Germany's attitude was deeply
appreciated.

During 1909 the United States and Great Britain
continued to correspond with the Belgian Govern-
ment, maintaining in common that the annexation
could not be recognized until definite guarantees
were given on the subject of the exploitation of
natives. But Belgium took her cue from Austria-
Hungary's recent action in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
International agreements are not worth the paper
they are written on. The transfer was celebrated
at Antwerp by a colonial festival. King Leopold
made a speech in which he was silent on the native
question, but held up glowingly the commercial
advantages to Belgium, urged the development of the
merchant marine, and invited capitalists to take up
concessions in the Congo. At that very moment, the
Socialists in the Chamber exposed the fact that one
of the first decrees of the new Colonial Minister
was to impress twenty-six hundred natives for railway
construction. The Colonial Minister justified forced
labor on the ground of urgency and said that the

159

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

natives had no reason to complain, as the railway
would be useful to them as well as to Belgium. His
position was endorsed by the Chamber.

Belgian promises were still not believed in England.
Sir Edward Grey declared that Great Britain would
never have recognized the Congo Free State at all,
if she had known what it was going to become, and
that she would not now recognize it until she was
sure that conditions would be radically reformed.
But when it was suggested several months later that
the British navy blockade the mouth of the Congo
as a protest against the annexation, Sir Edward was
frank in stating that allowing Belgium to rule the
country was the ultimate solution. All the British
wanted was a practical expression of willingness on
the part of the Belgians to act decently in the Congo.
When I say "the British," I mean not merely the
Government but enlightened public sentiment, which
in this matter dictated the Government's policy
irrespective of international political consideration.
On November 19, 1909, the demonstration at Albert
Hall must have been a warning to Belgium that a
solution of the Congo question was necessary, if
good relations were to be maintained. The Albert
Hall demonstration was presided over by the Primate,
assisted by nine bishops, leading nonconformists,
many peers, and about fifty members of Parliament.
The Primate and the Bishop of Oxford expressed
faith in the good intentions of the Belgian people,
but denounced in most unqualified terms the admin-
istration, the ill will, the bad faith, and the atrocities
in the Congo, declaring that King Leopold was per-

160

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

sonally and beyond any doubt responsible for them.
The Bishop of London formulated the British de-
mands: ill treatment of natives must cease, land be
restored to them, proper soldiers and police substi-
tuted for the rubber- collecting bullies and assassins,
"hostage houses" done away with, the method pro-
posed for abolishing taxes explained, decimation of
natives stopped, and the promises made at the time
of annexation immediately fulfilled.

It is well to remind those who are arguing to-day
(and there are many of them) that in continuing the
Congo agitation after the Belgian annexation the
British public was imposed upon and misled by
prejudiced reports of missionaries and by the report
of a now discredited traitor, of the testimony of
Casement's successor at Boma. Colonel Thessiger
reported officially to the Foreign Office at the begin-
ning of 1909 that the whole system of Belgian taxa-
tion was fraudulent, and that the violation of laws
and the heart-rending atrocities of the rubber col-
lecting were due to the wilful blindness, if not to the
actual connivance, of the Belgian officials. During
the same year, in October, the native chiefs sent
a memorandum to the Belgian Colonial Minister,
praying for relief from taxation. They could obtain
no rubber, and received no return for the taxes ex-
acted of them. British prospectors and traders were
prevented from operating in the Katanga Province.
The Belgian Socialist leader, Vandervelde, made a
journey to the Congo to defend two American mis-
sionaries, who had been arrested on the charge of
libeling one of the big rubber companies. M.
II 161

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Vandervelde secured their acquittal, and when he
returned to Brussels, he gave testimony on the floor
of the Chamber of the arbitrary exploitation, tortur-
ing and killing of natives, and the use of armed sen-
tries over rubber-collecting slaves. All the Colonial
Minister could answer was that he hoped the charges
were exaggerated.

The death of Leopold 11. on December 7, 1909,
brought some ray of hope that the people of Belgium
would have an awakening of conscience, and attempt
to do away with the wholesale butchery and slavery
in Africa that brought them as a civilized and Chris-
tian nation to shame before the whole world. Leo-
pold's successor, the present King Albert, had visited
the Colony during the year before his accession.
Starting at Katanga, which he reached by way of
Cape Town and Rhodesia, Prince Albert had walked
fifteen hundred miles through the Congo forests.
He was not allowed to see what was going on in the
Congo, but he heard enough during his journey to
make him dissatisfied with existing conditions. The
passing of the Congo's evil genius Leopold gave
Belgium a chance. But it is very interesting to note
here that the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Belgium,
who in 1914 appealed to the Vatican and the whole
world against German cruelties in Belgium, "stood
pat" only five years before, in the face of irrefutable
evidence of the death and torture and maiming of
many times the number of innocent women and
children that the Germans had to their record in
1 914. All parties and all circles in Belgium, with
the exception of the Socialists, had supported

162

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

King Leopold and defended the Congo adminis-
tration.

For the first three years of King Albert's reign,
Great Britain still refused to recognize the annexa-
tion. In 1 9 10, the Congo Reform Association and
the Aborigines Protection Society, whose agents were
touring extensively, convinced the Foreign Office
that forced labor had not been abolished. In 191 1,
consular investigation showed that conditions were
improved in many districts, but that the Belgian
administration was still far from satisfactory. There
was the controversy, also, over the question of free-
dom of trade. Sir Edward Grey doubted the desire
of the Congo authorities to observe treaty obliga-
tions in this matter. The revocation, however, of
the charters of three of the largest concession com-
panies at the beginning of 1912 showed that Belgium
was at last awakening to the necessity of abolishing
monopolies and throwing the Congo open to free
trade.

The last outstanding question between Belgium
and the public opinion of the world was that of native
right to land ownership. In this matter, Germany
stood with Great Britain. Concessions to companies
gave private individuals rights over large tracts of
land which superseded preexisting native rights.
This was a violation not only of elementary prin-
ciples of justice, but also of a clearly formulated
stipulation of the Berlin Act. By what right, other
than that of the possession of superior brute force, is
a man's land taken from him and the owner com-
pelled to work for the interest of another by terms of

163

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA i

a unilateral agreement imposed upon him without his
consent? In the old days, the natives of Central ,„
Africa suffered from occasional slave-raiding parties, 1
Y/hich would take a few hundred at a time into cap-
tivity. Europeans abolished slave-trading — ^in the
name of Christ and humanity — but they substituted
a slavery far more degrading.^ Not an occasional
few hundred were victims, but all the people all the
time were reduced to slavery. The companies
answered the charge of the Aborigines Society, that
native rights were being violated in the leased areas,
by the statement that their concessions tended "to
the uplifting of the native and his betterment."
They professed the most benevolent intentions to-
wards the people they were oppressing !

In June, 191 3, after ten years of constant agitation,
the victory appeared to have been won. For Sir
Edward Grey announced in June that consular re-
ports from the Congo made it no longer justifiable
or expedient to withhold recognition of the annexa-
tion. Arrangements were being made to grant free
land to natives for cultivation, and Belgium had

^ I say Europeans instead of Belgians, because this evil was by no
means confined to the Congo. Atthis very time it was-under investi-
gation in the French, British and German West African colonies,
especially in connection with the cocoa and palm-oil industries.
Violation of native land rights and forced labor go hand in hand —
inseparably — in almost every concession in what is known as Protec-
torate areas. If you take the black man's land to develop it, you
must use him as the laborer. If he does not want to work on your
terms, you make him. Hence the abuses. It was on the ground of
violation of the Berlin Act that Germany in 1913 protested against
the extensive concession granted by Liberia to the British firm of
Lever, the soap manufacturers.

164

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

accomplished much in improving her administration.
The personal knowledge and influence of King Albert,
the pressure of the Belgian Socialist Party, and the
increasing revelation of the richness of the Congo
basin were the decisive factors in the work of reform.
One searches in vain to find, outside of the Socialist
organization, a campaign for Congo reform in Brus-
sels and Antwerp during these ten years. The
Belgians seemed to have no sense of responsibility
toward the Congo, and the stories of the atrocities
of which their officials and soldiers were guilty, sup-
ported though they were by incontrovertible testi-
mony, made no impression upon them.

Fortunately, unchecked exploitation by concession
companies and maladministration of officials is not
the whole story of the Congo since 1900. As was
indicated in the report of the Commission of Inquiry,
there is another and brighter side of Belgian activity.
In May, 1902, an agreement was signed in Brussels
for the extension of the Cape to Cairo railway from
the northern border of Rhodesia to Lake Kasala. It
was the idea to have the Rhodesian line, which was to
pass through Katanga, join in this region a line from
Benguela, an Atlantic port in Portuguese West Africa.
Rhodesia would then have a much shorter connection
with the sea coast, and a northern route would be
opened up through the Congo valley across to Lake
Albert and up the Nile. At this time the Reichstag
had refused to vote the credits for the extension of
the line from Dar-es-Salaam to Lake Tanganika, and
it was believed that the German line would not be
built. The line from the south into Katanga Pro-

165

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

vince of the Belgian Congo reached, in 1912, Eliza-
bethville, only a few miles from the Rhodesian
frontier, but over one hundred and sixty miles from
the point in which it enters Belgian territory. It
had been surveyed north to Bukama, and construc-
tion work was being rapidly pushed in 1914.

Progress has been made also in opening up the
Congo valley south from Stanlej^ille, where the
river makes its sharp bend, through the heart of
Central Africa, into Katanga. In September, 1906,
the railway from Stanleyville to Ponthierville, a
stretch where the Congo is not navigable, was com-
pleted. The Congo from Ponthierville to Kindu
is navigable. From Kindu to Kongolo two hundred
and twenty miles of railway have been built. A
glance at the map will show that these are important
sections in the Cape to Cairo railway. From Stan-
leyville to Lake Albert Edward the survey was com-
pleted in 191 1, and an agreement reached to connect
the Katanga railway with the Portuguese frontier,
and the Congo with Lake Tanganika. The latter
line, because of its importance in the campaign
against the Germans, was completed in March, 19 15.
There are also railway lines from Matadi (near
Boma) to Leopoldville, ^ and from Boma to Tshela.

' "Leopoldville, on the opposite side of the Congo River from
Brazzaville, is less pretty and picturesque ; but one feels there more
activity, or an activity more concentrated, and much more order
and method. The state is proprietor of almost all the land, and of
almost all the houses, as well as of the camp on the outskirts, where
is found grouped the entire black population. The Belgian line
from Matadi to Kinchassa is a narrow-gauge railway over the moun-
tains. It takes two days to go the 500 kilometers. Its construc-

166

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

As the Congo from Leopoldville to Stanle3rv^ille is
navigable, communication by rail and steamer is
now practically complete all the way across the
continent, and from the heart of Central Africa south
for nearly two thousand three hundred miles to Cape
Town.

Unstinted credit is due to Belgian engineers and
Belgian officials for vision, for energy, and for ability
to surmount seemingly unsurmountable difficulties
in making these railways possible. There has always
been, on the part of the Belgian authorities, whole-
hearted cooperation with British and Germans in
opening up Central Africa, and the three states have
worked together, without too much thought of sel-
fish advantage, in furthering transportation schemes.
In March, 19 14, the Colonial Minister, in a remark-
able speech presenting the Congo budget, admitted
that the completion of the German line from Dar-
es-Salaam to Lake Tanganika was going to modify
transport conditions by attracting traffic that would
otherwise go west through Belgian territory all the
way to the Atlantic. But he believed that there was
room for all, and that the influence of German ac-
tivity on Belgian railwayplans was much exaggerated.
He thought, on the other hand, that Belgium would
ultimately draw advantages from the increased means

tion was to cost five million dollars: it has cost thirteen millions.
Commenced under great obstacles, it has admirably succeeded.
Travelers and freight increase each year; and the company is able
to lessen tariffs, which are still very high." M. Felicien Challaye,
a member of the de Brazza investigating party, writing in 1905.
See Le Congo Frangais (Paris, 1909), pp. 21-2, 28.

167

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

of transportation in all directions. He submitted
new railway projects for over two thousand miles of
interior lines.

Aside from slight difficulties with Great "Britain over
the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Uganda frontiers, and the
evacuation of the Lado Enclave, Belgium has worked
in harmony and in a friendly spirit with France,
Great Britain, Germany, and Portugal in the estab-
lishment of frontiers. Too much praise cannot be
given to the members of the frontier commissions
everywhere in Africa for the completion, without
friction, of tasks that are little appreciated and talked
about, though arduous and perilous. How often
have frontier commissions had to make their own
maps, decide on questions that may in the future be
of tremendous importance, and at the same time be
ever on the alert to defend themselves against hostile
savages and keep in check jungle and swamp fevers !

Belgium has a rich possession in the Congo, espe-
cially since the solving of means of transport has done
away with dependence upon native porters and has
made possible the development of mining. In the
Katanga region, copper and tin and diamonds have
been discovered. In many valleys of the Congo
tributaries there is gold. The palm oil and palm
nut industries are developing encouragingly. In
view of the rapid decrease of forest produce, this
means economic salvation for the Congo. For con-
cession companies, knowing that they had to make
hay while the sun was shining and as indifferent to
the future as if they had been American lumber
companies, deliberately killed the goose that laid the

i68

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

golden egg. In 1912, forest produce fell off nearly
ten per cent., and in 1913, the export of rubber de-
creased fifty per cent. • There are left in the world few
virgin territories. It is a pity that governments
have followed the line of least resistance in the
development of new territories, farming them out on
concessions, and have not waked up to the fact that
private corporations have no interest in the common-
weal, until it is too late to save much of what might
have been conserved. The days of chartered com-
panies, with a free hand to milk dry vast regions, are
over. Belgium in the Congo, like other European
nations in their colonial possessions, is waking up to
the fact that the State alone feels its responsibility
towards unborn generations, and that only by govern-
mental restrictions, enforced by capable govern-
mental supervision, can individuals and corporations
be prevented from sacrificing the future for im-
mediate gain. The rubber industry in the Congo
illustrates this principle perfectly. Big dividends
to-day, for to-morrow our leases may be revoked.
The devil take the future.

Belgian experiences in administration and finance
in the Congo have not been very different from those
of Germany and Italy in their early days as coloniz-
ing states. An official class, accustomed to deal with
colonial problems, cannot be created in a generation.
Pioneers make many mistakes. Socialist parties —
every Opposition in fact — use colonial blunders and
mismanagement, real or fancied, for attacks upon the
Government, especially in connection with budget
estimates. In Belgium as in Germany the Socialists

169

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

have been the voice of conscience. We have already
mentioned Vandervelde's courage in speaking the
unwelcome truth after his visit to the Congo. Time
and again he and other Socialists criticized in the
Chamber what they considered unjust decrees of the
Colonial Minister, and exposed abuses. But the
Socialists, while performing this useful service, are
obstructionists in money matters, and oppose con-
sistently "throwing good money after bad " in colo-
nial enterprises. They oppose also military service
abroad. There was a howl when Belgium sent nearly
four thousand soldiers for Congo duty in 1909, and
the deficit revealed in the 1910 budget added to the
complication of the British attitude. As far as
revenue goes, things have not been improved. Just
before the war the revelation of a deficit of nearly
five million dollars in the 1914 estimates made diffi-
cult getting the ear of the Chamber for railway grants.
The customs yield of the Belgian Congo is not much
larger than that of Sierra Leone, with one- thirtieth
of the area and one-fifteenth of the Congo population.
Although reforms have been sincerely effected,
Belgium has still the same great problem of colonial
administration that France and Portugal face in
Africa. These states possess enormous territories,
which are not well administered and developed as
they might be because they have not the surplus popu-
lation able and willing to undertake the task. Before
the war, the Belgian Congo was run by a staff of
Europeans of many nationalities, some of them ad-
venturers of the worst type. Even among the high
officials, many were not Belgian. They were in the

170

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

Congo only because they saw there an opportunity
to have influence and to make money that was
denied to them in their countries of origin.

Belgium has given valuable assistance in the long
two years campaign against German East Africa.
I have understood, on good authority, that she has
been able to train, equip, officer, and put into the
field twenty thousand native troops.

During the first year of the European War, there
was much discussion about the future of the Congo,
and it is certain that Germany intends to use her hold
on Belgium, if she is able to maintain it until negotia-
tions for peace begin, as a trump card in the read-
justment of European spheres in Africa. Should she
be successful, it would mean the realization of Ger-
man dreams of a path from east to west across the
continent. The Germans have not hesitated to
insinuate that the great sums loaned to Belgium by
the Allies, especially by Great Britain, would be
secured by Anglo-French economic, if not political,
control of the Congo. In order to make clear the
intentions of the Allies, and to set at rest the minds
of the Belgians and allay suspicions of neutrals, the
French Minister handed to the Belgian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs at Havre on April 29th, 191 6, the
following declaration:

"Referring on one hand to the agreements with
Belgium of April 23-24, 1884, February 5, 1895, and
December 23, 1908, and on the other hand to the
note handed on September 19, 1914, to the Belgian
Government by the Minister of Great Britain on the
subject of the Congo as well as to the declaration of

171

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the Powers guarantors of the independence and neu-
traHty of Belgium on February 14, 191 6, the Govern-
ment of the French Republic declares that it will lend
its aid to the Belgian Government at the time of the
peace negotiations with the view of maintaining the
Belgian Congo in its present territorial status and
of having attributed to this colony a special indem-
nity for the losses incurred in the course of the war. "
On the same day, the British and Russian repre-
sentatives at Sainte Adresse stated that their Govern-
ments adhered to this declaration, and the Italian
and Japanese representatives that Italy and Japan
approved the French note.

172

CHAPTER IX

THE FIRST GERMAN COLONY: SOUTHWEST
AFRICA

GERMAN Southwest Africa occupies more than
a quarter of the area of the continent south
of the Zambesi River. Its coast Hne, running
from Portuguese West Africa to the Orange River,
which is the boundary with Cape Colony, is, with
the exception of the Spanish Rio de Oro, the most
barren and forbidding Httoral of all Africa. It was
formerly known as Damaraland in the north and
Namaqualand in the south, and was as completely
ignored in the early days of European colonization
as Bechuanaland and the Kalahari Desert, which
form its interior boundary. The British neglected
to proclaim a protectorate over territories which
had so little promise. They awakened to what they
had missed only when Germany anticipated them.

In 1883, an enterprising Bremen merchant ac-
quired from a native chief the southern portion of
this territory from Angra Pequena to the Orange
River and called it Liideritzland after himself. The
following year Germany's entrance into Africa —
and into colonial politics — was announced by Bis-
marck's telegram to the German Consul at Cape
Town:

173

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

"According to a communication from Herr Liider-
itz, the British Colonial officials doubt whether his
acquisitions north of the Orange River can claim
German protection. You will declare officially that
he and his settlement are under the protection of the
Empire."

The German flag was rapidly extended north
along the coast to Portuguese territory at the mouth
of the Cunene River, which is some distance beyond
Cape Frio. Between 1884 and 1890 the Germans
penetrated to the desert of Kalahari. A boundary
was established with Great Britain on the edge of the
Bechuanaland Protectorate, and in 1890 the Germans
made good their claim in the extreme north to a
narrow strip which gave them access to the Zambesi
River not far west of Victoria Falls.

The occupation of Togoland, Kamerun, and
German East Africa followed that of Southwest
Africa in less than a year.

Many English writers, and particularly the few
who have written on the German African colonies
since August i, 1914, have described the German
penetration in Southwest Africa and elsewhere as
the result of contemptible trickery and bluff. They
try to prove that the whole history — from the diplo-
matic and political side, and even partially from the
economic side — of Germany in Africa is a disgraceful
chapter of brutality and failure. The heat of conflict
has led them to distort facts and to express hopelessly
biased judgments. It is unfortunate, at a moment
when the question of the future of the German
colonies needs a dispassionate attitude, that sources

174

GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

of information in the English language should be so
one-sided. ^

There is much to deplore and condemn in German
methods of colonization in Africa. But there is no
more to condemn in German methods than in
French and Italian, and not as much as in Belgian.
The results of thirty years are not encouraging, if
one compares them with the results obtained by
Great Britain during the same period. It must
always be borne in mind, however, that Germany,
Italy, and Belgium are new hands at colonizing. It is
as unfair to compare German colonial administration
with British colonial administration as it would be
to compare British General Staff officers with German
General Staff officers. As for the methods by which
colonies are acquired, Germany has done nothing, in
bringing territories under her flag, that has not been
done by every other colonizing Power. The Euro-
pean colonial game has always been one of grab
when you can and how you can, and the last word has
invariably been to him who was the strongest. The

' "In something less than a year Germany had intrigued, lied, and
tricked Britain into acknowledging her sovereignty over 1,000,000
{sic) square miles of Africa, or an area about nine times as large as
the whole of the United Kingdom, with a total native population of
nearly 14,000,000." — A. F. Calvert, German African Colonies (Lon-
don, 1916), p, xiii. of preface. Mr. Calvert claims that all the
territories were virtually British, and that their chiefs had begged for
the establishment of a British Protectorate. He pretends that the
native population of the German colonies welcomed the British
recently as deliverers, in sharp contrast to "the Boers, converted by
British rule to be its enthusiastic supporters," who defended South
Africa against the German invasion.

175

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

title to possession of the territories held by European
states outside of Europe is a title won by force.

German development has been hampered from the
very first days by the British possession of Walfisch
Bay, the only natural port along the coast. The
two important watercourses that reach the seaboard
in German Southwest Africa empty into Walfisch
Bay, and England is able (as the events of 1 9 14
proved) to dominate the coast without difficulty
from this important strategic point. The harbor
has good anchorage, and is sheltered from the most
frequent winds. The British have never been able
to make anything out of Walfisch Bay for themselves.
By continuing to hold it, they have compelled the
Germans to spend enormous sums of money in
creating the port of Swakopmund in a far less favor-
able locality. It is a striking example of a dog-in-the-
manger policy that a more liberal and wiser attitude
towards German extra-European expansion should
have prompted Great Britain to abandon long ago.
Walfisch Bay is one of the pin-pricks that have
developed in Germany the spirit which is now taking
terrible vengeance upon the world.

Absence of water from perennial rivers and a
limited rainfall give Southwest Africa a soil that
makes agriculture exceedingly difficult. In dry
years the rivers cannot be depended upon. Irriga-
tion is so costly that the prospect of the colony
becoming agricultural is very slim indeed. But the
country is covered with a grass that possesses
unusual nourishing properties, and there is sufficient
water for cattle in almost every district. The only

176

GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

way to utilize the land to advantage is by stock-
raising. Dr. Rohrbach, who looked over the country
for the German Government in order to see what the
prospects of systematic settlement were, declared
that about five hundred thousand out of the eight
hundred thousand square kilometers could be used
as grazing land. This means five thousand good
farms. On April i, 191 3, there were over twelve
hundred farms in private hands.

The Government has done much to encourage
stock-raising by importing bulls and cows, by paying
the cost of transporting Australian sheep, and by
organizing a splendid veterinary service. During
the years immediately before the war there was a re-
markable increase in cattle and horses and ostriches.

In 1 913, the Government inaugurated a Land
Bank, with a capital of two and one half million
dollars, to lend money at easy rates to farmers for the
purchase of stock and for tiding them over bad years.
The system is worked out to the very smallest detail,
and shows the German genius for finance. Advances,
which are made up to fifty per cent., are secured on
the value of the property. The arrangement for
looking after existing mortgages satisfies the creditors.
From the Land Bank money can be obtained at two
per cent, lower rate than from other sources.

Dr. Rohrbach's hope that there might ultimately
be five thousand prosperous stock-raising farms in
the colony — and this was the estimate if every
available acre was used — would not make the
tremendous sacrifices of Germany, both of blood and
treasure, seem worth while, were it not for good
12. 177

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

prospects of mining exploitation. The country has
been frequently gone over by geologists and pros-
pectors. There is gold at a number of places. Rich
gold-bearing lodes have not yet been discovered.
What ore there is, is of the same low grade that has
made mining development on the Transvaal Rand
possible only by companies with large capital.
Copper had just passed the experimental stage
before the war, and was becoming a valuable export.
In the first six months of 1913, copper was exported
to the value of three-quarters of a million dollars —
a substantial increase over the same period in 1912.
Copper development has been started on an admir-
able scientific and financial basis. Lead and silver
are found with copper. Smelting is done on the
ground. Electric power is used. The by-products
are carefully saved. Tin has been discovered not far
from Swakopmund, and over a hundred tons were
exported in the first six months of 19 13. If the
industry grows as in Nigeria, it ought very soon, with
the short railway haul, to become a valuable asset.

But by far the richest find in German Southwest
Africa is the discovery of diamond fields. Herr
Liideritz went to Angra Pequena in the first place for
minerals and with no thought of agricultural develop-
ment. The gold and diamond discoveries in British
South Africa led him to hope for a rich reward.
Neither gold nor diamonds came to him, or to those
who followed him. The fortunate man was the
German railway superintendent of the Luderitz-
Auas railway. He believed that there were diamonds
in the neighborhood of Luderitz Bay, and kept

178

GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

talking about it until people thought he was crazy.
He instructed his employees to have their eyes open
while they were digging the railway bed, and to
bring him curious stones which they did not know.
In April, 1908, his hopes were rewarded. A native
brought in several diamonds. The exploitation
began immediately. Within eighteen months the
whole of the coast line to the Orange River had been
prospected. Companies were formed and another
railway was built. In five years the diamond industry
became the most important in the colony, and a
source of revenue that was a godsend to the adminis-
tration. The diamonds are small, but of exception-
ally good quality, and a good half of them clear
white.

A railway was constructed from Kolamanskop to
Bogenfels through the diamond country in 19 13.
Most of the mines and settlements are lighted with
electricity from Liideritzbucht. Nowhere in Africa
are mining enterprises and railways equipped and
running as well as in the German colonies.

The Government originally took a royalty on
diamonds. It was changed in 1 912 to a tax on profits
amounting to about forty per cent. The change
shows the acumen of a Government in which brains
is the essential factor. Under the old royalty system
the miners picked up the stones that were easiest to
obtain. For the royalty made no distinction between
the stone found by hazard and that which cost a lot
of money to unearth. Taxation on profits encourages
the mining companies to develop consistently all
their fields. The Germans saw that if the industry

179

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

was to become a permanent source of wealth to
the Government, it was imperative to discard the
royalty system.

The profit that the Germans derive from the
diamond industry is shown by the development in
six years from less than forty thousand carats to
nearly one million six hundred thousand carats. One
mine alone produced over six hundred thousand
carats in 19 13. The German output during 19 12
increased over the figures of the previous year, in
proportion to the total output, twice as much as that
of the South African Commonwealth.

Until 1892, when the German people first began
to believe in colonies. Southwest Africa was ex-
ploited by companies, who held concessions and were
partly subsidized by the Government. There were
less than fifty soldiers in the colony, and the natives
had no conception of a powerful German Empire.
Government officials were very few, and were at the
beck and call of the companies. The hinterland was
not under administrative control, and absence of
ports made coast communications difficult. Colonial
history begins only with the twentieth century, when
the British aggression against the Boer republics
awakened interest in Germany. The Germans
realized that they must develop the territories they
held — or quit the game altogether. Over two million
dollars was granted to Southwest Africa in 1901,
and arrangements made to begin railway construc-
tion into Damaraland northwest from Swakopmund.
The line was to have its terminus at Otavi, four
hundred miles from Walfisch Bay. Another line,

180

GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

already started directly inland from Swakopmund,
was completed in 1902 as far as Windhoek, which is
almost exactly in the center of the colony.

At this moment began the conflict in the Reichstag
between the Radicals and the Imperialists, which
extended over five years, and which must he taken into
account constantly in a study of German colonial
expansion. It was not until 1907, when the Colonial
Office was established, after the question of colonial
expansion had been referred to the electorate, that
Germany can be said to have entered with a free
hand and with parliamentary and popular support
into the work of colonizing. When one criticizes
German colonial administration, and tries to estimate
the ability of the Germans to develop colonies, it is
not fair to begin before 1907. The German nation
and the German Government must be judged only
by what has been accompHshed since that date.

When the Government proposed to the Reichstag
in 1902 to subsidize the immigration bureau estab-
lished by the Colonial Society, the proposal was
rejected. The Reichstag majority was unwilling to
use state fimds to encourage immigration to colonies
that were unsuitable for European settlers. The
argument of Germans abroad living under the German
flag did not appeal at all. It was urged on the floor
of the Reichstag that if emigrants were to be
assisted, they ought to be directed to South America,
and especially to southern Brazil. The subsidy
proposal was made the occasion for a bitter attack
upon the acquisition of the Spanish islands in the
Pacific. There were less than three thousand five

i8i

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

hundred Europeans in the Protectorate in 1902,
spread over a territory one and one-half times as
large as the German Empire, and more than a
thousand of these were not Germans. A serious
question arose as to the future from the entry of a
great many Boers who had trekked once more to
escape the extension of British rule. Severe measures
had to be taken to prevent the country from being
overrun by Boer irreconcilables. If they were
allowed to come in large numbers, they would un-
doubtedly soon be at loggerheads with the Germans
and other Europeans.^

When the future of the German colonies was being
seriously compromised, their existence, in fact, im-
periled, by the radical attitude in Germany, an event
happened in Southwest Africa that has changed the
course of history. A revolt of Hottentots at Warm-
bad in December, 1903, resulted in the death of a

* Capital has since been made of the inhospitality of the German
Government to the trekkers of 1902. I have looked into this question
very carefully, and cannot see where the Germans acted in any other
way than it was imperative for them at the moment to act. The
Boers quickly outnumbered in some districts the German settlers.
The very fact that they trekked was a proof that they were either an
unsuccessful element at home, who had nothing to lose, or intractable
to an extreme degree. The pastors with them immediately demanded
a promise of education in the Taal language imder much more liberal
provisions than the Boers have obtained in South Africa. Many of
them, demoralized perhaps by three years of undisciplined warfare
in commandos, wandered about the country, killing game, cutting
timber at will and wastefully, and pasturing their flocks over wide
areas. Many wells were destroyed. What Germany insisted upon
was only that the Boers should submit to the laws and regulations
governing German settlers in the colony; and the same terms of land
settlement were proposed to them as to colonists from Europe.

182

GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

German officer and several non-commissioned officers
and soldiers. During another native rising some
settlers were massacred. In January, 1904, the
Hereros began to murder settlers and destroy railway
bridges and telegraph lines. In October the Witbois
revolted. These events were due to the inevitable
clash that comes in Africa when Europeans penetrate
into the interior with their railways and their ideas
of taxation and administrative control. Every
nation that has attempted to colonize the interior of
Africa has met with the same opposition. Th"fe
wrongful treatment of natives by colonists and
mining companies, who had obtained land by fraud
and extortion and who were attempting to make the
ousted natives work for the benefit of those who had
ousted them, was frankly admitted in Berlin. This
also has happened everywhere in Africa, when a
government has parted with large areas of land on
concession, and has not simultaneously organized
an official supervision to protect native rights.

The mistake of the Germans was in the way they
tried to put down the uprising. Experience in
colonial administration, and the presence in the colony
of skilled administrators, might have saved all the
trouble that followed. It was decided to send out
German troops, under the command of a general
who knew nothing whatever about native fighting
and native psychology. The German miHtary system
is presided over by an officer caste, whose arrogance
robs it of tact and whose methods are abhorrent.

We have not space to go into the long and sad
story of the war that lasted until the summer of 1907.

183

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Instead of trying to conciliate the natives and
organize the country administratively through the
tribal chiefs, as Sir Frederick Lugard did so admir-
ably in Nigeria during the same period, Lieutenant-
General Trotha tried to "stamp out" the rebellion
by frightfulness. He set a price on the heads of
insurgent chiefs, and issued a proclamation menacing
the natives with extermination if the insurrection
continued. When this became known in Germany,
a storm of indignation swept over the country, and
Chancellor von Biilow was compelled to declare null
and void the disgraceful proclamation. Von Trotha
criticized the Chancellor's "weakness," and attri-
buted the continued opposition of the Hereros to the
repeal of his proclamation. He was removed from
his command. ^ But the mischief was done. It had
now become a life and death struggle.

More troops and more money were required as the
result of von Trotha's stupendous folly. Germany
now felt that the war against Hereros and Hotten-
tots had to be seen through to the bitter end. This
feeling was shared by all the Powers. For white
supremacy throughout Africa was compromised.
When von Trotha's successor passed through
Johannisberg, Lord Selborne, the British High

' The German people felt that the honor of Germany had been
compromised by von Trotha's conduct, but not so the military caste,
of whom Emperor Wilhelm is the high priest. After von Trotha's
return to Germany, the Kaiser awarded him the decoration "Pour
le Merite. " It is this contemptuous disregard of public opinion and
the dictates of humanity, tolerated by the nation which does not and
cannot approve it, that has alienated from Germany the sympathies of
the world in the present war.

184

GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

Commissioner for South Africa, at a public banquet
wished him success, and spoke in emphatic terms of
the community of interests between German and
British in South Africa. Many Boers enlisted with
the Germans, and the Cape Colony forces rendered
valuable assistance by killing and capturing the
natives who were forced to cross the border. When
the war ended and peace was once more established,
nearly twenty-five hundred Germans had been killed
and half the Herero nation was dead. The Germans
had to undertake a complete disarmament of the
natives. There were sixteen thousand recalcitrant
prisoners of war on their hands, each one a Toussaint
Louverture, who knew many German Leclercs.

The war in Southwest Africa, unjustified in its
origin and barbarous in the way it was conducted, has
played, like the Boer War for Great Britain, an
important part in colonial history, and marked the
beginning of a new era in the history of Germany.
Like the Boer War again, good came from evil. For
it put the issue squarely before the Germans as to
whether they intended to become a colonizing Power
or not. It revealed to them the deficiencies and
weakness of their administration up to that time,
and the necessity of assuming heavy burdens if they
were to build up an overseas empire. The year 1907,
that saw the end of the rebellion, was the year of
crisis with the Germans. The decision was in favor
of colonization. Germany, freed of handicaps at
home, was making rapid progress when the European
conflagration of 19 14 caused the temporary, if not
permanent, disappearance of her colonial empire.

185

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

German Southwest Africa was radically trans-
formed, root and branch, by the three and a half
years of war. Administrative control, under civilian
officers, superseded the old regime of private con-
cessions and military posts. Railways that would
have taken long to build (or might not have been
constructed at all, because of lack of economic justi-
fication for putting up the funds), were built for
military purposes, and left as a precious heritage to
the colony. The advertisement from the struggle
brought colonists who would not otherwise have been
attracted. Then, suddenly, just when colonists and
money were needed for consolidating the new era of
peace, the discovery of diamonds was the deus ex
machina.

In 1909, German colonists increased three hundred
per cent., and the Government began to work hand
in hand with the settlers to develop in every possible
way the agricultural and mining resources of the
colony. There were ten thousand Germans, exclu-
sive of the army, in the colony in 19 14.

At the outbreak of the war one thousand four
hundred miles of railway, twenty-five hundred miles
of telegraph line, and over four hundred miles of
telephone line were the achievement of a decade.
A cable touched at Swakopmund. The wireless
stations — as the Allies found — were the last word in
efficiency. The state had taken over the ownership
of mines and railways, and farmed them out on
leases. In the north the railway from Swakopmund
to Otavi was extended in two branches to Tsumbel
and Grootfontein. The southern railway formed a

186

GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

semicircle in the interior, with its termini at Swakop-
mund and Angra Pequena. A branch of this line
south through the Hottentot country had neariy
reached the Orange River.

A crisis arose in 1910, the solution of which
demonstrates the wisdom and foresight with which
Germany has been treating colonial problems in
recent years. Herr Ertzberger proposed to the
Reichstag that the expenses of the Herero war be
met by an extraordinary tax on the property of
the colonists. Dr. Dernberg, Colonial Secretary,
promptly replied that the military operations had
been the fulfillment of the Empire's duty to protect
people and property under the German flag, and
that the charges, or the greater part of them, should
fall upon the Empire. He showed that three-fourths
of the inhabitants of the colony had gone out since
the Herero campaign. Such a tax would not only be
unfair to them, but would kill the interest that was
just beginning to be taken in colonial settlement.
After three days of debate, the Chancellor was asked
to initiate legislation for the relief of the Imperial
Treasury by taxing the settlers and companies who
lived in the colony before the outbreak of the upris-
ing. In March, 191 1, the Colonial Office published a
statement, containing a review of British colonial
policy from 1767 to 1906, to prove that the taxation
of possessions abroad was unwise, until the financial
and economic position of the colonies made taxation
justifiable and tolerable. As far as possible, the
Empire should seek its compensation for the sums
expended by the colonial budget in the development

187

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

of commerce with the colonies. Local colonial taxa-
tion should be determined by the colonists themselves
and its proceeds used in the colonies.

German Southwest Africa was conquered in 191 5
by the South African Commonwealth Army, and is
under the British flag. Its future is being decided
now on the battlefields of Europe, where British
South Africans are fighting in the British Army to
make the conquest permanent.

188

CHAPTER X

THE HERITAGE OF LIVINGSTONE AND
RHODES

NYASALAND and Rhodesia are names written
on the map of Africa by the sacrifice and the
vision, the will and the courage, the devotion
and the endurance of two men. The missionary,
Livingstone, was thinking about the Ejngdom of God,
and the business man, Rhodes, was thinking about
the Kingdom of Great Britain. But the former was
not unmoved by worldly considerations : nor was the
latter unmoved by philanthropic considerations.
Livingstone cared very little about money and world
fame: Rhodes cared a great deal about both. But
missionary and promoter were at one in the desire to
bring the blessings and not the curses of civilization
to the natives of Central Africa, and in the belief
that this could be accomplished better under the
£egis of Great Britain than of any other Power.
Obstacles, such as lack of maps and of knowledge
of the interior, were nothing to the missionary who
had devoted his life to blazing a path for the Cross.
He was undaunted in the face of the hostility of
tribes who knew not the white man and this white

189

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

man's mission, wild animals, fevers, and — by far
the worst of all — solitude. Obstacles, such as the pres-
ence of the Boers on the road to the north, the
territorial appetite of other Powers than Britain, the
skepticism of those from whom the money had to be
obtained, and the engineering difficulties of rivers,
mountains, jungle, and swamp, were nothing to the
promoter who had devoted his life to advancing the
British flag by means of a railway from one end to
the other of Africa. Both Livingstone and Rhodes
were doers as well as dreamers. They were pioneers
in fact and not in fancy. But, as we look back upon
their life work, we see that their ability to fire the
imagination of their fellow countrymen and to
inspire others to join in the work they were doing
has meant far more to South and Central Africa
than their actual achievements.

The name of Livingstone is connected with Central
Africa from the Zambesi to the Congo. But his
great work was in the valleys of the Zambesi and
Loangwa and Shire and in the region west of Lake
Nyasa. Nyasaland, where he was buried, is his
particular country. Livingstonia, at the southern
end of Lake Nyasa, perpetuates the missionary's
name, and Blantyre, in the Shire Highlands, his
birthplace. The name of Livingstone has also been
given to the town on the Zambesi, where the Cape
to Cairo Railway crosses the great river, just east of
Victoria Falls.

The name of Rhodes is borne by British territory
in South-Central Africa north and south of the
Zambesi River. Mashonaland and Matabeleland

190

LIVINGSTONE AND RHODES

are Southern Rhodesia; Marotseland .is Northern
Rhodesia; and the valleys of the Loangwa and
Chambeze Rivers, and the little angle between the
southern end of Lake Tanganyika, with the eastern
side of Lake Mweru and the western and north-
ern sides' of Lake Bangweulu, are Northeastern
Rhodesia.

The Nyasaland Protectorate is a narrow strip of
territory running north and south. The northern
portion touches German East Africa on the north and
shuts off Rhodesia from Lake Nyasa the whole length
of the lake. The southern half, south of the lake, is
an enclave in Portuguese East Africa, extending
along the valley of the Shire River almost to the
point where the Shire empties into the Zambesi on
its lowest navigable reach.

The Zambesi, from German to Portuguese terri-
tory, forms the division between Northern and
Southern Rhodesia. Northeastern Rhodesia is
almost separated from the other portions by pro-
jections of Belgian and Portuguese territory, which
make Rhodesia as a whole look like an hourglass.
Both east and west Rhodesia has Germany and
Portugal for neighbors. Belgian Congo is on the
north and the Transvaal and the desert on the south.
German Southwest Africa penetrates in a narrow
strip of land up to the Zambesi River, not far west
of Victoria Falls and Livingstone, through which the
Cape to Cairo Railway passes.^

After the present war there will be readjustment
of frontiers, especially if the Allies are able to impose

' This was seized by Rhodesia in the early months of 1915.

191

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

their will upon Germany and if they do not intend
to keep the faith with Portugal. But the frontiers
of 1 9 14 will always be a valuable historical record
of how explorers and colonists and Government
officials, with no knowledge of topography farther
than their eyes could see, followed river valleys, and
planted the flag of their countries wherever they
happened to penetrate the unknown interior of
Africa. Their controling idea was to keep clear the
path back to the coast from which they had come.

Nyasaland has only eight hundred Europeans
and four hundred Asiatics among a native population
of a million spread over forty thousand square miles.
It cannot be said, except in the Shire Highlands in
the extreme southern part of the protectorate around
Blantyre, that Nyasaland is colonized at all. It is
like Uganda and the Sudan and all the West African
colonies — a country where the white man rules and
trades, but where he does not settle. Strenuous
attempts, since communications by railway and
river with the Portuguese coast were projected and
started, have been made to encourage European
colonization. But from 1906 to 19 14 the European
population increased by only two hundred. Dysen-
tery and malaria have proved too much for the
whites.

In 1909, the Government of the Protectorate
prohibited the recruiting of blacks for work beyond
the confines of Nyasaland. This measure caused
some irritation and denunciation in Rhodesia, But
it was principally directed against the Transvaal,
and was enacted for purely humanitarian reasons.

192

LIVINGSTONE AND RHODES

It is interesting to note here that this measure made
it impossible for the British Government to help the
Transvaal in the negotiations with Portugal regarding
the amount of traffic demanded by the Lorenzo
Marques Railway at the expense of Natal and Cape
Colony. For if Portugal had threatened to prohibit
the yearly exodus of laborers from her East African
colony, the British could have said nothing at all.^

The two matters of general interest in Nyasaland
since the beginning of the twentieth century are
native antagonism and the spread of Mohamme-
danism.

In 1908, a native prophetess by preaching that
the Europeans would leave the country, and that it
was a sin to pay the hut tax to the white men,
obtained a great following. The tax fell off, and
there was much trouble and ill-feehng in getting the
natives of districts along the Portuguese frontier
back to the habit of paying this tribute to the white
man. It was believed that black fanaticism was on
the wane. This was a grievous mistake. A religious
organization, known as the "Ethiopian Church,"
with which it was impossible to find cause to interfere,
spread in Southern Nyasaland, in the Shire High-
lands, where the blacks came into contact with the
whites. The doctrine of the "Church " is that Africa
belongs to the black man, and that the white man is
an intruder, who ought to be killed off until he is dis-
couraged from coming to take the black man's lands
and oppress him. In 191 5, a very serious uprising,
which had no connection whatever with the Eiu*opean

' See pp. 78-82 above.

13 193

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

War, took place at the beginning of the year. On an
estate at Magomara, the manager was beheaded and
other white men killed. The heads were taken to
the church for a Thanksgiving service. Simultane-
ously an attack was made upon Blantyre, where
arms and ammunition were captured. The rebellion
miscarried, owing to a lack of coordination among
the ringleaders. After two weeks, the police had
dispersed all the bands in arms. It was found out in
the investigation that the natives of Shire Highlands
were more or less all in sympathy with this move-
ment, the purpose of which was to exterminate the
white men in Nyasaland and to carry off their
women. It is easy enough for a thousand armed
men to keep in respect a hundred thousand natives.
But one wonders whether colonization is worth
while in a country where there are many more sol-
diers and police and officials than there are colonists,
and where security is assured only as the result of
eternal vigilance.

Some ten years ago it was reported that a bastard
form of Mohammedanism was pervading the masses
in Nyasaland. Its growth had been remarkable
since 1903. All the villages along the Shire had huts
set aside for mosques. By 1910, from Lake Nyasa to
the coast in Portuguese and German territory, and
all around the lake shore and in the southern district
of Nyasaland, a Moslem teacher was to be found in
every village. When the Protectorate was formed
in 1 891, Mohammedanism was non-existent. The
propaganda had been carried on by Zanzibar Arabs.
Although it is frankly opposed to European influence,

194

LIVINGSTONE AND RHODES

British officials have not felt it incumbent to oppose
the propaganda. The Nyasaland natives do not
make fanatical Moslems, and it is believed that the
movement will not spread south of the Zambesi.
Christian missionaries are making strenuous efforts
to combat Mohammedanism, and are, as in Uganda,
meeting with considerable success because of the
great desire of the natives to learn to read and write.
In the country where David Livingstone died, and
where an obelisk now marks the tree that bore his
heart, militant Islam and militant Christianity have
met to fight for the allegiance of the people whom
Livingstone loved.

The development of Rhodesia began only a quarter
of a century ago, when the South African Company,
under the management of Cecil Rhodes, was granted
a charter for the exploitation of territories whose
limits were vaguely defined. As settlers entered the
country, and the necessity was imposed upon the
British Government of organizing Rhodesia adminis-
tratively, the south and north and northeastern
parts were separated politically, and have undergone
several changes in the last two decades.^ But all of
Rhodesia has remained under the economic control
of the South African Company, whose charter was
granted for twenty-five years.

Cape Colony took in the whole southern tip of
Africa, south of the Orange River, which traverses
almost completely the continent from west to east.
There were to the north, on the Atlantic coast,

' Distinct administrative districts have been called Western and
Northwestern Rhodesia.

195

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

German Southwest Africa, and, on the Indian
Ocean coast, the British colony of Natal. Directly
north of Cape Colony, Bechuanaland and an un-
claimed and undesired hinterland lay between Cape
Colony and the interior of the continent that Cecil
Rhodes was developing. It was largely the Kalahari
Desert. The hostile Orange Free State, north of
Cape Colony and west of Natal, barred the way
from the Cape of Good Hope to Rhodesia, and north
of the Orange Free State lay the Transvaal, a country
founded and developed by Boers who had trekked
to escape British rule. These independent states
were strong in fighting power, as the British had long
ago discovered, and their conquest was not worth
while until diamonds brought the British to the
western frontier of the Orange Free State and gold
made the Transvaal a prize that would return interest
on enormous sums of money. Before the develop-
ment of the Rand, a Jameson raid would have been
regarded as the mad and criminal folly of outlaws.
With the Transvaal stamps turning out gold, it was
a wise and patriotic enterprise of pioneers.

The Cape to Cairo Railway did not need to pass
through the territory of either of the Dutch republics.
It has not, in fact, done so. The line runs through
the Kimberly diamond field, skirts the western
frontiers of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal
without entering either, and strikes north across the
Khama Country to Bulawayo in Matabeleland.
But it would not have been safe with two hostile
states so near to it, and Transvaal trade and money
were needed to make it, in conjunction with the lines

196

LIVINGSTONE AND RHODES

running south, a good investment. The Boer War
was essential to bring to fruition the dream of Cecil
Rhodes to found an Anglo-Saxon state in South
Africa. His last years were spent in the uncertainty
and agony of the conflict which he had indirectly
precipitated. He died the very week that the Boers
gave up the struggle.^

Between the Commonwealth of South Africa and
the British possessions that are now united under
the name of Rhodes, are the Kalahari Desert,
IQiama's Country, and the land of the Bamangwatos.
The heart of southern Africa is a protectorate called
Bechuanaland. The native chiefs have a large
amount of freedom, and are under the direct author-
ity of the British Crown. They pay for each hut
five dollars per year to the British Commissioner,
who resides at Mafeking in the Commonwealth.
The Protectorate is in the South African customs
union, and, when Rhodesia is ready to enter, will
become an integral part of the Commonwealth.

Rhodesia touches the Transvaal border on the
Limpopo River, ^ near 22° S., and extends to the

^ Naturally there is a division of opinion in South Africa in regard
to Rhodes. While the British look upon him as the greatest states-
man produced among African colonials, to the Boers he is the enemy
of their race, and the unscrupulous financier whose only object was
to exploit their country for his own benefit. Fifteen years after his
death, their implacable hatred is still shown in the opposition to the
scheme of having the national university placed at his Table Moun-
tain residence near Cape Town.

*Who does not remember "the great grey green greasy Limpopo
River, all set about with fever trees," upon whose bank the Elephant's
Child, "with his 'satiable Curtiosity, " got his nose with the help of
the Bi-Coloured Python Rock Snake, of Kipling's Jiist So stories?

197

THE NEW MAP OP APRICA

southern end of Lake Tanganyika near 8° S. At its
widest point (including Nyasaland) on the 14th paral-
lel of latitude, it broadens from 22° to 36° longitude.
British authority in Rhodesia is represented by ad-
ministrators for Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rho-
desia, appointed by the British South Africa Company,
with the approval of the Secretary of State, and a resi-
dent Imperial Commissioner, who is the same for both
the northern and southern administrative districts.
^' Bulawayo, near the southern frontier, is the
junction point of the two lines from the Cape to
Southern and Northern Rhodesia. The southern
line runs to Salisbury and connects there with the
railway through Portuguese East Africa to Beira.
From Salisbury there are several spurs, two from
Gowelo and one from a point near Bulawayo to West
Nicholson in the south. The northern line makes a
wide detour to cross the Zambesi at livingstone, and
passes through Broken Hills into Katanga Province
of Belgian Congo. This will be the main line of the
Cape to Cairo Railway, unless a different future for
German East Africa and for the spur of Portuguese
East Africa between Mashonaland and Nyasaland
makes possible the connection of Salisbury and
Blantyre, and a line from Lake Nyasa to Lake
Victoria. In this way an all-British railway from the
Cape to Cairo could be realized. ^

^ I found, however, in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan a strong feeling
that the railway connection of Lake Victoria and Khartum, by the
valley of the White Nile, is the very last project to be thought of
in building the Sudan railway system. Economic and engineering
reasons seem to militate against the building of tliis link of the Cape-
Cairo all-rail route.

198

LIVINGSTONE AND RHODES

The history of the development of Southern and
Northern Rhodesia is not unUke that of Southern
and Northern Nigeria, one territory developing
rapidly and becoming self-supporting, and the other,
because it must take in a hinterland of protectorates,
costly to pacify, slow to yield returns, and showing
each year a large deficit. Naturally the colonists
of the prosperous portion — as well as ojEficials anxious
to present a good budget — do not feel enthusiastic
about the pooling of interests that would follow
administrative union. But there is a difference in
the fact that white colonists have become much
more numerous in Rhodesia than in Nigeria and
have good hopes of making the entire country a
white man's land. The problem of unification
has been complicated by the grievances of colon-
ists against the chartered company, and by the
demand, as in British East Africa, for self-govern-
ment.

As early as 1904, there were plans afoot among the
settlers of Rhodesia to start an agitation to make the
British Government expropriate the Chartered Com-
pany, and make a Crown Colony of Southern
Rhodesia. In 1906, when Lord Selborne visited
Salisbury, he heard the grievances of the settlers
against the company, and promised to bring them
to the attention of the Home Government. In 1907,
representatives of Matabeleland settlers told the
directors of the company who were visiting the
country that the white colonists demanded a voice
in their government. The directors favored the idea
of federation of all Rhodesia, and an ultimatum

. 199

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

union with the new Commonwealth that was in the
process of formation in South Africa. But they did
not see how the settlers could ask for a voice in the
Government, when all the financial responsibility
was being assumed by the company, and when the
company was investing huge sums for railway
development. But in May the Legislative Council
of Southern Rhodesia passed a resolution asking
the British Government to extend representa-
tive government to Rhodesia. There were now
fourteen thousand Eiu*opeans in Southern Rho-
desia, and the revenue of 1907 exceeded expendi-
ture.

In 1908, the South Africa Company yielded to
local pressure and issued new regulations, which
made taking up land much easier, and afforded
settlers better facilities for transport and travel on
the railways. In 19 13, after five years of unexampled
prosperity, political activity was renewed. The
twenty-five-year charter of the South Africa Com-
pany was to expire on October 29, 19 14, and in
extending it, the Crown reserved the right to add
provisions or repeal provisions in the existing charter.
The company claimed as its property a million acres
of unalienated land, exclusive of native reserves, in
Northern Rhodesia. There was already a big land
question in Southern Rhodesia. Colonists held that
unalienated ground is not the property of the com-
pany, but Crown land administered by the company
only because there is no other form as yet of ad-
ministration. The Rhodesian Agricultural Union
petitioned the Imperial Government to constitute

200

LIVINGSTONE AND RHODES

a Royal Commission of Inquiry.^ The Executive
Council passed resolutions stating that the Union
could not cooperate in the general scheme of defense
for South Africa as long as the Chartered Company
were responsible for the government.

Throughout 1913 and 1914, there was much
confusion and division of opinion about the future
among the Rhodesian colonists. They were all at
heart against the Chartered Company, and preferred
some other form of government. Rhodesia could
hardly become a Crown Colony, for then the Imperial
Government would have to indemnify the Chartered
Company, and the country would be saddled with a
very burdensome debt. Not many of the settlers
were in favor of the alternative of entering the South
African Commonwealth. Sir Starr Jameson, who
had recently become president of the company,
urged the settlers to support the Chartered Company,
for the sake of their own prosperity and for the sake
of the future political status of Rhodesia. He

^ The land question in Rhodesia is very obscure. It depends upon
the legal interpretation of the terms of the charter, and there is a
case pending before the Privy Council at the present moment. The
European settlers are against the company to a man on the land
question. But the company — up to this time — can scarcely be
accused of exploiting Rhodesia in their own interests. The share-
holders have spent millions upon the country, and have been most
liberal in their attitude toward railway extension. They have never
had a penny of interest. It is natural that they should look some-
where for a little reward for their confidence and a little return for
their money. The case is not at all as if the company had been
enjoying huge profits for years, and was trying to grab more, and to
prevent colonists from getting the power into their own hands in
order to keep going a profitable investment.

201

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

warned them that the downfall of the Chartered
Company would mean the inclusion of Rhodesia in
the Union instead of a wonderful independent future.
The elections to the Legislative Council in March,
1914, resulted in the return of pro-charter candidates.
It cannot be interpreted as an out-and-out victory
for the company, but rather as the decision of
Rhodesia not to amalgamate with South Africa.
The colonists want self-government, and are, as in
British East Africa, determined to get it. But they
do not want it enough to enter the South African
Union. There are only twenty-five thousand Euro-
peans in Rhodesia, and they would be swamped in
the midst of the electorate of over a million in the
other colonies, the majority of whom are Dutch,
and would interfere in many ways, especially in
compelling the Taal to be taught in schools. Most
of the Rhodesians are of British extraction, and have
had a growing feeling since the federation was formed
that they are "jolly well out of it." And they do
not want to be a dumping ground for all the failures
and poor whites who would work their way quickly
into the new province. Only when Rhodesia has a
large enough European population to be able to
maintain local interests in a federal parliament, and
to turn the balance in favor of the English against the
Dutch, will Rhodesian colonists be ready to join the
Commonwealth. In South Africa, too, the English
extremists think as the Rhodesians do, and are
praying for the day when a strong Rhodesian province
— markedly Anglo-Saxon — will put the Afrikanders
in a minority in the Commonwealth Parliament.

202

LIVINGSTONE AND RHODES

Southern Rhodesia, nearest to South Africa,
nearest to the mouth of the Zambesi, and with
railway communications (to the Indian Ocean at
Beira and into the Commonwealth) of much shorter
distance than the rest of the country, has shown a
very healthy development since 1900. Since 1907,
revenue has exceeded expenditure. In 1909, the
gold output was over two and a half million pounds.
In 1 9 10, cotton-growing was started on an extensive
scale. The cotton already sent from Rhodesia
brought a higher price in the London market than
that of any other variety except Sea Island cotton
from the West Indies. Tobacco, citron, and rubber
were yielding excellent results. In 191 1, the railways
were earning sufficient to meet interest charges and
leave a margin. In 19 12, it was announced that over
a million acres were being cultivated in Southern
Rhodesia, and that the Liebig Company had bought
half a million acres for ranching purposes. When the
war broke out, the gold production was increasing
rapidly.

As in other South African colonies, the two main
factors of economic development are white settlers
and native labor. Efforts were made in 1907 to
attract immigration from England through the
Salvation Army. Great hopes were based upon
General Booth, who had taken up the scheme
enthusiastically. It never came to anything. ^^-
sisted immigration is wise nowhere in Africa. Since
whites will not do manual labor of the kind that
blacks do or any kind in company with blacks, the
only settlers who have a chance to succeed are those

203

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

understanding farming or stock raising or with a
trade. In addition to being skilled laborers, colonists
must also have some capital. Even where the State
gives immigrants a start, after having assisted them
to come to the country, a year of bad luck in the
way of drought or personal illness (both are very
likely to happen in Africa) is apt to ruin a man who
has not funds to tide him over.^ Native labor is
always a serious question. After Nyasaland pro-
hibited labor recruiting in 191 1, immediately there
was a scarcity of hands for agriculture in Southern
Rhodesia and for mines in Northern Rhodesia.
Complaint was made against the action of the
Protectorate. But what could the Home Govern-
ment do to Nyasaland for adopting a law which
Rhodesia herself was enforcing?

Northern Rhodesia, aided greatly by the boom in
gold-mining and by the extension of the railway to
Katanga, has been developing rapidly since 1910.
In 1912, Lord Grey, in a speech at Bulawayo declared
that Northern Rhodesia was likely to surpass
Southern Rhodesia in agriculture as well as mining
during the near future. A land bank was founded,
as in German Southwest Africa, to aid settlers in
getting started by advancing money on the security
of their land. There were about fifteen hundred

' Owing to the fact that grants for assistance are a fixed amount
in the budget, and cannot be overstepped, an "assisted" colonist can
look for a stipulated sum from the State, and no more, no matter
what happens. There is no way of remedying this, because a special
fund, set aside to meet unusual cases, would be swept away at the
first drought or epidemic.

204

LIVINGSTONE AND RHODES

Europeans in Rhodesia, north of the Zambesi River,
at the outbreak of the war.

One-sixth of the population of Rhodesia was under
arms in 19 15, and five hundred went to join Lord
Kitchener's army. Rhodesian regiments cooperated
for the conquest of Southwest Africa and East
Africa. It is their hope to get an outlet both to the
Indian Ocean and to the Atlantic through German
territories. If this is reaUzed, the British, through
Rhodesia, will have done in the southern part of the
African continent what, through Rhodesia, they
prevented the Portuguese from doing — opening
up a path under one flag across the continent.

205

CHAPTER XI

THE BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND
UGANDA

SOUTH and north of the equator to the fourth
parallel of latitude East Africa is dominated by
the British. The large Protectorate of British
East Africa stretches from the coast of the Indian
Ocean between Italian Somaliland and German East
Africa back to the headwaters of the Nile. The Juba
River forms an eastern inland boundary with Italian
Somaliland from the equator line nearly to 4° north.
On the north are Abyssinia and the Anglo-Egyptian
Sudan. The British Protectorate of Uganda is on
the west, and Lake Victoria and German East
Africa on the south. The Uganda Protectorate is a
quadrangle at the headwaters of the Nile, between
Lake Albert, Lake Edward, Lake Victoria, and Lake
Rudolf, and surrounded by British East Africa, the
Belgian Congo, German East Africa, and the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan.

Uganda first came under British influence by
exploration. The British title was not established
until the Germans and British began to organize
the hinterland of their East African colonies. In
1894, a protectorate was declared over the kingdoms

206

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

of Uganda and the tribes in adjoining territories
that were known and accessible. During the first
decade of the twentieth century almost the whole
territory of the Protectorate, whose population is
now about three millions, was brought under direct
British administration. Where they have shown
loyalty and ability, native chiefs have been main-
tained. One province, Baganda, is still recognized
as a native kingdom. Although the soil is exceedingly
fertile, and the development of lake communication
and the completion of the railway through British
East Africa to the coast have given excellent means
of transport, the climate of Uganda causes it to be
avoided by settlers. There are only a thousand
Europeans in the country, of whom considerably
more than a quarter are Government officials.

The railway from Mombasa reached Lake Victoria
in 190 1 . It enabled the British to bring Indian troops
into the country in fourteen days. The importance
of the Protectorate, from the moment ofi ts establish-
ment, has been political rather than economic. It
was essential for the British to have control of this
district in order to destroy the power of the Dervishes
in the Sudan. Money and energy were put into
Uganda, as into Somaliland, to keep it from falling
into the hands of another Power. If the British had
not gone into Uganda, the Germans certainly would
have extended their territory north around the
western coast of Lake Victoria.

Winston Churchill, after his African visit, declared
that Uganda was the jewel of the Empire in East
Africa, that its negroes were the most intelligent he

207

THE NEW MAP OP APRICA

had seen, and that the country was one of the most
beautiful gardens in the world. He believed that
when Uganda was developed, its traffic would make
the railway a paying concern. At last reports,
however, Uganda was still costing Great Britain
very much more than it yielded, and trade was
alarmingly large with the Germans and Belgians.

The importance of Uganda in the history of Euro-
pean expansion in Africa is that its creation pre-
vented the Germans from controling Lake Victoria
and the Belgians from reaching Lake Victoria. It
has rounded out the territory of the British East
African Colony, and gives to Britain control of the
headwaters of the White Nile.

During the period of our review, the devastation of
sleeping sickness, the remarkable development of
Christianity, and the interest taken in farming by the
native chiefs are the events of general interest in
Uganda.

Throughout central Africa sleeping sickness, a
fever carried by the tsetse fly, is the most formidable
barrier to the progress of European civilization. It
has prevented the spread of white colonization. By
suddenly ruining great districts, calculations of
financial return are made so uncertain that railway
construction, where there is no political reason to
prompt and justify it, has been retarded. In German
and British East Africa, in northern Rhodesia, in
the two large Portuguese colonies, in the Belgian
Congo, and in Prench Equatorial Africa, sleeping
sickness has made great ravages during the past
twenty years. It has hampered the development of

208

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

the southern Sudan. But its worst effects have been
felt on the islands and the Uganda shore of Lake
Victoria, which were entirely depopulated in 1908.
Two-thirds of the population of the protectorate had
died in six years. In many places the disease dis-
appeared for lack of people to attack. Famine
followed plague. The survivors were starving to
death by the thousands. This calamity, far worse
than any earthquake and comparable in modern
times only to Chinese and Indian famines, awakened
the Powers who had interests in Africa to the neces-
sity of common action for combating the ' plague.
But no more in medical than in political matters are
international jealousies able to be compounded.
The second international conference in 1908 closed
without coming to any decision, because the French
and Italian delegates were opposed to establishing
in London the central bureau of the international
organization. ^

The British sent a special sanitary mission to
Africa. Segregation camps were established in
Uganda, where the Peres Blancs of the Algerian
mission did a work that brought much power and
influence to the native Catholic Church. After
three years it was announced that preventive
measures were beginning to save lives from sleeping
sickness. But the problem still remains.

In Uganda, Christianity has made more rapid
progress than in any other part of Africa. There are
over two hundred thousand baptized converts, and

' Great Britain and Germany later appointed a joint commission
to study sleeping sickness for three years.
14 209

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the rest of the Baganda race is under Christian
influence. The adherents are almost equally divided
between English Protestants and French Catholics.
Unique in African history is the way that agricul-
tural development, along European lines, has been
taken hold of by the Uganda natives. One can
attribute this for the most part to the influence of
Christianity. We cannot expect Moslems and
Pagans to comprehend and appreciate and take
advantage of the European way of doing things until
they have adopted the European religion. Not only
our institutions, political and social and economic,
but also our manner of thought, are the result of
centuries of an evolution that has been shaped and
dominated by Christianity. In 1913, the Baganda
chiefs were reported as owners of large rubber and
cotton plantations, and fast growing rich. The
official report stated: "It is gratifying to note that
contact with civilization has not had a deteriorating
effect." Is the reason of this to be found in an
inherent superiority of the Uganda natives to those
of other parts of Africa, or in their acceptance of
Christianity? The British Government has or-
ganized the country, spent large sums of money on
it, and brought it into railway communication with
the outside world. But to the French Catholic and
English Protestant missionaries is due the unique
place of the Uganda natives in Africa. Unless they
are given the moral foundation upon which to build,
material prosperity that comes with European con-
trol is to aboriginal races certain destruction — a
rapid disappearance following deterioration.

210

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

The British came into possession of the southern
half of the coast Hne of the East Africa Protectorate,
from the northern mouth of the Tana River to the
Umba River through the connection with Zanzibar.
The Sultan's dominions extended only ten miles
inland, and were leased from him by the British.
Between the Tana River and the Juba British
sovereignty was established, as in the interior, by a
Vague harking back to Egyptian rights and a practi-
cal opening up and occupation of the country, treaties
being made with local chieftains as the penetration
progressed. A frontier was gradually decided upon
with the Germans on the south, carried from the
coast where spheres were definitely established, to
Karangu Bay on Lake Victoria.

The frontier with Uganda is marked by Lakes
Victoria and Rudolf and a line drawn from one to
the other. While the British were establishing the
hinterland of West Africa and extending their
Protectorate over the natives of Uganda, British
and Egyptian troops were reconquering the Sudan.
The settling of Sudan frontiers with Belgium and
Abyssinia and Italy was accompanied at the same
time (1902 to 1906) by the fixing of Uganda bounda-
ries with Belgium and West African boundaries with
Abyssinia and Italy. The British possessions then
came to an understanding among themselves, made
easy by the fact that their interests were all in the
hands of the same arbiter, and that local opposing
influences were lacking. The "all red" stretch from
the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean by way of
West Africa, Uganda, the Sudan, and Egypt became

211

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

a reality between 1898 and 1906. Although the
British flag waves over neariy a third of the continent,
this is the only place in Africa where British posses-
sions reach from one sea to another.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
East Africa Protectorate was an inchoate jumble of
territories under the administration of the Foreign
Office. Not until the end of 1906 were Orders in
Council issued to establish a definite status for the
country. A Governor-General and Commander-in-
Chief were appointed, and Executive and Legislative
Councils, the former consisting of the Governor and
four members, and the latter of eight official and four
unofficial members. Although still called a Protec-
torate, British East Africa has become virtually a
Crown Colony. When the strip on the coast leased
from Zanzibar was freed of foreign consular jurisdic-
tion in 1908, the last vestige of the technical Zanzi-
bar connection disappeared. The four provinces of
1900 have now been increased to seven, and effective
administrative control is exercised throughout the
Protectorate, except in the northeastern districts.

As in German East Africa, the history of pacifica-
tion and economic development is the history of the
progress of the railway from the coast through the
interior to the western confines of the country. The
line starts at Mombasa on a small island close to the
coast in the southern part of the Protectorate and
ends at Port Florence on Lake Victoria. On the
lake, steamers make the connection with Uganda.
From Nairobi, the capital and most important
interior city, there is a spur north to Fort Hall.

212

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

Some distance nearer the coast a branch runs west
to Lake Magadi. The railway was completed soon
after the opening of the twentieth century. The
southern portion of British East Africa has enjoyed
the advantages of railway communication through-
out the period of our survey.

The railway has cost over £6,000,000, two and one-
half millions in excess of the estimates. But there
has never been any doubt about the political wisdom
and financial soundness of the investment. As
everywhere else in Africa, railway communication is
a sine qua non of effective administrative control and
of economic development. As in the neighboring
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the railway, owned and run
by the State, brings in a handsome profit, which
makes the difference between deficit and surplus in
the budget. From 1910 to 1913, the deficit of British
East Africa, thanks to the railway, was cut down
substantially and progressively. In 19 14 the colony
became self-supporting.

We have seen how the business basis upon
which the finances of the Sudan were organized
and managed, and the excellent budget showing,
prompted the Imperial Parliament to pass without
hesitation, shortly before the outbreak of the Euro-
pean War, a bill to guarantee interest on a three
million pound loan. The same facility was accorded
to British East Africa and Uganda in 19 14.

Up to 1908, the railway to Lake Victoria from the
coast had profited enormously by Belgian and Ger-
man through trade. But after the remarkable
achievement of the Germans in pushing through

213

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

their railway to the upper end of Lake Tanganyika,
a serious falling off in railway receipts was expected.
The rapid development of the country, however,
produced the surprising and gratifying result of a
railway profit of £66,000 in 191 1. Sheep were doing
very well in the highlands. There was a great in-
crease in cotton, lumber, and hemp export. Silver
was beginning to be exported. Gold was discovered.
In 1 913, although there was a decrease in rubber and
the ivory trade was dwindling rapidly, the total
amount of the trade of British East Africa had
increased seventy-five per cent, in five years, and a
good seventy per cent, of it was with the British
Empire.

The northern part of the Protectorate, between the
Tana and the Juba rivers and west from Lake Rudolf
to the border of Italian Somaliland, has not yet been
developed, and is the only part of British West
Africa to which the authority of the Government does
not extend without constant military expeditions.
The Ogaden Somalis, who cause so much trouble to
the British and Italians in Somaliland, raid fre-
quently the northern part of British East Africa.
As in Somaliland, the Home Government has
opposed a forward policy, and has refrained from
occupying interior posts. The Ogaden Somalis are
left to quarrel among themselves. After ten years of
comparative quiet, the Somalis proved in British
East Africa as in Somaliland that they would and
could take advantage of a Government which shirked
its responsibilities. In the spring of 1914, there were
serious disturbances in Jubaland province. The

214

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

Somalis seemed to have got a plentiful supply of
rifles and ammunition from Abyssinia. They re-
fused to submit to disarmament, and attacked
British fortified posts. Troops had to be hurried
from Uganda and Nyasaland. The Somalis, aban-
doning bush tactics, tried to rush the British forces,
who were saved only by their machine guns. When
the general war began, the trouble had died down,
but by no means could it be said to have ended.
After peace is restored in Europe and Africa, the
British Government must either occupy this north-
ern country, or by strict coastal control and bringing
pressure to bear upon Abyssinia effect a stoppage of
traffic in arms. As long as the Somalis have good
rifles and plenty of ammunition they will be a thorn
in the flesh.

Christian missionaries working in common or
adjoining fields have found throughout the world
that unity is essential, if real progress is to be made in
converting pagans and Moslems. In the untutored
mind there is room only for the essential fact of
Christ redeeming men from sin through their con-
fession of faith in Him and their dedication of life to
His service. Antagonistic and competitive mission-
ary propaganda is damning to the common cause.
A native may be able to appreciate the difference
between the Catholic and Protestant point of view.
But when it comes to distinctions between various
Protestant sects, the effect on the native convert is
disastrous. From personal investigation in many
mission fields, I have come to the conclusion that
denominationalism in missionary propaganda is

215

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

criminal folly. It leads to lives wasted in fruitless
effort and useless sacrifice. It creates a prejudice
against Christianity on the part of those who are
being "reached." It means throwing away for
nothing the money of those who support missionary
organizations.

Anglicans and Episcopalians on the mission field
must make common cause with other Protestant
denominations, emphasizing the evangelical note in
their preaching, or "renounce their schism" and
join the Roman Catholic Church. There is place for
a middle ground in Europe and America, where
Christianity has a historical background. But there
is no place for "straddling" in a pagan country.
This truth was brought out in the missionary con-
ference at Kikuyu, where Anglicans, Presbyterians,
Baptists, Methodists, and Congregationalists met to
discuss plans for unity of action among the natives.
The Bishop of Uganda described the aim of the
Conference to be for an ultimate "union of native
Christians in one native Church.^* At the close, the
Bishop of Mombasa, assisted by the 'Bishop of
Uganda, administered the sacrament to members of
the Conference, irrespective of their denomination,
in the Scotch Presbyterian Church. It was an epoch-
making event in the history of Christian missions in
Africa. The fraternizing — even to the sacraments —
of Anglicans and other Protestants aroused a great
deal of excitement and indignation among narrow-
minded fanatics in England. When the Bishop of
Zanzibar charged the Bishops of Uganda and East
Africa with heresy, it showed that mediseval bigotry

216

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

had found its way into the church mihtant in Africa,
to weaken and paralyze effort where strength and
stimulus were needed.

The chief interest of British East Africa from the
point of view of Europe in Africa since 1900 is the
experiment of white colonization. It is important
for us to follow the movement to attract white
settlers to the Protectorate, and to note how the
same questions presented themselves as in other
British colonies in Africa, economic competition with
natives, the color question, the exclusion of. Asiatics,
the demand for self-government. What has happened
in this colony is of utmost value in throwing light
upon the solution of problems that arise everywhere
in Africa.

In 1902, Commander Whitehouse completed a
survey of Lake Victoria, which had taken him more
than a year to make. He announced that he had
found on the east side of the lake a forty-mile stretch
of enclosed water at the mouth of which was a
valuable tract of high country and a large population.
He was of the opinion that there was a possibility
of this becoming a white man's country. Mr. Cham-
berlain took back to England the same opinion, after
he had visited Mombasa and had gone inland for a
short trip on the railway. In 1903, the Governor,
Sir Charles Elliott, said that a large part of the
Protectorate was a white man's country, and that, if
European settlers and merchants were encouraged,
British East Africa would pay its way in ten years
at the very most. In 1907, Mr. Winston Churchill
crossed the Protectorate on his way to Cairo via the

217

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Great Lakes. At Nairobi he declared that the
highlands was certainly a white man's country, that
the Government would reward settlers with market-
able titles, and would prevent absenteeism by ex-
propriation. In 1909, Mr. Roosevelt said at Nairobi
that the country was "a real white man's land,"
and besides, "the most attractive playground in
the world."

Glowing official reports, added to the widely
heralded remarks from distinguished travelers, at-
tracted white settlers. They began to flock to
Mombasa. The discovery of diamonds near Nairobi
in 1907 brought more white men to the interior, and
Nairobi became rapidly a European city. But from
the very beginning there were difficulties. Racial
and political agitation arose, as is inevitable wherever
the Anglo-Saxon goes.

Like many other colonies, beginning with the
famous example of India, a chartered company was
the original developing agency. As long as there
were only natives to exploit, the company met with
no opposition. But the moment the British colonist
appeared, the company was a competitor, and was
opposed at every turn. The conflict was brought out
in rather an unusual and very pubUc way by the
quarrel between Sir Charles Elliott and the Home
Government. In 1904, Sir Charles resigned the High
Commissionership, and asked for a public inquiry
into the circumstances of his resignation. He
charged that Lord Lansdowne had ordered him to
refuse grants of land to certain private persons, while
giving monopoly of land on unduly advantageous

218

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

terms to the East Africa Syndicate. Sir Charles
resigned rather than execute instructions which he
regarded as unjust and impolitic. The Foreign Office
ignored the demand for a public inquiry, but issued a
statement to the effect that the East Africa Syndi-
cate employed a large staff, was a responsible body,
and had spent a great deal of money on its enterprises
up to that stage. Sir Charles replied that the money
had been spent on a fruitless search for minerals, and
that the principle of a new company concession was
bad, for it would exclude genuine colonization and
European settlement. The granting of small private
concessions was the only policy to follow, if the
proper sort of white settlers were to be attracted to
East Africa.

The white colonists were opposed not only to
company concessions, but also to the introduction of
Jews and Indians, Umited leasehold of land grants,
"favoritism" toward natives, and government
without representation. Wherever John Bull goes
he holds out for the good and bad in Anglo-Saxon-
dom, just as vigorously if the flag over the land where
he settles is British as if it is of an alien government.

I. No Jews or Asiatics. When Mr. Chamberlain
visited the Protectorate, he conceived the idea of
offering land to the Zionist movement. When he
first broached the subject in England, a howl of
protest went forth from the few hundred Englishmen
already in British East Africa. No Jews from
Central or Southeastern Europe, of the type that
private charity would set up in life, were wanted as
neighbors in agriculture. They certainly were not

219

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

wanted as competitors in small commerce. The
Imperial Government paid no attention to the pro-
tests. A commission was sent out to examine
territory available for Zionist settlement. The com-
mission went to Uganda, and decided to offer land
there to the Zionists. The Zionist Congress at Basle,
in 1905, declined the offer. Small wonder! For I
suppose some of them had read the report of the
High Commissioner of Uganda for 1904, which was
published shortly before the Congress assembled.
In it occurs this sentence: "Uganda will never be a
white man's country, for it has no areas, as in East
Africa, suitable to white colonization. "

There were many Indians in Zanzibar and East
Africa before the coming of the white settlers. Here
was a country, directly controlled by the British
Crown, where conditions, which Her Majesty's
Government made a casus belli against the Boers of
the Transvaal, did not prevail. The Indian, being a
British subject, had the right to settle wherever the
British flag flew. But the moment white settlers
came in numbers to British East Africa, agitation
against the Indians commenced. When Mr. Winston
Chiirchill said at Nairobi that the whites required
the cooperation of Indians in developing the immense
areas of the highlands, the statement was received
in silence. But much approval was expressed at his
later modification that it was a mistake to introduce
artificially Asiatic population before the country
was ready. Only he was told that the country never
would be ready for that, unless he wanted to drive
away the white men there and discourage other white

220

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

men from coming. In 1910, the London All India
Moslem League protested to the Colonial OfSce
against the exclusion of East Indians from the high-
lands, where the best areas for settlement were alone
available. It was contended that as indentured
Indian labor was being used to develop British East
Africa, it was unfair to prevent Indians whose time
had expired from getting the good lands of the
country for which they were performing essential
service. The Government was warned that the
maintenance of anti-Indian prejudice and discrimina-
tion in East African legislation would react on the
political situation in India. It is the same story as
in South Africa. Although when the, war broke out,
the question of the reservation of the highlands for
European settlement had not been decided, it is
certain that, unless this action is taken, British East
Africa has no chance whatever of becoming a white
man's country.

2. No land grants with a string attached. When
the Britisher leaves his island, where all the land is
in the hands of a few, to start a new life, he wants to
own land, and to know that it is really his and that
its increased value through his own efforts or the
development of the community will accrue to him.
He wants the chance of enjoying what the privileged
classes of England enjoy. The British Government
did not seem to appreciate this in adopting a land
policy for East Africa. In order, as Lord Elgin said,
to hamper speculative acquisition and the locking
up of the land, such as had occurred in the earlier
years in Australasia, land was to be leased for ninety-

221

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

nine years, with reassessment after the thirty-third
and sixty-sixth years. The settlers protested against
these terms. They said that this form of land grant
would bar the flow of capital into the country, and
would not attract the right kind of settlers. In 1908,
after the limited leasehold policy was adopted, there
were several failures among small farmers in the
highlands, and applications for taking up land fell off.

For several years there was continued agitation to
return to the old system of out and out alienation of
land. Sir Percy Girouard (who would not have been
a high British official were he not enjoying the fruits
of his ancestors' refusal to assent to any such scheme)
defended the Colonial Office in their refusal to change
the leasehold policy, and advised the settlers not to
retard the development of the country by renewing
the agitation. Sir Percy painted in glowing terms
the possibilities of the future. British East Africa
might soon be regarded as a new source of wheat
supply for Britain, for the wheat grown compared
favorably with that imported from France. Beans
of various kinds could be produced in abundance for
export and cattle feed. There were immense possi-
bilities in timber and silver. A rich harvest in cotton,
rubber, and hemp was awaiting the white men who
would cast in their fortunes with the colony. Men
with capital of from £800 to £4000 were urged to
come. Men without means were needed to work
under large landowners. But in spite of the increase
of the prosperity of the Protectorate, land under the
leasehold policy went begging.

In 1 91 3, the Legislative Council was informed that
222

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

the Colonial Office would accept the following
principles of land policy: abolition of occupation
licenses and issue of transfer licenses; abolition of
requirement of personal occupation, if a manager be
left in charge; stock to be included in assessing value
of development work, expenditure on which would be
extended over five years. These concessions were
regarded as a step in the right direction. But the
agitation continued.

In abstract principle, the Colonial Office has acted
in an enlightened manner in regard to land settlement
provisions. Experience has certainly taught the
advisability of a government, when conditions of
land ownership are to be created, making those
conditions preventive of absentee landlordism,
fraudulent transfers, and holding land undeveloped
until the development by neighbors or the work of
the community gives the proprietor a wholly un-
earned increment. But in land legislation one can
neither go against human nature, nor prevent the
working of the old law that to him who hath shall
be given. Large estates are inevitable. The only
logical way of securing for the Commonwealth the
advantage of land values created by Government
initiative and the industry of the whole people, and
of preventing selfish landowners from holding un-
developed land for an unearned increment, is to put
the tax on land values and not on improvements.

3. No social or political equality for the black man.
Experience would have led one to prophesy in all
safety that the coming of white colonists into British
East Africa would soon create a native question.

223

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Very few years of white colonization led to the
necessity of a special parliamentary paper on the
relations between whites and negroes.^ The official
element in the Protectorate had long been accus-
tomed to act with severity against Europeans who
maltreated natives. For there were few Europeans,
and those generally a bad lot; and injustice and
cruelty on the part of whites often brought serious
troubles with the natives. From the official point of
view, wholly aside from considerations of justice
and humanity, it was easier to be severe on one white
man than to have to send an expedition to put down a
native uprising. But when colonists began to come,
the officials discovered that there was a most alarm-
ing solidarity among them to prevent justice being
done to native victims of the white man's temper
and arbitrary punishment. Some Englishmen were
prosecuted for flogging natives in 1907, and were
convicted and sentenced. Much feehng was aroused
against the officials, and serious consequences might
have resulted had not the sentences been reversed
upon appeal.

In 1908, there was an vLnmly demonstration before
the Governor's residence, largely on the ground of
what the white settlers called his "pro-native"
policy. In 191 1, the Honorable Galbraith Cole shot
dead a native who was trespassing on his farm.
Although incontestable evidence of his guilt was
produced at the trial, and only a verdict of man-
slaughter asked for by the prosecuting attorney, the
white jury acquitted him. The Colonial Secretary

' See Cd. 3562.

224

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

then ordered the deportation of Mr. Cole. The
settlers in British East Africa protested against the
illegaUty of this action and what they termed the
persecution of one of their number, and urged Mr.
Cole at the time of his forced departure to bring
action against the Colonial Ofhce in the English
courts. In 1 9 13, a native labor commission, studying
the serious difficulties that were arising from the
presence of white settlers, recommended the appoint-
ment of a native commissioner, a demarcation of
native reserves, increased taxation and registration
of natives, government control of labor recruiting,
and restriction of liquor consumption by natives.

4. No government without representation. As we
stated above, East Africa was a growth. It started
in the coast-land lease from the Sultan of Zanzibar,
and gradually developed by a penetration in the
hinterland, and a proclamation of sovereignty over
Jubaland. The original economic development was
in the hands of a private company, whose charter
included also Zanzibar. Not until 1906 was there a
settled form of government. Colonists in numbers
and diamond prospectors first came at that time.
Not a year had passed after the system of govern-
ment had been established before agitation started
for some form of self-government. When Mr.
Winston Churchill passed through the country in
1907, he told the settlers that the Legislative Council
had been established for criticism of the administra-
tion and not for its control.

The unsatisfactory land policy of the Colonial
Office and the agitation over the punishment of
IS 225

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

white men who acted as their own judges of natives
hastened what inevitably would have come later —
the demand for local representation in the Govern-
ment of the Protectorate. The Indian agitation of
1 9 10 increased the determination of the settlers to
have some voice in decisions affecting their interests.
Sir Percy Girouard's tactic of calling attention to the
material benefits that settlers were receiving, and the
advantages that would be theirs in the future "if
only they ceased to harm the colony and scare away
colonists by their senseless agitation," was typically
Tory, and did not go where there were Englishmen
instead of natives to deal with. English newspapers
were established at Mombasa and Nairobi.^ The
settlers began to organize to compel the recognition
of their right to participate in the Government of
the Colony. In 1913, the Settlers' Association peti-
tioned the Colonial Office that the unofficial minority
of the Council be elected instead of nominated. Mr.
Harcourt, radical in England, had no sympathy with
liberalism in East Africa. His reply evaded the
issue. The unofficial members of the Council, except
one, resigned. Up to the outbreak of the European
War, Nairobi was the center of continual agitation
for a form of self-government, which would begin by
making elective the representatives of the Legislative
Council, and liberally extending the powers of that
body.

The Home Government point of view, unanimously
sustained by officials in British East Africa, is that
the white settlers of British origin are as yet far too

^ In 1913 also at Entebbe, in Uganda.
226

BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

few in number to make self-government feasible.
The country is large, and must depend upon the
Home Government to guarantee its loans, to safe-
guard capital already invested, and to attract new
capital in London that will be put into the Colony
only if the investors are assured that the reins of
government continue to be firmly held by the
Colonial Office. Then, too, settlers have not yet
given proof of a desire to deal justly and equitably
with the natives, who are the wards of the British
Empire.

Since the outbreak of the European War, the white
settlers in British East Africa, regardless of origin,
have shown gi^eat devotion to the Empire, and many
of them have risked and sacrificed their lives in the
long and arduous campaign against the German
Colony on the south. Some, also, in the early days
of the war left everything and went back to England
to volunteer in Lord Kitchener's army. As in South
Africa, the colonial problem will be elsewhere in the
British Empire. The settlers of East Africa will
undoubtedly profit by the privileges that Great
Britain will be forced to grant to her colonials all
over the world.

227

CHAPTER XII
THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

ALTHOUGH East Africa was the last of the four
German colonies in Africa to receive recogni-
" tion from Berlin, and the last to have its
definite status as German territory assured, it has
become during the past ten years by far the most
important of German possessions, and stood, in 19 14,
as the most remarkable achievement in the world of
German colonizers and German merchants. South-
west Africa, with its forbidding harborless coast and
its poor territory, illustrates the indomitable spirit
of men who made the very best of the worst possible
circiimstances, and created a self-supporting colony
in spite of adverse political, geographical, economic,
and financial conditions. Togoland and Kamerun
share the general characteristics of other European
colonies in West Africa. Although better "organized"
than their neighbors, they show no outstanding
marks of superior ability or superior energy. Then,
too, in the last analysis, they share the handicap of
all West African coast colonies of a climate that
makes impossible the hope of a white man's country.
German East Africa is a totally different proposi-
tion. Its situation is admirable. It has good ports,

228

THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

navigable rivers, and mountain-lands. The climate
is suitable for white colonization. Agricultural and
mineral resources are very great, and not difficult
to exploit. The colony is surrounded by rapidly
developing neighbors, whose prosperity aids the
Germans in many ways: the practicability of more
frequent steamship service on the coast and lakes;
profitable transit trade on the railway; adjacent
markets for local and metropolitan trade, developed
by German merchants settled in the colony; and
emulation. German East Africa has the most
advantageous coast line of African colonies: for
there is an inland coast as well as a seacoast. On
the north, half of Lake Victoria is in German terri-
tory. Almost the entire western boundary is formed
by Lakes Nyasa, Tanganyika, and Kivu.

The colony is bounded on the north by British
East Africa and Uganda, on the west by Belgian
Congo, and on the south by Rhodesia, Nyasaland,
and Portuguese East Africa. The islands of Zanzi-
bar and Pemba, off the northern portion of the coast,
form a British protectorate. Mafia Island, off the
delta of the Rufiji River, was saved by the Germans.
A conventional line from the mouth of the Umba
River to Lake Victoria forms a boundary with British
East Africa. The Uganda boundary is also a con-
ventional line. Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika, with
the river between them, form a natural boundary
with Belgium. The southern boundary with Great
Britain is the mountain range running from Lake
Tanganyika to Lake Nyasa. The Rovuma River
forms almost the entire botmdary with Portugal.

229

■/

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Some distance out in the Mozambique Channel, off
Cape Delgado, the coast boundary with Portugal,
and the mouth of the Rovuma River, lie the Comoro
Islands, belonging to France. Considerably farther
out, all the islands (and there are many of them)
directly east of German East Africa, and north and
northeast of Madagascar, are owned and occupied
by Great Britain.

Germany owes East Africa to the enterprise of the
great explorer, Dr. Peters, who founded the German
Colonization Society in 1884, against the advice of,
and with the warning of no support from. Prince
Bismarck. Late in 1884, Dr. Peters made a series of
treaties with the Sultan of Zanzibar for the posses-
sion and exploitation of the mountainous territory
back from the Indian Ocean coast between the
headwaters of the Wami and Rufiji rivers. When he
returned to Berlin in February, 1885, with the treaties
in his pocket, he succeeded in getting an Imperial
Charter. The German East Africa Company was
formed. During the next three years. Dr. Peters
gradually extended his privileges and territories on
the Zanzibar mainland by successive agreements
with the Sultan. In 1888, the Sultan leased all his
mainland territories, south of the Umba River, to tlie
German East Africa Company for fifty years, under
certain stipulations. When the East Africa Company
tried to assume the control of the country, some of
the local authorities refused to recognize their
Sultan's treaty, and rebelled. The German Govern-
ment had to intervene. In 1891, the Company was
in full control, and, during the last decade of the

230

THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

nineteenth century, developed its territories along
the lines of similar British and French companies
in other parts of Africa.

The rebellion, however, changed radically the
political status of the Protectorate, in reference to
Zanzibar, to Germany, and to the world. When the
British saw that the German Government was
intervening on the Indian Ocean coast, they invoked
old shadowy rights of the middle of the nineteenth
century, and made the lessor accept a protectorate.
They, in turn, leased the mainland of Zanzibar north
of the Umba River. At the same time, the British
claimed a protectorate over Uganda, and warned
Germany that all territory north of Lake Victoria
Nyanza was in the British sphere. Germany, in
return, was recognized as owner of what the East
Africa Company had leased from Zanzibar, and of
the hinterland back to the lakes. In addition,
HeHgoland was ceded to Germany as "compensa-
tion. " At the time, there was so little public opinion
in Germany favorable to an aggressive colonial policy,
that only Dr. Peters and his friends felt bitter about
being shut off from Central Africa. On thfe other
hand, British statesmen congratulated themselves
on having turned a clever trick. They never dreamed
of the quarter of century of German naval expansion
that was to follow, and the vital importance of
Heligoland in making impregnable the German
coast Hne and home naval bases. ^

^ Because of Heligoland, Winston Churchill's boast of two years
ago, that the British would go into German ports and pvdl the Ger-
mans out of their holes like rats, was absurd.

231

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

The Treaty of 1890, however, was a great advan-
tage to the British, not only because it prevented
German colonial expansion in Central Africa, and
gave them the coast line north of the Umba that Dr.
Peters hoped to include in his colony, but because
the control of Zanzibar and Pemba prevented
Germany from establishing a naval base at Dar-es-
Salaam or Pangani or on the coast line between those
two ports. Zanzibar stands to German East Africa
as Walfisch Bay to German Southwest Africa, the
mouth of the Volta and Cape St. Paul to Togoland,
and the Niger delta to Kamerun, an everlasting
command — thou shalt not!

The claim of partisan writers that Germany
acquired her African colonies by trickery and bad
faith is unfounded. In support of the assertion are
cited the change of attitude of the German Govern-
ment towards Herr Ltideritz in Southwest Africa
and Dr. Peters in East Africa between 1884 and 1885,
and the "conversion" of Bismarck. We are told
that the German Government all along was behind
these two men, and that the seeming opposition was
a blind to deceive the British Foreign Office. The
evidence is overwhelmingly against this accusation.
Not only in 1885, but right along for almost twenty
years after that, few German statesmen were favor-
able to colonies. The colonial budget was a constant
embarrassment to the Government in the Reichstag.
The German electorate was opposed to colonization.
Not until 1906 did the change come. Before Dern-
berg, Germany had no colonial policy. Her acquisi-
tions and her interferences in Africa, Asia, and

232

THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

Oceania, far from being the result of deep-laid
Machiavellian plots against the peace of the world,
were as much hit-and-miss, as hesitating and vacil-
lating and uncertain of popular support, as the
British Imperial program before 1898. I do not at
all believe that Great Britain went into Egypt in
bad faith, and that her repeated assurances about
evacuating Egypt, frequently given to the Powers,
were a wilful deception. I think that the statesmen
who told the Powers so positively that Great Britain
intended to evacuate Egypt meant what they said.
But if a writer went at the Egypt situation between
1884 and 1890 in the same way that English writers
are going at the German colonial situation during
that period, he could build up, from the attitude of
British Ministers and their official utterances, as
damning an indictment of Downing Street as of
Wilhelmstrasse/ Both Foreign Offices were prob-
ably innocent of intention to deceive, and were
continually embarrassed and perplexed about the
way events forced their hand. How often are those
who get the credit or the blame for events as sur-
prised when they occur as are outsiders! None
believes them, however, and they have to take the
reputation of being wise or sly or incapable.

Instead of receiving the encouragement and the
honors they would have had, if they were British
pioneers and British organizing officials in British

' Able French writers, in fact, have done this very thing. Eng-
land's honesty of purpose in Egyptian diplomacy has been accepted
in France only since 1904 — and then, not because of new light or new
facts in the case!

233

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

colonies, Germans who had to do with the foundation
and early development of East Africa were treated
with signal ingratitude. In England, Stanley was
rewarded with a knighthood and election to Parlia-
ment; in Germany, Dr. Peters was slandered and
discredited. In British East Africa, Uganda, and the
Sudan, the British Government helped the local
officials in every way possible, and Parliament never
turned a deaf ear to railway projects essential for the
pacification and economic development of these
colonies. The Colonial Loans Act, passed in 1899
right in the midst of the Boer War, of which we have
spoken elsewhere, has been of great aid to British
colonies during the period of our survey. There was
nothing similar in Germany. The Reichstag dis-
couraged East African development by throwing out
budget appropriations, while the Uganda Railway was
being built directly north of the German colony from the
coast at Mombasa to Lake Victoria! When one reads
through the Reichstag proceedings during the first
six years of the twentieth century, he marvels at the
optimism and courage of the officials who "held on"
in East Africa. They were denied the funds for rail-
way construction. The rival British colony was
getting, because" of its railway, not only Belgian
trade, but also German hinterland trade. In spite
of all this discouragement during the years from 1900
to 1906, trade more than doubled in the German
Protectorate.

The railway across British East Africa was
completed soon after the beginning of the twentieth
century. The Germans interested in colonial de-

234

THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

velopment knew how important it was not to allow
the rivals on the north to get too far ahead of them
in establishing their trade in Central Africa. They
tried their very best, by conferences, newspaper and
magazine articles, public meetings, and Reichstag
and Bundesrath discussions to get public interest in,
and public money for, white colonization and railway
extension in East Africa. The former could not
come without the latter. Railways were essential
for pacification and administrative organization of
the interior. After the completion of the British
Uganda Railway, a small — very small — beginning
was made. A private company had started in 1896
a railway from Tanga, opposite Pemba Island, along
the Pangani River valley into the mountainous
Usambara country. Half way from Tanga to the
river it was stopped for lack of funds. In 1902, the
Government took over the line, and pushed it forward
to Korogwe on the river. In 1904, it reached Mombo.
In the central part of the Protectorate, the route
from Lake Tanganyika to the coast was served by
slow, expensive caravan transport to Bagamoyo oppo-
site Zanzibar Island. Porters carried on their backs
the ivory, rubber, and other hinterland products
to the sea, and returned inland with the imports in
the same way. In 1896, when the line from Tanga
was started, a railway inland from Dar-es-Salaam
was projected also. Nothing was accomplished. In
1900, when the Uganda Railway was triumphantly
progressing inland, the Reichstag refused to vote
twenty-five thousand dollars for a survey of the first
section of a transcolonial railway in East Africa ! In

235

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

1904, the Deutsche Bank got a concession for a single
track from Dar-es-Salaam to Mrogoro. Work was
begun in 1905.

The dissolution of the Reichstag, in 1906, referred
the question of colonial policy to the country. The
general election was a victory for Imperialism. A
completely new era commenced for German East
Africa and all the other colonies. The Reichstag
began to cooperate with Dr. Dernberg and the new
Ministry of Colonies. Generous imperial grants were
voted, and railway construction by Government
initiative and by Government expense was started.

In December, 1907, train service was initiated
from Dar-es-Salaam to Mrogoro. The next stage
was to Kilossa, which rapidly became the great
inland city of the colony. In six years the remark-
able feat was accomplished of continuing the railway
directly across German East Africa to Lake Tan-
ganyika. It reached the lake port terminus at
Kigoma in 1913. Immediately the German railway
became the shortest and best route from Belgian
territory to the coast. The upper valley of the
Congo, the extreme northern part of Rhodesia, and
even portions of Nyasaland and Uganda Protec-
torates, found in the German line the best outlet
for their trade. Economic conditions in the Central
African lake country were completely changed. No
single engineering feat in African history has been
wrought in so short a time and brought so important
results. During the same period the ocean terminus
of the railway, Dar-es-Salaam, has been transformed
from a negro village, in whose suburbs lions prowled,

236

THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

to a "clean and imposing residential town, laid out
with handsome squares and avenues, and furnished
with substantial churches, hotels, and pubHc build-
ings, and neat, white tropical houses. The ' harbor of
peace' still shelters native craft, but majestic liners
now ride on its well-sheltered waters. ""^

Before the construction of the railway — they could
not wait for that — the administrative organization
of the colony was started by the authorities on an
extensive scale. After each punitive expedition,
military posts were established. Following the
remarkably successful example of the ItaHans in
Somaliland, wireless telegraphy was included in the
scheme of military operations almost from the
beginning of the placing of upland posts. In 1903, a
departure was made from the custom of other Ger-
man colonies, which levied a head tax, and the hut
tax, so satisfactory in some British colonies, was
adopted. The Germans were continually studying
the results obtained by British and French adminis-
trators. The reports of German consuls and special
commissioners all over the world included their
section for the Colonial Ministry. Since 1906, a
larger budget has made it possible for Berlin to
receive information concerning the administration of
rival colonies fully as complete as that which had
long been received concerning their trade. The

^ See Calvert's German African Empire (London, 1916), p. 196, to
which I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness for the fullest and
most illuminating account available in English of what the Germans
have accomplished in Africa. The maps in this volume, and its
careful statistics, are as valuable as Mr. Calvert's text.

237

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Germans, like the Japanese, owe much to the fact
that they are the best students in the world of what
others in the world are doing.

There has been, however, the handicap in East
Africa as elsewhere of a too rigid bureaucracy, and
the unfortunate Teutonic disregard of the rights of
others when they come into conflict with Teutonic
rights — or what are believed to be Teutonic rights.
German missionaries had the same experience as in
China. A bishop was murdered in the south-
eastern part of the Protectorate, near Lake Nyasa,
in( 1905, and several of his colleagues suffered the
same fate. There can be no doubt of the truth of
the charge that German missionaries, like Belgian
missionaries in the Congo, exacted unpaid labor of
natives, and that the system of entrusting adminis-
trative districts to low caste native officials resulted
in unjust exploitation and persecution. Until the
Germans can recruit for colonial service a better
type of men than they have had, German colonies
will not be administered as well and as justly from
the point of view of the natives, as British Crown
colonies, which are the model and admiration of the
world.

A curious speech of Prince Hohenlohe to the
Reichstag in March, 1906, showed the difference
between German and British ideas of treating
Mohammedanism. He explained that there was a
broad distinction between the advantageous culti-
vation of friendly relations with Mohammedan
foreign powers and the attitude the German Govern-
ment should adopt toward its own Moslem subjects.

238

THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

In the one case, German policy was dictated by
"the necessities of the general international situa-
tion." In the other case, it was the duty of the
Government to promote the spread of Christianity
in the German colonies. If favor was being shown to
Mohammedans in Government schools in German
East Africa, and if Moslems were selected for petty
posts in preference to native Christians, it was
because they had to accustom the natives to a
Christian atmosphere before attempting to teach
them Christian doctrine. Nothing could be more
reprehensible and more pernicious than such ideas.
Proselytizing is not a Government's business: but if
it is undertaken, it should be undertaken openly.
Moslems are too clever to be fooled. Being mission-
ary enthusiasts and propagandists themselves, they
respect the man who tries openly to convert them.
He is doing only what they themselves would do, and
they understand his motive. They see without
difficulty through the dissimulation of indirect
methods, and they despise the dissimulator — aU the
more so because he has made religious zeal the excuse
of his hypocrisy. ^ No German needs to wonder why

^ As far as the eastern end of the Mediterranean goes, the French
have made a fatal poUtical mistake in laying emphasis upon their
traditional position as defenders of the Catholic Church. In Turkey
and the Balkans, Moslems of very mediocre knowledge of the world
know that France ten years ago drove the religious orders out of the
country and confiscated their property, and yet in Moslem countries
was granting at the same time large sums for the schools and religious
propaganda of these very orders, and jealously defended their
property rights even from fancied infringements. Books like
Psichari's recent posthumous Voyage du Centurion, in which the

259

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Islam has not followed the Turks in the present war.
Arab Moslems are at heart enemies of all ghiaours
(infidels). But, from personal and frank intercourse
with them, in several countries, I have found that
the Englishman is the only ghiaour they trust.
They like the Frenchman better than the English-
man. But they do not trust him. The German they
neither like nor trust — except where they have never
come into contact with him and know nothing about
him. Why should they?

In 1908, after a visit to East Africa, Dr. Demberg
said that he had found the condition of the natives
unsatisfactory, and the judicial system unfavorable
to them. There were too many officials on the coast,
and too few in the interior. He was opposed to the
encouragement oi present of European immigration,
but he had sent an Under Secretary to study the
capabilities of the highlands for white settlement, as
was being done in British East Africa. He returned
with the firm conviction that it would be bad policy
to restrict Indian immigration. The Indians were
indispensable to the Government in many ways, and
were an essential part of the economic life of the

French soldiers in Northern Africa are represented as being each "a
Christopher, carrying Christ," show that Prince Hohenlohe's views
are not without sponsors in France. Among EngUshmen, also,
"Chinese" Gordon has not been the only colonial official who be-
lieved he had a proselytizing mission. A very recent example is
General Sir Ian Hamilton, whose proclamation to the Turks assured
them that the English were not coming to Turkey with any intention
to destroy their independence or religion, and whose speech to his
troops on the following day, when they were disembarking at Galli-
poli, ended with the words, "You are starting upon the last Crusade !"

240

THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

country. This was in contradiction to the view
expressed by the German Colonial Society's Congress
the year before. The Congress had recommended
that the authorities issue regulations and adopt
measures with a view to the better protection of small
German traders and settlers against Indian mer-
chants, and suggested restrictions similar to those in
South Africa. There were nearly fifteen thousand
Asiatics in the colony at the outbreak of the European
War. The European settlers had passed the five
thousand mark, and over four thousand of them
were native-bom Germans.

In the ten years from 1903 to 1913, the trade of
German East Africa increased five hundred per cent.
In 1 912, it had reached over twenty million dollars,
and jumped two and a half million dollars upward in
1 9 13. In spite of extensive pubHc works, the budget
did not show a large deficit.

Contrary to what has been frequently asserted
during these past two years, public opinion in Ger-
many, as we have already seen in the matter of the
putting down of the Herero rebellion in Southwest
Africa, has been very much alive to the responsibility
of Germany toward her native wards. One has only
to read the newspapers and reviews, and to look
over book lists, and to go through parliamentary
debates during the past fifteen years, to realize that
only in Great Britain, among all the Eiiropean
colonizing Powers, has there been manifested as
much humanitarianism and ideaHsm as in Germany
with regard to the establishment and maintenance
of a just and enlightened colonial regime. At this
16 241

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

moment, it is exceedingly important that this state-
ment be made by one who cannot be suspected of
sympathizing with Germany in the present war or of
trying to plead the German cause. The truth is the
truth. Only on the truth can the future be built.
In France, in Belgium, in Portugal, in Italy, in
Russia one looks in vain to jEind so widespread and
so important a championing of the cause of native
races as one finds in Germany.

In the early part of 19 14, the Reichstag passed a
resolution asking for the abolition of serfdom in East
Africa before January i, 1920. A Government white
paper pointed out that it would be dangerous to fix
a date for abolition. But at the outbreak of the war
German public opinion was still demanding that this
date be fixed. In East Africa, Germany had been
dealing with the slavery question very much as
Great Britain dealt with it in Zanzibar. It was
enacted in 1905 that no native could be born in
slavery after that year, and that slaves could pur-
chase their freedom for a small sum, which masters
are not allowed to prevent them from earning. In
eight years nearly twenty thousand had emancipated
themselves by their own efforts. It was estimated
that only eighty-five thousand were left, and that in
fifteen years slavery would disappear entirely. The
white paper used practically the same arguments as
those of the British authorities in Zanzibar against
the hastening of the emancipation process by fixing
an arbitrary date, while there were still many old
slaves alive. For these would be left without means
of existence.

242

THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

To mark the thirtieth anniversary of the colony,
an exhibition was being prepared for August, 19 14,
at Dar-es-Salaam. When August arrived, the Ger-
mans in East Africa were cut off from the rest of the
world. Left to their own resources, they managed
to carry on a resistance that is just drawing to a close
when these lines are being written in October, 19 16.

24s

CHAPTER XIII

THE PROBLEM OF THE PORTUGUESE
COLONIES

IN the fourteenth century, one hundred years
before a united monarchy ruled over Spain,
disHke and fear of the Spaniards led Portugal
to seek foreign aid to prevent absorption in the
unification of the Iberian Peninsula. There were
later treaties with Charles L, Cromwell, and Charles
II. The infeodation of Portugal to England was
completed by the Methuen Treaty, signed shortly
after the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Suc-
cession. For over two hundred years Britain has
held the Portuguese in a state of complete vassalage.
She used the Portuguese against Spain and against
France to break their sea power and their budding
colonial empires. Now Germany is having the same
experience.

The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1703 put Portugal
in economic as well as political dependence upon
England. During two hundred years this dependence
was contested only by Napoleon. At the end of
the nineteenth century the British began to feel
anew the danger of a change in the comfortable
status quo they enjoyed in regard to Portugal. Ger-

244

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

many loomed up as a successful economic rival.
Her representatives started to "intrigue" at Lisbon.
The reason for Germany's interest was the valuable
Portuguese colonial empire, which financial difficul-
ties and poHtical decadence made Portugal incapable
of exploiting. Spain saw the disappearance of her
colonial empire in the war of 1898 with the United
States. Could Portugal hope to hold much longer
her overseas possessions?

When Germany entered Africa her two great
southern colonies became neighbors of . Portugal.
She installed herself on the coast of the Atlantic
south of Portuguese West Africa, and on the coast of
the Indian Ocean north of Portuguese East Africa.
In 1887, a treaty was signed delimiting the Germano-
Portuguese frontiers on the Indian Ocean side of the
continent, which was immediately followed by an
extension of commercial interests in Portugal and
in the Portuguese colonies.

It was an advantageous moment for Germany.
The British penetration north from the Cape towards
the center of Africa brought Great Britain and
Portugal into conflict. Portugal, relying upon the
general interpretation as to hinterland possessions
agreed upon in the international conferences about
African spheres of influence, believed that she had
the right to the interior of Africa between her colonies
on the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. But the
British won over native chiefs in Nyasaland and
along the Zambesi valley. An ultimatum was
presented to Portugal in 1890. The oldest colonizer
of Africa had to bow to force. On June 11, 1891, a

245

THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA

treaty was signed which destroyed forever the hopes
of Portugal to a transcontinental African colony,
just as the same argument of force, applied eight
years later to France, destroyed forever similar hopes
of French Imperialists in North Africa. I do not
mean to imply that the British were acting towards
Portugal and towards France in an indefensible
manner. The enterprise of British explorers and
the energy and ability of British military and civil
officials to profit by the principle of carpe diem
brought the reward which is "the way of the world. "
But, as is also "the way of the world," the final
and convincing argument applied both to Portugal
and France in Africa was superior force. Yet that
the Lisbon and Fashoda ultimatums did not alienate'
Portugal and France definitely from Great Britain is
a tribute not only to British diplomacy but also to
the confidence bom of experience in Anglo-Saxon
fair dealing — once Anglo-Saxon pretensions are ac-
knowledged and claims admitted.

The last years of the nineteenth century were
marked by an event which, in the light of present
events, might have been a turning-point in history.
Chamberlain, Rhodes, and other British Imperialists
of the early days were firm believers in the necessity
of building the future of Great Britain, especially
in Africa, upon the foundation of an understanding
with Germany. Rhodes saw peace and prosperity
for Great Britain, and the realization of his dreams in
, Africa, only in harmony between the two great Teutonic
races of Europe, which was to he shared with Anglo-
Saxon countries overseas, the United States, Canaday

246

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

and Australia. His South African empire was to
cooperate with German Southwest Africa and
German East Africa. If Portugal could be made to
develop her African heritage herself, Great Britain
and Germany were to stand behind her and help her.
If Portugal proved hopelessly beyond reform, Great
Britain and Germany should divide the Portuguese
colonies.

Mr. Rhodes visited Berlin, and talked over with ^
the Germans his plans of railway expansion in South f
and Central Africa. He secured Germany's consent
to join in railway schemes that would bind the
system he had in mind for British penetration in the
interior with outlets through German and Portuguese
territories to the coast. Mr. Chamberlain signed
a treaty with Germany in 1898, providing for an
eventual partition of the Portuguese colonies between
Germany and Great Britain. This treaty has never
been published: but it was not officially denied at
the time, nor has it been since. Germany was to
have the Portuguese possessions in Asia; East
Africa south to the junction of the Zambesi and
Shire rivers; and West Africa north to Cape Santa
Maria, including the whole of Mossamedes. Great
Britain was to cede Walfisch Bay to Germany, and
receive the rest of Portugal's African possessions.
According to British explanation, semi-ofhcially
made after the secret leaked out, the two Powers
had no intention of buying or seizing the Portu-
guese colonies or of impairing the legitimate
sovereignty of Portugal. They were simply ar-
ranging "economic spheres" — something Hke the

247

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

later Russian and British spheres in Persia, I sup-
pose!^

The Boer War and the accession of Edward VII.
brought a change in Anglo-German relations. Ger-
man industry, German commerce, and the German
naval program alienated British opinion from the
policy of Rhodes and Chamberlain. Germany
and Great Britain drifted apart. In 1904 came
the agreement with France. In 1907, the agree-
ment with Russia made it clear that Great Britain had
thrown in her lot with Germany's enemies. But
the will of Cecil Rhodes stands as the record of what
he believed was the hope of the future of Anglo-
Saxondom and the basis of peace for the world in the
twentieth century. He expressed the hope that his
countrymen would cultivate the friendship of Ger-
many in the most unmistakable terms. He felt
deeply the necessity of Anglo-Saxon solidarity. He
left money to enable Americans and Germans to
study at Oxford, in the "implicit belief that a good
understanding between England and the United
States of America and Germany would secure the

^ See Berlin Lokalanzeiger, December 28, 1899, and London
newspapers passim, during January, 1900. Cf. A. Marvaud, Le
Portugal et ses Colonies (Alcan, Paris, 1912), p. 58. " II est difficile
de pousser plus loin I'hypocrisie, " writes M. Marvaud. I gratefully
acknowledge my indebtedness to this illuminating volume, a careful
economic study of the Portuguese colonies, which has helped me
greatly. Most of this chapter, however, and especially what is
said of the rivalry between Germany and Great Britain and the
effect of the problem of the Portuguese colonies on their foreign policy,
is taken verbatim from an article I wrote in Constantinople two years
before the appearance of M. Marvaud's book and four years before
the war.

248

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

peace of the world and that educational relations
form the strongest tie."

Events may not have proved that Cecil Rhodes
was right: but they have yet to prove that he was
wrong.

As elsewhere in the world, and especially in Africa,
the increase of German trade and the multiplication
of German enterprises has been especially marked in
Portugal and the Portuguese colonies since 1900.
German imports to Portugal more than doubled
between 1900 and 1910, and the German carrying
trade was threatening to displace that of Great
Britain in 1913. Germany's increase, proportion-
ately, was far greater than that of any other nation,
both in trade and shipping. In the Portuguese col-
onies the figures are eloquent. In spite of vexatious
tariff discrimination and port regulations, German
ships were bringing each year a notable increase
of German goods to Portuguese colonies in Africa
and were taking the exports to Hamburg, very often
to be resold and reshipped there in German bottoms
to the very country which owned the colonies!^

The alarm that has been felt in recent years by the
British over the possibility of Germany getting
a foothold for coaHng stations and naval bases
in the Portuguese colonies is illustrated by the
sanatoriums incident in Madeira. In April, 1903, a
German artillery officer, who had gone to Funchal
for his health, secured a concession for sanatoriums
and hotels for invalids. He had formed a company
and the terms of the concession allowed gambling.

^ See below, p.

249

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

The London press immediately took up the matter
and declared that Germany was trying to "invade"
Madeira. They called attention to the fact that the
island was "only some hours distant from Gibraltar, "
that the Germans would expel English merchants,
create a "diplomatic incident," and end up by
installing themselves in the Portuguese islands.
The British Minister at Lisbon was instructed to
declare to the Portuguese Government that Great
Britain would not permit the German company to
acquire any privilege to the detriment of British
subjects. The German concession had in it a clause
allowing expropriation. When the Germans tried to
expropriate a property belonging to an Englishman,
the crisis became acute.

The Portuguese Government was not allowed to
refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal, or even to
offer the Sanatoriums Company another property in
exchange for the one they desired to expropriate.
Great Britain insisted on the concession being
cancelled. For years the matter hung fire: the Ger-
man company demanded a large indemnity. Later,
a new company, almost entirely English in its stock-
holders, applied at Lisbon for the gambling conces-
sion, with the intention of working along the German
lines. In 1909, there was again a great campaign in
the London press over German "intrigues " at Lisbon.
It was claimed that Germany was trying to buy some
small islands off the Portuguese coast, and that
Germans were being given privileges at Lorenzo
Marques.

British public opinion has always been unalter-
250

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

ably opposed to transfers of territory anywhere in
the world that might affect her position as "mistress
of the seas." To maintain her world supremacy,
Great Britain is always willing to fight. That is
reasonable. One likes to keep what one has, and to
prevent others from changing the status quo. The
historian has no quarrel with the frank expression
of this determination. But he has a quarrel with the
strange and altogether untenable idea that other
nations are "faithless" and guilty of "treachery"
and "brutality" and "disturbing the world's peace, "
who try to carve out for themselves a place in the
world by following the same path of acquisition along
which Britain and her predecessors in world empire
have intrigued and bluffed and fought their way.
Denying that the past has any effect on the present
is as illogical as it is pernicious. We cannot be
surprised at and denounce and try to remedy ef-
fects unless we make a sincere and detached study of
causes.

The Madeira and Azores islands are an integral
part of Portugal. Since Spain lost her colonies, the
Portuguese colonial possessions in Africa and Asia
are, in extent of territory, larger than those of any
country in the world, except Great Britain, France,
and Germany. They have not, however, as large
a population as the colonies of Holland. Aside from
a foothold in China at Macao, and small bits of terri-
tory in India and the Malay Archipelago, which
mean little more than the memory of ancient glory, ^

' To a Power like Germany, which has so few footholds in the
world, Goa, Damao, Diu, Macao, and Timor might prove of value

. 251

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Portugal as a colonial Power has her interests in
Africa, and is important only in Africa.

Portuguese colonies in Africa consist of the Cape
Verde Islands, a group in the Atlantic off the western
shores of the continent, where its bend is most
accentuated; Guinea, an enclave, wholly surrounded
by French West African territories; Sao Thome and
Principe, two islands in the Gulf of Guinea; Portu-
guese West Africa (Angola), from the mouth of the
Congo south to German Southwest Africa; and
Portuguese East Africa from Cape Delgado, bound-
ary with German East Africa, south to Delagoa
Bay, which cuts off the Transvaal from the sea, and is
just north of Natal. These colonies cover nearly
eight hundred thousand square miles, and have a
population of over eight millions.

There are fourteen islands, some very small, in
the Cape Verde group. As they are on the route
from Europe to South America, and command the
coastal passage around Africa, their situation is of
unusual importance. The cables to Brazil and to
South Africa touch St. Vincent, and also the line to
Bathurst, in British Gambia. In the hands of a
Power like Germany, these islands could easily
become an incomparable naval base, coaling station,
and wireless telegraphy center. To Portugal they
have no value. The Portuguese have not been able
to develop them in the interest of their inhabitants :
nor have they made use of the advantage that the

as naval, coaling, and wireless stations. To Great Britain or France,
who have many ports and islands in the same waters, they would be
of no value, except to keep out someone else.

252

PROBLEM OP PORTUGUESE COLONIES

route to South America passes between the two north-
em islands of the group, St. Anthony and St. Vincent.
Agriculture is in a deplorable state. The inhabi-
tants have not even been taught to use plows. They
have been allowed to destroy the trees of the islands
by unchecked goat pasturage. The natives are in
a state of distressing degradation. An enterprising
nation would not only make the islands pay by their
cultivation, and lift the inhabitants to the level of
European civilization; but would also profit by the
situation on the trade routes to establish coaling
and provision depots and dry docks. The lamentable
state of civilization in the Cape Verde Islands is a
striking proof of Portugal's inability to discharge the
duties of her stewardship.

Guinea tells the same sad story. It is traversed
by three deep rivers, and off its coast are numerous
islands. The possibilities of a strong fortified harbor
and of developing a splendid trade with the interior
are greater in Guinea than in the neighboring posses-
sions of France and Great Britain. What Senegal
and French Guinea and Gambia and Sierra Leone
are, is the strongest possible indictment of Portugal
as a colonial power. The colony has fertile soil, rich
forests, unrivaled means of communication by water
with the interior, and the protection of a compact
group of islands just off the coast. Where France
and Great Britain have wrought miracles in the
immediate neighborhood of Guinea under far less
favorable conditions, Portugal has done absolutely
nothing. The French and British colonies more
than pay for themselves. Gmnea shows a large

253

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

yearly deficit. Outside of four towns, the Portuguese
occupy few places and develop none. Portugal's
title to Guinea is a disaster to the inhabitants, who
are good workers, owning good land. When the
boundary between France and Portugal was definitely
fixed in 1906, the French Commissioners saw what a
rich country, easy to exploit, was being ruined. To
those on the Portuguese side it was "abandon hope,
you who are fated to remain here." The wealth of
the forests is almost entirely neglected.

The port of Bissao is connected only monthly
with Lisbon. The greater part of the commerce,
both exports and imports, is in the hands of Ger-
many.

Sao Thome and Principe are beautiful islands,
fertile, and, when one takes into consideratioii their
nearness to the equator, salubrious. Almost every-
thing in the way of tropical product has been tried
on these two islands. But during the past quarter of
a century, cocoa has been grown so successfully that
it now furnishes ninety-five per cent of the total
exportation, and has given to the Portuguese Minis-
try of Colonies the delightful and unaccustomed
surprise of a colony with a budget surplus. And yet
only a third of the total area is cultivated and only a
sixth is worked to yield in a scientific modern way.
For there are no satisfactory means of communication.
When cocoa first became a source of wealth easier to
tap than gold mines, the question of establishing
means of transport and communications that would
put the two islands wholly under modern cultivation
was raised. In fact, a law was passed in 1899 for

254

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

railway construction. It has been pushed (?) in so
typically Portuguese a manner that nine miles have
been completed on Sao Thome in fifteen years, and
the plans for Principe are still being studied. Roads
and little coast ports and overhead cables have also
been planned. They may come in time. Up to now,
the backs of negroes still afford the chief means of
transport. The trouble is that the Portuguese
Government uses the surplus from the cocoa industry
of these islands to try to meet the huge deficits of
the other colonies.

Portuguese exploitation of native labor in Sao
Thome and Principe stands forth, next to the rubber
atrocities of Belgium in the Congo, as the darkest
page of European colonization in Africa. In 1907,
when the Congo agitation was at its height, Mr.
H. W. Nevinson made a trip through Angola, starting
inland from Loanda and coming out to the coast at
Benguela. He then visited the two cocoa islands.
His book, Modern Slavery, is a terrible indictment of
Portuguese officialdom and greed. He proved that
the method of recruiting laborers in Angola for the
cocoa plantations was slave trade of the most heart-
rending sort. Portugal was compelling her main-
land natives to go to Sao Thome and Principe to work
on the cocoa plantations. They were recruited with
no consideration whatever for principles of human-
ity, and were allowed to suffer and die on the islands,
driven to work as the Pharaohs used to drive their
subjects to pyramid-building. Mr. Nevinson said
that the callous indifference of the Portuguese Gov-
ernment to treaty obligations should call for the

255

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

intervention of governments "more sensible to the
claims of civilization and Christianity." The great
English cocoa firm of Cadbury sent out a competent
and reliable man to investigate the accusations of
Mr. Nevinson. His report confirmed in every par-
ticular the story told in Modern Slavery.

The British Government made representations at
Lisbon. But, just as at Brussels, English agitation
was interpreted as due to commercial jealousy. The
Portuguese resented what they called "unfounded
accusations"^ and "hypocritical sentimentality."
Only when Portugal saw that British public senti-
ment was resulting in a boycott of her cocoa were
measures taken to reform the heartless methods of
exploiting natives. The menace to the pocketbook
and not the appeal to humanity led Lisbon to
announce in November, 1907, that the adminis-
tration of the Portuguese colonies would be reformed.
More than a year passed before anything was done .

In July, 1909, a royal decree suspended for three
months recruiting of natives on the Angola mainland
for island plantations. Sir Edward Grey told the
British Parliament that Portugal seemed now to give
proof of an honest intention to correct the abuses.
Portuguese action was hurried by the news that the
large cocoa firms of the United States had decided
(in the summer of 1909) to join British manufactur-
ers in boycotting Portuguese cocoa. Portugal had
to take the matter up with the British Antislavery

^ A Portuguese official investigator reported that the natives
were "not badly treated," but fifty thousand were being retained
after the expiration of their "contracts."

256

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

Society, and assure its officials, by giving them a
chance to investigate themselves, that the Angola
slave trade had been stopped. The heavy mortality
among the laborers in Principe was attributed by the
Portuguese to sleeping sickness. It was proposed to
recruit laborers, under proper safeguards, from
Mozambique, with the promise of repatriation on the
completion of a two years' contract.

The Portuguese settled at the mouth of the Congo
before Columbus discovered America, and have had
coast settlements from the Congo south to Tiger
Bay for four hundred years. Portuguese West
Africa, or Angola, as it is commonly known, is four-
teen times the size of Portugal, and has a wonderful
coast Hne with many ports of great value, and rivers
through all the interior, navigable for long distances
from the ocean. Its hinterland is a continental
watershed, containing sources of Congo tributaries
and the headwaters of the Zambesi. And yet
although its soil is fertile and its forests rich, the
colony has never been properly exploited. It still
imports more than it exports, and costs Portugal
yearly enormous sums of money, which are only met
by taking the surplus of the cocoa producing islands
and increasing the Portuguese national debt. Had
it not been for the necessity of forming fixed boundary
lines with Germany, Great Britain, and Belgium, much
of the interior would still be unexplored. As it is,
there are portions of Angola of which the Portuguese
know very little. The tribes of the interior have
not all accepted Portuguese authority. They have
necessitated, especially during the period under our

17 257

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

review (before that they were mostly let alone),
numerous military expeditions. The hinterland is
not organized effectively either from the military
or civil point of view.

In 1904, native troubles were serious. After two
hundred and fifty soldiers in outlying posts had been
massacred, the authorities felt the necessity of send-
ing out a punitive expedition five thousand strong.
In 1905, there was a new revolt of considerable extent
near the German frontier. In 1907, regiments had
to be sent in a hurry to Angola from Lisbon. In
1912, there was considerable fighting on the Katanga
border. In 19 14, the natives of the south and of the
Congo frontier were once more in rebellion. With all
these military operations, costing sums that Portugal
had to borrow at high interest, large portions of the
interior are not even organized as military districts,
much less brought under civil administration!

The Belgians to the north, with their very narrow
coast Hne, — enjoying only free access to the mouth os
the river, in fact, — ^have got the trade from the inte-
rior, which ought to be Portuguese, largely in their
hands. The Germans on the south, with a colony
that has no ports and a hinterland not one tenth
as rich as that of Angola, have covered their posses-
sion with a network of railways, and made their
colony self-supporting. When we see what the
British have done in the hinterland in the creation of
Rhodesia, we realize how fortunate for the world it
is that a British ultimatum, twenty-five years ago,
prevented Portugal from extending her sovereignty
from one coast colony to the other. Rhodesia, with

258

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

its rapid economic development and its extensive
railways, is a reproach to Portugal.

Unlike Germany and Great Britain, Portugal has
tried to make her colonies a preserve for herself.
Her tariff scheme in Angola is calculated in such a
way that Portuguese ship owners and Portuguese
merchants will make all the profit out of the exploi-
tation of the colony. Portuguese products pay only
ten per cent of the tariff. Other products, dis-
embarked at Lisbon, and reexported from there to
Angola, enjoy a reduction of twenty per cent.. Imports
entering Angola under the Portuguese flag pay only
half the tariff. The result is, of course, insufficiency
of shipping facilities for exports, and contraband
over the Belgian": frontier and a prohibitive price of
articles coming into the colony from abroad. The
Portuguese customs lose far more revenue than they
gain by their tariffs, and the high cost of living pro-
hibits successful colonization. If Portugal had the
shipping facilities for developing herself the possibili-
ties of Angola trade, or if she manufactured in Portu-
gal articles to sell to her colony, there might be some
justification for this tariff policy. As it is, Portugal
cuts off her nose to spite her face. She has huge sums
to pay to retain possession of the colony at all; colo-
nists and natives are in a bad economic state; and
Africa suffers from the maladministration and non-
productivity of one of its richest areas.

Formerly, Angola lived from slave traffic. When
that was stopped, sugar cane was grown to manu-
facture spirits for native consumption. The Brus-
sels Act of 1899, in which the European stateg

259

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

holding African possessions pledged themselves
to put excessive taxes on alcohol in order to stop
its use by natives, ruined this industry — if it can be
called by that name. The Brussels Conference of
1906 raised the tax by thirty per cent, for a period
of ten years. Portugal was allowed to retain the old
tax in Angola, but the industry was already con-
demned. Nothing has replaced it.

Cotton is indigenous to Angola. Before the
development of the rubber boom, it was the great
industry. It could become so again: for Portugal
uses nearly half a million pounds of American cotton. ^
This could easily be raised in Angola. Laws were
passed in 1901 and 1906 to encourage the cotton
industry in the Portuguese colonies. But results
have not been encouraging. Methods of planting
and harvesting are primitive; means of transport are
lacking; the tariff regime discourages colonization and
foreign capital; and Portugal has no capital herself.

One can say, however, that Portugal has of recent
years tried hard to remedy conditions in Angola.
The trouble is that her handicaps are too great for
her. She fears that giving out concessions on a
large scale to foreign concerns will mean the eventual
loss of the colony. Her own people are ignorant
and poor. Her Government has no conception of a
free trade regime. To illustrate the evil of the
Portuguese protective system, one has only to cite
the reason for lack of labor. It is not due to lack
of hands, but to the high price of food to feed the

^ Eighty thousand families in Portugal are dependent upon cot-
ton industries and trade.

260

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

hands and to lack of machinery for development.
When the freight charges, due to trans-shipment
at Lisbon or to high Portuguese steamship and rail-
way rates, or the direct entry duties, are added to the
original price of everything that is imported, it puts
the cost of production so high that developing the
country does not pay.

There are three lines of railway into the interior at
the present time, from Loanda, Benguela (Lobita
Harbor) , and Mossamedes. The Loanda line is owned
by a private Portuguese company, the Benguela line
is an English concession, and the Mossamedes line is
state-owned. The Loanda line has reached about
half way to the Belgian frontier. The Mossamedes
line, after ten years, has not progressed much more
than a hundred miles. The English line from Lobita
Harbor, which leaves the coast at .Benguela, was
started in 1902 by a British engineer, who formed a
company for the purpose of building a trans-conti-
nental railway to join the line from Beira to Rhode-
sia. In ten years this line reached Bihe, and at last
accounts was being rapidly pushed toward the
Marotseland frontier. It will follow the valley of
the Lungwebungu River to the Zambesi and then
down the Zambesi to Victoria Falls, where it will
meet the Cape to Cairo railway. When this line is
completed, the mails from the Cape to London will
save four days, and Rhodesia will be nearer England
in time than the Commonwealth. A northeastern
branch to this railway will run from Bihe into the
Katanga province of the Belgian Congo, opening up
an enormously rich and still partially unexploited

261

THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA

territory. Although this railway is being financed
and constructed by British capitalists and engineers,
there has been some official opposition to it in British
Government circles, on the ground that it will deflect
considerable trade from the Cape to subsidized
Portuguese and German steamship lines.

The annual deficit of Angola increased rapidly
before the war, and reached in 191 2 double the
revenue. In 1913, the situation of the colony was
desperate. A group of Portuguese banks offered to
loan eight million dollars to the Government at six
and a quarter per cent, to be used exclusively for
railway development in Angola. In the spring
of 1 9 14, however, the Colonial Minister told Parlia-
ment that not less than forty million dollars was
required, and that something must he done immediately
to demonstrate do the world the ability of Portugal to
administer and develop this colony.^ He declared
that the lack of effective administrative control was
clearly demonstrated by the yield of the hut tax,
which was only one hundred and forty thousand
dollars, when it ought to be three million dollars.
His remedy was incorporated in a project of the law,
providing for a huge loan to finish the railways, roads,
and ports; revision of laws concerning land conces-
sion, native labor, commerce and industry, revision
of tariffs ; creation of new lines of navigation between

^ Senor Lisboa e Lima had undoubtedly received official intimation
of the serious "conversations" going on at that moment between
Great Britain and Germany. He accepted during the same month,
without Britain opposing offers of a German syndicate and German
banks to help in Angola.

262

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

Europe and the colony, organization of a liberal
banking and credit system in the colony; new law for
colonization, to encourage small colonists; and a
revision of the tariffs of the mother country in every-
thing that concerns colonial products. Within
three months came the war.

Portuguese East Africa was, like Portuguese West
Africa, a fifteenth-century colony, settled as a
stopping-place on the way to India. It is fortunate
in its geographical position. One has only to look at
the map to see how essential to the British in South
Africa is the retention of this vast country by a weak
nation, which can be held under British tutelage.
For over a thousand miles the western boundary of
the colony touches the Transvaal and Rhodesia.
The southern portion of Nyasaland, including the
whole valley of the Shire, is an enclave in Portuguese
territory. The Zambesi, from the junction of the
Loangwa River to its mouth, runs through Portu-
guese East Africa. The northern part of the colony
touches the shore of Lake Nyasa. To the port of
Beira, in the center, runs the railway from Rhodesia
to the sea. To the port of Lorenzo Marques in the
south runs the railway from the Transvaal to the sea.
Were it not for the outlet through friendly Portuguese
territory, Nyasaland and Rhodesia would be badly
landlocked. The same can be said of the northern
portion of the Transvaal. For the mining portion
of the Transvaal, outlet through Portuguese territory
is shorter and cheaper than through Natal. To have
this colony pass into German hands would be a calam-
ity to British supremacy in South Africa. From the

263

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

standpoint of France, also, Portugal is a safer neighbor
than Germany. For Madagascar lies off the coast of
Portuguese East Africa, and the Comoro Islands are
in the channel between Madagascar and Mozambique.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance and
tremendous possibilities of the territories under
the Portuguese flag along the Indian Ocean. Moz-
ambique, in the north, neighbor of German East
Africa and British Nyasaland, and holding a generous
coast line on Lake Nyasa, is the territory through
which the railway from Lake Nyasa to the coast must
run. Quilimane, just south of Mozambique, will
some day be as important as Delagoa Bay in the
south. For it is not only the key to the Shire River
valley of Nyasaland, but to all the Zambesi valley,
which runs for a thousand miles in Portuguese
territory. Sofala Bay, in which is Beira, increases in
importance as Rhodesia is developed. Delagoa Bay,
in which is Lorenzo Marques, is the outlet for the
richest country in Africa.

To the Commonwealth of South Africa, the posses-
sion of Delagoa Bay by Portugal is extremely unfortu-
nate, and has been the cause of internal complications
for the South Africans. When gold was discovered
in the Transvaal, Delagoa Bay became the natural
outlet for the Rand. After the British conquest,
Natal expected this extremely profitable transit
trade to be deflected to Durban. This might have
been possible were it not for the fact that Portugal
is the Transvaal's neighbor all along the Transvaal's
eastern frontier. Even were it possible to send
and receive the Rand and southern Transvaal trade

264

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

by way of Durban, the haul would be considerably
longer for the northern Transvaal. Then, too, the
Rand depends upon the Portuguese colony as a
recruiting ground for native labor. So the port
of Lorenzo Marques has prospered wonderfully from
its transit trade with the Transvaal.

Over fifty years ago Great Britain tried to claim
Delagoa Bay, in spite of the fact that the Portuguese
had been in effective possession since the end of
the eighteenth century. The British founded their
claim on the fact that the Portuguese had not
occupied both sides of the bay and all the islands
in it. On the south side of the bay and on an island
the British flag had been planted in 1823 and 1861.
The question was submitted to arbitration. The
decision rendered in 1875 was in favor of Portugal.
Not until after the Boer War did the British realize
what this award had cost them.^

* During the Boer War, however, Great Britain constantly vio-
lated the neutrality of Portugal in East Africa. Ammunition
and troops passed from Lorenzo Marques and Beira into the interior
whenever it was convenient to have them pass that way. The
British Government declared that Portugal was bound by treaty
to Britain, and that this gave the right. But Portugal was bound
also by treaty to the Transvaal, particularly in regard to the very
Lorenzo-Marques-Pretoria Railway in question. It is the same
thesis as that used by the Allies to defend the Salonica disembark-
ment. Greece is the ally of Serbia, etc. But at the same moment
the Allied Ministers sustained exactly the opposite thesis at Buch-
arest, when it was a question of German reservists and officers and
war material passing to Turkey. Still, Rumania was at that moment
the ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary. All of which goes to
show that Governments are found by treaties and international law
only when it is to their interest to evoke treaties and international
law on their side.

265

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

In 1888, a railway line, built by a private inter-
national company, was completed from Lorenzo
Marques to the Transvaal frontier. It was only
fifty-five miles long. Taking advantage of the
technicality that the actual frontier of the Transvaal
was several miles beyond the terminus of the railway,
and that the concession was for the construction of
the railway to the frontier, Portugal confiscated the
line. After ten years of litigation, the builders of
the railway were awarded damages that fell consider-
ably short of their claims. There were rumors
current that Great Britain and Germany were going
to divide Portuguese East Africa in return for
advancing the indemnity Portugal was condemned to
pay. Upon this the Transvaal Government offered
to loan Portugal the money. But Portugal found
the amount of the award in a disinterested quarter,
and saved what has become her most valuable bit of
territory.

When the British became masters of the Transvaal,
Lord Miiner confirmed, as a modus vivendi, the former
treaties of the Transvaal with Portugal for transit
trade through Lorenzo Marques. Immediately after
peace was reestablished, the rivalry became acute
between Cape Town, Durban, and Lorenzo Marques
for the Transvaal carrying trade. The story of this
competition, which ended in the treaty of April i,
1909, between Transvaal and Portugal, is told else-
where.^ Its importance to Portugal is the fact
that it assured to Lorenzo Marques a minimum of
fifty per cent of Transvaal trade for ten years, and

' See above, pp. 78-82

266

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

thus establishes for Portuguese East Africa a large
revenue from the fact of the lucky position of this
port. It is not probable, however, that if Lorenzo
Marques remains Portuguese territory, it will con-
tinue to be able to exact a lucrative toll without
giving more in return than is given now. There
is reason to believe that the South African Common-
wealth will make every effort to bring Delagoa Bay
and Lorenzo Marques under the British flag with
the peace settlement of the European War.

In 1907, autonomous government on the repre-
sentative system was granted by Portugal to the
Lorenzo Marques district. In 19 10, on the strength
of the Transvaal Treaty, Lorenzo Marques secured a
loan of four million dollars to construct coal depots
and stone quays, dredge the channel, and renew
the rolling stock of the railway.

The problem of Portuguese East Africa is different
in every particular from that of Angola. Angola is a
colony whose prosperity and economic development
depend entirely upon the way it is administered.
Its five thousand square miles of Africa, held by a
nation that has neither the ability nor the money
to make its possession worth while, remain stagnant
— ^but without serious consequences to any one except
the owners. Portuguese East Africa, on the other
hand, must be opened up and pacified and devel-
oped, in spite of the hopeless maladministration of
the Portuguese. It is too far away, also, from
Portugal to suffer, as Angola is suffering, from
the policy of preferential tariffs. Portugal simply
cannot assume to trade with her East African colony

267

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

as she trades with her West African colonies, ^ The
imperative necessities of Nyasaland, Rhodesia, and
the Transvaal have made Chinde, Beira, and Lorenzo
Marques open ports for through trade, and have
led to the establishment of bonded warehouses
under foreign control. Thanks only to the develop-
ment of the interor by Great Britain, the Portu-
guese have succeeded in extracting sufficient toll
from transit trade to balance the budget of this
colony.

Nor has Portugal been allowed to say in East
Africa, as in Angola and Guinea: "If we are unable
to take advantage of our colony, that is our affair.
We shall keep others out." The fear of being
forcibly dispossessed compelled the Portuguese to
make tolerable conditions of transit trade at the
ports, the proper running of railways, and the main-
tenance of suitable transport facilities on the Zam-
besi. Covetous neighbors have been kept from
encroaching politically by the farming out of large

^ In spite of the monthly P. and O. and Messageries Maritimes
services, the Germans enjoyed almost the monopoly of foreign trade.
For a while the British gave up the north bound regular sailing.
The rates of the Deutsch Ost Afrika Linie to Hamburg were less
than the French rate to Marseilles. The same conditions prevailed
even in the British Indian Ocean ports. German goods for Portu-
guese territory, and for transit into the Commonwealth and Rhodesia
as well, were rapidly supplanting English goods. Colonists as well
as natives preferred German goods, not so much for the reason that is
so frequently given by English and French writers, i.e., cheaper price
for shoddy goods, as for their suitability. The Germans put on the
market everywhere in the world what they knew, from studying
local conditions, customers wanted — ^not what they thought cus-
tomers ought to buy,

268

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

portions of the colony to foreign capitalists, After
the scare of the British "big stick" in the hinter-
land question, it was believed that if subjects of the
"Great Powers" were given concessions on a liberal
scale, such as Rhodes and his associates enjoyed
in the interior, powerful capitalists might find it to
their interest to champion the maintenance of the
colony under the Portuguese flag, and Lisbon would
have an unanswerable argument to the accusation
that the country was not being developed. Char-
tered companies, also, would enable Portugal to
collect a revenue without investing any money and
doing any work.

It is impossible in the limits of this book to go into
the history of the chartered companies. The most
important are the Mozambique, Nyasa, and Zambesi
companies, which were formed in 1891, 1892, and
1894. Their twenty-five-year concessions are just
drawing to a close. To these companies Portugal
gave practically complete sovereignty, in return for
seven and a half per cent, of their revenue. The
companies have had to build the railways and tele-
graph lines wholly at their own expense. They have
enjoyed the right of giving sub-concessions. What
agricultural and mining development has taken place
in Portuguese East Africa is due to these companies.
The Mozambique Company founded Beira, built the
railway to Rhodesia, and has developed the port.
The Zambesi Company is building the railway from
Quilimane to Shire, and manages the Zambesi River
transport through a sub-concession.

None of the chartered companies, in spite of their
269

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

possibilities, have succeeded well under Portuguese
rule. There are too many discouragements, and
too many disagreements with Lisbon. Shares soon
became a speculation. For several years there has
been a movement on foot to suppress the charters
entirely or to make radical changes. Certainly a
completely new system of government will have to
be arranged for Portuguese East Africa. To the
prosperous and growing hinterland a continuation of
the present regime is intolerable.

In 191 1, the shooting of a British missionary by a
Portuguese ofBcial on the Nyasaland frontier led to
a diplomatic incident with Great Britain that shows
how Portuguese colonial administration was viewed
in England just before the war. The shooting was
established by the evidence of competent witnesses
to have been wholly unprovoked. It took a year to
bring the official to trial and then he was sentenced
to one yearns imprisonment. The trial was a farce.
In remonstrating, the British Foreign Office demand-
ed that this man be not reemployed in a responsible
position. The note stated that the tragedy was the
result of having an uneducated soldier, totally unfitted
for his place, in a government post. Portugal was
told plainly that Great Britain could not let this
incident pass without declaring that in the future
only properly qualified officials must be appointed
to posts in which they would have to deal with
British interests of serious importance.

In going over the statistics of Portuguese East
Africa for the decade before 1914, one is struck with
the fact that the Portuguese revenues are practically

270

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

wholly parasitical, due to the lucky accident of
geographical position. The British pay for the use
of ports and railways. The Germans pay for the
privilege of running Zambesi River steamers and for
carrying the export and import and coastal trade.
The natives find work in the Transvaal. From fifty
to sixty thousand go yearly to the mines in British
territory, and carry back to spend in Portuguese
territory three to four million dollars a year. The
chartered companies pay for the privilege of existing
imder an obnoxious regime. I wish I could find
something encouraging and kind to say about Portu-
guese colonial administration.^ There is nothing
in the facts but ground for destructive criticism.
This is the only chapter in my book where I cannot
do what I like always to do — find the bright spots
and bring them out strongly.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century,
with the exception of one year, Portugal has had
to increase her national debt to meet a serious
budget deficit. The balance of trade is also increas-
ing against Portugal. The last available statistics
before the war showed imports considerably more
than twice the value of exports. Only Turkey of all
the European states is so hopelessly in debt. But
Turkey's debt is not larger than Portugal's: and
Portugal has a quarter of Turkey's population and

^ The Portuguese themselves have evidently passed adverse
judgment on their colonial administration. For in Africa more
Portuguese live outside of Portuguese rule than under it. There
are many more Portuguese in the American colony of Hawaii, on
the other side of the world from Portugal, than in all the Portuguese
colonies put together.

271

THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA

not a tithe of Turkey's resources. Portugal's debt,
in fact, is nearly as large as that of the United
States and bears more interest. Half of Portugal
is uncultivated, only two per cent, of her area wooded,
her merchant marine smaller than that of any nation
with an ocean coast except China, and her navy
smaller than that of any nation except Norway.
Between seventy and eighty per cent of her popula-
tion is illiterate.

In every nation an anti-colonial policy has been
adopted by advanced radicals. European govern-
ments have had the same experience as that of the
United States. The Socialists of Germany, Belgium,
Italy, France, and Spain, and the Labor Party of
Great Britain, have been untiring in their criticism
of colonial administration and their opposition to
colonial budgets and colonial military expeditions.
Radicals are almost always anti-imperialists. Portu-
gal has been no exception to the general rule. Her
radicals have found the armor of their government
much the easiest in the world to pierce. To under-
stand the internal history of Portugal, and her
colonial policy since the accession of the ill-fated
Dom Carlos, it is essential to keep constantly in
mind the struggle of Republican elements against
the dynasty. The Republican party has always
used the colonial question to attack the monarchy.
One moment the Republicans would be the cham-
pions of Portuguese pride against Great Britain and
Germany, and the next the defenders of Portuguese
taxpayers against the Colonial Minister's demands
upon the budget.

272

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

The assassination of Carlos and his heir in 1908,
followed by the expulsion of Manoel in 19 10, brought
the problem of the Portuguese colonies once more
before the world as a question of far-reaching inter-
national importance. During the four years between,
the birth of the Republic and the beginning of the
European War, there were constant rumors of the
intention of Portugal to sell her colonies to Ger-
many. Discerning readers could see in the way
these reports were commented upon a clear indi-
cation of how Great Britain and Germany were
drifting towards war.

The unwillingness of the British to execute the
Chamberlain Treaty of 1898 or to allow Germany
to deal directly with Portugal in this question was a
sure sign of their determination not to allow Germany
to establish naval stations and coaling bases that
might jeopardize Britain's maritime supremacy.
The articles of Blatchford and the general campaign
of alarm against Germany in the British press were
indicative of this determination. There were many
liberals in Great Britain and Germany who deter-
mined that the two nations should not be allowed to
drift into war. They tried their best to bring about
an understanding between the governments on the
naval program and other points at issue. Among
the important questions that came up in these
informal and semi-official pourparlers was the prob-
lem of the Portuguese colonies.

Shortly before the outbreak of the war, it was the
belief in Portugal that the two great rivals had come
to a new understanding. This time, Germany was
18 273

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

to have all of Angola, and was to give up in re-
turn to Great Britain privileges that her subjects had
acquired in Mozambique. So persistent were these
rumors that they were noticed editorially in the
London press. The Times declared that there was
nothing in the new Anglo-German accord to diminish
the value of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, and no
intention to despoil Portugal, either by purchase or
any other means, of any of her colonies. An im-
portant German newspaper at the same time, speak-
ing of the law for the development of Angola, just
presented to the Portuguese Parliament by the Colo-
nial Minister, said: "These plans seem to us deserv-
ing of commendation. The exposition of the Minister
of Colonies is characterised by undoubted sincerity,
and his project of law seems to be well worked out in
all its details. " ^

Three days after Great Britain joined France
and Russia against Germany, Premier Machado
stated that Portugal could not disregard the duty
of her alliance with England, and the Lisbon Parlia-
ment declared that Portugal was on the side of the
Allies "as much as is necessary and up to what-
ever point is necessary.*' But for nearly eighteen
months there was no certain indication that Portugal
intended to embroil herself with Germany. The
people certainly wanted to fight, especially after
an actual state of war had arisen in Angola, where
German and Portuguese soldiers came into frontier
conflict. It is not easy at the present writing to

' See leaders in London Times, May 28, 19 14, and Kolnische
Zeitung, May 22, 19 14.

274

PROBLEM OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES

give a clear idea of what has happened in Portugal
during these past two years. According to the
sympathies of the man to whom you talk or the
newspaper you read, is the information given to you.
As far as I can gather, the question of intervention
or non-intervention in Portugal was the old question
of Republic or Monarchy. The Germanophiles
and anti-war partisans were monarchists. The
Government got into the hands of the reactionaries.
Although troops were sent to Africa to fight the
Germans, and although the Portuguese. Cabinet
received from Parliament on November 23, 19 14,
full power to declare war upon Germany, Baron von
Rosen, the German Minister at Lisbon, seemed to
retain great power. Parliament was closed by armed
force, municipal councils dissolved, and functionaries
of the old regime reappointed to prefectures and sub-
prefectures. It required what was virtually a second
revolution to maintain the Republic.

When Germany declared war on Portugal in the
spring of 191 6, a new situation was not established
in Africa, where the Portuguese had long been in
open conflict with the Germans. But it made easier
the final stages of the conquest of German East
Africa.

Portugal's alliance with Great Britain and France
may save her colonies for a while. But they cer-
tainly will not be retained permanently, unless,
with French and British help, they are properly
developed. The parable of the Ten Talents works
in colonies as well as in everything else.

275

CHAPTER XIV
THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

THERE are four British colonies in West Africa.
On the extreme western coast of the continent,
Gambia, extending back for several hundred
miles along the banks of the Gambia River, is a
narrow enclave in French territory, just south of
Senegal. Sierra Leone has a considerable extent of
coast line, but not much hinterland, south and west
of French Guinea, and west and north of Liberia.
Farther east, on the north littoral of the Gulf of
Guinea, the Gold Coast Colony parallels German
Togoland, and is, together with Togoland, an enclave
in French territory between the Ivory Coast and
Dahomey. The northern frontier of the Ivory Coast
Colony is an arbitrary line, which marks equally the
northern confines of Togoland. But the Gold Coast
is almost twice as wide as Togoland, and has a very
much more extended coast line. In fact, as elsewhere
in Africa, the Germans are shut off from a logical
and natural portion of their coast line by a projection
of British territory. Nigeria is much larger than the
other three colonies put together. It has a very
important portion of the coast line on the Gulf of
Guinea, just west of the bend, and contains the lower
valley of the Niger River, with its delta, and the

276

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

outlet of Benue River, which, with all its tributaries
except one, has its source in German Kamerun. The
northern boundary of Nigeria extends nearly to 14°
N., and has most of the western border of Lake
Chad. Its southern and eastern neighbor is
Kamerun. Nigeria projects into the German colony
far enough to control Yola at the confluence of the
rivers which form the Benue.

All four of these possessions are protectorates in
the hinterland and Crown Colonies on the coast.
The latter two have been formed gradually by the
same process of penetration as in East Africa, and
are still in the process of transition. Just as in
British East Africa, the Government has been
changed — or rather organized and consolidated — dur-
ing the period of our survey.

Gambia and Sierra Leone are extensions of the
old British West African settlements of Bathurst on
the Island of St. Mary and of Freetown. Both
colonies are extremely interesting as examples of pros-
perity that has come during the past fifteen years,
and of the unadulterated profit that England enjoys
from the possession of bits of territory like these
scattered all over the world. In Gambia, trade
doubled from 1906 to 1912, and reached over £2,000,-
000 in 1 91 3. Forty per cent, of the imports were
English goods from Liverpool. The surplus of
revenue over expenditure was nearly £30,000, and
the whole country was kept in order by one hundred
and twenty-five soldiers and native policemen.
The colony has no debts, and is no expense whatever
to the mother country.

277

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

In Sierra Leone revenue has exceeded expenditure
since 1905, and trade almost doubled between 1908
and 1 91 3, passing in the latter year £3,000,000.
Two-thirds of the imports were furnished by England,
and two-thirds of the total trade was carried on
British ships. A narrow gauge railway, owned by the
Government, runs directly across the colony from
Freetown to the Liberian frontier, and another line
is being constructed through the northern portion of
the colony to the French frontier. Freetown is a
fortified coaling station.

Two matters of general interest in the history of
European colonization stand out during the past
fifteen years in Sierra Leone. In the hinterland, when
the Protectorate was organized administratively,
nine-tenths of its revenue came from the imposition
of a hut tax. The natives protested against this,
and it was exceedingly difficult to make them under-
stand the reason for it. There were many revolts,
and in some cases tribal chiefs, who assisted the
authorities in its collection, were killed or driven into
exile. Some Europeans took the side of the natives,
and claimed that the prosperity of the colony was
steadily declining because of the persistence in exact-
ing this tax. But in an uncivilized country, where
import duties are negligible and where the Govern-
ment can hardly adopt the former customs of warlike
tribes to collect a tax on through trade, seeing that
they went into the country on the pretext of destroy-
ing this very practice, how can expenses be met dur-
ing the years of economic development in any other
way than by a head tax or a hut tax? Until protec-

278

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

torates are fully organized, the hut tax is by far the
more feasible. Homes can be located, their number
estabUshed, and difHculties of identity avoided —
especially where a population is migratory or can
easily become so to avoid taxation. By quiet and
steady persistence, the Sierra Leone authorities were
able to report in 191 3 that there was trouble over the
hut tax collection in only one district.

■ The second matter is the fight against secret can-
nibalistic societies, whose practices are repugnant to
European ideas of humanity and justice. As British
control spread to the interior, it was the policy to
continue to keep order and to administer justice, as
well as to collect taxes, through native chiefs and in

* accordance with native laws. But where an organ-
ization known as the ' ' Human Leopards ' ' was hold-
ing secret meetings, with a ritual demanding the
sacrifice of boys and girls, followed by a cannibalistic
feast, the authorities felt compelled to intervene, and
declare that such practices would be treated as
murder. In 1905, there were twenty-eight murder
convictions for the crimes of this organization.
After eight years of unremitting effort, the authorities
reported that they had not yet succeeded in getting
the better of the "Human Leopards. " In 1913, over
three hundred persons, including several paramount
and tribal chiefs, were arrested, and a special court
was set up to try them. It was exceedingly difficult
to get evidence even from the relatives of the victims.
Only twenty-four could be brought to trial, and nine
convictions for murder were secured. There were
seven executions.

279

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Organizations like the "Human Leopards" furnish
one of the most perplexing problems of the European
administrator in the interior of Africa. They have
probably existed for centuries, are ingrained in the
character and habits of the people, and are believed
to be a medicinal and spiritual necessity. Aside
from officials, there are probably less than fifty
Europeans in the protectorate portion of Sierra
Leone among a native population of nearly a million
and a half. It is open to question whether one can
compel the natives to adopt a European attitude
toward practices that are repugnant to our nature,
until, living among them and revealing to them our
civilization by example as well as by word, we make
these practices repugnant to their nature.

In regard to both of these problems, which are
found in the recent history of other protectorates
besides Sierra Leone — every protectorate, in fact,
that claims sway over the interior of the African
continent — the reader may ask whether it is logical
and just to force an alien Government and alien
standards upon the natives against their will, com-
pel them to pay taxes to support what they do not
want and hate, and punish them when they violate
an ethical code which is peculiarly ours and of which
they have no conception. This question comes up
everywhere in the pages of recent African history.
The answer is very simple, much more simple than it
seems on the face of it. We ask the question only be-
cause Africa to-day affords the example of transition
that long ago took place in Europe and more recently
in America. In Africa we see with our own eyes and

280

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

in our own day the working out of the inevitable law
of the imposition of the superior civilization upon the
inferior civilization. It is the triumph of mind over
matter, of knowledge over ignorance. The survival
of the fittest is a spiritual rather than a physical test.
We cannot get away from the white man's burden.
The impulse to make others like oneself has always
been as strong in the human race as the impulse to
propagate the species.

The man who opposes and ridicules and deprecates
missionary effort is logical only if he is sincerely
willing to have himself,, his family, and his country,
lapse back into the period when his ancestors walked
through the forests of Germany with untanned skins
hanging from their necks and clubs in their hands,
looking for men from the next village to kill. By the
same token, the Government official, who is grap-
pling with problems of civilizing natives under his
charge, is logical, when he condemns missionary effort,
only if he denies that Christian influence has created
the institutions he is trying, by purely secular means,
to force the savages to understand and accept.
Education alone will civilize Africa. The spread of
commerce and the opening up of trade routes alone
will make workable and permanent European
institutions in Africa. Education is possible only
through missionary agencies, and the whole history
of Europe extending outside of Europe teaches that
the flag follows the cross.

Is it not significant that in Sierra Leone, as well as
in the neighboring republic of Liberia, the substitu-
tion of Islam for paganism — so marked in the last

281

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

decade — has done more to check the evil of drink,
to turn the natives away from cannibaHsm and to
reconcile them to the necessity of submitting to a
central constituted authority than all the efforts of
French, British, and German military and civil
officials? How much more could Christianity do?

The littoral between the French Ivory Coast and
German Togoland, for 350 miles along the Gulf of
Guinea, is known as the Gold Coast Colony. Accra,
the capital, has nearly twenty thousand inhabitants.
From Secondee to Coomassie, the capital of Ashanti,
170 miles in the interior, there is a railway, which
cost £2,500,000. Two other small lines, in the
eastern part of the colony, will in time reach the upper
valley of the Volta River, the boundary line between
Togoland and the Gold Coast. In the hinterland of
the Gold Coast are Ashanti and the Northern Terri-
tories.

The Kingdom of Ashanti was a very recent British
Protectorate at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury and its wealth in gold mines and forests was just
beginning to be realized. In 1900, a new governor
of the Gold Coast, Sir Frederick Hodgson, visiting
Coomassie, heard that the Ashanti had a golden stool
or throne. He sent the police to find it. The Ash-
antis had long been wanting to rebel against British
authority, and reinstate their King. This gave an
excellent reason for an outbreak. The Ashantis
invested Coomassie, and for several months it was
believed that the garrison, who were defending the
Governor and Lady Hodgson, would succumb before
help reached them. The official party, with a por-

282

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

tion of the garrison, managed to break through the
besieging forces after several months, and arrived at
Accra nearly starving only a few days before Coo-
massie was finally relieved. The folly of Sir Freder-
ick Hodgson compelled the British to undertake a
regular war against the Ashantis, which, after a
summer campaign, ended, as all native wars must
end, in a decisive victory and annexation. Ashanti
became British territory by Orders in Council of
September 26, 1901, and has since been governed by
the administration of the Gold Coast Colony.

When Ashanti was annexed, another farther bit of
the hinterland was placed under British protection,
and frontiers arranged with Germany and France.
This is known as the Northern Territories, and is
governed by a Commissioner at Tamali, subordinate
to the Governor of the Gold Coast. There are many
Mohammedans in the Northern Territories. It is
believed that valuable gold mines may be developed
when railway communications are established
through the valley of the White Volta.

The annexation of Ashanti was the beginning of a
new era for the Gold Coast. It gave impetus to the
railway construction to Coomassie, which was imper-
ative for permanent pacification. The railway, in
turn, stimulated the gold industry, which grew in the
ten years from 1903 to 191 3 from £100,000 to over
£2,000,000. The Ashanti War cost £400,000, which
was imposed upon the Ashantis as a debt. It in-
volved the British Government in 1904 in the ex-
penditure, also, of nearly £300,000 in the Northern
Territories.

283

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Like Gambia and Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast is
proving a valuable market for British trade. Liver-
pool supplies a substantial part of the imports.
Sixty per cent, of the carrying trade is under the
British flag. Trade doubled between 1906 and 191 2,
and jumped ten per cent, over the figures of 1912
during the year before the European War. Year
after year the surplus of revenue over expenditure
increased until it reached £200,000 in 1912. In 1913,
the large accumulated surpluses were spent in har-
bor works, water works, and sanitation, and new
railway lines were planned to the cocoa districts.
In the Northern Territories, however, it was es-
timated in 1 914 that many decades would be required
before that part of the Gold Coast paid its way.

As its name implies, this region attracted Euro-
peans for its mining wealth. But gold has been
exported since the fifteenth century, and the mines,
under present conditions of intensive development
and large production, cannot be considered as a
permanent source of wealth. The British have been
experimenting in the Gold Coast and Ashanti, as in
almost every other African colony, in cotton growing.
The British Cotton Growing Association sent experts
throughout Africa in 1903 to stimulate a movement
that they hoped would in time make Manchester
wholly independent of American cotton. Although
the Ashanti chiefs were reported to be interested, and
were started in cotton growing, the propaganda
cannot be said to have succeeded in this part of
Africa. Gold still holds the premier place in Ashanti
exports, and is surpassed in the Gold Coast only by

284

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

cocoa, which is being grown on enormous and con-
stantly enlarged plantations.

British efforts in the Gold Coast have been stimu-
lated by French and German activities around the
colony. The remarkable development in gold min-
ing, which has paid railway expenses and enabled the
colony to accumulate a surplus, has been very fortu-
nate for those who have been working along lines of
agricultural development. But sanitary conditions
have never been satisfactory, and the mortality
among officials and other Europeans is exceedingly
high. The possibilities of the country are unlimited,
if only it can be made habitable for Europeans on a
large scale. At present there are less than two thou-
sand Europeans in the colony, and very few indeed,
outside of officials and missionaries, in Ashanti and
the Northern Territories.

Little Togoland was easily conquered in the first
month of the war by the Gold Coast forces, cooper-
ating with the French. The Gold Coast Legislative
Council, enthusiastically hopeful of keeping per-
manently the German colony whose wonderful devel-
opment is sketched elsewhere in this book, offered to
pay the total expenses of the conquest, and to con-
tribute £80,000 to the general war expenses of the
British Empire during 191 6. If Togoland remains in
British possession, the Gold Coast will have not only
the entire valley of the Volta River, but will gain
possession of the thriving port of Lome, just beyond
their coast line, and the two railways leading back
into the interior of Togo. Hope is expressed in
British Imperialist circles, not only that Togoland

285

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

will remain British, but also that France, by receiving
compensation elsewhere, will be willing to cede
Dahomey and Bordu to Great Britain. If Nigeria
keeps Kamerun, and the hopes of ousting the French
from Dahomey be realized, Great Britain will be
master of the whole of the Gulf of Guinea coast line,
and British West Africa will become a colonial pos-
session second to none in Africa.

Nigeria, whose interest and importance to the
British Empire has been realized only now that the
dreams of the future include the German Kamerun,
is largely a product of the twentieth century. The
British flag first appeared in what has grown to be
Nigeria, in the little kingdom of Lagos, which was
"bought" from a native King more than fifty years
ago, after France had begun to extend her influence
over the neighboring kingdom of Dahomey. It
belonged first to Sierra Leone, and then to the Gold
Coast, but was made a separate colony in 1886, after
the Germans had got a foothold in Togo and Kam-
erun. Lagos was the nucleus from which the great
territory of Nigeria has been built. If one glances
at the map, it will be seen that the hinterland of this
territory reaches the Niger at its second bend. Im-
mediately after the colony and Protectorate of Lagos
was constituted, the National African Company,
which had prevented the Germans from getting the
delta and the lower valley of the Niger, obtained a
charter from the British Government under the name
of the Royal Niger Company. The charter was sur-
rendered in 1899, and the two Protectorates of North-
ern and Southern Nigeria were formed of its territories

286

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

on January i, 1900. Southern Nigeria absorbed
two smaller Protectorates, one of which was the
"Oil Rivers," hurriedly constituted in 1885 to pre-
vent Germany from approaching the mouth of the
Niger. In 1906, Lagos was incorporated in Southern
Nigeria, and on January i, 19 14, Northern Nigeria
was taken in, and the whole Niger valley territory
organized as a colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. ^
There is a governor-general, an executive council,
which acts for the Protectorate as well as for the
colony, and an advisory council with neither legisla-
tive nor executive authority.

The population of Nigeria is probably twenty
millions, and its area is nearly three times that of the
United Kingdom. Most of the inhabitants of the
Hausa States in the northern Protectorate are Mo-
hammedans, and the Islamic propaganda has made
rapid strides south along the valley of the Niger.
Lake Chad is at the northeastern end of Nigeria.
The caravan routes across the desert lead to Tripoli,
by which access to the Mediterranean is very much
shorter than through Algeria. So Nigeria has been
extremely interested in the development of French
and Italian influence in North Africa, in the decline
of Ottoman power, and in the Pan-Islamic movement.
In regard to slavery, the same policy of gradual eman-
cipation has been adopted as in Zanzibar, and the

' A special silver coinage for all the West African colonies was intro-
duced shortly before the Nigerian unification. In size, weight, and
value the coins correspond to those of the United Kingdom. The
reserves to guarantee the coinage are deposited in London, under the
control of the West African Currency Board.

287

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

results of fifteen years demonstrate the value of this
policy in doing away with slave-dealing, if not with
slavery, among Moslem tribes, who are under Arab
and Moslem influence and who have fashioned their
social institutions and customs and laws by Moham-
medan precept and example.

Lagos, before the amalgamation of 1906, was grow-
ing in the same rapid way as Sierra Leone and Gam-
bia. In 1905 there was an excess of revenue over
expenditure of £30,000. Lagos is another illustra-
tion of the profit British manufacturers and mer-
chants and shippers derive from colonies. For Lagos
in 1905 took over seventy-five per cent, of her imports
from Great Britain. The Colonial Loans' Act of
1899 enabled Lagos to secure the money for a railway
into the interior, which has since been extended to
Jebba on the second bend of the Niger River, and
connects there by ferry with the line from Kano to
the Niger.

The 1905 report of Lagos admitted that much
of the revenue was derived from spirits duties, but
declared that the importation of spirits could not be
prohibited without seriously dislocating the finances
of the colony. The growing sentiment against
alcohol in Great Britain, and the belief that African
natives were being demoralized by rum, led to agita-
tion in Evangelical Church circles and among Non-
conformists. Missionary reports and speeches of
missionaries home on furlough did much to deepen
the conviction that an enlightened Christian nation
should not abolish slavery and introduce civilization
in Africa only to demoralize the freedmen with the

288

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

curse of Anglo-Saxondom. After the coining of the
Liberal Government to power in the General Elec-
tion of 1906, a victory won by Nonconformist votes,
political pressure was brought upon the Colonial
Office to investigate the liquor traffic in West Africa.
In December, 1908, a committee was appointed to
go to Nigeria for this purpose.

The findings of the committee were very different
from the representations of some travelers and all
missionaries. The committee reported that in
Southern Nigeria spirits furnished twenty-two per
cent, of the total imports and provided fifty per cent,
of the revenue. Rum paid two hundred per cent,
and gin three hundred per cent. duty. But the
merchants engaged in liquor importation were almost
exclusively Dutch and German, and the spirits came
chiefly from Rotterdam and Hamburg. The Com-
mission stated that the standard of sobriety in
Southern Nigeria was much higher than in Great
Britain, and concluded that "there is absolutely no
evidence of race deterioration due to drink . . .
hardly any alcoholic disease among the native popu-
lation, and with the exception of one or two isolated
cases, we found no connection between crime and
drink." But the agitation continued. The Colonial
Secretary was asked to extend the Sierra Leone sys-
tem of local option throughout the West African
Colonies, and to make illegal the use of gin as cur-
rency and the practice of pawning children for gin.
He gave a non-committal reply.

It is extremely difficult to come to a definite con-
clusion on this subject, of which one hears and reads
19 289

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

so much. On the one hand, it is easy to believe that
those who are anxious to preserve the equilibrium
of budgets are very greatly, if unconsciously, influ-
enced in their attitude toward a question of this kind
by their desire not. to lose. a vital item of revenue.
On the other hand, it must be remembered that the
missionaries consider drinking a sin, wholly repre-
hensible in itself, and are apt to exaggerate — un-
consciously also — the evil effects of a practice they
condemn on principle.

The conquest of the hinterland of Nigeria occupied
a period of five years, from 1901 to 1906, and is one
of the most remarkable feats ever accomplished by a
British colonial administrator. Sir Frederick Lugard
not only had to work with inadequate military and
civil establishments and with grants far below his
needs, but he was also hampered by the same laissez
aller policy of the Home Government which rendered
the situation in Somaliland so difficult during the
same period. If he had depended upon guidance
and advice from London, and had not possessed
initiative to an extraordinary degree, France and
Germany might have cut the British off from Lake
Chad, occupied the Yola Province on the River Benue,
and anticipated the British in establishing a pro-
tectorate over the Hausa .States.^ On the other
hand, the task of extending British sovereignty over
the hinterland received powerful support from Im-
perialists and from local sentiment in the Lagos

' A portion of the area, potentially British through the enterprise
of Sir Frederick and his associates, was sacrificed by the compensa-
tions to France in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904.

290

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

and Southern Nigeria colonies. France and Great
Britain were bitter rivals, and Germany was begin-
ning to develop the neighboring Kamerun in what
was, from the British Imperialist point of view, "an
alarming manner. "

Nigeria had to lend troops to the Gold Coast for
the relief of Coomassie and the subsequent Ashanti
campaign. As soon as they came back, a vigorous
forward policy was decided upon. For France was
still smarting from the humiliation of the Fashoda
affair, and determined to make as much as possible
out of her paramount position in the Upper Niger
Valley and in the eastern Sahara and Sudan. Her
aim was to have Lake Chad wholly French and to
limit by anticipation the British and German pene-
tration north and northeast from the Gulf of Guinea.
Against the British, the French plan was to get con-
trol of the valley of the Sokoto River from the border
of the desert to its junction with the Niger, and also
to control the whole basin of the Komadugu Waube
running along the southern edge of the desert east-
ward into Lake Chad. They entered what the
British claimed was their "sphere" and nearly pre-
cipitated a second Fashoda crisis by killing an
English officer. But at the same time, the troops
who had come back from Ashanti overthrew the
Emirs of Kontagoro and Beda, two of the most
powerful feudatories of the Sokoto Empire. During
the autumn of 1901, the province of Yola, in the
Upper Benue Valley, which the Germans coveted,
was brought under administrative control, and a
resident placed at Yola.

291

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

In 1902 the diplomacy that foreshadowed the
Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was initiated. It
was decided to make a delimitation of French and
British spheres south of the Sahara, to determine the
Lake Chad boundaries, and to modify — or rather to
make more precise — the Convention of 1899 in
regard to the Sudan spheres of influence. As the
French were claiming a frontier from the Niger to
Lake Chad, which would give them access to the
Benue River, thus shutting the British- off entirely
from Lake Chad, the Nigerian officials sought to
make effective their occupation of this region.
Their success depended upon the acceptance by the
Emir of Kano of the British Protectorate that Sir
Frederick asserted his predecessor had agreed to.
The Emir proved recalcitrant and refused the bribes
of British agents. Sir Frederick announced that
the only possible policy for the future of Nigeria was
to include in the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria
the entire territories of the Hausa States. In spite
of the lukewarmness of the Colonial Office, he pre-
cipitated a conflict with the Emir of Kano and other
Sokoto vassals in 1903. Sokoto was occupied on
March 15th, and, after much difficulty and one seri-
ous reverse, the Emir of Kano was tracked and
killed in June. Less than one thousand men were
at Sir Frederick Lugard's disposal, but with them he
was able to include the entire Sultanate of Sokoto in
Nigeria, and to bring the British sphere up to the edge
of the Sahara.

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 compounded
the rivalry with France. But there was still much

292

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

work to be done to pacify the territories left to the
British. For several years after Lugard's resigna-
tion, there was much fighting. Emirs who proved
refractory were killed or deposed. On the Anglo-
German frontier, Germans and British combined to
subdue the resistance of remote tribes, and in the
north those who resisted the European penetration
were caught and crushed between British and French.
After the Europeans came to an understanding,
.resistance on the part of the Africans was hopeless.
The railway from the Niger was pushed on to
Kano. The British worked in the organization of
Northern Nigeria through the local emirs. By
respecting their customs and laws, and by granting
civil lists to the emirs and fixed salaries to native
officials, the loyalty of the "protected" to the "pro-
tectors" was established upon the solid basis of
financial interest. In 1910, Sir Frederick's successor
in Northern Nigeria held a court at Kano, to which
the emirs came from long distances. Fourteen
thousand native cavalry formed his escort. An
Imperial proclamation declared the land of the Pro-
tectorate under the control of and at the disposition
of the Crown, in order that natives might be assured
of their rights to the land and to forest produce.^
In 191 1, when the railway to Kano was completed,
the Government claimed that unarmed Europeans
and natives could now travel with perfect security
from one end of Northern Nigeria to the other. In

* It is interesting to note that Great Britaia showed her good faith
in the controversy with Belgium, which was acute at this time, by
doing in Nigeria what she asked Belgium to do ia the Congo.

293

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

1912, Sir Frederick Lugard returned to amalgamate
the northern and southern Protectorate and the
colony. He held a Durbar at Kano on New Year's
Day, 1913, which was attended by emirs and chiefs
representing sixty-eight tribes, loyal and contented
under British rule.

While Northern Nigeria was being penetrated and
conquered, Southern Nigeria increased in prosperity
every year. After the inclusion of the Lagos colony,
Southern Nigeria was more than self-supporting.
In 1908, there was a revenue surplus of over £200,000
and grants from the Imperial Government had been
discontinued. The revenue had doubled in five
years, and the sound financial condition of the colony
made possible the issue of a loan of £3,000,000 at
four per cent, for harbor works and railway construc-
tion. 1910 brought an increase of £350,000 revenue
(25 per cent.) over 1909, and trade increased £2,-
000,000. The tin mining area in exploitation had
tripled. One ton of tin was exported in 1903 : fifteen
hundred tons in 1912. In 1 913, it was reported that
the total trade of Southern Nigeria had more than
doubled in six years, and that the surplus of revenue
had reached £120,000. In 19 14 the Colonial Office
was able to reduce railway rates and the scale of tin
mining royalties.

Although during the same period Northern Nigeria
was still costing much more than it brought in,
it was considered wise, as in the case of Sierra Leone,
to unite the Northern Protectorate with the prosper-
ous colony and Southern Protectorate. Hinterland
development would mean prosperity for the coast.

294

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

The coast had every reason, then, to be glad to con-
tribute to that development, and to supervise and
manage it.

On January I, 1914, the union was effected, and the
public debt unified. In view of the war that followed
so soon, with the long and arduous campaign that
had to be undertaken against Kamerun, union came
at a most fortunate moment.

In Nigeria as in the Sudan, East Africa, Uganda
and Nyasaland, the first decade of the twentieth
century was marked by an extraordinary interest in
cotton-growing experimentation. In 1902 a move-
ment was begun, backed by money and specialists
from the British Cotton-Growing Association, to
make cotton the staple industry of British West
Africa. Ginning mills were erected and premiums
offered — in many cases facilities for loans granted to
those who were willing to undertake the cultivation
of cotton. For several years there was much enthusi-
asm. In spite of some failures in 1906, cotton cul-
tivation was believed to be the great industry of the
future. Mr. Winston Churchill evidently believed
of West Africa what he had said of East Africa during
and after his trip from Mombasa to Cairo overland.
When the bill for the Kano railway was introduced
in 1907, Mr. Churchill told Parliament that this rail-
way would mean the development of a new cotton-
growing area which was going to save Lancashire from
dependence upon the United States!^ It was a typi-

^ Sir Gilbert Parker remarked that the commercial uses of the Kano
railway, as Mr. Churchill exposed them, made the bill inconsistent
with the free trade policy of the Government. Mr. Churchill re-

295

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

cally Churchill utterance, very much like later
combined boasts and prophecies about the defense
of Antwerp, dragging the Germans out of Wilhelms-
haven like rats, and walking across the Gallipoli
peninsula to Constantinople. Cotton is not exactly
a failure in Nigeria, but the promises and hopes of
1907 have certainly remained unfulfilled. Only
£150,000 of cotton was exported in 19 13, less than
one-thirtieth of the value of the palm-oil export.
Tin, which just began to be a Nigerian industry in
the year of Mr. Churchill's speech, was an export
four times the value of cotton in 19 13.

For all this, the activities of the British Cotton-
Growing Association bear watching on the part of
the United States : and the progress of cotton cultiva-
tion in Africa and in Asiatic Turkey foreshadow a
time — perhaps not far distant — when Europe will
no longer need the cotton of our Southern States.
The cotton-manufacturing industry in America ought
to be developed along with the cotton-growing in-
dustry in Africa. When the day arrives that Lan-
cashire will no longer need our raw material, we must
be in the position no longer to need Lancashire's
manufactured goods.

This summary review of the histoiy of Nigeria is
sufficient to indicate the secret of British success in
African colonization. It is in the character of the
men entrusted with colonial administration, their
enterprise, their vision, their ability to conciliate,

plied that there was a wide difference between improving trafl&c
communications and erecting a tariff wall.

296

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

and make happy the natives whom they have sub-
dued. Up to the present time, England has fur-
nished the unique example of a nation able to utilize
its best talent in the building of an overseas Empire.
Napoleon was not wrong when he called the English
a nation of shopkeepers. They are merchants par
excellence, and their foreign policy has been dictated
ever since the days of Cromwell by purely commercial
considerations. They spend their money and they
sacrifice the blood of their people only when they
know it is going to pay them to do so. But by a
curious paradox, the men who have made Great
Britain the premier commercial nation of the world
have been led into the work of building the Empire
because they themselves looked down upon and
scorned to enter trade. Just as in feudal days the
fighting men purchased the right to a place above
their fellows and became the aristocracy by being
willing to take the risk and the burden of defending
the peasants of the field and the artisans of the city,
so up to the present time the British aristocracy has
preserved its caste and its privileges by devoting
its energies and its brains and its blood to the enrich-
ment and protection of traders and manufacturers.
The Liverpool and London merchant and the Man-
chester and Shefiield manufacturer grows rich. The
Liverpool and London ship-owner grows rich. He is
perfectly willing to take off his hat to the military
and naval officers and the colonial administrators
who are making possible his prosperity. In the city
and in the country he yields precedence to the no-
bility and the county families. Their children are

297

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

sacrificing themselves for his children. When he
teaches his son the mysteries of the bank balance, he
teaches him at the same time what is due to those
who make that bank balance possible. Why not?
As long as he is content with the station of life to
which God has called him, and his "betters" are
content with theirs, why not indeed?

Perhaps the war is going to change all this. But if
it does, it will change the colonies also.

298

CHAPTER XV
THE GERMANS IN WEST AFRICA

ON the north side of the Gulf of Guinea, Ger-
many is ensconced in a narrow strip of
territory called Togoland. This colony,
with Great Britain's Gold Coast colony, is an en-
clave in French territory between Dahomey and the
Ivory Coast. The German boundary on the west
with Great Britain is partly formed by the Volta
River. On the east, the Mono River divides Togo-
land from Dahomey. Both with France and Great
Britain the lateral boimdaries of the hinterland are
conventional lines not exactly defined. Togoland
has very little coastline. For Great Britain holds
both sides of the Volta River and its mouth, including
all of Cape St. Paul, and France holds Great Popo
Island. Lome, the railway terminus of Togoland, is
as much at the mercy of the British, as Swakopmund,
the terminus of German Southwest African railways.
On the west side of the Gulf of Guinea, between
British Nigeria and French Gabun, Germany has the
large colony of Kamerun, with an extensive coastline
that includes most of the Bight of Biafra. Kamerun
extends north to Lake Chad in a narrow wedge
between the Shari and Yedseran rivers, and south-

299

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

east tO' the Congo in two wedges cutting through
French Equatorial Africa. Rio Muni, or Spanish
Guinea, is a little enclave in Kamerun, on the east
side of the Gulf of Guinea, not far from the Franco-
German border. The island of Fernando Po off
the Kamerun coast, in the Bight of Biafra, is also
Spanish territory. Since France has by treaty the
right of preemption to Spain's African colonies,
Germany has been in Kamerun, as elsewhere, not
wholly master of her own destinies.

Togoland was neglected by France and Great
Britain, although they had established themselves
prior to the time when Germany began to have
colonial ambitions at several points along the coast.
There was just one wee opening for the Germans on
the coast. Little Popo Island, on which German mer-
chants had established factories in order to escape
the duties levied by the British on the Gold Coast.
The chief from whom these Germans had obtained
concessions died opportunely in 1883, and the dispute
over his succession gave the German Consul for
West Africa the chance to slip in and hoist the German
flag. By exploration of the hinterland, and succes-
sive treaties with tribal chiefs, a wider interior came
under German sovereignty. In 1897 and 1899,
treaties with France and Great Britain settled the
general limits and the international status of the
colony. JThe natives were brought under adminis-
trative control with much less difficulty than France
experienced in Dahomey and Great Britain in
Ashanti. In 1900, a military force of seven Germans
and 150 natives was all the colony needed.

300

THE GERMANS IN WEST AFRICA

In the early days of the colony, Germany received
a decided setback from the fact that France was able
to make good her claim to Great Popo Island, which
controls the larger portion of the coast. But the Ger-
mans consoled themselves for this political setback
by starting commercial development of Little Popo
and the Togo hinterland on a remarkably successful
basis. Almost from the beginning they were able to
substitute cash payments for barter to the great satis-
faction and advantage of the natives. They put their
minds, also, on the problem of getting out of the palm
oil and palm nut industries all there was in them. So
they were soon able to control the greater part of the
Dahomey production. By establishing regular steam-
ship service and by being able to offer a higher price
for palm products, they succeeded in making Ham-
burg the depot for Dahomey as well as for Togoland. '

Togoland is one of the few happy colonies in Africa
without a miHtary and political history. Both from
the administrative and economic point of view, the
colony was weU organized and on the way to self-
support at the beginning of the twentieth century.
By 1905, a coast railway was completed from Little
Popo to Lome. In the next five years two railways
were built into the interior from Lome, and surveys
have since been made to extend the Lome-Atakpame
line to the very north of the colony.^ Lome, like

^ See below, pp.

* Togoland has had the common experience of colonies which
keep railways and other public works in their own hands. Railway
receipts in 1912 were seventy per cent, in excess of running expenses.
After interest charges were paid and depreciation reserve laid aside,
the profit to the colonial budget was considerable.

301

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Swakopmund, Luderitzberg, and Dar-es-Salaam,
represents Germany at her best in Africa. In build-
ings, public works, and sanitation Lome is the model
city of the West African coast.

Germany has outstripped other colonizing powers
in Africa in four things, all of which are strikingly
illustrated in the little colony of Togoland: road-
building for cooperation with railways and transport ;
accommodation for travelers in the interior; scienti-
fic forestry ; and supervision of public health.

In a quarter of a century, with very limited means
at their disposal, the Germans have built 750 miles
of roads over which motor cars can run. Every
mile has been placed to feed communities whose
products for export justify the money put into the
road. Nowhere in Africa, where white colonists
are lacking, are the natives so well served in the way
of roads as in Togoland. One can say the same of
conveniences for travelers. Togoland is unique in
its rest-houses for Europeans and for natives. At
the end of the day's journey, one can always be sure
of a comfortable place to sleep, where cleanliness is
invariable. From personal experience on the Bag-
dad Railway in Asia Minor, I can testify to the joy
the traveler finds in the modest little hotels that go
with the German wherever he penetrates. In sharp
contrast to the uncomfortable and filthy native
accommodations in the Near East and in Africa are
the clean beds and rooms and the wholesome food of
the German inns.

None accuses Germany of not having got the most,
from the European standpoint, out of the colonies she

302

THE GERMANS IN WEST AFRICA

possessed in Africa. We have spoken above of Dr.
Rohrbach's report about the possibiHties of Southwest
Africa for cattle-raising, and the generous assist-
ance given by the Government to encourage stock-
breeding. In Togoland, the problem of forestation
has received long and intensive study, and been the
subject of reports, that have aided immensely the
officials of other colonizing Powers. Herr Metzger,
Forestry Superintendent of Togoland, found that
sixty per cent, of Togoland was covered by non-
productive growth, due to wasteful methods of the
natives through many centuries. The reclamation of
that land, and the better yielding of the forty per
cent, under cultivation and virgin forest, was one of
the principal ambitions of the Togoland Government.
Mahogany was scientifically grown to a certain ex-
tent; but the marvelous development was in teak,
which thrives everyivhere. As in Hungary and Bul-
garia, German forestry experts were reconstructing
the forests by planting seedlings.

What the Germans accomplished in educating the
natives in preventive medicine, and in caring for
their personal and corrimunal health and cleanliness,
is marvelous. Not only were Government officials
tireless in preaching the value of keeping clean, being
vaccinated, burning or burying refuse, making a war
on the fly and the mosquito, and other matters that
are still not fully appreciated in many parts of Europe,
but they enlisted the cooperation of paramount and
local chiefs to an extent unknown elsewhere in Africa.
The fight against malaria, yellow fever, sleeping-
sickness, skin diseases, and tuberculosis, was carried

303

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

on with unremitting vigilance and enthusiasm. The
greatest success was - in vaccination. Smallpox is
the most dreaded scourge of the country. The
German propaganda made the native so alive to the
value of vaccination that they came and asked for it
and many paramount chiefs established compulsory
vaccination by law.

In the same week that Dr. Nachtigal hoisted the
German flag in Togoland, he succeeded in getting a
foothold on the Kamerun coast by making treaties
with native chiefs. He outwitted the commander of
an English gunboat, who had proceeded to the Gulf
of Guinea to prevent the Germans from getting a
foothold there. Almost a year of discussion between
the London, Paris, and Berlin Foreign Offices fol-
lowed. Great Britain and France both had claims
to footholds on the Kamerun coast. But Germany
advanced similar claims to footholds at the mouth of
the Niger and at Konakry, in French Guinea. Ger-
man, French, and British claims all rested on shadowy
foundations. If one be admitted, the others were
equally good. As Germany's claim at the mouth of
the Niger was just like the claim by which the British
at that time were hoping to oust the Portuguese from
Delagoa Bay, London thought it best to make a
treaty with Berlin, recognizing Germany in Kamerun
in return for German recognition of British rights in
Nigeria. France ceded Great Batanga to Germany
in return for Konakry.

For fifteen years not much was done by British
and Germans to develop the hinterland between
Nigeria and Kamerun and Lake Chad. Great

304

THE GERMANS IN WEST AFRICA

Britain and Germany got busy only when they saw
the French trying to put the whole Lake Chad region
under the French flag. In 1902, Germany and Great
Britain cooperated in a military and surveying
expedition along their common frontier with the
object of fixing boundaries. The underlying motive
was, of course, to prevent the French from getting
into the Bornu country, between their colonies and
Lake Chad. Nigerian and Kamerun authorities
were in perfect accord, and the official reports of
1903 are much in the nature of a mutual admiration
society. The object of cooperation was accorhplished.
Native tribes were "pacified, " and at the beginning
of 1904 France saw that she had to accept Britain
and Germany as neighbors on Lake Chad. British
and German authority was firmly established in
Nigeria and Kamerun in 1904 from the coast to Lake
Chad. The definite Anglo-German boundary was
not fixed until 1 913 — except at the farther unknown
Lake Chad end. That was the only part of the game
which needed hurry and an understanding. That
the British Cabinet did not hesitate, even after
pourparlers were under way, to continue to work with
Germany in Morocco and to seek German aid in doing
France out of her "legitimate rights" to Bornu is
one of the factors in causing France to yield a few
points she was holding out for in making the agree-
ment with Great Britain. The Anglo-French Agree-
ment of 1904 was business from beginning to end.
There was no sentiment in it — except in retrospect.

Germany had much trouble with native outbreaks
in Kamerun. The hinterland is vast and mountain-

30 305

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

oti^ and does not possess navigable waterways such
as the British have in Nigeria. MiHtary and ad-
ministrative expenses were very heavy. But mahog-
any, ebony, ivory, rubber, and cultivated products
made the colony actually as well as potentially one of
great wealth. Kamerun is a splendid rubber coun-
try. The Germans looked at the rubber question
from a broad scientific standpoint, keeping always in
mind the future. Private concessionnaires, with their
killing off of rubber trees and rubber gatherers, have
not been allowed to give Kamerun the bad name
of adjacent French and Belgian territory. Cocoa
plantations doubled between 1908 and 1913. Timber
export nearly quintupled in the same period. Mining
industries, being wholly dependent upon transport,
are not developed: although many minerals exist.
The colony found fortune enough in forest and
agricultural produce.

Kamerun territory was substantially increased,
and given an outlet in two places to the Congo River,
by the "compensations" granted by France in ex-
change for the recognition of the Protectorate over
Morocco. The New Kamerun was enthusiastically
and glowingly depicted to the German people by
those who had to justify the Agadir coup and its
aftermath. But the Reichstag thought very little
of the diplomacy of the Foreign Office and the results
accomplished by it. Almost immediately after the
Congo territories were ceded by France, Germany had
native troubles, which compelled the establishing of
garrisons and the expenseof a large punitive expedition.

Before Germany adopted a colonial policy, backed
306

THE GERMANS IN WEST AFRICA

by popular support, there was maladministration in
Togoland and Kamerun, involving the governors of
both colonies. In 1905, native chiefs of Kamerun
protested directly to Berlin against the system of
government of Von Puttkamer. To prove their
charges, the Kamerun chiefs presented a register of
arbitrary acts committed by the governor and his
subordinates. These were numerous well-authenti-
cated cases of brutality and administrative oppres-
sion. The whole matter was aired in the German
press and in the Reichstag. The governors were
recalled and tried. Both were found guilty of mal-
administration, and one of cruelty. Popular indigna-
tion was as great as at the time of the Peters trial. ^
Had there been no strong, irresistible public opinion,
aroused by the appeal of the chiefs and the presenta-
tion of their pathetic evidence, the governors would
have escaped trial. For Berlin bureaucracy went
to the extent of destroying documents on file in the
desire to save the culprits. The scandal led to the
resignation of Prince Hohenlohe, and the abolition
of the disastrous system of entrusting the manage-

^ Dr. Peters, like Stanley and other famous African explorers,
was charged with the most unbelievable cruelties to natives in the
course of his trips in Central Africa. Stanley was never brought to
book, as was Peters, but I have been assured by the Countess
di Villamarina, whose first husband was a scientist who died on one
of Stanley's trips, that her husband's diary gave irrefutable proof
of Stanley's heartrending brutality. The mania to torture natives
seems to attack often the white man in the jungle. It is a mental
malady. Whatever might be said in extenuation of explorers or of
lonely officials in remote posts, who become neurasthenic and lose
their grip, there is no possible excuse for a governor of a colony who
allows excesses to go on unpunished under a civil administration.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

ment of the colonies to aristocrats and bureaucrats.
Dr. Dernberg, a bank manager, succeeded Hohenlohe.
The General Election brought to the new business
management of the colonies Reichstag support. It
was the beginning of a new era.

Like the British and French, the Germans had
great hopes of finding a source of cotton supply in
their African colonies that would make them in-
dependent of the United States. We have spoken
elsewhere of British and French efforts and hopes,
and the disappointments experienced, especially in
West Africa. British initiative, in the matter of
encouraging cotton-growing in West Africa, was
largely private. The German Colonial Society,
both in East Africa and West Africa, took up the
matter of cotton-growing along the lines of the
British Cotton-Growing Association. If success in
the experimental stages was greater in the German
than the British colonies in West Africa, it must be
confessed that this success was largely due to the
greater power over the native given to Europeans by
the Germans than by the British. In British West
African colonies, a European is fined who strikes a
native. In the German colonies, one can flog a
native up to twenty-five lashes. This helps greatly
in making the native work. But the method is in-
compatible with Anglo-Saxon ideas of the way things
should be done. ^

' It must not be forgotten that the explanation of German success
in road-building and in enforcing measures for health and cleanliness
is due partly to compulsion of a character British Government
ofiScials (I am sorry I cannot say also British colonists) would not
use.

308

THE GERMANS IN WEST AFRICA

In 1907, in his great speech before the Chambers of
Commerce, Dr. Dernberg expressed the same opinion
and the same prophecy as Mr. Winston Churchill, that
West and East Africa were both admirably adapted
to growing cotton and that the development of the
industry in the African colonies would make the
mother country independent of the United States.
In German East Africa, cotton export increased from
less than a thousand pounds in 1902 to half a million
pounds in 1908, and nearly a million pounds in 19 13.
Over two hundred and fifty thousand acres were laid
out and in the process of development for cotton
plantations in German East Africa when the war
broke out . Togoland began cotton production in 1 90 1
with twenty thousand pounds. In 1908, Togoland
produced about a million pounds. Not much has yet
been done with cotton in Kamerun. But the Ger-
mans have been studying possibilities with all the
keenness and energy they put into every economic
problem. From the reports of Steubel, Dernberg,
Warberg, and Solf , one gathers that Germany had high
hopes of a glorious future in her African cotton cultiva-
tion. East Africa was growing Egyptian cotton, and
the price of land compared favorably with prices in
Egypt and in Texas. After plow cultivation could be
introduced,^ the probable yield of the African colo-
nies was estimated at two and one-half million bales,
which would satisfy the needs of German industry.

^Plowing in many parts of Africa will not be practicable until
the discovery of a means to destroy the tsetse fly or to protect from
his bite makes possible the use of draft animals. The tsetse fly is
the greatest drawback in Africa both to man and to beast.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

From Duala, at the mouth of the Kam.erun River,
a railway runs north behind the Kamerun Mountains
into the Manenguba Mountains. A second line
southeast from Duala had crossed the Sanaga River
and was being constructed along the valley of the
Nyong River, when the war broke out. A railway
into the hinterland of Kamerun is going to be an ex-
tremely slow and costly project. But it is bound to
pay expenses, and. Until it is constructed, the hinter-
land will remain largely undeveloped for want of
means of transport. Animals cannot be used, and
porterage is too expensive except for rubber and ivory.
In the fifteen years from 1899 to 1913, imports in-
creased from less than ten million marks to consider-
ably over thirty million marks, and exports from less
than five million marks to considerably over twenty
million marks. The railways, as far as they were
opened, were paying well, and the finances of the
colony were on a very sound basis.

Telegraphic communication in Togoland and
Kamerup. had been developed in recent years fully
as rapidly as anywhere in Africa, and telephonic
communication more rapidly. The natives of Togo-
land have better telephone service, and avail them-
selves of it more freely, than in many European
countries. In 1913, Kamerun was connected with
Germany by direct cable, and at Kamina, north of
Atakpame, in Togoland, was erected in the same year
the largest wireless station in Africa, which was able
to communicate directly with Germany.

Aside from what they accomplished in the matter
of sanitation and the spread of the knowledge of

310

THE GERMANS IN WEST AFRICA

preventive medicine, the most remarkable achieve-
ment of the Germans in West Africa was their school
system. Although Kamerun has hardly more than
half the area of its neighbor, Nigeria, and one-seventh
of the population, its Government and assisted
schools in 1913 were proportionately better attended
than those of the British Protectorate. Similarly,
Togoland has better school opportunities than its
French and British neighbors. In 19 10, Kamerun
made school attendance obligatory for children of
both sexes. There was plenty of zeal and peda-
gogical ability, and a very earnest desire to lift the
natives to a higher level, morally as well as mate-
rially. But the education was given without much
affection and astonishingly little attention was paid
to native psychology. There was too much of the
idea of Germanizing what could not be Germanized
and of willing that the natives learn rather than
of winning them to learn. German colonization
shows the same weaknesses and the strong points of
the Teuton that have been revealed to the world
during the last two years of Herculean struggle.
Matchless in their commercial aptitude, in their
industrial resourcefulness, in their scientific genius,
and in the organization of their administration, the
Germans are pitifully weak in political understanding,
in diplomacy, and in ability to understand and handle
other nations.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FRENCH IN WEST AFRICA AND THE
SAHARA

THE French African Empire touches the Atlan-
tic coast at six places from the Sahara Desert
to the Congo. Gambia and Sierra Leone,
British colonies, the republic of Liberia, and Portu-
guese Guinea, are enclaves of French territory on the
Atlantic coast. The British Gold Coast and Ger-
man Togoland are surrounded by French territory
coming down to the Gulf of Guinea on either side.
The French Empire also completely surrounds the
enormous territory of British Nigeria and German
Kamerun, reaching the Gulf of Guinea on the north
in Dahomey and on the east in Gabun. The coast
colonies of France in West Africa are Senegal, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and Gabun. AU these colo-
nies have the same general characteristics, and are con-
fronted with the same general economic and climatic
conditions as their British and German neighbors.
But they have the advantage of being connected
with each other by contiguous territory and with a
hinterland that goes to the very heart of Africa, and
extends from the Congo to the Mediterranean without
passing through foreign territory. The import-

312

/
FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

ance of this advantage is demonstrated by the
fact that the growth and prosperity of the coast
colonies in West Africa have followed the French
penetration into the upper valleys of the Senegal
and Niger and Congo and the spread of French terri-
tory in the Sahara and the Sudan.

French West Africa was almost all opened up and
colonized and connected during the last decade of the
nineteenth century. But its unity and official status
were not determined until the decree of October i,
1902, which divided French West Africa as follows:
the colonies of Senegal, French Guinea, ' the Ivory
Coast, Dahomey, and "the territories of Senegambia
and the Niger." Gabun on the west side of the
Gulf of Guinea was made a portion of French Equa-
torial Africa. In the following year the territory
between Senegal colony and Spanish Rio de Oro
was organized as the Protectorate of Mauritania.

Senegal is the oldest French colony in West Africa,
and goes back to the days of Richelieu. Its capital,
St. Louis, was settled in 1637, and is at the mouth
of the Senegal River. But the most important city of
Senegal is the modem fortified naval station of Da-
kar on Cape Verde, the western point of the African
continent. A railway connects these two cities.
There is river navigation from St. Louis for nearly
five hundred miles to the interior. But the great
railway into the hinterland of West Africa joining
the Senegal and Niger, to Kayes, the former capital
of the, region, has its terminus at Dakar. A govern-
ment cable has connected Dakar with Brest since
1905* and there are other coastal cables, and cable

313

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

connection with South America. French, German,
and British lines make Dakar a regular port of call.
Largely because it is the route of through trade from
all the vast interior, Senegal has more than half the
total trade of the French West African colonies, and
reached nearly thirty milHon dollars in 19 13.

French Guinea lies between Portuguese Guinea
and the British colony of Sierra Leone. Its large
port, Konakry, has been free since the Anglo-French
Agreement of 1904, when the Los Islands, which
command the coast, were ceded to France. If this
had not been done, Konakry would have been in the
unfortunate position of Swakopmund in German
Southwest Africa — at the mercy of the British.
This is one illustration of the many advantages that
have accrued to France from the compounding of
colonial rivalries with Great Britain. After the
Anglo-French Agreement, the railway was pushed
inland rapidly, and reached Kurussa on the Niger
River in 191 1. A new era began for French Guinea
and for the country at the headwaters of the Niger.
It was an important step forward in the plan of
joining the Ivory Coast in French Guinea by an
interior railway.

The Ivory Coast, between Liberia and the British
Gold Coast, has a larger frontage on the ocean than
either of its neighbors, and the great advantage, like
all the French West African colonies, of free access
to the great Senegal-Niger hinterland under the
same flag. Lines drawn from the Ivory Coast and
Dahomey directly north to Algeria pass all the way
from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean through

314

FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

French territory, won and consolidated by French dar-
ing and persistence in two generations. The most
important part of the work, however, has been
accomplished since the beginning of the twentieth
centiiry, and has been made possible by railway
extension and native armies.

The French became acquainted with the Ivory
Coast during the reign of Louis Philippe, while
they were still involved in the conquest of Algeria.
They did not make good intangible claims until
1883, when rumor had it that Germany was looking
for colonies. The Ivory Coast was connected with
the hinterland in just the opposite way to that of
most colonies. The penetration was from the
interior to the coast. After the fall of Timbuktu,
when many officials and military men and explorers
were occupied with the problem of connecting the
upper Niger valley with the Senegal valley, a young
marine officer conceived the plan of penetrating also
toward the Gulf of Guinea. While routes were
being opened up from the Niger to Senegal and to
Guinea, he would open up a route to the Ivory
Coast. Between the Niger and the Ivory Coast
lay the mountainous Kong region. For eighteen
months, with one French companion, Captain Binger
was lost to the world. He finally appeared on the
Ivory Coast, having blazed a route for France with-
out firing a shot. Bingerville, the port terminus
of the railway that now runs into the heart of the
Kong country, commemorates one of the most re-
markable and most useful feats in the history of
African exploration.

315

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

The French have had much trouble with the
natives of the Ivory Coast during recent years, and
have been compelled to go to the expense of a num-
ber of punitive expeditions. Yellow fever, and lack
of railways and roads, as well as the mountain-
ous character of the Kong region, made administra-
tive work very difficult. The troubles culminated
in the rebellion of 1909, which spread among
many tribes. Disarmament had to be undertaken
on a large scale. To their amazement, the military
authorities were able to gather in eleven thousand
rifles. This was a forcible argument for the advo-
cates of carrying through the subjection of the Sahara
and the Sudan. For as long as vast regions were left
to tribes who did not acknowledge French authority,
and who could not be controlled, gun-running would
continue; and local authorities, with few troops at
their disposal and an enormous administrative area,
would always risk a serious revolt when they tried to
collect taxes.

The Ivory Coast-Kong railway serves a country
rich in minerals and mahogany forests, and has ad-
vanced far enough to make the plan of joining Senegal,
French Guinea, and the Ivory Coast by an interior
railway system a reality of the near future. Those
who scoffed a decade ago at the idea of Timbuktu
being connected by rapid steamer and railway service
with Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Sene-
gal, have only to look at the map to understand that
they would be doubting Thomases if they refused
still to believe in the transformations French genius
is making in West Africa. Fifteen years ago, it took

316

FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

three months to go from Dakar to Timbuktu. One
can make the journey now in ten days. Fifteen
years ago, French officials took a month for traveling
from the Senegal River to the Niger River. Now
they need two days.

Next to Senegal, Dahomey, the narrow little
wedge between Togoland and Nigeria, has the most
distinctive personality of the West African colonies.
The Ivory Coast and Guinea owe their importance
to the hinterland, and to the development of French
influence in the upper Niger valley. Their prosper-
ity is largely dependent upon that of the whole of
French West Africa. Senegal has suffered, from
the point of view of individuality, since it became a
province of West Africa. This is illustrated by the
way Dakar, administrative center for the group of
colonies, has eclipsed St. Louis, the old capital of
Senegal.^ But Dahomey, farthest removed from

' " Dakar, in 1902, was only a simple chance landing place, without
coal and without water, where twice a month the Messageries Mari-
times Company threw off hastily its passengers in order to flee as
quickly as possible towards coasts less desert and climates less
unhealthy. To-day, Dakar, protected from the sea by a powerful
dyke, receives on its two moles three or four steamers a day (I have
seen eleven in one day) which find in abundance coal, drinking
water, fresh vegetables. The city is growing and is being embel-
lished. In a few years Dakar wUl be one of those cosmopolitan ports
like Port Said or Colombo, where people are elbowing each other in
the streets, and where the largest and swiftest vessels of the world
cross each other's path. And yet, the plan of 1902 appeared rash
even to those who wanted to believe in it. The Governor-General
was charged with megalomania, and here after a decade the port
is too small, and is already being enlarged. " — M. Guy, former
Governor of Senegal, in a lecture at the Ecole des Sciences Poli-
tiques, April 16, 19 13.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the influences that have brought into being since
1900 a French Empire in the Senegal and Niger val-
leys, still preserves her identity. Dahomey is an
historic kingdom, inhabited by a race very dif-
ferent from those of the hinterland and the other
French colonies. It was conquered and annexed to
France in somewhat the same way as Madagascar
during the last decade of the nineteenth century,
and as Ashanti nearby in the first years of . the
twentieth century.

Like its neighbor, Togoland, Dahomey has a very
small stretch of coast. But, unlike Togoland, its
ports are not at the mercy of other powers. There
is excellent shelter and deep water at Kotonu. By
her possession of the Grand Popo, France, like Great
Britain, holds a part of the natural coastline of Togo-
land. Railways penetrate inland from Kotonu
nearly two hundred miles, and from the capital,
Porto Novo, fifty miles along the Lagos frontier.
There are less than seven hundred Europeans in the
colony in the midst of a native population of nine
hundred thousand. In the hinterland, between
Dahomey and the Niger, is Borgu, which the British
hoped to include in Nigeria, when their Protectorate
was extended by Sir Frederick Lugard over the
Sokoto Empire.

In Algeria and Tunis, and in most of the West and
Central African territories, France has been able —

Dakar now has twenty-five thousand inhabitants, of whom over
three thousand are French. Its poUce force numbers ten. St.
Louis has about the same population, but only one-third as many
French.

318

FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

sometimes in defiance of treaty rights — to destroy, by
gradual measures, the principle of the open door
which Great Britain and Germany follow, and
which has been forced upon Belgium. The open
door means fair play and equal advantages for all.
Neither in tariffs nor in concession regulations are
advantages granted to the subjects of the nation
holding the colony which are not granted to subjects
of other nations. Only by maintaining the open
door is Great Britain able to justify the holding of
one-fourth of the world's productive territories.
Only by maintaining — or rather establishing fairly —
the principle of equal advantages to all comers can
France hope to keep and develop properly her vast
African empire. If she attempts, after this war, to
extend to the West African colonies the iniquitous
tariff regime that has been put into practice in
Algeria, Tunis, and Madagascar, not only will her own
real interests be jeopardized, but she will have to face
another war with Germany within the next genera-
tion. A nation may hold, and justify her right to
hold, colonies to the exclusion of other nations, by
the exercise of superior colonizing ability. But it is
unthinkable that she be allowed to make a national
preserve of colonies in this period of world markets,
unless she has the force to continue to keep others out.
Bound by strict treaty obligations, France has
been unable to make tariff discriminations in the
Ivory Coast and Dahomey. She has taken upon
herself similar obligations in regard to Morocco.
The result has not been favorable to French com-
merce. Dahomey illustrates the inferiority of French

319

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

to German commercial methods. In 191 3, Germany
had forty per cent, of the total commerce of Daho-
mey, against France's twenty-four per cent. German
ships carried sixty per cent, of the exports. German
ships embarked and disembarked twice as much
tonnage as French ships. Seventy-five per cent, of
the palm nut output, valued at two million dollars,
was bought by Germans, and most of it sent to
Hamburg, which has become the first market in the
world for this product. From Dahomey and the
Ivory Coast together, Hamburg bought nearly a
million dollars' worth of other forest products. From
Senegal, Hamburg took in 1913, peanuts valued
at one and one-quarter million dollars against French
purchases of thirty thousand dollars. Many tons of
peanuts from French West Africa were transported
to Hamburg on German bottoms, and reshipped from
Hamburg to France on other German bottoms, and
sold to French buyers. The French paid Germany
two commissions and two freight hauls on products of
their own colonies!

Last spring, when I was in the Riviera, I read in a
local newspaper the following:

"It is necessary to call attention once more to the
method and perseverance of the Germans in their
effort to gain the commerce of our colonies. They
have not stopped with creating at Hamburg a market
for palm nuts rivaling that of Liverpool, and with
getting their money's worth out of the products they
brought to this market. Their chemists set to work,
with the result that, aside from the manufacture of
soap and candles, their industry has succeeded in
extracting from palm nuts different vegetable fats,

320

FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

appreciated for their cheapness in certain European
regions, and which have a large market in America.
More than this, they have been able to find on the
spot a market for the residue, which has been adopted
by stock raisers for nourishing cattle, and which
unfortunately is not yet common as stock food in
France and England. This way of getting all there
is in a product permits them to pay the highest
prices, and naturally it is towards the market where
prices are highest that producers direct by preference
their expeditions. "^

1 expected to read a splendid lesson, drawn by the
writer from the wholesome truth he was putting
before his fellow-countrymen. But instead of stating
that Frenchmen must study German methods and
try to emulate them, this writer proposed as a remedy
for ruinous German competition the enactment of a
law forbidding to Germans the privilege of doing
business on any terms whatever with French colo-
nies! This curious mental attitude — blindness, may
we call it? — is alarmingly prevalent in France to-day.
If what this writer says be true, what will be the
result of the "remedy" he proposes? Producers
will be cut off from the market where they get the
best prices. They will be compelled to do business
with merchants and manufacturers who are not alive
to the full value of the product they are buying, or
who do not know how or care to get the full value out
of it. So they will not and cannot pay the prices
Hamburg pays. The quotation I have cited proves
that German competition is beneficial to the producer
in the French colony. Who will suffer if this whole-

' Nice Petit Nigois, April 25, 1916.
21 321

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

some competition is destroyed by an arbitrary law?
The whole world indirectly, but first of all, the
French colony.

Senegal colony has four self-governing communes,
and the five thousand French citizens return a deputy
to the Paris Parliament. The other coast colonies
have not as yet reached the self-governing stage.
There are too few Europeans.

The British and German cotton-growing associ-
ations have not been alone in their efforts to make
West Africa a new source of the world's cotton sup-
ply. The Association Cotonniere of Paris has been
spending a great deal of money in West Africa for
the past ten years. Cotton, as a wild plant, grows
everywhere. The natives know its value, and make
use of it in their weaving. But all attempts to culti-
vate cotton for the market have failed, as in the
German and British colonies. The natives find easier
money in peanuts and forest produce. Cotton-
growing is hard work, and requires a long period of
waiting to gather the harvest, and the willingness
to put aside seed for next year. Only if they are
under the close and strict control of white over-
seers wiU the negroes bother with cotton. That
control cannot be exercised — whence the failure of
cotton.

In spite of their hinterland, and the advantages
they enjoy from administrative and territorial union
with each other, the coast colonies of French West
Africa are not at all satisfied. The enclaves belong-
ing to other Powers are a continual source of irri-
tation, and, from the French standpoint, spoil the

322

FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

homogeneity of the Empire. French ImperiaHsts
maintain that British Gambia is altogether an anom-
aly. In the Agreement of 1904, Great Britain ceded
Yarbutenda to France, together with the landing
wharves on the river Gambia, and promised that if
at any future time there was no longer free access by
water from Yarbutenda to the ocean, further terri-
tory woiild be yielded. This removed the serious
economic difficulty of Southern Senegal and the
Dentilia hinterland of not being able to enjoy the
natural advantage of water transport on the Gam-
bia. When the country is fully developed, the advan-
tage gained in the Agreement of 1904 will be of the
most substantial character. Within two years of the
signing of the Anglo-French Agreement, the British
Foreign Office was approached with a proposition to
exchange Gambia for territories in the New Hebrides
or for the complete renunciation of French rights in
Saint-Pierre and Miquelon. The French claimed
that the British would never be able to make any-
thing out of the possession of the valley of the
Gambia, and that it was a thorn in the flesh of an
ally that ought to be withdrawn. They represented
also that the commerce of Gambia was entirely in the
hands of French houses. Similar overtures were
made by France to Germany in 1912 to secure
the cession of Togoland in exchange for territorial
and political advantages elsewhere. I have under-
stood from a good source that this proposition was
first made to Germany after the Agadir crisis, and
that it was blocked by the unwillingness of Great
Britain to assent to the compensations France

323

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

proposed to give Germany. The ambition of France
to do away with Liberia altogether, and to buy
Portuguese Guinea, was openly voiced the year before
the war by a former governor of the Ivory Coast,
who stands high in French colonial councils.^

Mauritania, as we have said before, was made a
separate territory in 1903, at the time of the redistri-
bution of Senegal territories and the formation of the
Senegal-Niger colony. In 1909, when the decision
to pacify the whole Sahara had been made, and when
plans were definitely laid for seizing Morocco,
Mauritania was made into a protectorate. Its
northern boundaries have never been fixed, and
taxes have not been widely collected from its popu-
lation of nomad Moors.

Behind the four coast colonies and the Mauritania
Protectorate lies the fifth province of West Africa,
whose history belongs almost wholly to the period
after the decree of 1902. In the decree constituting
West Africa, the great hinterland was called "the
territories of Senegambia and of the Niger." After
the restoration of the Senegal Protectorate to Senegal
colony and the creation of Mauritania, the upper
valleys of the Senegal and the Niger were without
definite status. It was felt that civil administration
should take the place of military administration
wherever possible, especially since railway and
steamer communication had been established with
the coast. The relation, too, of the hinterland with
the coast colonies, and with the Governor- General
at Dakar, was extremely uncertain. In 1904, "the

° See VAfrique du Nord (Paris, 1913), pp. 119-121.

324

FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

colony of Upper Senegal and of the Niger" was
constituted. It was styled colony for want of a
better word. It is unique among the colonies of
Africa and of the whole world. Its boundaries are
formed on the west and south by the French and
other European West African colonies, on the east
by a line from Lake Chad to the Tuareg-Azkar
country on the southwestern border of Tripoli,
and on the north by the Algerian sphere. It includes
the upper valley of the Senegal River, two-thirds
of the valley of the Niger, and a large bit of the
Sahara Desert. In a territory of eight hundred
thousand square miles there are six million natives
and hardly more than a thousand Europeans. The
eastern and northern portions of the colony are still
under military control, but the river valleys are
administered civilly. Timbuktu, near the top of
the great bend of the Niger, is very nearly in the
center of the colony. Just north of the bend of the
Niger, the Sahara begins and stretches to the Al-
gerian and Moroccan frontiers.

The tenth degree of longitude, from the Mediter-
ranean to the Atlantic, passes from Tunis through
Ghadames and Ghat, the westernmost points of
Tripoli, to the place where the Gulf of Guinea turns
south in German territory. West of the tenth
parallel is the big bend of Africa. Almost all of this
quarter of the continent is now in French possession.
Spain in Morocco; Portugal in Guinea; England in
the valley of the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Gold
Coast; Germany in Togoland; and the negroes
mismanaging Liberia under American protection; are

325

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

flies in the French ointment. But the great dis-
appointments of France — "errors of vision," her
Imperialists say — are the British in Nigeria and the
Germans in Kamerun, stretching inland to the
shores of Lake Chad, and disturbing France's
"heritage" just across the desert from the Italian
"intruders" of Tripoli.

The Germans in Kamerun, especially since the
territorial readjustments of 1912 have disturbed
the continuity of French territory and French
influence from the Mediterranean to the Congo.
The French are hoping, however, to remedy this by
eliminating Germany in the Treaty of 191 7.
'j The great fault of France, thirty years ago, was to
allow the ubiquitous English to install themselves at
the mouth of the Niger, and then later to take in a
third of the Niger valley, and all of the Benue
valley. Not only this, but even after French West
Africa had been administratively organized, the
British were allowed to extend their Protectorate over
the Hausa States and through Bornu to Lake Chad.
British alertness and vigilance, seconded by genera-
tions of experience and a fleet and a merchant
marine, have enabled Britain to keep on the process
inaugurated one hundred and fifty years ago of
gathering in the choicest tit-bits for colonies every-
where in the world. West Africa follows the general
rule. In 1891, when British authority was definitely
established in the lower Niger valley, and the French
were expending their energies against savage tribes of
Senegambia and the upper Niger and pacifying desert
wastes, Lord Salisbury ironically declared: "To

326

FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

the French the Sahara and the northern caravan
routes, the Niger where the cataracts are, the sand
and the bush and the waterless wastes; to the Eng-
lish Sokoto, Bornu, and the splendid route of the
navigable Niger and the fertile Benue valley."
' By the Agreement of 1904, the English allowed
France a frontier with Northern Nigeria that did
not quite push her into the desert. But on the
whole. Lord Salisbury's words still contain the
kernel of the matter. Britain bars France's outlet
by the Niger to the sea. The French have reached
Lake Chad at the price of herculean efforts and con-
stant sacrifice of human life and treasure. But the
sides of Lake Chad, from which there is exit by rich
and fertile territories to the sea, are in British and
German hands (all in British hands now). France
holds the desert sides of Lake Chad, from which the
exit to the sea passes through the Sahara to the
north and to the west. The French at Lake Chad,
in addition to their desert route, are several times
farther to the sea than are the British. The Senegal,
which the French control, is a very small stream
compared to the Niger, which the British control.
The errors and disappointments, and the flies in
the ointment, do not make West Africa any the less
one of the epic colonizing feats of history, and a rich
reward for the devotion and sacrifice of those who
have given their lives to make West Africa French.
In a brief review of this character, there is not the
space to recount the exploits of many others who
performed feats that rivaled that of Binger in travers-
ing the country from the Niger to the Ivory Coast.

327

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

There was the exploration of the upper Senegal,
the crossing from the Senegal to the Niger, the
exploration of the Niger, the opening of the routes
to Lake Chad from the Niger and across the Sahara
from the north, and the opening of the route from
Algeria to the Niger across the desert. First there
were the explorers, who had no maps and no more
knowledge of where they were coming out or whether
they would come out than Columbus had. Then
.military expeditions followed, which had to over-
come by far the greatest difficulties that any coloniz-
ing power in Africa has encountered in the way of
armed resistance and of transporting supplies and of
keeping open a line of communication. The French
accomplished the bulk of their work of conquest
before the days of wireless telegraphy, and when
parliaments opposed even the smallest grant for
African colonization. There was no glory, no
reward in what they did. The metropolitan news-
papers could hardly be induced to mention the
battles in which French officers lost their lives.

From the standpoint of the pocket-book, France
had begun to reap a rich harvest from the work
of her West African colonizers several years before
the Great War interrupted economic progress in
Africa. In ten years the receipts of the general bud-
get had more than doubled, and each year the sur-
plus was increasing. Trade passed from twenty- six
million dollars in 1905 to fifty-six miUion dollars
in 1 91 3. Nearly three thousand kilometers of rail-
ways, government owned, and a large river steam-
ship service, government run, were bringing in a net

328

FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

profit of over a million dollars a year. Plans were
made to double the railway system, and to borrow
one hundred and twenty million dollars for that
purpose. In 1902, the only railway in French West
Africa was the Uttle line of a private company,
joining Dakar and St. Louis.

West Africa has meant most to France, though,
as a training school for army officers and as a reser-
voir of splendid faithful troops. The last two years
have amply justified the plea that has so long been
made in the Chamber of Deputies, that every bit of
energy and money put into Africa would come back
with interest when the day of France's need for more
men arrived. For from Africa would be brought the
trained soldiers to equalize France's inferiority in
population to Germany. As an American and an
Anglo-Saxon, I cannot overcome my personal pre-
judice against the idea of introducing African troops
to fight white men. As a student of history, I have
my misgivings about the ultimate wisdom of the
Anglo-French policy of calHng upon Africa and
Asia to help fight their battle in Europe. But under
the circumstances of 19 14, when France found her-
self suddenly the victim of a long and methodically
planned aggression, what Frenchman in his right
senses would have opposed calling to the rescue
every possible helper? They came from Senegal,
from Morocco, from Algeria, from Tunis, from the
desert, thousands of excellent soldiers, eager to fight
for France. And they played an important part
during two years up to the moment that the defense
of Verdun proved the turning-point of the war.

329

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Equal in military value to their possibilities as
reservoirs of men are North and West Africa as
training grounds for officers. Constant African
fighting since 1900 has given to officers of the French
army a more valuable experience in actual warfare
than that enjoyed by the officers of other European
Powers. Great Britain had officers with fighting
experience — but they were few in number. The
Germans had the training and the discipline, but it
was of the schools. When the armies came into
conflict in 1914, the practical advantage was wholly
with France.

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 and the set-
tling definitely of the limits and status of the French
West African colonies made possible for the first
time maps that were not guesswork. Frontiers
were delimited with Great Britain in the Gold Coast
and in Nigeria, and with Germany around Lake Chad
and in Togoland. In 1907, an Anglo-French treaty
fixed, in accordance with the spirit of the Agree-
ment of 1904, the important border from the Niger
to Lake Chad. Within a year this frontier was
completely furnished with stone pyramids and other
permanent marks for a distance of a thousand miles.
The Sudan and Lake Chad frontiers with Kamerun
and the Togoland boundary were finally settled by
the Franco-German Commission that sat at Berne
in the summer of 19 12 to arrange the Morocco
" compensations. "

When the French went to Algiers, a fine was
drawn some few miles back from the coast beyond
which it was believed they would never pass. The

330

FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

conquest of the Kabyles marked another "extreme
limit." But in time expeditions got all the way to
the desert. That was certainly the end! The
French penetrated the Niger valley by way of the
Atlantic and the Senegal. They were south and
north of the Sahara. In order to open a route to
Central Africa, the West African penetration was
carried beyond Lake Chad into the Sudan. In order
to make secure the hinterland of Algeria and Tunis,
and prevent slave-trade, gun-running, and the pan-
Islamic propaganda, North African penetration was
carried to the border of Tripoli into the Tuareg
country. The Tuaregs inhabited both sides of the
desert, and the oases of the desert. They were as
numerous south of Timbuktu as they were south of
Ghat, and they barred the way from the Niger to
Lake Chad.

In 1900, French officers, who had taken part in
desert expeditions and who were interested in the
development of West Africa and the Sudan, began
to declare that the Sahara must be pacified, and
that all the caravan routes must be in the hands of
the French. They were treated as madmen or fools.
Ten years later what they advised was not only
attempted, but was pretty well on the way of reali-
zation. A French Minister of War once had plans
drawn up, and filed in the Rue Saint-Dominique
for a Sudan expedition from Algeria. He counted on
a force of forty thousand men — owing to the neces-
sity of conquering the Tuaregs. Eventually they
were conquered by a few hundred natives on camels
under the command of a few dozen Frenchmen.

331

THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA

Establishing order in the Sahara became possible —
and easy — when European and even Algerian
methods were given up, and nomad tribes were
organized militarily. By the Meharistes the French
have succeeded in policing the Sahara, and making
safe the caravan routes. The French flag now flies
on every important oasis. In 1906, military patrols
of West Africa and Algeria met in the Sahara. They
have been meeting ever since. Rarely do they have
to use their arms. The best way to get to Timbuktu
and Lake Chad is still by Senegal. But crossing
from Algeria is not impossible.

The military problem in West Africa has been
solved. The problem of communications is well on
the way to solution. Miraculous economic develop-
ment depends wholly upon the solution of the labor
problem. West Africa is a white man's country nei-
ther on the coast nor in the hinterland. Agricultural
settlers, to take up and work the land, as in Algeria
and Tunis, cannot be expected. Travel facilities,
medicines, and knowledge of how to dress and what
to eat and the precautions to take against fevers,
have made it possible for white men to live and move
about in the country. But aside from traders and
officials, and managers of plantations,, no Europeans
live in West Africa. Given the security of an
organized government, the direction of skilled men,
the establishment of banks and commercial firms,
and, above all, means of transportation, the natives
of West Africa will have to work out themselves the
destinies of West Africa. If the country is to go
ahead, and develop wealth, the natives will have to

332

FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

do the work. The labor problem, then, as every-
where in Africa, is the chief preoccupation of officials
and students of these French colonies.^

Nowhere is the population as large as it ought to
be. Nowhere do the natives show much disposition
to work. Negroes have no sense about caring for
their own health or the health of their children, and
no thought of putting aside to-day something for
to-morrow's needs. Plagues and epidemics spread
very rapidly among them. They make no attempt
to check illness in their families and in their com-
munities. When they have a good year, and make
money, they stop work until they have spent their
surplus. As inseparable to the negro as his skin
is the notion that one works only when he has to.
Since West Africa is not a white man's country, the
hope of the future lies wholly in the Europeaniza-
tion of the natives. Physicians and dispensaries,
teachers and schools are what West Africa must
have. Economic prosperity is an idea of ours and a
goal of ours. Civilization is what we have created,

^ Slave-trade has practically disappeared. But house slavery, as
in all European colonies where Islam is the religion, continues to
exist, and is exceedingly difficult to cope with. In a circular of Dec.
4, 1905, M. Roume, Governor-General of West Africa, said: "The
coming of native populations into a state of more advanced civili-
zation is not accomplished by decrees. It will result only from a
series of patient and convergent efforts, having for purpose the
moral and material betterment of the native by assuring to each one
his rights, especially the most sacred of all, the liberty of the individ-
ual. " But, until the individual knows and feels that liberty is a
right and his right, what can decrees accomplish? The abolition of
slavery, like every other reform in the world, is a matter of enlighten-
ment through education rather than of law.

333

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

and what we think is a thing to have. In parts of
Africa where the white man can live, he can estab-
lish his ideas and his goal and his civilization by
dispossessing the native of the land, and taking it for
himself. In other parts of Africa, when we attempt
to introduce our civilization we demoralize the
native, both from the physical and social point of
view, unless we can somehow get him to see things as
we do and understand and appreciate the new environ-
ment as we understand and appreciate it. Unless
physician and teacher inculcate into him our ideas
of health and wealth he will have neither. Nor wiU
the Europeans who live with him.

334

CHAPTER XVII

FRENCH PENETRATION INTO CENTRAL
AFRICA

LAiCE CHAD is south of the Sahara Desert,
directly opposite the southernmost- angle of
Tripoli, on the line of latitude that passes
through Sicily and Naples. British Nigeria and
German Kamerun form its south and east shores.
The rest of the lake is bordered by what the French
Imperialists dreamed it would all be — French terri-
tory. Lake Chad stands about halfway across the
African continent. Directly to the west the French
colony of Senegal, with its great modem port of
Dakar, lies on the Atlantic coast. Between Senegal
and Lake Chad all is French territory. Directly to
the east, at the depth of the Gulf of Aden, and hold-
ing the African shore of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb,
lies French Somaliland, with its port of Djibouti.
During the last half of the nineteenth century Lake
Chad was to mark the middle point of a trans-
continental railway, just as real to French Imperial-
ists as was the Cape to Cairo Railway to British
Imperialists.

But while the French were expending their ener-
gies in the barren wastes of North Central Africa, the

335

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

British were occupied with realities. In South
Africa, they were planning to absorb the Dutch
republics. In North Africa, the reconquest of the
Sudan by Lord Kitchener and his combined British
and Egyptian army came just in time to frustrate the
plans and hopes of France. The French had reached
Fashoda on the Nile, almost to the Abyssinian border.
They had actually planted their flag there. The
British told them to take the flag down. It was
either obey or go to war. They could not go to
war: so they obeyed. The final argument in African
colonization has always been force. There were
many coups in African colonial poHtics before Agadir.
The British, of course, argued that the whole valley
of the Nile was Egyptian territory, abandoned only
temporarily to the Mahdi, and that the French had
no right there. But had the tables been reversed,
the British certainly would never have hauled
down the flag. Possession is nine points of the law — •
no, ten — if you have force on your side, and only if
you have force on your side.

After the humiliation of Fashoda, France made an
agreement about the Sudan, in which Tibesti, Borku,
Wadai, and the Chad territory south to the Niger were
recognized as hers by Great Britain in return for
leaving the British in undisputed possession of the
desert of Libya, at the eastern end of the Sahara,
and of the whole valley of the Nile, and acknowledg-
ing British rights over Darfur.

The Sudan Convention of 1899 was a very reason-
able arrangement. If one grants the intention of the
British to remain permanently in Egypt, and the ad-

336

FRANCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA

visability of their doing so, both for their own interest
and for the interest of the Egyptians, the possession of
the Egyptian Sudan was certainly essential to assure
the future political security and economic prosperity
of Egypt, and the action of Kitchener in compelling
the French withdrawal from Fashoda was just and
wise and logical. But at that time the French
denied the British right to stay in Egypt. In fact,
they had Great Britain's word that she intended to
withdraw from Egypt. Hence the British claim to
the upper Valley of the Nile, based on Egyptian rights
that had practically been abandoned, was to the
French bad faith and brutal bluff. But the British
were going to stay in Egypt, and the French had
their hands full pacifying and organizing the already
tremendous territories in Africa to which they laid
claim. By the Convention of 1899, France had a
right to expect British diplomatic support against
Italy and Turkey in the north, and against Ger-
many who was making great strides in the hinter-
land of Kamerun. The Sudan Convention was the
precursor of the general agreement of five years later,
which made possible the Entente Cordiale. French,
as well as British Imperialists, then, cannot in
retrospect deplore the Fashoda crisis and the conse-
quent clearing of the atmosphere between the two
greatest African colonizing powers.

French West Africa, as we have seen, was formed
into a distinct administrative area in 1902, and the
military area of its hinterland colony extended as
far east as Lake Chad. It was not until 1906, after
the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 had been worked
22 337

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

out in detail, that the French were able to bring
together their Sudan and Congo spheres of influence.
By decree of February 15, 1906, French Congo was
formed, with four provinces: the Gabun colony,
the Middle Congo colony, the Ubangi-Shari-Chad
colony, and the Chad military region. In 1910,
French Congo became French Equatorial Africa.

Gabun is a coast colony on the Atlantic, just south
of the Gulf of Guinea and taking in the bend of which
Cape Lopez is the western point. Its northern
frontier is the very narrow strip of Kamerun that
separates French territory from Spanish Guinea
(Rio Muni). The Gabun River, really a deep bay,
from which the colony takes its name, is in the extreme
north. At its mouth is Libreville, ^ the capital. The
principal river, which runs for several hundred miles
through the heart of the colony, and empties into
Nazareth Bay, to the north of Cape Lopez, is the
Ogowe. Here Port Lopez has been established.
On the coast at the south, French territory is
separated from Belgian Congo for a short distance
by a little Portuguese enclave around Kabinda
Bay.

Gabun, like other west coast colonies, is a heritage
to France from, the days of Louis Philippe. Libre-

^ Libreville, as its name indicates, was, like Freetown in Sierra
Leone, originally a settlement of emancipated slaves. When the
intercontinental slave trade of Africa was destroyed in the middle of
the nineteenth century, the principal part in this great work was
played by the British and French fleets. It is natural that the
influence of the two Occidental Powers along the Atlantic coast of
Africa, exercised altruistically in this humanitarian movement,
should have resulted in precious political and territorial advantages.

338

FRANCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA

ville was founded in the year after the fall of the
Orleans dynasty, and Cape Lopez was acquired
during the Second Empire. The interior of the
Gabun was made known to the children of my gener-
ation in English-speaking countries by the books
and lectures of Paul du Chaillu. The hinterland of
Gabun and the territory of the Middle Congo Colony
were won by explorers in the late seventies and early
eighties.

Inland, the Middle Congo colony occupies the
north bank of the Congo for some hundreds of miles.
Its capital, Brazzaville, which is directly opposite
Leopoldville in Belgian Congo, is named for the
intrepid French explorer who reached the Congo
at this point thirty-five years ago, and prevented
Stanley from occupying both banks of the river.
Since the Agadir crisis was compounded with Ger-
many, two spurs of territory reaching the Congo at
Gonga and Mongumba, together with a substantial
bit of hinterland, were ceded by France to Germany
on September 28, 1912. These two projections of the
Kamerun spoil the continuity of French territory
from the Sudan to the Atlantic.

The third colony, Ubangi-Shari-Chad, comprises
the regions north of the Belgian Congo, east of
Kamerun and west of the Bahr-el-Ghazal province
of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Darfur is north
of the eastern portion of the colony. The Ubangi
River forms the larger portion of the boundary with
Belgium. At the beginning of the sharp bend in
this river, which is the most important northern
tributary of the Congo, has been established the

339

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

capital, Bangui. In the colony are the headwaters
of the River Shari, which flows into Lake Chad.
The fourth province of French Equatorial Africa
is known as the Chad Military Territory. It forms
the connection by land with the other portions of
France's African empire, and has been won since
the Sudan Convention of 1899. Kanem, northeast
of Lake Chad, was conquered in 1903. Immediately
afterwards, most of the sultans of Wadai accepted
the French Protectorate. Wadai is the southern
and largest of the three provinces of the Sudan the
British consented in the Convention to regard as
French. It lies between Lake Chad and Darfur.
The other two provinces, Borku and Tibesti, are
between the Sahara and the Libyan deserts, on the
western border of Egypt, and southeast of Tripoli.
Since the definite French occupation of Abeshr, the
principal city of Wadai, in 19 10, the French have
sent many expeditions into Borku and Tibesti, as a
part of the general plan of pacifying and keeping
patrolled the Sahara Desert. We have spoken else-
where of the Turkish activity in the last years of
Abdul Hamid and the first two years of the Young
Turk regime, which brought the Turks and the
French into conflict in the oases between Tripoli
and Lake Chad.^ France established her rights in
the hinterland of Tripoli just in time to confront
Italy with a fait accompli. The Italian attempt
to conquer Tripoli drew from the desert the most
warlike of the tribesmen, and turned the attention of
the Senussi towards a new foe. Since the Italians

^ See above, p. 121.

340

FRANCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA

went to Tripoli, the Senussi have directed their
principal efforts against them.

France, while freed of pressure in the Lake Chad
region, had not yet been able to call Borku and
Tibesti more than a "sphere of influence" when the
European War broke out. In the Wadai also, the
French were not altogether masters of the situation.
The Governor-General of Equatorial Africa com-
plained that he had less than five thousand men for
policing a country four times as large as France,
while his colleague of West Africa could count on
more than ten thousand troops. Events in' Morocco
led to the diminishing of military effort in 19 13.
Sultan Ali of Darfur never accepted the Anglo-
French Convention of 1899. He paid a nominal
tribute to the British as long as Khartum let him
alone. Against the French, he was continually
plotting. AH helped the Senussi in their attack
against Egypt in 191 5, and in the spring of 19 16
he came out boldly for the Turks and Germans,
declaring that he must obey the Khalif's injunction
to enter "the Holy War." The French garrisons in
Wadai had been depleted to conquer and hold Kam-
erun. Serious trouble for the French was averted
only by the prompt action of Sir Reginald Wingate,
Governor- General of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan,
who sent an expedition into Darfur to occupy
El-Fashr in May, 191 6.

In 1 90 1, a commercial convention was made
between France and the Congo Free State. France
was dependent, for the outlet of her trade, upon the
Belgian Railway, and has remained so throughout

341

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the period of our survey. Direct French communi-
cation to the coast will not be possible until the
railway from Brazzaville on the Congo to Loango, on
the Atlantic, is completed.

In the development of her Congo territories,
France has had to face the same conditions, and
has made the same mistakes, as the Belgians in Cen-
tral Africa. Although it is not pleasant to do so,
it is necessary to deal here rather fully with problems
and abuses : for a review of European colonization in
Africa in the twentieth century would not be com-
plete without touching upon weaknesses that have
arisen in French administration. It is only fair to
say, however, that the criticism can be directed
against European colonization in general in Central
Africa. French maladministration is merely the
specific illustration. The sources of information,
except in the question of the effect of the concession-
naire system upon the open door principle in trade,
are wholly French, and of unimpeachable authority.^
^ At the time the convention with Belgium was
made, British firms claimed that they were being
excluded from the possibility of developing their
trade in the French Congo in exactly the same way as
in the Belgian Congo. The whole country was being
farmed out to French concessionnaires in violation

^See E. D. Morel's British Case against the French Cojigo, and
Fdicien Challaye's Le Congo Franqais (Alcan, Paris, 1909). M.
Challaye was a member of the mission sent by the French Govern-
ment in 1905, under M. de Brazza, to investigate conditions in the
French Congo. His volume is invaluable eye-witness testimony,
and is written carefully and judicially. I have borrowed constantly
from it in this chapter.

FRANCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA

of the Berlin Act. When representations were
made to France, as the result of complaints from
British subjects to the Foreign Office, Paris an-
swered to London that the Berlin Act had become,
in respect to monopolies at least, a dead letter.
Arbitration, however, was agreed upon. But the
concessionnaire system had become so deeply rooted
that it was found difficult to remedy its abuses, both
from the standpoint of foreign traders and of native
victims, without a radical administrative reorganiza-
tion. Fimds as well as the intelligent and independ-
ent personnel for accomplishing this were lacking.

In 1904, an official investigating commission,
under de Brazza, the famous explorer, who had
opened up the Congo to France back in Stanley's
time, started from Libreville, and made an extensive
tour of the three French colonies. What they found
was so disheartening that M. de Brazza declared
that he would never have explored this country,
and brought it under European control, had he
realized what suffering and disaster European pene-
tration was going to bring to the natives. Worn out
by fever and broken-hearted, M. de Brazza died
before his mission was completed.

At Libreville, after fifty years, there was not
even a wharf, and the total European population
amoimted to sixty men and five women. The original
inhabitants of the coast country, from whom the
colony took its name, were rapidly dying out, killed
by the vices introduced by Europeans. The natives
of the Gabun hinterland declared that the conces-
sions companies, who had them at their mercy,

343

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

were constantly putting up the price of the objects
they sold them. The companies demanded always
rubber, rubber, and more rubber. Trade was in kind,
and the natives had no appeal from the arbitrary
exactions of their taskmasters. Since taxes were
not being used for the development of the country,
but to enrich the companies and compel the natives
to work for the concessionnaires, taxes were regarded
as fines. To escape the taxes, the inhabitants of
Gabun abandoned the edges of the river and hid
their villages in the jungle. A decree of the Governor
in 1904 forbade immigration to Kamerun, where
the natives liked to go, because they were paid
there for their labor.

At Loango, prosperity had been killed by the loss
of through trade, which went to Belgium after the
Free State Railway was built. The Loangos had
the attitude of the Gabunese towards taxation.
They would be willing to pay taxes, they declared, if
only the money were used to give them roads and
bridges and especially schools. But they paid, when
they were compelled to, and got nothing in return.
They were not allowed to leave the country. The
concessionnaires recruited labor at Loango by force.
The laborers were called "volunteers," and were
given "contracts." When the de Brazza mission
interrogated them, it was discovered that they had
been taken inland "without knowing where they were
going or what work they were going to undertake.
They believed they w^ere engaged for a year. They
ask us with anxiety how many moons they must
still remain here. The work is too hard and the

344

FRANCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA

food insufficient ; many of them are of heartsickening
thinness. Their contract and pay books, which,
according to the law, should be in their possession,
are in the hands of their white foreman. What good
would it do if they did have them? They do not
know how to read. Most of these books, which
ought to be vised by a government official, have no
signature. All contain this stipulation: 'The con-
tract will be cancelled, with no indemnity for cancel-
lation, when, for whatever motive, the laborer
renders no more services to the company.' Warning
to those who are accidentally injured or who fall ill!'*
At Bangui, the commission found that the fore-
man of the companies exercised pressure upon the
blacks to bring in rubber by seizing their women
and children, and holding them as hostages until
the allotted quota was brought to the company's
compound. In 1904, at Bangui, one concessions
company, which made a practice of this barbarous
hostage system, shut up in a small hut sixty-eight
women and children, without air and food and
water enough to keep them alive. The crime hap-
pened to be discovered by a young French physi-
cian. He demanded their release. Forty-five women
and two children were found dead. Only thirteen
women and eight children were still alive. Some
of them died in spite of all the exertions of their
liberator. The case could not have been unique.
It was discovered only because it happened on the
path of travelers. The Government of the French
Congo failed to take action because "proof was
lacking," and the official who ordered the imprison-

345

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

merit of these hostages was soon after promoted from
Bangui to Brazzaville. This is a statement of fact,
substantiated on the ground by personal investi-
gation. It happened only twelve years ago, and is
a crime of the twentieth century.

In the High Shari, which is conceded to a company,
at the end of 1904, the chief of the Bibigri tribe was
arrested on the ridiculous charge of obstructing "the
liberty of commerce, " because he would not or could
not make his people bring in the amount of rubber
arbitrarily imposed upon his tribe by the concession-
naires. A month later he died in prison. To avenge
his death, the Bibigris revolted, and killed nearly
thirty of the black foremen, employees of the com-
pany, who were oppressing them. The troops who
went to put down the revolt found in the houses of the
natives the skulls of the foremen, filled with balls
of rubber. "It was a striking sym.bol," wrote the
scribe of the de Brazza mission, "well expressing the
real cause of these cruel and awful revolts. "

It was at Dakar, on his way back to France, that
M. de Brazza died. His friend and companion
wrote :

"The book one ought to re-read in the French
Congo is the Inferno of Dante. All my life, I shall
preserve the sadness of having seen, with my own
eyes, a real hell. M. de Brazza saw a despotic ad-
ministration, eager to establish badly calculated or
vexatious taxes, to demand their payment by brutal
procedures, to frighten natives, and to drive them
from European control instead of bringing them under
our administration by protecting them. He saw the

346

FRANCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA

concessions companies, rapacious and cynical, trying
to reconstitute anew slavery, to impose upon the
blacks, by threat and violence, insufficiently remuner-
ated work, instead of trying to attract them by free
and loyal commerce. He saw how officials, by fre-
quent brutalities, had fallen to the level of the most
barbarous negroes. He knew in all its details the
odious history of the High Shari: forced porterage,
camps of hostages, razzias, and massacres. From
these terrible discoveries, M. de Brazza suffered in
his heart. This heroic sorrow, this sublime sadness,
spent his strength and hastened his end. He said
in dying: ^The French Congo must not become a new
Belgian Mongala.' "

In 1905, at Brazzaville, occurred the trial of two
French officials of the High Shari for "voluntary
homicide." There were several serious charges
against them of murder of natives in their jurisdiction.
It had taken two years to bring them to justice, and
this was the first time white men had been prosecuted
in a serious way before a French civil court. Mes-
sieurs Toque and Gaud were brought to trial for
crimes committed at Fort Crampel in 1903. There
had been many rumors in connection with many
officials. But evidence was hard to get. Probably
nothing would have been done in this case, had it
not been for the energy and insistence of Lieutenant-
Colonel Gouraud, commandant of the MiHtary Terri-
tory of Chad, who was determined to put a stop to
the evil reputation France was getting among the
natives of his jurisdiction because of the crimes of
regularly commissioned colonial officials in Shari,
where, according to one of the accused, Toque,

347

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

every consideration of humanity had to be subordi-
nated to the necessity of getting porters to carry
rubber. "It was a general massacre we had to
institute in order to make the service run," said
Toque. Against Toque, the charges were: shooting
a Moruba porter, who refused to carry burdens;
ordering killed with a bayonet a native chief; drown-
ing a porter who stole cartridges by having him
thrown into the Nana Falls. Gaud was accused of:
throwing a woman into the River Gribingui ; beating
men and boys; boiling a negro chief's head, and
compelling his servant to drink the water after-
wards; and other crimes of a revolting nature.
Together the two men were accused of various
unbelievable tortures, causing the death of several
natives, and of tying a dynamite cartridge to a
man's head, and blowing his head off.

All the crimes were not proved. The court went
on the principle laid down by Dr. Cureau, in a study
on the psychology of negro races: "The testimony of
the negro in justice offers absolutely no guarantee. "^
But from the confessions of the accused and from
testimony of white witnesses, the two cases of throw-
ing a man into the Nana Falls and of blowing off
another man's head with a stick of dynamite were
proved. Toque and Gaud were condemned each to
five years imprisonment.

The condemnation provoked a great deal of
astonishment and indignation among the Europeans
of Brazzaville. The friends and associates of the con-
demned refused not only to shake hands with the

^See Revue generate des sciences, July, 1904.

FRANCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA

judges but with those who ate with them. For
the first time since they had been in the Congo, the
Frenchmen and other Europeans who had sloughed
off decency and civiHzation were reminded of the
existence of law and order and justice. It had
never occurred to them that a negro had rights.
One French functionary drew distinction between
homicide and animalicide. In his opinion, Toque
and Gaud were merely guilty of animalicide. An-
other young official, when the sentence was pro-
nounced, cried out: "Are we to become naturalized
negroes?" The military officials, however, who had
come from the Chad district with the determination
to see that justice was done, were highly satisfied
with the verdict, and expressed in no uncertain terms
their contempt of Frenchmen who could fall so low
as to sympathize with and take the part of these de-
generates. But Toque and Gaud had been defended
in court by the civil governor of Brazzaville!

For two years after the de Brazza investigation,
there was ample confirmation of the reports of those
who accompanied the great explorer on his last
African trip in serious and widespread native up-
risings. Some tribes arose en masse. Senegalese
troops had to be used in large numbers to "pacify"
those who had been goaded to the breaking point
by tortiire and abuse of concessionnaires and their
brutes of henchmen. An expedition, which started
from Brazzaville to find a direct trade route in the
unknown region between Lake Chad and the Congo
basin, in order that the trade which was passing
through Kamerun might be directed to French

349

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

posts, learned how terrible was native hatred and
how difBcultly bridged the chasm of native mistrust
of the French.

Fortunately, the revelations of the de Brazza
mission were not without wholesome effect in Paris.
The French Congo has not become a new Belgian
Mongala, although it was rapidly drifting that way.
Much has been accomplished that was needed in the
way of reform by the establishment of a common
central administration in 1910.^ But the evils of
the old regime were not eradicated root and branch.
Although greatly mitigated, they still remain. They
always will remain in the French Congo until an
abundant official class, recruited from the upper
classes, is found to administer the country in the
interest of the natives, instead of in the interest of
their exploiters.

The blame that attaches to France and to her
Colonial Ministry is in allowing the French flag to
wave, and in assuming the responsibility of govern-
ment, over regions where concessions companies

^New arrangements were made in 19 10 with the chief concession-
naires. They were on the basis of cultivation or other actual use
of the land. The companies were permitted to select their blocks
of land, with definite limits. The title would revert to them in
1920, only if during ten years there was systematic exploitation
and development by the concessionnaires themselves. All rubber
concessions were to revert to the state in 1920, and after that time
leases would be renewed yearly, subject to the production and conduct
of the companies. Rights were recognized of natives to their
own villages and to their local customs, and to all the produce of
their own lands. They might also collect forest produce from
undeveloped lands. Contracts between chiefs and companies for
tribal labor were subject to the approval of the Governor-General.

FRANCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA

are given uncontrolled power to exploit the blacks
for their own benefit; and then in sending troops
to punish the natives for doing what Frenchmen
would do under similar circumstances, protecting
their wives and children from dishonor, torture, and
death. What a mockery to free the negroes of Cen-
tral Africa from the slave trader, and then turn them
over to soulless corporations with a thousand times
more power to bully and drive and massacre than
Tippoo Tib and his ilk! There is blame, also, for
putting power in the hands of Senegalese brutes,
and invariably supporting them in the exercise of
that power. Most of all, there is blame in allowing
France and Christian civilization to be represented
by officials who would hardly find a place in the
mother country outside of a jail. In the Congo
region, what one could say to Portugal and Belgium
during the first decade of the nineteenth century, one
could say to France: If you are not prepared to as-
sume the government of this country, in accordance
with the standards of justice you insist upon in France,
you ought not to have undertaken the government.

Washing dirty linen is a painful and unpleasant
business. It is an unprofitable business, also, unless
it serves some good purpose. I would not feel justi-
fied in speaking of the sad maladministration in the
French Central African colonies, if I were not able at
the same time to suggest the reasons for this malad-
ministration, and the way in which it can be remedied.

Central Africa has an evil effect upon the moral
sense of the white man, when left too much alone or
entrusted with the exercise of uncontrolled power.

351

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

He becomes lazy, careless, neurasthenic, credulous.
In continual contact with the brutality of the blacks,
and their hopeless degradation, out of touch with the
civilization whose magic is in the ability it gives man
to dominate his natural bestial instincts by a culti-
vated spiritual control, the European quickly de-
generates. He becomes as careless of human life as
those around him. He commits acts of cruelty with-
out a qualm, the remembrance of which haunts him
continually years later when he returns to civili-
zation. Only men of the strongest character and
moral fiber, who have been born and raised in an
atmosphere of culture, who have gone through the
severe discipline of cultural education, who have
inherited the habit of exercising authority, and who,
when they return from their post, go by right of blood
and ability into cultivated circles and to responsible
positions, are fit to be entrusted with administrative
posts in Central Africa. For this type of man alone
is able to resist the demoralizing influences of solitude,
degrading surroundings, and unlimited power of the
Central Africa ofiicial.

The British send this type of man to Africa.
Other nations do not.^ Hence the joy of natives

^ In his Guide Pratique de VEuropeen dans VAfrique Occidentale,
Dr. Barot writes: "For those who have not the necessary moral force
to endure two years of absolute continence, there is only one practi-
cable line of conduct, temporary union with a well-chosen native
woman. " The advantages of such a step are glowingly set forth.
Dr. Barot declares that no wrong is done to the temporary little
wife, for native morality is not at all severe. "The former wives of
Europeans are very much sought after by the blacks and generally
marry very well." See pp. 328, 330.

FRANCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA

under the British flag, and the misery of natives under
other flags.

Let it be remembered that I am not speaking of
commissioned army officers. I am speaking of ad-
ministrative officials in the civil service. The very
best men of France, gentlemen in the fullest conno-
tation of the word, have served in the French African
army. One may ask why the French army is able
to draw the best while French colonial civil service
recruits from a class not in any way representative of
the best in French Hfe. The answer is not hard to
give.

As I look from my study window, I see four splen-
did boys playing in the sand. They are helping
my children build a trench to let in the water when
the tide comes up. In their faces, in their bearing,
in their actions, they tell the story that only blood
tells. Their father died just two years ago in the
battle of the Marne. His widow said to me
the other day, "My husband was bom to fight the
Germans, and he spent his life in learning how to do
it." It is not the glamour of colonial service or the
desire to build up a new world that has sent the best
of France into Africa in the army. They went there
to learn how to fight the Germans, and to train sol-
diers to fill the gaps in the French army caused by
depopulation. They looked upon Africa as a school
in warfare and a reservoir of warriors against the
inevitable day.

The Frenchman of the upper-classes, when it is
not a question of national defense, has no desire to go
abroad and no reason for doing so. The upper-class
23 353

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Englishman is pushed into the exile of colonial civil
service by reasons of caste and by the law of entail.
The money in the family goes to the eldest son,
and the others, not wanting to engage in trade, enter
government service. French law requires that a
man's money be divided equally among his children.
Then there is the family. English fathers and moth-
ers bring their children up with the idea that they are
going to leave them and work out their own salva-
tion. French fathers and mothers bring up their
children with the idea that they are going to keep
them with them or near them as long as they live.
To the Englishman of the upper classes, England is a
country to be mildly proud of but not to live in until
one is over fifty, and even then not all the time. To
the Frenchman, France is a country never to be left
except under dire necessity. To the Englishman,
London is a city to visit occasionally between pro-
tracted week ends, but never to live in if you want to
make a reputation for yourself. To the Frenchman,
reputation is made only in Paris.

A very keen French critic once told Jules Ferry
that Indo-China and Madagascar and the Congo
would never be distinctively French, and would
never bring glory or profit to France. "Why?"
asked the Colonial Prophet. "Too far from Paris, "
was the laconic reply.

354

CHAPTER XVIII

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO BEFORE
ALGECIRAS

THE portion of Africa nearest Europe and
America, and adjoining the most highly de-
veloped European colony in Africa, was, at
the opening of the twentieth century, the most back-
ward, the most unknown, the most inaccessible.
Morocco, on account of the rivalry of the Powers,
remained outside European "spheres of influence"
until Great Britain and France compounded colonial
differences in the famous Agreement of 1904. In the
decade from 1904 to 19 14, Morocco was "taken over"
by France, but not until after Europe had been led
from one international crisis through another to the
catastrophe of a world war. Commercial antago-
nism, irreconciliable political aims, and traditional
hatreds could have brought the Great Powers to a
twentieth century war without Morocco. But with-
out Morocco, war might have been deferred and the
alignment of the Powers might have been different.
The student of history may not be able to find in his
studies positive assurance of the avoidability of war.
But he certainly finds, even in contemporary history,
positive assurance of the impossibility of predicting,

355

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

from decade to decade, which nations are to be
allies and which are to be enemies. ^ Of this truth,
Morocco is the present-day illustration.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, British
and Germans were working together against France
in Morocco. The British were more vigorous than
the Germans in their opposition to the desire of
France to repeat what she had done in Tunis by
getting possession of the other ''key to her house. "^
The British contention, frequently put into print,
was that the independence of the Shereefian Empire
must be upheld at all costs. Britain was the pro-

^ The Crown Prince of Japan received a tremendous ovation in
Petrograd during the last week of September, 1916. Ten years ago
he would have been lynched. Turkish troops are fighting with
Bulgarians against Servians in Macedonia. Three years ago,
Bulgarians and Servians were fighting against Turks. Italy and
Rumania are in the field against their allies of yesterday. A Greek
army corps recently sought protection of the Bulgarians against
Prance and England at Cavalla. The Sheriflf of Mecca is fighting
the Khalif of the Moslem world. The most popular contemporary
Breton song contains a verse in which England is treated as the enemy
of France at sea. The British army now occupies Normandy, with
bases at Rouen and Havre, as a friendly army come to defend France.
Not many years ago Guy de Maupassant put the following words
into the mouth of a physician at Gisors in one of his most famous
stories: "In spite of my hatred against the German and my desire
for vengeance, I do not detest him, I do not hate him by instinct
as I hate the Englishman, the real enemy, the hereditary enemy, the
natural enemy of the Norman. For the Englishman has passed
over this soil inhabited by my ancestors, has pillaged it and ravaged
it twenty times, and my aversion for this perfidious race has been
transmitted to me, with my life, from my father. " See Le Rosier
de Mme. Husson, in the collection En Famille (OUendorf, Paris),
p. 83.

^ Speech of Jules Ferry on Tunisian policy in Chamber of Depu-
ties, November 5, 1881.

356

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

tector of weak nations against the strong. What
Emperor WilHam said at Tangier in 1905, and what
the German press wrote at the time of Algeciras and
Agadir, is substantially what has been said in more
than one Speech from the Throne of Queen Victoria
and what the British press wrote before the bargain
with France. When one reads what was going on in
Morocco fifteen years ago, the pages consecrated by
English writers of the present time to German in-
trigues inAfrica are amusing and amazing reading. In
their indignation against Germany and in the accusa-
tion that Germany has tried to "block the legitimate
aspirations of other nations, " as one eminent author-
ity puts it, they indict, by the same token, their own
policy in more than one part of Africa, as well as the
policy of Prance, now their ally but fifteen years ago
their bitter enemy.

As will be seen in this chapter and the chapters that
follow it, I have deep sympathy and warm admira-
tion for French policy in Morocco and British policy
in Egypt. These two countries are far better off
under British and French rule than they would be if
Britain and France had stayed out. But I have no
patience with insincerity in recording historical
events and with the cant that sees only right in
what one does oneself or what one's friend does, and
only wrong when the identical thing is done by an
enemy. We shall have a lasting peace on the day we
recognize that human nature is the same the world
over (and in particular diplomatic nature). If
things have been done differently, and have brought
different results, it is because special influences have

357

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

been at work in one case, or with one nation, that
were lacking in another case and with another nation.
During the five years preceding the Agreement of
1904, France, thwarted at Fashoda and converted to
the necessity of a constructive and logical African
program, began her effort to secure the Moroccan
"key to her house. " The most effective opposition
to her attempts to gain control of the Moorish army,
to obtain harbor and mining concessions, and to
secure a "rectification" of the Algerian frontier, was
that of the British Legation. The German Legation
was a very poor second. Britain and Germany,
though their dual and common influence was suffi-
cient to ruin the French program, were not able to
obtain advantages for themselves. Much as she
welcomed Germany's aid against France, Britain
did not want a naval rival anywhere on the African
coast opposite Gibraltar. Germany thought Egypt
and Malta and Cyprus and Gibraltar were enough
for Britain in the Mediterranean. France had a
sincere desire, and a very good reason, to see peace
and order and economic prosperity brought to Mo-
rocco. The Anglo-German policy paralyzed every
effort, both of Moroccan and French authorities, to
improve political and economic conditions in the
northwestern corner of Africa. British policy in
Morocco before 1904 is similar to that in Persia and
Turkey, the two other independent Moslem states.
Reforms that might bring political and economic
strength were opposed on purely selfish grounds, and
with no thought or care for the interests of the nations
used as pawns in the diplomatic game. This fact is

358

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

irrefutable. Before April 8, 1904, the British Min-
ister, advising the Sultan of Morocco as a friend
whose interest he had at heart, urged him to resist
French advances and combat French influences.
After April 8, 1904, he told the Sultan that he must
do what the French said. The British Minister at
Teheran did exactly the same thing with the Persians
in regard to Russia before and after the Agreement
of 1907.

The present dynasty of Morocco was founded in
1660 by Reshid, a descendant of the Prophet, who
began his career at Talifet, in the south- near the
desert; subjected the tribes of Udja and Riff; and
finally established his capital at Fez. His recogni-
tion in the region of Udja marked the final disappear-
ance of Ottoman authority in Morocco. Reshid
never became sovereign of the whole of Morocco : nor
did his siiccessors. One cannot understand recent
events in Morocco, unless he keeps constantly in
mind the nature of sovereignty in the Shereefian
Empire. There are three differences between the
Moroccan conception of the state and ours :

1. The Sultan's authority depends upon his
recognition by other religious chiefs, who are, like
himself, descendants of the Prophet. There is a
traditional right of blood but not of primogeniture.

2. The state is not a geographical conception.
The Sultan rules over tribes, not over territories.

3. By no means all the tribes recognize the
authority of the Sultan. Some never have recog-
nized his authority. Morocco is divided into two
distinct sections: the Makhzen and the Siha. The

359

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Makhzen are the tribes who recognize the authority
of the Sultan, and the Siba are those who do not.
The Makhzen and the Siba are all mixed up in differ-
ent parts of the country.

These three facts show how absurd was the Anglo-
German contention that Morocco must not "lose
her independence, " and the French contention that
the Sultan was responsible for the actions of all the
tribes within the region our maps call Morocco.
Before the -British sold out the Shereefian Empire to
France, the Sultan could always play one power off
against another, and his anomalous "government"
was allowed to exist. When France got a free hand,
and Great Britain stood behind her by preventing
Germany from assuming the traditional role she her-
self had abdicated, the Sultan was brought face to
face for the first time v/ith the necessity of represent-
ing geographical Morocco. He was asked to accept
responsibility for and to act for tribes that did not
recognize his authority and had not recognized the
authority of his ancestors.

Spain and France, neighbors of this country of
anarchy, had wars with Morocco in the nineteenth
century. In both cases, England ^interfered to pre-
vent them from securing the amelioration of the evils
on account of which they had fought. The Moroccan
question became international in 1880, when Eng-
land and Spain, in an attempt to prevent France from
taking the measures that were necessary (and which
she had treaty right to take) to protect her Algerian
frontier from tribal raids, called the Madrid Confer-
ence. Although France was vigorously supported

360

SKETCH MAP
SHOWING THE

GERMAN- FRENCH

BOUNDARIES

1912

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

by the German delegates, British opposition com-
pelled her to give up her ancient treaty rights in
Morocco. The foundation of the internationaliza-
tion of Morocco was laid. British diplomacy had
only one thought, to prevent France or Spain from
getting a fortified foothold opposite Gibraltar. In
all the Morocco agreements the British Foreign Office
has invariably insisted that France and Spain bind
themselves not to follow the British example of
putting fortifications in the Strait of Gibraltar. The
fact of Great Britain, perched on the big rock in
Spanish territory, forbidding Spain to fortify the
African side of the strait, illustrates the world-old
axiom that a nation's territorial rights are founded
on force and maintained by force. The British took
Gibraltar by force. They are there only by right of
force. They will stay there as long as they have the
force to defend Gibraltar. And as long as they have
the force they will prevent others from imitating
their example on the African side of the Strait of
Gibraltar or anywhere else in the world.

British diplomacy anticipated in 1844 and i860
the German attempts of 1906 and 191 1, the difference
being that the British succeeded where the Germans
failed. In 1844, Great Britain prevented France
from extending her protectorate over Morocco. In
i860, she prevented Spain from extending her pro-
tectorate over Morocco. Both times she would
have fought, if the rival had not given way. Several
times the British tried to extend their protectorate
over Morocco, and would have fought any Power
that opposed the project. The British flag does not

361

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

wave over Morocco now, only because Sir Evan
Smith could not persuade the father of the present
sultan to accept a protectorate/ and the London
Cabinet did not dispose of the forces and ships that
would be required to conquer the country. But if
there had been extensive gold mines in the country
to make the conquest worth while, the pourparlers
of 1892 would probably have ended by Hassan yield-
ing to force.

The Moroccan crisis, which was to bring about
momentous results for the world, began in 1901 with
the occupation by French troops of the oasis of Twat,
on the northern edge of the Sahara Desert in the
undefined hinterland between Morocco and Algeria.
When one studies the map, with the plan of French
penetration across the Sahara and the protection of
the Senegal-Niger Colony in mind, and considers also
that the administrative organization of the Algerian
hinterland was an imperative necessity for the peace
and prosperity of Algeria and Tunis, France cannot
be accused of wanting to provoke the Sultan or of
infringing upon his rights. But it was unfavorably
commented upon by France's rivals, and things were
whispered in the ear of Abdul Aziz. In the same
year the assassination of a French colonist of Oran
brought an ultimatum to the Sultan, supported by
two warships at Tangier. In spite of Anglo- German
opposition, the Sultan made two agreements in April
and May, 1902, which opened up the way for France
to interfere in the internal management of Morocco.
France and the Government of the Sultan were to

^ Cf. Bernard's Le Maroc (Alcan, Paris, 1915) p. 316.
362

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

work in accord in the frontier regions in matters
concerning police, commerce, and customs. After
repeated tribal raids on the frontier showed the
inability — if not the ill will — of the Moroccan Gov-
ernment to live up to the agreements it had made, M.
Jonnart, Governor-General of Algeria, called Colonel
Lyautey in 1903 to undertake the task of pacifying
the hinterland of Oran and of making the Algerian
"rontier secure against raids from Morocco. As
jast as he was strict, as judicious as he was energetic,
as cool-headed as he was enthusiastic, Colonel Ly-
autey developed in his task diplomatic and military
qualities that have brought him a seat in the French
Academy, a generalship in the army, and the mission
of making Morocco French.

From 1 90 1, when France determined to make her
African Empire what it could become, the French
attitude toward Morocco was logical and justifiable.
When Colonel Lyautey took charge of the frontier
forces, it became energetic and unyielding. What
France asked for she had a right to expect- — that the
Sultan of Morocco should exercise effective control
over the tribes that were threatening the security and
disturbing the prosperity of Algeria and the Algerian
hinterland, or refrain from opposing France in taking
the necessary military measures to call the Moorish
tribes to order. From the French point of view, the
line of argument to justify a "violation" of the Moor-
ish frontier was unanswerable. If Morocco meant
a definite geographical territory, the Government of
Morocco was responsible for what happened in that
territory. If the Sultan answered that he 'was re-

363 .

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

sponsible only for the acts of the Makhzen, i. e., the
submitted tribes, France was not attacking his sover-
eignty or his Government, v/hen she punished un-
submitted tribes, i. e., the Siba, and occupied their
territories.

The difficulty of France lay not with Abdul Aziz
and his native advisers, but with Kaid Maclean, the
Instructor-General of the Moorish army, a Scotch
adventurer in the pay of the British Foreign Office, ^
and the British Minister at Tangier. As long as
these two men, aided by the German Minister, kept
telling Abdul Aziz that it was his duty and his right
to oppose the French thesis, France could be put
before the world — even before her own people — as an
aggressor, trying to bully the poor weak Moslem
sovereign of the one remaining independent Moslem
State of Africa.

The Sultan Abdul Aziz, son and successor of Has-
san, was an ignorant and weak-minded young man,
who might have lasted for a lifetime as nominal ruler
of Morocco, supporting his authority upon the re-
ligious chiefs and expecting only homage and little

^ Sir Harry Maclean was formerly an officer in the 59th Regiment,
stationed at Gibraltar, who secured a temporary appointment with
Sultan Hassan to organize his army. When he saw how nicely his
bread was buttered in Morocco, Maclean decided to cast in his for-
tunes with the country. He acted as tout for concession hunters
and other grafters, who wanted to get the ear of the Sultan. He was
the pillar of strength upon whom the British Legation at Tangier
depended to keep French officers out of the Moorish army, and to
block the French proposals to establish a joint Franco-Moorish
police control over the tribes that were opposing the French admini-
strative organization of the Algerian hinterland and the western
Sahara.

364

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

money from the Makhzen tribes. But he was in-
capable of seeing through the European intrigues and
of avoiding the traps that were set for him. His
brothers and other chieftains were bribed by Euro-
pean agents to conspire and revolt against him; the
leaders of his army and his ministers drew subsidies
from Tangier Legations; and tribes were instigated
to attack him, to attack the French and the Spanish,
and to kidnap European subjects. Nothing was
too petty or too mean to be left undone by
agents of European diplomatic representatives. The
worst of all, however, was the way Abdul Aziz's
credulity was imposed upon by concession hunters
and merchants, who involved him in diplomatic
controversies and in debts. Like Khedive Ismail of
Egypt, he fell an easy prey to the European adven-
turers that surrounded him, and with whom his
Ministers and favorites were in connivance and
shared ill-gotten profits. His concessions and his
extravagances gave the Powers the opportunity to
interfere in the domestic affairs of Morocco. Out of
the money he borrowed, Abdul Aziz got absolutely
nothing either for himself or for his country. During
his reign, Morocco fell into the clutches of European
money-lenders. But no harbors were constructed;
no roads or railways were built; and Abdul Aziz
never occupied himself in any way with pubUc works
of any kind.

Abdul Aziz's purchases were of the most foolish
and useless and naive character. An adventurer
interested him in photography. He bought cameras
by the hundred, films by the thousand, and develop-

365

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

ing materials one might say almost by the laboratory!
He took only a few pictures, andthen gave__up photo-
graphy, because, as he confided to a friend, he found
it was too expensive even for a Sultan. When he
wanted a grand piano, he was told that pianos could
be purchased only by the dozen at fifteen hundred
dollars apiece. He was deeply interested in moving
pictures, and had his own agents securing the best
films for him in Europe. Once he invited a friend
to see King Edward's coronation in Westminster
Abbey. It was a wretched fake, with painted back-
ground and] third-rate actors. He told the friend
in all seriousness that this was the only film that had
been taken inside the Abbey, and that he had to pay
a bribe of several hundred pounds to the Dean of
Westminster to get his operator introduced and hidden
in the gallery over the choir. Once, when he was
going from Fez to Tangier, he met a caravan of
camels carrying his latest shipment of grand pianos.
In the pouring rain, he had one of the pianos un-
packed and set up by the roadside. He went up to
it, singing la-la-la. On the third la, he struck a
key of the piano with his index finger. Then he went
on his way to Tangier. What remains of the Stein-
way Grand is still there by the roadside.

The beginning of the end in Morocco came two
years before the Anglo-French Agreement, with the
revolt of Bu Hamara against the Sultan. In October,
1902, Bu Hamara pretended that he was Mohammed,
brother of Abdul Aziz and son of the late Hassan.
He claimed to be the rightful heir to the throne and
rallied around him the tribes who were beginning to

366

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

be alarmed by the European intrigues. His policy
was anti-European, and he asserted that Abdul Aziz
had forfeited all rights to the throne by conspir-
ing with the foreign infidels to the detriment of the
Shereefian Empire. Although Mohammed was ac-
tually alive at the time, a prisoner of his brother, the
claims of Bu Hamara were accepted by many tribes.
One cannot, in the absence of facts, assert that Bu
Hamara was instigated by the French. But it is
none the less true that his action gave to France the
opening she had long been looking for. France pro-
posed to send troops to Morocco to put down the
insurrection of Bu Hamara. It was represented to
Abdul Aziz by the British and German Ministers that
consent to this proposition would be looked upon by
his subjects as substantiating the very charge that
Bu Hamara made against him. So French assist-
ance was refused.

Dining 1903, Morocco fell into a state of complete
anarchy. The insiurection spread alarmingly. In
spite of serious reverses, Abdul Aziz kept his throne.
There was no unity among his opponents, and he
was able to borrow money to bribe important re-
ligious chiefs. The Government troops were not
regularly paid. Although there was considerable
revenue from the customs, his bribes and his indul-
gence in personal luxuries soon plunged Abdul Aziz
hopelessly into debt. Creditors, through their Lega-
tions, began to press him.

In order to obtain food for her troops at Melilla,
Spain was compelled to acknowledge Bu Hamara as
Sultan. It was in this region that the Pretender was

367

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

strongest, and he had the Spanish at his mercy.
Spain, in return for her recognition, secured from Bu
Hamara mining concessions which were afterwards
the subject of much discussion with France, and were
finally disallowed. Germany and England had no
direct interest in the revolution of Bu Hamara. For
it affected only the district between Fez and the
Algerian frontier. But they watched its progress
none the less with anxiety, for they saw in the re-
sultant anarchy an excuse for France to intervene.

At this critical moment, the Anglo-French Agree-
ment of April 8, 1904, was signed. France and
Britain agreed to let each other have a free hand in
Egypt. Abdul Aziz found himself suddenly deserted
byXEngland. The British Minister, who had all
along been warning him against the French and urg-
ing him to resist their intervention, which could lead
only to the destroying of Moorish independence,
turned overnight the deaf ear to his appeals. The
Sultan was] advised to make what terms he] could
with France. Abdul Aziz could look now only to
Germany.

The English in Morocco were very bitter against
their Government and just as hostile to the Entente
Cordiale as were the Germans. Even now, more
than a decade later, when England and France are
united in the Great War, it is not impossible to find
British residents of Morocco who feel still that their
interests were sacrificed in a "deal" of international
politics, of which the advantages to them were nil.
For one must remember that British merchants and
British trade have never prospered in French colo-

368

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

nies. No matter what assurances have been made to
them, the British in Morocco tell you that sooner or
later they will labor under the same disadvantages
of the closed door that foreigners find in Algeria,
Tunis, Madagascar, and Indo-China.

It is claimed by British writers that the Germans
had no ground whatever for complaint when the
Anglo-French Agreement about Egypt and Morocco
was signed, and that no privileges would accrue to the
French and British merchants and goods in the
countries whose fate was sealed by this Agreement,
that would not accrue equally to German merchants
and German goods. This is not strictly true. In
the Agreement, Great Britain protected her mer-
chants from the contingency of French railways into
eastern Morocco turning trade through Algerian
ports to the sole advantage of France, by exacting a \
clause that British goods could travel over Algerian \
railways into Morocco without paying Algerian duties. \
The French, in return, received the same privilege ^
on Egyptian railways leading into the Sudan. This
is but one instance of how an agreement of this
character discriminates against the commerce of a
third nation, even where the principle of the open
door is asserted to have been maintained. If British
merchants and residents of Morocco, and French
merchants and residents of Egypt, protected by
a mutual dual engagement, were bitter against the
Agreement of 1904, is it unreasonable that Germans
should find cause for complaint and should appeal
to their Government to defend their interests in the
few places still left open to them in the world? Then,
24 369

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

too, we should never forget that however much we
say to a foreigner that he is at home in our midst, he,
on his side, feels a foreigner still. He is under the
perpetual menace of a sudden change in his status,
such as occurred in both Egypt and Morocco at the
beginning of this war/ Even when peace is ar-
ranged, he will feel that he has not exactly the same
privileges and advantages that are accorded to
merchants and traders of the nation whose flag flies
over the territory where he is working. It is no
argument against this to point out the success of
Germans in British colonies: for that success has
been largely won by greater efforts and greater ability
in spite of unfavorable circumstances. And as
regards French colonies, English merchants and
traders have only to consider their own experience to
realize why the Germans were justified in protesting
against Morocco becoming a French colony.

Abdul Aziz had little faith, after the desertion of
England, in German support. It was too intangible
— mere words — and the British Legation, untroubled
by such a little thing as inconsistency, now began to
urge him strongly to play up to the French. His
inclination was to compromise with the French to
save his throne. But he was too weak, and too afraid
to act, to change circumstances.

The month after the signing of the Anglo-French
Agreement, France had an excellent opportunity to

' The Johannesburg riots in May, 19 15, resulted in property
damage to German firms and residents of two and a half million
dollars. The majority of the sufferers had settled in the Transvaal
before the British conquest.

370

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

show internationally her position as "predominant
Power." The famous Raisuli captured two Euro-
peans, one a Greek who was a naturaHzed American,
and the other a Britisher. Algerian police were
landed at Tangier, and other steps taken to "pre-
serve order" in the bandit-ridden neighborhood of
Tangier, where order had never existed. A few
months earlier, such a step would have been greeted
by an indignant outcry in the London press. The
new word of order having gone out from Downing
Street, the "French protective measure" was sym-
pathetically recorded and commented upon. ^ /Abdul
Aziz avoided complications with Americans and
British by buying the release of the prisoners from
Raisuli, and agreeing to other conditions imposed by
Raisuli, which amounted virtually to an abdication
of all pretense to sovereignty in the Mediterranean
and Gibraltar regions of Morocco. In December,
1904, the French, alarmed by the growing anti-French
feeling among all the different elements in Mo-
rocco, Siba as well as Makhzen, increased their troops
at Tangier and sent a detachment to Rabat on the
Atlantic coast. All Europeans were ordered by their
Consuls to leave Fez, and a French invasion of
Morocco was predicted.

But France still stuck to diplomacy. Bu Hamara
and Raisuli, bitterly opposed as they were to Abdul

^ A study of Reuter's Agency telegrams at this period shows
how important it is for the American press to endeavor to become
independent of London in presenting foreign 'news to the public.
Our Associated Press gives Reuter telegrams to its subscribers with-
out independent verification and no indication of the source.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Aziz, might easily be led to join the Makhzen tribes
in rallying to the Sultan's support, if the French
precipitated matters by force. A mission was sent
at the beginning of 1905 to Fez to urge upon the Sul-
tan a scheme of reforming Morocco, in which France
would be the adviser and "elder brother" of the
Sultan. The Berber tribes, incensed against France
for having extended her aggression from Twat into
the Figuig region, refused to obey a summons from
Abdul Aziz to attend a Divan to "discuss the French
proposals. ' ' They warned Abdul Aziz against listen-
ing to the treacherous words of the infidel. Most of
the religious and tribal chiefs, however, assembled at
Fez. The Divan, Hke all Oriental assemblies, was
convoked for the purpose of assenting without discus-
sion to the conclusion put before it by the Government.
At this moment occurred the first German interven-
tion, of which so much has been written. Germany
was not a party to the Anglo-French Agreement.
She had no reason, then, to cease suddenly, as Great
Britain had done, her interest in preserving the
political and territorial integrity of Morocco. On
March 31, 1905, Kaiser Wilhelm landed at Tangier,
sent greetings to Abdul Aziz of Morocco, and let it
be known in no uncertain terms that he regarded
Morocco as an independent country, and intended,
in spite of the English defection, to continue to sup-
port the Sultan against intrigues that were threaten-
ing to destroy him and his country. The Kaiser's
visit to Morocco was only for two hours, but it gave
Abdul Aziz and his Ministers courage to resist the
demands of the French Mission. On May 28th, the

372

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

Sultan formerly rejected the French proposals, re-
ferring to the decision of the Divan as the ground
of their non possumus.

The Government of the Makhzen, accepting the
suggestion of the German Minister, proposed an in-
ternational Conference of all the Powers to decide
upon the status of Morocco before the world. The
British Foreign Office refused to accept the Confer-
ence, unless France were willing. M. Delcasse
strongly advised the French Cabinet to refuse the
proposal for a conference, no matter what might
happen. His colleagues, however, fearing a- war with
Germany for which they were not prepared and on
an issue that was not clear to their own electorate,
much less to the world, did not see their way clear
to follow the Foreign Minister's advice. M. Delcasse
resigned. This was the beginning of the actual gather-
ing of the war clouds that were to break a decade later.

The Conference was first set for Tangier, after
long negotiations between the Powers and Morocco.
During these negotiations, Abdul Aziz borrowed two
and a half million dollars from German financiers,
and gave to German contractors the concession for
harbor work at Tangier. Bu Hamara continued his
war against the Sultan, and it was believed that he
might — ^perhaps with the connivance of the Makhzen
— make some coup that would upset European calcu-
lations before the Conference met. The Oriental delay
of the Moors caused the postponement of the Confer-
ence, and Bu Hamara's activity a change of its place of
meeting. It was set finally for January i6, 1906, at
Algeciras, a town on the Spanish coast near Gibraltar.

373

CHAPTER XIX
FRANCE GETS MOROCCO

THE Conference of Algeciras, and the Act
which its delegates drew up after long and
unedifying bickering, belongs to European
rather than African history. I have dealt with it
from the European standpoint, and given the main
provisions of the Act, in an earlier volume.^ The
Act was unsatisfactory and futile, as are all interna-
tional compromises that do not meet issues squarely.
Instead of establishing definitely the status and
privileges of France and Spain in Morocco under
international sanction, and requiring of these two
states an absolutely restrictive pledge to abide
loyally by the status and keep loyally within the
privileges, France and Spain were given police powers
that might be interpreted by either more widely
than the Act intended, without ground for accusa-
tion of violation of the Agreement and of breach of
good faith. One can argue with equal force that
it was a diplomatic defeat for Germany and a diplo-
matic defeat for France. Had German diplomats
been sure of popular support at home, they would
have insisted upon a much more strict limitation

' See my New Map of Europe, pp. 71-83.

374

FRANCE GETS MOROCCO

and definition of the powers entrusted to France and
to Spain. Had French diplomats been assured of
British backing, they would have refused to sign
the Act. But German pubUc opinion was not con-
vinced of the wisdom of showing the mailed fist
over Morocco, which interested the Germans very
little indeed: and the new Liberal Government in
Great Britain was not in a position to promise France
more than "sympathy."

Delegates left Algeciras without having accom-
pHshed the piupose for which they had come. In
Germany, a storm of condemnation and ridicule
met the announcement of the "decision" of the
Conference. Those in France who cared at all
were determined to ignore the Act. Spain, instead
of having clearly defined rights by international
agreement, was left to negotiate separately with
France.

Germany's interests in Morocco, in spite of all
the hubbub of the Mannesmanns and the soUcitude
of Dr. Rosen, were sHght, potentially as well as
actually. From the moment the Act of Algeciras
was signed her statesmen and the Colonial Party and
the Navy League regarded Morocco as the means of
working upon the German electorate. They put
forward the question of principle. Germany must
have her place in the sun. She was not going to
take away by force the colonies of others, but she
was going to prevent others from extending their po-
litical sovereignty over territories not yet "grabbed,"
without Germany's consent and without giving
Germany "compensations" elsewhere. Morocco

375

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

was to be used to get increased budget grants for
the colonies, the army, and the navy. French
statesmen and imperialists were equally alive to
the possibility of using Morocco to work upon their
electorate in exactly the same way. They began to
enlighten the French nation on the value — no, more,
the necessity — of Morocco in defending what France
had already won and built in North Africa. They
could put forth logically, truthfully, and tellingly
the menace to the security and prosperity of Algeria
and Tunis and of the recently created West Africa
from anarchy in Morocco and a spread of Islamic
agitation. Events since 1900 could be cited to
prove the wisdom of having occupied Tunis, one of
the keys of the house. Morocco, the other key,
must also be taken.

At the bottom of the Morocco question was the
gulf that had been made between the two nations
by the Treaty of Frankfort. The unity and pros-
perity of Germany was dependent upon maintaining
that Treaty. France would never be "France her-
self again " until the lost provinces had been returned.
The North African Empire, moreover, was the
Third Republic's consolation for Alsace and Lor-
raine. Was Germany now threatening to take that
also from France? The fuel for keeping the Morocco
question alive, then, was the mutual animosity
between France and Germany. But the Germans
did not feel as intensely as the French until the
Morocco question proved that the British were
standing behind the French. The present war
had multiple causes. Morocco, however, can un-

376

FRANCE GETS MOROCCO

hesitatingly be called a principal cause. On both
sides of the Rhine, the Socialists foresaw this, and
feared it. Before and after Agadir, they worked
hard to prevent the catastrophe. Without the
Balkan troubles, they might have succeeded. When
they were taxed with lack of patriotism, they stuck
by their guns without wavering. Only to avoid
the shameful epithet of traitors did they finally
weaken and give in. When they were opposing an
aggressive colonial policy, increase of standing army,
increase of navy, and the huge budget estimates of
latter years for shot and shell and cannon, the Social-
ists believed they were combating chauvinism and
not patriotism. In England, also, independent
thinkers, advanced Radicals, and labor leaders
fought jingoism, and sustained the thesis that war is
the spontaneous combustion that occurs when materials
for making it are gathered. In the midst of the
conflict, Socialists and Radicals and dreamers are
anathematized. Events, they are told, have proved
the folly of their thesis. The roar of the gathered
materials drowns their answer. But will not the
historian give them reason?

Would Germany have been satisfied in the long
run, if France had abided loyally by the provisions
of the Act of Algeciras? Did German intrigues in
Morocco induce, if not compel, France to refuse to
abide by the provisions of the Act? These vital
questions are answered by the polemicists^ in a

^ There are polemicists among European writers only since 1906,
The best independent discussion of Algeciras and the years of ten-
sion following it are found in Arthur Bullard's The Diplomacy of

377

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

totally contradictory manner. Algeciras was a
defeat for both France and Germany, as every com-
promise is a defeat for those who are advocating
opposite solutions. Germany wanted the complete
independence of the Shereefian Empire, and the
refusal to acknowledge superior or "particular"
interests of any Power or Powers. France wanted
the free hand that she afterwards boldly took.
The Powers signed an Act which, if the letter had
been taken, would have prevented France from
inheriting Morocco. On the other hand, the par-
ticular interests of France in Morocco were acknow-
ledged by the Powers.

Sultan Abdul Aziz resented keenly the Conference
at Algeciras. His feeling about the gratuitous
assumption of the Powers to the right to decide the
destinies of his Empire were shared by every religious
and political chief in Morocco. There was no
formidable and united resistance on the part of the
Moors and Berbers to repudiate the Act. But,
just as has happened in other Moslem lands when
Europe took advantage of weakness, anti-infidel
feeling was aroused. There had not been before
Algeciras opposition to Europeans on religious
grounds. Intelligent Moors realized that Morocco
must fall under European influence. But they
determined to postpone the evil day when their
habits and usages of centuries would be rudely up-

the Great War, a notable book that well deserves the careful study
of students of contemporary history. Mr. BuUard has a better
first hand knowledge of Morocco than any other American writer.

FRANCE GETS MOROCCO

set by the imposition of an alien and infidel yoke.
Europeans who believe that Moslem impotence and
fatalistic acquiescence to foreign domination means
indifference sadly delude themselves. The delusion
may some day bring disastrous results. For the
people whom they rule are not reconciled to the
humiliation of being a subject race. I have seen
at close range in many countries what is called
Moslem fanaticism. I believe firmly that this
miscalled fanaticism is not due to religion. Moslems
hate Christians because they believe that Christians
have taken advantage of their political weakness.
They resent our assumption of superiority, and await
with burning eagerness the day when they are able
to strike, and strike to kill. Their impotence is due
to their inability to understand the meaning of
solidarity. But those who live in Islamic countries
are never free from the shadow of the menace of an
uprising.

Had they been able to unite in action, as they
were united in spirit, the Moors could undoubtedly
have presented so formidable a barrier to French
penetration that France would have hesitated to
undertake what she had in mind. But Abdul Aziz
was not the man who could rally around his throne
tribes that had never acknowledged his authority,
and that were traditionally hostile to each other as
well as to the Makhzen. The internal condition
of Morocco made impossible internal reform. We
must not forget that even if the French had been
imbued with good-will and the best intentions in
the world toward Abdul Aziz and his government,

379

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

they realized that treating with him as responsible
sovereign of the whole country would have been
much like President Wilson treating with Carranza
when Huerta and Villa were in the field. Bu Hamara
was still powerful. Raisuli was master of the
Tangier district, and at the end of 1906, Abdul Aziz's
brother, Hafid, rebelled against him with the inten-
tion of deposing him. Abdul Aziz had sent a repre-
sentative to Tangier to negotiate "practical measures
of reform" with the Ministers of all the Powers,
ignoring the special position of France. But the
Europeans in the coast ports were under French
and Spanish protection, and Abdul Aziz could
put in the field an army of only three thousand
men.

In January, 1907, Abdul Aziz appealed to the
Tangier Legation for a loan to maintain his forces
against Hafid, Raisuli, and Bu Hamara. In March,
after a French physician had been assassinated and
the British Consular Agency attacked at Marakesh,
France crossed the Rubicon. The Ujda district
on the Algerian frontier was occupied. Events
moved fast. When Abdul Aziz issued an edict
calling upon the people to remain quiet, and pro-
tested to Europe against the occupation of Ujda as
a violation of all treaties, Hafid was proclaimed
Sultan at Marakesh. European control of customs
was established to protect the creditors of Abdul
Aziz. This led to an anti-European outbreak at
Casablanca, a port on the Atlantic between Rabat
and Mazaghan. France promptly sent cruisers to
bombard Casablanca, and landed three thousand

380

FRANCE GETS MOROCCO

troops to occupy the city on August 9th. ^ Moorish
attacks against this expeditionary force necessitated
a vigorous French campaign in the hinterland. At
the same time, General Lyautey was given full
authority from Paris to use the French forces in
Gran to repress the lawless Moors on the western
frontier, who were trying to dislodge the French
from Ujda. The French occupation had begun.

The complete anarchy that reigned throughout
1908 demonstrated the hopelessness of Morocco
existing in any other state than as a country from
which Europe was completely barred or in which a
European administration controlled the entire ma-
chinery of government, with full political and mili-
tary powers. Abdul Aziz and Hafid were fighting

^ Much was said and written at the time about the cruelty of the
French in the bombardment of Casablanca, the occupation of the
city, and the subsequent campaign. German and English residents
of Casablanca, who saw commercial disaster for themselves in the
French occupation, were assiduous in giving circulation to these
stories, just as four years later the foreign residents of Tripoli sent
out blood-curdUng stories of Italian atrocities. Women and child-
ren certainly were killed in the bombardment and subsequently.
The testimony I have gathered from eye-witnesses is conflicting,
as it always is in such cases. Nothing is more difficult to get at
than the exact truth of atrocities to non-combatants in a military
expedition. Soldiers get out of hand. Much suffering is unavoid-
able. But that the military authorities do not try their level best
to prevent excesses is improbable. During his march north from
Reggio to Naples, Garabaldi had to order the execution of some of
his bravest Red Shirts. He remarked at the time that the officers
of invading armies were rarely responsible for the murder and pillage
and theft of their troops, and that they ought always to be given
the benefit of the doubt. Practically the same thing was said to
me by General Chaffee, who commanded the American army at
Tien Tsin.

381

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

for the sultanate of the Makhzen. Bu Hamara
remained an independent usurper in the Riff. Rai-
suli was supreme in the neighborhood of Tangier.
France had to fight hard to maintain the foothold
she had gained in Morocco. The Riff tribes were
becoming a serious menate to Spain on the Mediter-
ranean coast. Abdul Aziz and Hafid both appealed
for French aid. After Hafid occupied Fez and
defeated the loyal army in August, Abdul Aziz took
refuge with the French. Germany then came to the
support of Hafid.

The international — or rather Franco-German —
tension over Morocco was brought to fever heat
by the Casablanca incident. Five members of the
Foreign Legion, three of them Germans, who were
in the French garrison occupying Casablanca, de-
serted and took refuge in the German Consulate.
The three Germans demanded repatriation. A
native escort was sent to put them aboard a German
vessel. They were taken from this consular escort
by force by French gendarmes. The German Con-
sul's demand for their release was refused. Ger-
many at first asked that an apology be made before
the incident was referred to The Hague Tribunal.
But international public opinion was hostile to the
German side of the case, and at this moment Kaiser
Wilhelm was betrayed into the indiscretion of the
much-bruited Daily Telegraph interview. So the
German Foreign Office did not feel strong enough
to insist upon the apology. A Solomon's judgment
was gravely rendered by the Tribunal. The Hague
avoided carefully pronouncing on the real issue,

382

FRANCE GETS MOROCCO

i. e., whether France was at home in Moroccan
territory. The incident showed, however, that
public opinion was beginning to be inflamed
both in Germany and France over the Morocco
question.

In November, 1908, Abdul Aziz, who, after all
the years of struggle, was not yet thirty, agreed to
abdicate, if he were assured of his private property,
a pension of thirty-five thousand dollars a year, and
the right to live at Tangier. Hafid had now to gain
recognition as Sultan from the Powers. At the
end of the year, he received a communication from
all the Powers through the French and Spanish
Ministers stating that he must assume the debts
of Abdul Aziz and agree to accept the provisions of
the Act of Algeciras. Hafid proved himself a master
at bargaining and dilatory tactics. He received a
French Mission in January, 1909. While he was
negotiating with the French he sent his Finance
Minister to raise a loan in Europe, and strengthened
his internal position by gaining a victory over Bu
Hamara and by winning Raisuli through the gift
of the governorship of the north. In April, a British
Mission went to Fez, ostensibly to present some long
outstanding British claims, but in reahty to impress
on Hafid the necessity of agreeing to do what he
was told by France.

Hafid, however, continued to gain in strength by
the disappearance of his rivals. The real Moham-
med, Hafid's elder brother, conveniently died (per-
haps he was poisoned) at Fez in June. Bu Hamara
was captured in August, and taken to Fez in an

383

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

iron cage.^ The more Hafid felt his strength, the
more he wa^ disinclined to allow the French to
dictate to him.

Hafid succeeded in placating the French tempo-
rarily and winning their support by agreeing to
reimburse France for the expenses incurred in the
Algerian frontier and Casablanca expeditions, and
to satisfy the claims of European creditors, the
majority of whom were French. A host of hungry
crows flocked to Tangier, and presented their claims
before a commission. It is best to draw the curtain
on this shameful business, in which the European
Legations were involved. Morocco was saddled
early in 1910 with a debt of twenty million dollars.
The Moors received nothing from the loan. The
control of the customs and harbor dues, the munici-
pal duties on real estate, and the tobacco monopoly
passed into European hands. The revenues were
to be used to pay the interest on the loan. There
was no compensation for the natives, as elsewhere
in Africa, by having the loan devoted — in part, at
least — to railways and other public works.

After the loan was arranged, Hafid again resisted
the efforts of France to take over the administration

^ He was kept in the cage for a long time, and then thrown to
lions. Before they had mauled him to death, the executioner ar-
rested him, and he was formally shot. The custom of keeping a
prisoner of rank in a cage is very old in Oriental countries. Timur's
treatment of Sultan Bayezid is one of the most famous examples.
See my Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 255-256. Cage
imprisonment is not unknown, however, in Occidental history. At
Loches, near Tours, one can still see the place where Louis XI. kept
Cardinal de la Balue suspended in an iron cage.

384

FRANCE GETS MOROCCO

of Morocco. A campaign was then started in the
French and British press. A year before, he had
been extolled as a wonderful man, of strong character
and promising future. Now he was charged with
all sorts of unspeakable cruelties, of which the putting
out of the way of Mohammed and Bu Hamara were
only two counts on a long list. The Morocco Times
correspondent, who was largely responsible for
turning public opinion in England against Hafid,
after having praised him at the time of his accession,
told me that Hafid had really changed in nature
during 1909 and 19 10. He could not stand power,
and rapidly became worse than the brother whom
he had succeeded.

In the spring of 191 1, many tribes rebelled against
Hafid. He was besieged in Fez. This was the
moment for which France had been waiting. Act-
ing on the obligation which her position as "pre-
dominant power" imposed upon her, the French
forces at Casablanca were reinforced, and two flying
columns sent to relieve Fez. They were followed
by a French army of eight thousand under General
Moinier, which occupied Fez on May 21, 191 1.
The independence of Morocco was over.

As far as Europe was concerned, France would
have had ati absolutely free hand, in spite of the
Conference of Algeciras, had it not been for Spain
and Germany. With these two Powers, France was
compelled to negotiate.

The interest of Spain in Morocco dated back to
the end of the Middle Ages. It was natural that
the Spaniards should feel, from the very fact of
2S 385

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

geographical proximity, as much interest in Morocco
as the Power that held Algeria. Spain claimed the
coast line of the Mediterranean from Alcazar and
Ceuta in the Strait of Gibraltar to the River Muluya,
west of the Ujda region; and as far as El Arish on
the Atlantic coast. Historically, said Spain, the
whole of the Tetuan and Riff regions were hers.
But possession is the only claim worth presenting in
international diplomacy. Nous y sommes; nous y
restons. While France was acting energetically
on the Algerian frontier and on the Atlantic coast,
Spain had been making great sacrifices to extend
her authority in the hinterland of the Mediterra-
nean region. Tangier was internationalized, because
neither France nor Spain had been able before or
after the Conference of Algeciras to get the other
Powers to agree to giving up their rights there.
While France was negotiating with Hafid in 1909,
Spain had made a great military effort against
the Riff tribes in the hinterland of Melilla. ^ When

^ At first there were fifteen thousand Spanish troops at Melilla.
A call for forty thousand reinforcements was made, which was later
increased to seventy-five thousand. The tribesmen badly defeated
the Spaniards on July 27th. It was necessary for Spain to make a
regular hill campaign against the tribes to save her prestige, and to
turn Melilla into a fortress. The Melilla campaign was the cause
of serious internal troubles in Spain, especially at Barcelona, where
there was an uprising at the end of July. I was in Barcelona during
this uprising, and made a trip into the portions of Catalonia that
were in the hands of the rebels. There was universal complaint
against being sent to fight in Africa. Small wonder! In a few
months, Spain had more men engaged and lost more killed and
wounded than France during the whole period from the landing at
Casablanca until all Morocco was, six years later, under French
control.

386

FRANCE GETS' MOROCCO

Morocco was saddled with her debt the following
year, it was agreed that Spain should receive twelve
million dollars for expenses of the Melilla campaign.
In 191 1, when the grand coup was being carried on
by France, Spain hurriedly sent troops to occupy
various points in her zone, and almost came to blows
with France. In fact, during the trying diplomatic
period between the occupation of Fez and the settle-
ment of the Franco- German controversy, France
would have had serious trouble with Spain, if Spain
had been a strong Power like Germany. But Spain
was weak, and had to make the best terins with
France that she could.

Hafid did his very best to embroil France and
Spain. Up to the moment of General Lyautey's
arrival as Resident-General in Fez, he and his coun-
sellors continued their intrigues. But Spain,
although she invoked her rights under the Hispano-
Moroccan Treaty of i860 to claim several ports on
the Atlantic coast, finally signed a treaty with France
at Madrid on November 2J, 1912, by which she
was content to receive the northeastern corner of
Morocco, with the exclusion of Tangier. Even this
portion she has not been able to organize as military
territory, much less administratively. The Moors
have been won over to French rule, but they still
refuse to acknowledge Spanish authority in the
zone France agreed to leave to her by the Treaty
of Madrid. The international status of Tangier
has not yet been settled. It militates greatly against
the interests of Tangier, of France, and of Morocco
to have the hinterland between Tangier and Fez

387

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

occupied by a Power that is unable to master the
Tetuan and Riff tribes. It is probable that when
the world's territories are readjusted at the end of
the present war, Spain will find herself compelled
to renounce the western portion, at least, of the
territories she secured by the Treaty of Madrid.
In the twentieth century, the state that cannot rule
her colonies is bound to lose them. The law of the
survival of the fittest works remorselessly.

The story of how the Germans sent a gun-boat
to Agadir, the port of the Sus region, and held up
France for compensation, belongs, like the Confer-
ence of Algeciras, to European history. We have
not space here to go into the long and involved
story of the controversy. On November 4, 191 1,
Berlin and Paris came to an agreement. Two trea-
ties were signed. The first, to be presented to the
Powers who were parties to the Act of Algeciras,
recorded Germany's consent to the establishment of
the French Protectorate, under condition, that an
equality of rights to all nations for trade, mining, and
railway concessions, and coastal fishing, be guaran-
teed by France. The second treaty gave Germany
compensation by the cession of two large pieces of
the French Congo to her Kamerun colony.^

As soon as France had arranged to buy off Ger-
man opposition, she did not wait longer to come to
a definite understanding with Spain, or to hear from
the Powers who had signed the Act of Algeciras.
In fact, she could not wait. It was a case of going
into the land to possess it fully, or leaving in extreme

' See above, pp. 306, 339.

388

FRANCE GETS MOROCCO

peril her own forces and Europeans resident in
Morocco. The situation required energy and mili-
tary and diplomatic ability of a high order. On
March 30, 1912, Sultan Hafid bowed to the inevi-
table, and signed the treaty placing Morocco under
French protection. Less than three weeks later,
Moorish troops in Fez mutinied. They massacred
seventeen French officers and nine French civilians.
Europeans other than French were not molested.
Four thousand troops were hurried to Fez by forced
marches. On May 26, General Lyautey entered
Fez to take supreme command of Morocco; There
were nearly forty thousand French troops in the
country.

General Lyautey showed immediately a genius
for doing the right thing that one is led by African
colonial history to expect only of an Anglo-Saxon.
General Moinier had fined Fez a milUon francs in
punishment for the uprising. General Lyautey
withdrew the edict. He put his finger immediately
upon an injustice that was the principal cause of
native hostility, just as it had been in Algeria, —
the alienation of lands to French subjects and to
natives who had been manifestly working for French
political interests. He let it be known that France
intended to do the square thing in every particular.
There would be no injustice, no cruelty, no exploita-
tion by the adventurers who followed the army.

For five months, General Lyautey had his hands
full in pacifying the country. He deposed Hafid,
whom the French had never been able to trust, and
put on the throne Yusef, the third son of Hassan

389

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

to become Sultan. There was a pretender, who had
captured Marakesh, to put down. In November,
19 12, General Lyautey reported the pacification of
Morocco, and asked for a loan of sixty million dol-
lars to build railways and roads. During the first
half of 1 9 13, General Lyautey discovered that there
was still much important military work to be ac-
complished. But just a year before the beginning
of the European War, the French were able at last
to devote all their energies to administrative or-
ganization and to economic development. It is a
splendid tribute to General Lyautey that he was
able to send a large part of his army to France in
August, 1914, including contingents recruited from
tribes that had been his bitter enemies eighteen
months before.

Aside from two small military lines, there are as
yet no railways in Morocco. The European War
arrived too soon after the pacification to make
possible a definite statement of how Morocco is
thriving economically under French control. But
the beginning is encouraging in every way, and is
most flattering to the French authorities who have
to cope with an international situation that presents
many unsettled problems.

390

CHAPTER XX

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST OF THE
KHEDIVES

THE most fascinating and best known portion of
Africa, from the earliest days of history to
the present time, is Egypt. The valley of
the Nile plays no less important a part in world
history to-day than twenty centuries ago or forty
centuries ago or sixty centuries ago. More Ameri-
cans go to Egypt than to other Mediterranean
countries, with the exception of Italy. But no more
in Egypt than in Italy are they interested in a con-
temporary history. A guide (if I used the adjective
insistent I would be guilty of redundancy!) came to
me at Luxor last winter with an alluring project
of a week's journey to ancient monuments. There
were twelve items, I think. I crossed out all except
the first, a moonlight donkey ride to Kamak. "I
am here only for this evening," I explained. "To-
morrow I must leave at six in the morning for Assiut. ' '
"But you have just arrived, " he remonstrated, "and
no one goes to Assiut anyway." He did not under-
stand when I told him that there was too much history
being made in 1916 a.d. to waste time on 1916 B.C.
"You cannot be an American," he said, shaking his

391

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

head in disappointment and disapproval. Thou-
sands of Americans who have visited Egypt since
the beginning of the twentieth century know only
one event of its modern history, the building of the
Assuan Dam, and that because it was an "act of
vandalism" that partly covered the Temple of
Pylse. And yet, Egypt under the Pharaohs and
Ptolemies is not as interesting as Egypt under the
Khedives. The pyramids are not as monumental
as the Suez Canal, and the ruins of Luxor as impres-
sive as the realities of Assuan. Many and glorious
are the pages in Britain's Empire overseas, but none
so wonderful as the Egyptian page. In Egypt one
realizes that the inheritance of the Roman Empire
has not fallen on the Osmanlis through Constanti-
nople, but on the English through York.

Throughout the middle period of the nineteenth
century, British foreign policy was built upon the
maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman
Empire lay between Europe and Asia. The Sultan
of Tiu"key was the Khalif of the Mohammedan world.
Russia was making great progress in Central Asia.
This brought her to the northern and western con-
fines of India, and extended her sovereignty over
Mohammedan nations. If Russia became the mas-
ter of Turkey, not only would she have access to
the Mediterranean, but also she would control the
destinies of Islam. The preservation of Britain's
position in India and as predominant Power in the
Mohammedan world depended upon checking Russia.
British statesmen believed that the political in-
dependence and the territorial integrity of the

392

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

Ottoman Empire were essential to the British
Empire overseas. The Crimean War was fought
on this belief, and Russia was menaced with another
war in 1877 in pursuance of the same policy. The
Treaty of Berlin, which superseded the Treaty of
San Stefano, was the work of British statesmen,
who did not hesitate to sacrifice the Christian nations
of the Balkans and the Christians under the Turkish
yoke for the sake of British interests in India. This
policy was abandoned because Egypt made no
longer necessary its maintenance.

When the Suez Canal was projected, and even
while it was being built, the British opposed it.
The French were doing it, and French influence in
Egypt seemed as much a possible menace to India
as Russian influence in Turkey. The year after the
Canal was completed, Germany crushed France.
From that moment, it was possible for Great Britain
to get control of the Canal. To make secure the
control of the Canal, Britain must have the predomi-
nant position in Egypt. France would have to get
out. I am stating the facts baldly. There was no
deep-laid plot on the part of British statesmen to
reap where they had not sown. Nations like in-
dividuals are moved by irresistible forces. The
Canal was cut. Steam-driven ships had displaced
sail-driven ships. India and other important parts
of Asia were already in British hands. In Australasia
a new Anglo-Saxon world was in the process of
development. Great Britain had to control" the
path from east to west, which was far more important
to her than to any other nation of Europe.

393

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

The British entered Egypt in 1882 in a legitimate
way. An anti-European movement threatened the
lives and property of Europeans, and the safety of
the Canal, which had become an essential inter-
national waterway. The Khedive was powerless
to restore order. Turkey, the suzerain state, could
do nothing. France, invited to cooperate, refused
to intervene. The British fleet and a small British
army occupied Alexandria, Cairo, and the Canal,
and restored the authority of the Khedive. An
attempt was made immediately by British diplomacy
to regularize the new situation. London announced
that the army of occupation would be withdrawn
when order was restored.

No student, who has gone into the history of the
decade that followed, can find reason to question
the good faith and sincerity of the British Govern-
ment. A mistake was made in not asking consent of
the Powers and Turkey to the proclamation of a
British Protectorate. But it was a mistake that
demonstrates the honesty of purpose, if not the
statesmanship, of those who directed the Foreign
Office through a very trying period. It would have
been a calamity for Egypt as well as for the world
had the British withdrawn. The Egyptians could
not work out their own salvation. Turkey was in-
capable of taking back the country she had lost
through her incapacity to govern. The Powers
were unwilling to assume conjointly the responsibility
of governing Egypt or of internationalizing the Canal.
So the British authorities, supported by a garrison in
Cairo, simply stayed on. There was nothing else to do.

394

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

, At the beginning of the twentieth century, the
British had been eighteen years in Egypt. From an
international point of view, the situation was just
as it was in the beginning — and it remained so until
Turkey's entrance into the present war led to the
establishment of a British Protectorate.

Nominally, Egypt was an autonomous vilayet
(province) of the Ottoman Empire ruled by a khe-
dive (viceroy). The relations between Turkey and
Egypt had been arranged by agreements between
sultans and khedives. The khedives acknowledged
the suzerainty of the sultans, and paid an annual
tribute. After Ismail, succession in the khedivate
was from father to son and not (as should be the
practice in an Islamic country) to the oldest living
member of the house of Mohammed AH. The
Turkish flag was used in Egypt, and the spiritual
overlordship of Constantinople acknowledged by
Cairo. The relations between Egypt and other
nations had been established by treaties with Turkey.
Europeans and Americans enjoyed the privileges of
a capitulatory regime as in Turkey. Their interests
were looked after by consuls-general in Cairo,
exercising diplomatic functions, and consuls and
consular agents in other cities. Justice was ad-
ministered in consular courts and in mixed tribunals
of European and Egyptian judges. The Egyptian
debt was under international control, with repre-
sentatives of the Powers supervising the expenditure
of revenues affected to pay the interest on the debt.
All nations had the same privileges in regard to
customs and doing business in the country. The

395

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Government of the Khedive was exercised by a
ministry, with a premier, as in European states, but,
as in Oriental states, the Khedive kept legislative
authority in his own hands. His national council
and national assembly were advisory bodies, possess-
ing only such authority as the Khedive was willing
for them to enjoy.

Practically, Egypt was quit of Turkish control
with the tribute and the flag. The ruler of the
country was the British Consul-General, who ruled
through advisers in the different ministries. For
the sake of form, the diplomatic agents of other
countries looked upon the Khedive as ruler of Egypt,
and carried on negotiations with the Khedive's
ministry. In fact, all matters were decided at the
British Agency. The Khedive was a figurehead:
and his ministers were figureheads. Britain ruled
with the hand of a master. The final authority was
the British Cabinet, to whom the Consul-General
made an annual report.

Great Britain's position in Egypt was maintained
by a garrison in the Cairo citadel, and by control of
the Egyptian army through British officers, who
held the principal commands.

This situation was possible only through the im-
potence of Turkey, the acquiescence of the Powers,
and the willingness of the Egyptians to live under
British authority. In order to stay in Egypt, it
was necessary for the British officials to keep Turkey
and the Powers from interfering, and to prevent a
movement in Egypt on the part of the Khedive and
the educated Egyptians to take back into their own

396

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

hands the control of the country. From the very
beginning, it was reaHzed that this could not be
accomplished through force — save as regarded Tur-
key. The Powers would accept the de facto regime in
Egypt only if the British succeeded in making the
country prosper, so that the interest on the debt
could be paid, and in affording security and equal
opportunity to all Europeans to reside and to do
business in the country. As far as the Egyptians
were concerned, the task of Great Britain was to give
them good government and prosperity.

The British were able to stay in Egypt during the
last two decades of the nineteenth century, and to
make the Egyptians and the world in general accept
the status quo, all the while strengthening their
position, not because of the garrison in the Cairo
citadel, but because of the ability to send to Egypt,
for the civil administration and for the army, men
whose genius was matched only by their devotion.
British officers built up anew the Egyptian army.
British engineers solved the problem of irriga-
tion. British administrators attacked successfully
the political, social, and economic problems of bring-
ing peace and prosperity and contentment out of an-
archy and poverty and oppression. The supervising
agency of this remarkable achievement was the
British Consul-General, Sir Evelyn Baring, after-
wards Lord Cromer.

There is no need here to go into the economic
history of Egypt under British control. Twenty
years after the British entered Egypt, Lord Cromer
was able to write that the institution of slavery

397

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

was virtually defunct; the corvee (forced labor)
practically abolished; the courbash (whip) no longer
employed as an instrument of government ; the army
efficient and well-organized, and the abuses under
the old recruiting system swept away; new prisons
and reformatories built and the treatment of pris-
oners in conformity with principles generally adopted
in Europe ; the sick nursed in well-equipped and well-
managed hospitals; lunatics no longer treated like
wild beasts; means provided for allowing peasants
to free themselves from the grip of money-lenders;
a very great impulse given to education in all its
branches; the Assuan Dam opened, which would
provide one-third of the agricultural area of Upper
Egypt with perennial irrigation; modern railways
running from one end of the country to the other;
more than one hundred million dollars spent on
railways and other public works, all saved out of
the resources of Egypt, without recourse to foreign
capital or increase of the public debt; cotton-raising
developed so as to make Egypt one of the first pro-
ducers of the world; Alexandria and Cairo trans-
formed into great European cities; Alexandria and
Port Said developed into ports and coaling stations
of mondial importance; and the Suez Canal made
secure as the waterway of four continents. The
Egyptian Treasury contained an accumulated sur-
plus of thirty million dollars, which was increasing
annually by nearly three million dollars. When
one contrasts the economic and financial history of
the mother country, Turkey, during the same period,
and social conditions in Egypt and other Islamic

398

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

countries, the benefit of British rule cannot be
contested.

But the whole story of Egypt in the twentieth
century impresses us with the truth of the fact that
man liveth not by bread alone. No nation is con-
tented with material blessings. Nations, like in-
dividuals, are in an unhealthy state when they have
not developed by their own efforts, and are pro-
foundly unhappy when they are not managing their
own affairs. It is vain to try to persuade them that
they are better off under guardianship of another
nation stronger and more intelligent and more capable
than themselves. There is no more profound truth
in the history of human relationships than that
the benefactor is as much hated as the taskmaster.
Only when gifts are solicited and appreciated — and
not always then — is the giver liked. It is rare that
charity helps any one. Assistance ought to be on
the quid pro quo basis. Above all things in the world
it is impossible to help a man upwards morally when
you consider yourself his superior, and he knows that
you consider yourself his superior. I suppose this
will be considered rank heresy by many of my readers.
But it explains the history of Egypt in the last
fifteen years. Instead of marveling at the ingrati-
tude and blindness and shortsightedness of the
Egyptians, and denouncing the folly of their aspira-
tions, it is best to realize that their sentiments are
probably just what ours would be if we were in their
place.

Abbas Hilmi came to the throne, upon the death
of his father, Tewfik, in 1892, when he was a boy of

399

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

eighteen. From the very beginning of his reign,
it was impressed upon him by Lord Cromer, Colonel
Kitchener, and other British officials with whom he
came in contact, that he must realize which side his
bread was buttered on. He was given all the show
of power with none of the reality, and whenever he
seemed disposed to have an opinion contrary to that
of London or the British Agency, Lord Cromer
talked to him Hke a Dutch Uncle. He made the
best of it: because he had to. But one can hardly
blame him for not appreciating his benefits as much
as his benefactors did, especially as it was constantly
in his mind that, although they were doing the
handsome thing by Egypt, they were inspired, not
by love for Egypt, but by the fact that Great Britain
must stay in Egypt in order to keep control of the
Suez Canal. The thought must often have occurred
to him that the British had no real right, except that
of superior force, to rule the country which his ances-
tors had wrested from the Turks and into which the
khedives had tried to introduce modern civilization
long before Lord Cromer came. I take Abbas
Hilmi here as the illustration of the general attitude
of well-bom and educated Egyptians, whether they
are of Arabic, Turkish, Coptic, Syrian, or Armenian
origin.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in
Moslem lands education in missionary colleges and
in European and American universities, and general
contact with Occidental civilization, inspired the
younger generation with the desire to establish a
democratic and representative form of government.

400

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE^

The movement was, of course, primarily directed
against the despotism of Oriental systems of govern-
ment. Had it not been for the fact that in some
Moslem countries, such as Egypt and India, Euro-
peans were already in control, and in others, such as
Persia and Turkey, were endeavoring to gain control,
this movement would have been purely political,
and would not have affected international European
politics. Partly for this reason and partly for the
reason that the smartest and most advanced and
best educated elements within the Moslem countries
were the Christian minority, the Young Turk, Young
Persian, Young Indian, and Young Egyptian move-
ments very quickly took on an unfortunate religious
character. So the democratic ideal became hope-
lessly diverted. It was the mixing of oil and water.
Islam is an admirable social democracy within the
Moslem world. But it does not grant equality
before the law to non-Moslems, and it is irrecon-
ciliable in theory and practice with the modern state,
endowed with representative institutions, that has
been evolved by Christian civilization. The Young
Moslems wanted Christian Occidental institutions,
without their foundation and without their spirit.
The result was anti-European and anti-Christian
propaganda that would have brought either anarchy
or oligarchy, had the Young Moslems succeeded
in carrying out their program. Their partial suc-
cess in Persia and in Turkey did, in fact, bring
anarchy in Persia and oligarchy in Turkey. Egypt
and India were saved by the strong hand of their
British master.

26 401

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Coupled with the Young Moslem movement was
the pan-Islamic movement, launched by the Old
Moslems. It, also, was anti-European and anti-
Christian. It has failed just as the Young Moslem
movement has failed, because the spirit of sohdarity
is lacking in Islam, and because the great mass of
the followers of Mohammed are so ignorant that they
cannot grasp the possibilities and the advantages of
political union. Moslem countries will have neither
national nor international awakening until they have
passed through the stage of popular education and
until they have produced their Montesquieus, their
Lockes, their Adam Smiths, their Diderots, their
Voltaires, their Rousseaus, their John Stuart Mills,
and their Herbert Spencers. Their great Revolution
will come only after they are capable of a Tugendbund.

Egypt, the connecting link between Moslem Asia
and Moslem Africa, the home of enlightened Young
Moslems and of the most fanatical element of Islam,
refuge and pasture-ground of the most Tory of
Turkish pashas, vital milestone on Britain's path to
India, neighbor of Arabia and the Holy Cities, was
the maelstrom of Islamic agitation during the first
decade of the twentieth century. What the British
had to face in Egypt and how they faced it is an
all-important page in contemporary history. Three
Consuls-General, Lord Cromer, Sir Eldon Gorst, and
Lord Kitchener played a larger part in the history
of the world than they were aware of when they were
dealing with the Egyptian Nationalist movement.

Mustafa Kamel built his Nationalist propaganda
upon the hope of French intervention in Egypt.

402

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

He imbibed his democratic notions and conceived
the idea of a free Egypt in Paris. He was "taken
up" in certain circles and frequented certain salons
where the principal topic of conversation was how
the French hated the English. This was the year of
Fashoda. When I first knew of Mustafa Kamel,
he was being flattered and filled full of ideas by
several influential Frenchmen and one celebrated
Frenchwoman (it is not necessary to mention their
names now, for they have since become as intensely
Anglophile as they were then Anglophobe). Mus-
tafa Kamel was very limited intellectually. But his
French friends saw in him the best sort of a fire-
brand to throw into Egypt in revenge for the attitude
of Lord Cromer and Lord Kitchener at Fashoda.
For Mustafa Kamel had enthusiasm and magnetism
and the gift of public speaking — just the qualities of
the demagogue. He could be inspired and con-
trolled by French journalists working discreetly
behind the scenes.

At the end of 1899, Mustafa Kamel returned to
Cairo from Paris, and gathered around him by his
brilliant, though superficial eloquence, the educated
young men of Egypt. He would not have had the
ghost of a chance to succeed among intellectual and
thoughtful people, had it not been that they were
continually smarting from the fact that the British
in Egypt, residents as well as officials, treated them
as social inferiors. In order to extend his propa-
ganda to the fellahin, he founded the Arabic news-
paper Lewa. Its success was phenomenal. Within
a year, Lewa became the most influential newspaper

403

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

in Egypt. The fellahin could not read, but the
local Moslem clergy gathered the villagers around
them, and read to them of the new glory that would
come to Islam when the English were expelled.

At the very beginning, the Nationalist movement
dug its own grave. Mustafa Kamel and his associ-
ates thought that giving their propaganda a religious
character was the essential factor of success; but in
doing this, they defeated the very end they thought
they were advancing. Although Mustafa Kamel
considered himself almost a Frenchman and looked
to France for support, he was too stupid to see that
his agitation was directed against the interests of those
on whose cooperation he was banking. The Egyp-
tian Nationalist movement was launched by French-
men to make trouble for the British. It paved the
way for the Anglo-French entente! Mustafa Kamel's
speeches and writings in Egypt, and the Young
Egyptian congresses in vSwitzerland, caused alarm
among far-seeing French statesmen, who saw in
pan-Islamism a menace to their own interests fully
equal to the menace to British interests. From
the moment of its birth, the Egyptian Nationalist
movement was a boomerang to the French. The
most bitter Anglophobes began to feel the necessity
of an understanding with Great Britain. There was
the same reaction in Russia.

Nothing in contemporary history is more fascinat-
ing than the study of the change in Anglo-French
relations between 1898 and 1904. The student is
convinced of four things: that common interests
rather than common ideals bring nations together

404

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

into political alliances; that these common interests
are decided by a few men, who are able, even in
democracies, to lead their nations along paths that
the people at large are wholly ignorant they are
following; that the success of these few men in
winning and keeping the power to decide the des-
tinies of their fellow-countrymen is assured by the
cooperation of press agencies and newspapers; and
that the appeal to national honor and patriotism is
in reality an appeal to the two basic passions of
mankind, pride and pocket-book. When the storm
breaks, and the nation finds itself in danger, there can
be no doubt that the men who go to war are imbued
.with the highest and noblest qualities, and give their
lives gladly in defense of their homes and their loved
ones. God forbid that the slightest aspersion be
cast upon the motives leading heroic soldiers to suffer
and endure and die for their country. But in follow-
ing the gathering of the storm clouds, before they
breaks one sees clearly the iniquity of secret diplo-
macy. We are in hell now% and have to get out of it
the best way we can. But if students and writers
are honestly and courageously devoted to their high
calling, they will do all in their power to enlighten
pubUc opinion, in the hope that the next generation,
by taking into its own hands the decision of national
policies and national destinies, will avoid another
descent into hell.

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was a death-
blow to the Egyptian Nationalist movement and to
the success of pan-Islamism, which depended upon
the rivalry of the two European Powers who had most

405

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

to do with Islam. It came just in time. France
needed a free hand in Morocco and West Africa
and the Sudan. Great Britain needed to be re-
lieved of French opposition in Egypt. Not only
were the Nationalists gaining in strength, but
Turkey was beginning to interfere with the British
occupation.

The extension of the Ottoman railway from Damas-
cus to Medina and Mecca brought Great Britain and
Turkey into conflict over the question of the control
of the Sinai Peninsula. To anticipate the Turks,
Lord Cromer sent Egyptian troops to occupy posts
on the west side of the Gulf of Akaba. They found
the Turkish flag flying there. The Turks demanded
a boundary line which would have brought them to
the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. The British
Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to
demand the withdrawal of Turkish garrisons from the
peninsula, and to insist upon the right of Egypt,
under the Sultan's firman of 1892, to administer
the peninsula. The British claim really rested on a
telegram of Lord Cromer, appended at the time to
the firman, to which the Ottoman Government had
then "raised no objection." Turkey had to give in,
and the safety of the Canal was assured. It was at
this same time that the Turks were active in the
hinterland of Tripoli, and France was having a
similar discussion with the Sublime Porte over the
Turkish garrisons the French had found in the
Sahara on the route to Lake Chad. The benefit of
the Agreement of 1904 began to be evident to many
Frenchmen who had not up to this time become

406

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

reconciled to it. This was the period, also, of the
Conference of Algeciras.

The discussion with Turkey brought about much
unrest in Egypt, where the Nationalists were in open
sympathy with Turkey's side of the case. A British
soldier was beaten in the streets of Cairo, and on
June 13, 1906, the villagers of Denshawai assaulted
five British officers who were shooting pigeons.
One of them was killed, and two others seriously
injured. The natives were arrested and tried by a
special tribunal. Four were hanged, two sent to
prison for life, ten for shorter terms, and' eight were
flogged. As there was no doubt that the villagers
acted under great provocation, and had not at-
tacked the officers with intention to kill, the severity
of the sentence caused a great outcry in England,
and had a very bad effect in Egypt. ^ It gave to
the Nationalist party support among the Jellahin
that had been lacking before.

In the midst of the Nationalist turmoil. Lord

^ I first visited Egypt three years later, when the Nationahsts were
in close connection with the Young Turks. I found the Denshawai
executions invariably called "the massacre " by the Young Egyptians.
After a lapse of six more years, during my visit of 1916, "the mas-
sacre" was still vivid in the minds of many to whom I talked. They
spoke of it as the unforgettable and unforgivable crime that had
revealed to them the bitterness and injustice of their slavery. More
than one Egyptian drew the parallel between the British military
caste and the Prussian military caste, and said that the ofl5cers who
were shooting pigeons against the protest of the villagers richly
deserved the beating they got. There was no evidence whatever that
the villagers intended to kill them. The provocation must have been
very great: for the fellahin are peacefully inclined, and have very
little courage.

407

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Cromer resigned after twenty-five years of service.
We have already spoken of the wonderful work he
accomplished in the economic and social regeneration
of Egypt. I have not thought it necessary to go into
this side of Egyptian contemporary history. The
literature on the subject is voluminous, and accessible
to English-speaking readers everywhere. Lord Cro-
mer himself has written in detail the history of his
quarter century in Egypt. ^ From a material point
of view, it is the record of a miraculous achievement.
But the Egyptians never forgot that Lord Cromer
was a British official, ruling them against their will,
and always putting British interests before Egyptian
interests. A most intelligent Egyptian, who is a
believer in a limited British control of Egypt, an
admirer of British methods and British results,
and an influential supporter of the present British
Protectorate, said to me recently : ' ' During the first
fifteen years of the British occupation. Lord Cromer
was the right man in the right place. We needed
just his type. But he fell short of greatness, and
did not build a lasting monument, because he failed

' The two volumes, Modern Egypt, are well worth the attention of
the general reader. The third volume, Abbas Hilmi, written since
the war started, is totally unworthy of its author, and is a sad testi-
mony to the fact that the sanest and fairest of men were swept away
by passion and prejudice after the outbreak of the present war. If
there is anything that is repugnant to the Anglo-Saxon nature it is
kicking a man when he is down. Undoubtedly, Lord Cromer regrets
very deeply this little volume, which represents neither his spirit
nor that of his fellow-countrymen. We must throw out A bbas Hilmi,
and judge Lord Cromer by Modern Egypt. We can give no higher
praise to the book than to say that it is worthy of the subject and the
writer.

408

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

to realize that the people to whom he had given the
material benefits of European civilization, from the
very reason that he had given them those benefits,
had come to the place where they refused longer to
be treated as children, and wanted other things that
are the right and privilege of European civilization.
Egypt was his child. But if he had had a son, and
treated him straight through twenty-five years as he
treated Egypt and Egypt's Khedive, he would have
had exactly the same result. He left us unloved."
This was certainly the verdict of Egypt at the
time. A farewell demonstration was organized at
the Cairo Opera House. Except the officials, who had
to go for fear of losing their places, no prominent
Egyptians were present. The only member of the
khedivial family in attendance was Prince Said
Halim (now Grand Vizier of Turkey), who was
on the outs with the Khedive and went to spite him.
When Lord Cromer departed from Cairo, elaborate
military and police measures were taken to protect
him from insult and bodily injury.

The program Lord Cromer left for Egypt was:
abolition of the capitulations, so the Government
would have control over the foreigners in the coun-
try ; participation of all residents in a legislative body ;
an ideal of Egyptian nationality, which took in all
the inhabitants, irrespective of race, religion, or
extraction.

The new Consul-General, Sir Eldon Gorst, was a
man of pronounced democratic tendencies and liberal
sympathies. He started in by determining not to
"put on airs," and his Jeffersonian simplicity led

409

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

him to appear in the streets of Cairo hatless, astride
a donkey. This, of course, was the ridiculous other
extreme of pomposity. Aloofness in a high official
is no greater weakness than "hail fellow well met."
In a speech to his staff, Sir Eldon declared that the
aim of the British occupation was not to rule the
Egyptians, but to teach them to rule themselves.
This was immediately taken up by the Nationalists,
who asked the embarrassing question: How can a
nation he taught to rule themselves so long as they are
not granted the slightest bit of real responsibility and
real authority?

Mustafa Kamel died in February, 1908. He did
not live to see the success of his party in the elections
for the Legislative Council, and the dissension
immediately following, which resulted in a party
split. The Nationalist program was : administrative
independence of Egypt under khedivial authority;
fulfillment of British pledges to terminate occupation ;
representative institutions with full political and
administrative powers ; free primary education in the
Arabic language; preferential employment of Egyp-
tians in government services; extension of jurisdic-
tion of mixed courts to criminal cases in which
foreigners are concerned. In December, the Council
passed a unanimous motion, calling upon the Govern-
ment to initiate legislation to give the country full
participation in internal administration. The Coun-
cil called attention to the fact that only twenty-
four per cent, of the boys of school age were given
an opportunity to go to school.

The Young Turk Revolution, which gave Turkey a
410

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

Constitution and a Parliament, had a tremendous
repercussion in Egypt. The Nationalist newspapers
reprinted the glowing articles of the English press
in commendation of representative government in
Turkey, and asked how the English could sincerely
sustain the Young Turks while they suppressed the
Young Egyptians. Lewa began to publish violent
and inflammatory articles. When the Khedive
and his Cabinet did not come out boldly for the
Nationalist cause, they too received as severe press
criticism as the British "intruders," The answer
was that which has invariably met the first efforts
of people for self-government in every country: a
press law, with a system of fines, suspensions, and
suppressions, was introduced. But it was wholly
contrary to the Liberal spirit of Anglo-Saxondom,
and gained for the Nationalists sympathy and active
support in England, which might have helped greatly
their cause, had they not resorted to violence and
crime. On September 14, 1909, the twenty-seventh
anniversary of the British occupation, the following
telegram was sent from Cairo to the British Prime
Minister and the Turkish Grand Vizier:

"A meeting of six thousand Egyptians assembled
here to-day desires to convey to Your Excellency
the unanimous and energetic protest of the Egyptian
people against the British occupation, and demands
from to-day the evacuation, relying upon the engage-
ments and solemn oaths of the Queen's Governments.
Moreover, to gain our friendship is preferable for
English honor than to lose our hearts and sup-
port."

411

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

On February 20, 1910, the Egyptian Premier,
Boutros Pasha, was assassinated by a Moslem
Nationalist, who had been correspondent for Lewa
at the Young Egyptian Congress in Geneva the year
before. No connection was proved between the
assassination and the Nationalist party. But the
Nationalists — or rather the radical element of them
— did not condemn the crime. In fact, they con-
sidered the assassin a hero: and he has become their
martj^r. This crime was the culmination of the
breach that had long been growing among the
Nationalists. Boutros Pasha was a Copt. The
Copts could no longer sustain a national movement
that had become anti-Christian. The moderate
section of the Moslems among the Nationalists were
certain that the party policy of violence was ruinous.
They seceded.^ In the summer of 1910, there were

^ The split really occurred in 1908, but there were hopes for two
years of a reconciliation. The temperament of the Egyptians makes
them opposed to violence. One might say that the middle-aged and
elder Egyptians had never looked upon the program of the National-
ists with a feeling other than that of misgiving and alarm. The
"Party of the People" was formed, which claimed to be in entire
sympathy with the Nationalists' demands upon Britain, but believed
in confining the propaganda to a rational and courteous discussion
of the problem of emancipation, and in refraining from an agitation
that would awaken religious fanaticism and hatred of foreigners.
This Party founded its own newspaper, Garidah. The Nationalists
claimed that the new Party represented notables and rich pro-
prietors. But there was a question of division far more serious than
that of Liberal and Conservative temperament. The Nationalists
advocated close union with Turkey, while the Party of the People
believed that the only hope of Egypt was in keeping absolutely free.
Later, a third party, the partisans of the Khedive, through the news-
paper Moyaed, pronounced for a propaganda to convince the British

412

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

two Young Egyptian congresses in Europe, one
branch sitting at Geneva and the other at Brussels.
Both called on England once more to fulfil her
pledges to evacuate Egypt.

A popular movement can be successful only if it
fulfils three conditions: remaining united; enlisting
a number of men who have political prestige and
wealth; and winning the officers of the army. The
Nationalist Party, although all Egyptians were in
sympathy with its general aims, failed in all three
of the essentials of success. At the beginning, the
movement would have amounted to nothing,- had it
not been backed by French influence. After the
French abardoned them, the Nationalists would not
have been a serious menace, had they not been
able still to enlist influences outside of Egypt: pan-
Islamism and the Young Turks in the suzerain
Ottoman Empire, and radical sentiment in England.
The Turkish aid disappeared with the Italian and
Balkan wars, and EngUsh help was largely lost by
the assassination of Boutros Pasha.

Former President Roosevelt, on his way home from
a hunting trip in Central Africa, arrived in Cairo
shortly after the assassination of Boutros Pasha.
According to his usual custom of getting down off
the fence and taking the bull by the horns, Mr.
Roosevelt told the students of Cairo University that

that it was to their best interests to fulfil the solemn promise made to
evacuate Egypt. The Khedivial party, having no illusions concern-
ing the ability of the Egyptians to start a revolution without or with
the aid of Turkey, knew that evacuation or the granting of self-
government would come only from the free act of the British.

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

he did not consider Egypt ready for self-government, *
and later in London he told the British that they
ought either to rule Egypt or to get out. While
the first statement shocked Liberals on both sides
of the Atlantic, and the second was a rude jolt to the
complacency of insular Britons, none who was
acquainted with the situation contested the truth
of either observation. When press and Parliament
were full of Mr. Roosevelt's "impetuosity," Sir
Edward Grey, commenting on the Roosevelt speech
at the Guildhall, stated for the first time openly and
without equivocation that Great Britain intended
to rule and was not going to get out. This was an
answer, not only to Mr. Roosevelt's critics, but also
to the Egyptians, who had just been celebrating
with enthusiasm the rejection by the Egyptian
General Assembly of the proposition to extend for
forty years beyond 1968 the concession of the
Suez Canal Company. Sir Edward Grey para-
phrased the saying of President Cleveland, by
declaring that in Egypt "we have to consider
facts rather than theories." His attitude was very
different from the vacillation of earHer Liberal
Foreign Secretaries.

The Copts are the descendants of the Egyptians
who were not assimilated by the Arabs at the
time of the Mohammedan conquest. They took

' The New York Nation of April 7, 19 10, commenting unfavorably
upon this speech, declared: "Egyptians . . . have the recent ex-
perience of Turkey to hearten them." The most serious American
journals, even after nearly two years, were still in complete ignorance
of what was happening in Turkey.

414

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

the language and many of the customs of the con-
querors, but preserved their religion. As in Tur-
key, this surviving Christian element of the
earlier civilization, by the fact that it remained
politically inferior and socially distinct from the
ruling race, developed remarkable commercial abili-
ties. As the Moslems were prevented by their reli-
gion from exercising the profession of money-lending,
the Copts became the bankers. All through the
Near East the Christians — Greeks, Armenians,
Syrians, and Copts — are what the Jews are in
Christian countries, and for similar reasons. When
European civilization and European finance and
European economic and political conditions were
introduced into Moslem lands, the Christian elements
were already prepared to take advantage of ithe
revolution effected by contact with the Occident.
The missionaries who came, finding the door shut to
their proselytizing efforts among the Moslems,
started into catholicize and protestantize the Eastern
Christians. Not many were weaned away from their
own Church. But almost all came under the edu-
cational influence of the missionaries. They learned
our ways and our languages. This, also, was a
tremendous advantage in enabling them to profit by
the new conditions. So it was not unnatural that
the Moslem ruling races became jealous of their
Christian subject races, and suspected them of being
a reason for and party to European intervention,
and the humiliating political infeodation of Moham-
medan Africa and Asia to Christian Europe. The
Christians of the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor

415

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

have unquestionably been victims of European
colonial ambitions and rivalries.

The Copts, like the Armenians in Turkey, looked
upon the constitutional movement in Islam as a
means of deliverance from the bond of servitude
and the ever present shadow of massacre. They
were not only willing, but eager, to cooperate in the
Nationalist movement, until they realized that the
Young Moslems connotated nationality as religious
and racial, and not geographical. The assassination
of Boutros Pasha was an unwelcome, though not
unexpected, awakening. Shortly after the crime.
Sir Edward Grey, in answer to an interpellation in
Parliament, declared that "it is false that England
in Egypt is sowing dissension between the Copts and
the Moslems." This is undoubtedly true. The sus-
picion arose, probably, from the fact that the British
administration in Egypt, under Sir Eldon Gorst,
began to do all in its power to alienate promising
Nationalists from the cause by the bribe of giving
them Government positions; and that this policy
aroused the resentment of the Copts against the
Moslems and made easier the stifling of liberal
aspirations and Anglophobia in the younger gen-
eration.

Against the advice of the head of their Church
and of some of their leading men, the Copts held a
Congress in March, 1911, in Assiut, which was at-
tended by five hundred delegates. The ostensible
object was to "remove the causes of difference
between the various communities, constituting the
Egyptian nation." Sir Eldon Gorst rejected all

416

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

their demands. Their chief complaint was that they
were discriminated against in the filling of public
offices. One finds it very difficult to sympathize
with the Coptic position, on grounds of their best
national interests as well as of elementary justice.
The Copts had more than half the posts in the
Egyptian civil service, although they comprised
less than ten per cent, of the population! They
argued, and still argue, that this is because they
have ten times as many educated young men as the
Moslems.

The fatal weakness of education upon ■ Orientals,
Moslems as well as Christians, is the demoralization
that seems to follow it. When an Oriental has his
diploma, he feels that he is a gentleman, and that he
must follow a profession in a big city, or get a Govern-
ment position. He does not want to return to his
village. Farming, where he has to do any of the
work with his own hands, is unthinkable. Com-
merce is unattractive. Business is for men without
an education. For those who have not the money
or persistence or brains to qualify for a profession,
Government service is the summum honum, no, the
solum honum. Cairo and Alexandria are full of
young men, whose education has spoiled them for
any other pursuit than that of sitting around cafes.
Not until we can instil into the Oriental mind that
agriculture and commerce are dignified callings,
demanding the best brains of the nation, will educa-
tion prepare Oriental nations for self-government.
The East needs primary education and industrial
schools, where enthusiastic and devoted teachers
27 417

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

glorify by example as well as by precept the dignity
of labor, before it needs more colleges and universi-
ties. The young Oriental, who possesses financial
resources, is able to go to Europe or America for his
higher education. The village boys had better be
taught farming and stock-raising and trades and
business.

Sir Eldon Gorst died in July, 191 1. Long before
the end came, he was a very sick man, and, perhaps
largely for that reason, seemed discouraged and pessi-
mistic. His last public utterance on Egyptian affairs
was: "The policy of ruling the country in co-
operation with native ministers is, at the present
time, incompatible with that of encouraging the
development of so-called representative institu-
tions. . . . The recent experiment has, so far as the
Legislative Council and General Assembly are con-
cerned, proved a failure, and the results derived
from them have not been in accordance with our
intentions or hopes."

Italy's declaration of war against Turkey, for the
purpose of taking away the last province of the Otto-
man Empire in Africa, marked the beginning of a
crisis in the relations of Europe to the Near East
that has not yet ended. The British Cabinet knew
that a strong man, who was intimately acquainted
with the Egyptian situation, must be appointed
to Sir Eldon Gorst 's place. There was only one man
who filled the bill. From the first days of the
British occupation to the Boer War, Kitchener had
made his career in Egypt. He returned in November,
191 1, to grapple with a situation that needed "the

418

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST KHEDIVE

big stick" as well as intimate personal experience
of Islam, Egypt, Turkey, and North African military
conditions. The situation was one of great delicacy.
Turkey had a right to call upon Egypt for aid, or at
least to allow the passage of troops and military
supplies. But Great Britain, through diplomatic
agreements, was bound to preserve the neutrality of
Egypt. Even those Egyptians who were hostile to
a rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey, sympa-
thized with Turkey on sentimental as well as religious
grounds. Italy seemed to be attacking Islam. The
way the war was started, and the inability of the
Italians to solve the military situation they had
created for themselves in Tripoli, disgusted every-
body in Egypt, Europeans as well as natives. I
have never met a British official who sympathized
with Italian ambitions or Italian methods.

Lord Kitchener succeeded remarkably in suppress-
ing agitation and in strengthening Britain's hold on
Egypt. In view of the test that was going to come
in 1 9 14, Kitchener's three years in Egypt, following
the Gorst regime, were extremely fortunate for the
British Empire. A mad conspiracy to assassinate
the IQiedive, the Prime Minister, the British Consul-
General, and two judges was discovered in 1912 in the
inner circle of the Nationalist Party. It gave Lord
Kitchener the opportunity to suppress Lewa, and to
put the moving spirit of the Nationalists into jail
for fifteen years. Lord Kitchener built extensive
barracks at Cairo. He devoted his energies to
organizing an efficient secret service throughout
Egypt, and to getting a complete hold on the native

419

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

officers of the army. He made an excellent move
to win the Moslem clergy by creating a Ministry of
Wakfs (religious foundations). Trying to control
the expenditure of the revenues from religious
foundations along European lines had proved as
impolitic as it was hopeless. If the Moslem clergy-
had some leeway in the spending and accounting
for the Wakf revenues, they would be more satisfied
to accept a tolerant British control. If occasionally
a village Imam wanted to buy a goat with the money
instead of repairing the mosque, why interfere and
gain his ill-will?

Lord Kitchener's report for 19 13 was able to show
splendid economic progress, and a continuance of the
material benefits that Lord Cromer's administration
had given to Egypt. There was no political unrest.
But the increase in crime was alarming. The
British Adviser in the Ministry of Justice, who had
examined carefully the dossiers from all over the
country stated that crime was in no sense due to
poverty or to lack of means to lead an orderly life.
The elections at the end of 19 13 were marked by a
complete indifference of voters. Egypt was apathetic.
The Egyptians were showing an annually increasing
tendency to break the law. Murders and theft
over-taxed police and judges.

420

CHAPTER XXI

EGYPT BECOMES A BRITISH
PROTECTORATE

LITTLE was said about the Khedive in the
last chapter: for there was little to say.
He had reigned for over twenty years when
the war of 1914 broke out; but he had not ruled.
During the last ten years of the Cromer regime,
Abbas Hilmi had frequently been troublesome. He
had never been dangerous. In the man himself,
the gambler's spirit was lacking. From the moment
he arrived at the age to realize the humiliation of
his position, he rebelled inwardly. Like the great
majority of his fellow-countrymen, he detested the
English, and wanted to get rid of them. But he
was cowed by Lord Cromer: for he had been told
plainly that opposition meant deposition. He had
a splendid "berth" as Khedive of Egypt, — honors,
money, palaces. To win power he would not risk
privileges.

Had there been no Nationalist movement and
no pan-Islamic movement at the beginning of the
twentieth century. Abbas Hilmi would have re-
mained innocuous, and British Consuls-General
could have continued to snap their fingers at him.

421

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

But a ruler who put himself at the head of a popular
movement could easily have been dangerous to the
British administration. From the legal point of
view and from the moral point of view, he would
have had right on his side, and nowhere in Europe
would public sentiment have rallied to his support
more quickly and more generously than in the very
country from which the intruders came. Abbas
Hilmi missed a great opportunity of becoming ruler
of Egypt when the Nationalist Party was in its
hey-day. There would have been strength, and a
glorious opportunity for Abbas Hilmi, also, had he
come out boldly and staked his throne upon the
question of loyalty and fulfillment of obligations to
his suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey. He. had several
excellent opportunities to put the British in an
embarrassing position before the Moslem world
and in the eyes of Europe as well. If the Khedive
had come out openly as a supporter of the pan-
Islamic movement, and had he refused to accede
to Cromer's demands in connection v/ith the Sinai
Peninsula controversy, the British would hardly
have dared to depose him, and the Turks might have
gained their point. There was much nervousness
in British Cabinet Councils over the effect of the
pan-Islamic agitation in India, and the new Parlia-
ment was extremely Liberal. Lord Cromer had the
good fortune to be dealing with a weakling.

Sir Eldon Gorst tried to establish friendly rela-
tions between the Palace and the British Agency.
This he succeeded in doing, in spite of the change
in the situation in Egypt after the Young Turk

422

EGYPT A BRITISH PROTECTORATE

Revolution, which occurred in the second year of
Sir Eldon's incumbency. There seemed to be a real
attachment between the Khedive and the Consul-
General. When Sir Eldon Gorst was dying, Abbas
Hilmi made a visit to England to see him. For a
while, the Nationalists, especially those of the moder-
ate wing, had high hope that the Khedive would
assert himself, and demand on behalf of his people a
radical change in the humiliating policy of keeping
Eg3^pt in complete political tutelage. When the
Italian War brought Lord Kitchener once more to
Egypt, Abbas Hilmi had his last chance to come out
unequivocally on the Turkish side or to assure the
British that they could count upon his loyalty.
He did neither. He drifted along, suspected by the
British of intriguing with their enemies, and hated
by the Nationalists and Turks for failing in his duty
as ruler of the nation and as vassal of the Sultan.

Abbas Hilmi spent much time at his estates in
Turkey, and was at his summer home on the Bos-
phorus when the European War began. He refused
to declare for the Allies, and stayed on in Turkey
after the Turks decided to cast in their fortunes with
the Germans. Like every one else who was in touch
with what was happening at the Sublime Porte,
Abbas Hilmi knew well enough, from the very be-
ginning of the war, that the Young Turks intended
to cast in the lot of the Ottoman Empire with the
■ Central European Powers. A member of the Khe-
divial family. Prince Said Halim, was the Sultan's
Grand Vizier. Had Abbas Hilmi's past attitude
been one of constant and courageous opposition to

423

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the British occupation of his country, his defection
might have had serious results for the British. As
it was, the Khedive had become a neghgible quantity
with his own subjects. The hotheads had tried
twice to assassinate him. ^ The moderates knew that
he was a hopeless barrier to getting any concessions
from the British. It was the chance for Great
Britain to depose the Khedive, and to establish a
definite status by making Egypt a part of the British
Empire. Abbas Hilmi's desertion of his country
and his unpopularity among all classes of his subjects
made his deposition easy. The state of war with
Turkey dissolved Britain's obligations to the Sultan.
Shortly after his deposition, I saw Abbas Hilmi
in Vienna. He was cheerful and unruffled, and
did not seem worried about having lost his throne.
I think he was not at all misled by the hope that
German victory would lead to his reinstatement in
Cairo, rid of the British occupation. Like Abdul
Aziz and Hafid in Morocco, his only preoccupation
was the thought of the revenues from his estates.^
Of these he felt that he would be assured. Not
only were the British just, but they knew how im-
portant it was to purchase immunity from intrigues.

^ The second attempt was in Constantinople on July 25, 1914, just
a week before the war. The bullet hit the Khedive in the face. The
assailant stated that he was moved by the desire to rid Egypt of a
ruler who was betraying his people by refusing to lead them.

' Hafid, whom the French had deposed in Morocco after they
found that he would not work loyally with them under the Protec-
torate, was consoled by a large pension. But he, like Abbas Hilmi,
believed in the ultimate success of the Germans, and risked his pen-
sion to cast in his fortunes with them. The last I heard of him he was
living in a German milieu at Barcelona.

424

EGYPT A BRITISH PROTECTORATE

Abbas Hilmi is like many a man born with a silver
spoon in his mouth. He had homage and wealth
through no effort of his own, and the joy of privi-
leges was ample compensation for renouncing the
glory of responsibilities. Will and ability are rarely
handed down from father to son: the former is
developed through necessity and the latter through
effort.

Lord Kitchener, also, was away from Egypt
when the war broke out. He was needed at home
for the greatest task of his life. During the first
three months of the war, Egypt was forgotten in
the tremendous march of events in Europe. I was
in Paris during these months. My especial interest
in the Near East led me to scan eagerly the news-
papers for telegrams from Constantinople and
Cairo. Only once was there mention of Egypt, when
a news item, given out in London,- announced that
it had been found necessary to intern Germans and
Austrians. But the entry of Turkey into the war,
and the defection of the Khedive, brought a new
situation. From Berlin it was announced that the
Turks were going to reoccupy Egypt. The import-
ance of this menace was, of course, the Suez Canal.
If the Germans could get control of the Canal,
they would strike a more serious blow at the British
Empire than by any other move they could make.
I was in Berlin when the Egyptian campaign was
being widely discussed in the press and in political
circles. Great hopes were expressed, through the
seizure of the Suez Canal, not only of winning the
war by bringing Britain to her knees, quickly,

425

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

but also of permanent German control of Asiatic
commerce.

Immediately upon receipt of the news in Cairo
that hope had been abandoned of preventing Tur-
key from joining Germany, the numerous Turkish
agents and the dangerous agitators among the Egyp-
tians were quietly gathered in by the police, and
deported to Malta before they knew what had hap-
pened. Sir John Maxwell, who was in command of
the British Army of Occupation,^ was given full
powers from London, and assured that the first
Australian and New Zealand contingents would be
started immediately to complete their training in
Egypt. Other troops were sent out from England.
Sir John Maxwell, like Lord Kitchener and Sir
Reginald Wingate, was one of the "old guard" of
British officers in the Egyptian army, who made
their career in Egypt. He knew all the ins and outs
of Egyptian life, and the attitude of the leading
men toward the British occupation. He was one
of those rare Englishmen who had won the affection
of the Moslems. Bitter enemies of the English
have assured me that Sir John was the type of man

^ In 1906, the British forces were increased by a cavalry regiment,
an artillery battery, and an infantry battalion. This increased the
expense for the maintenance of the British troops, borne entirely
by Egypt, from half a million to three quarters of a million dollars
per annum. Cf. Mr. Haldane's speech in the House of Commons on
July 5, 1910. One tremendous advantage that Great Britain en-
joys from her colonial empire is the ability to have in training and
ready for use, without any expense to the British taxpayers, soldiers
and army officers and civilian officials. Many of Britain's most
celebrated administrators and generals have been developed with
very little, if any, expense to the budget.

426

EGYPT A BRITISH PROTECTORATE

to popularize British rule in Egypt, if only there were
more of his kind. He did not make the Egyptians
feel that they were social inferiors. When he called
the Bedouin Sheiks to the British Agency on Novem-
ber 2, 1 914, and broke the news to them of the state
of war with Turkey, he was talking to friends, and
not to a group of men who bowed to his will only be-
cause he had superior force. They agreed to stand
by him. This was the beginning of Germany's
deception concerning the Khalif's power over the
Mohammedan world, which came to the climax
eighteen months later in the rebellion of the Shereef
of Mecca. ^

The great problem was to secure a new ruler for
Egypt. It was known at this time that the Khedive
would not return, and the news was a relief, for
Abbas Hilmi would have been an embarrassment,
if not a danger, to the British. Negotiations were
opened with the uncle of the Khedive, Hussein
Kamel, the eldest living representative of the family
of Mohammed Ali. Under Mohammedan law he
should have been the ruler of Egypt. Prince Hus-
sein was in no hurry to accept the British overtures.
He was a man of the old school, who had been from
his youth a reader and a thinker. His culture was
wholly French, and he could not speak English.
His European experience and his European associa-
tions were mostly with France. He had been in

' The story of this far-reaching event, which is going to have a
vital part in the relations of Imperial Britain and Imperial France
with Islam, and in the future of Western and Central Asia, is treated
in my New Map of A sia, now in preparation.

427

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

exile in his youth, owing to differences of opinion
with his father, the Khedive Ismail, and since the
British occupation had abstained from mixing in
politics. His passion was agriculture, and he had
lived for thirty years the life of a country gentleman.
Of all the princes of the khedivial family. Prince
Hussein alone had abstained from entering the
service of Abdul Hamid, and becoming contaminated
by the degrading Yildiz Kiosk influences. He had
no illusions about the hopeless degeneracy of the
Turkish ruling caste, and the inability of the Young
Turks to recreate a strong Islamic state in the spirit
of Occidental and twentieth century civilization.
On the other hand, he was thoroughly convinced
that the inherent liberal spirit of the French and
British nations made them the safe mentors and
just guardians of Islamic interests.

After six weeks of pourparlers, Prince Hussein
consented to accept the rulership of Egypt under
a British Protectorate. On December 17, 1914, the
British Government announced that the relation
between Turkey and Egypt was severed, and that
Egypt was now a British Protectorate. Sir Henry
McMahon was appointed High Commissioner. The
next day Prince Hussein became Sultan of Egypt.
I have had the honor and privilege of several long
conversations with the Sultan, and have had from
his own mouth the story of the negotiations of
November and December, 1914, and the explanation
of the motives that led the Sultan to accept the call
to rule Egypt under British protection. The Sultan
is a great admirer of Mohammed Ali, the founder of

428

EGYPT A BRITISH PROTECTORATE

his House. He believes that it is his duty to carry
out the program of Mohammed Ali, the two cardinal
points of which were: complete separation from
Turkey, and the introduction of Occidental civiliza-
tion. The intention of Turkey to reconquer Egypt
with the aid of Germany threatened to overthrow
the successful achievement of Mohammed Ali in
freeing Egypt from the Turkish yoke. The reten-
tion and strengthening of the bond between Great
Britain and Egypt was the best way of securing to
the Egyptians the complete realization of the eco-
nomic and social prosperity that had been- initiated
by Mohammed Ali, and to which the ancestors of
the Sultan had given their lives.

The Khedive's Premier, Rushdi Pasha, rallied
to the new regime, and consented to stay in office
as head of the Sultan's Cabinet. Most of the lead-
ing Egyptians followed his example. The idea of
the permanency of the British occupation was far
less distasteful than that of seeing the material
prosperity of the country and the security of life
and property jeopardized by a Germano-Turkish
invasion. Even among the older pashas of Turkish
origin, who hate the British cordially for having
destroyed their power of exploiting the natives and
their privilege of dipping into the public treasury,
there was little joy at the thought of having to deal
with the Young Turks. In no country in the world
are conservatives in favor of a change in the status
quo. The class that has wealth in lands and invest-
ments, the class that has social prestige and privi-
leges, and the class that holds public offices, stand

429

THE NEW MAP OF .AFRICA

together to stand pat. I have been greatly amused
in reading glowing accounts of Rumanians of Tran-
sylvania, Italians of Trieste, Croatians of Agram, and
other inhabitants of terre irredente, who burn to
welcome delivering armies. Personal observation
on the ground has taught me that in all the countries
of whose nationalist and irredentist movements we
hear so much, the prime movers and agitators are
college professors and professional men and students,
who have little or nothing to risk or lose by a change
of government. The peasants feel the call of blood
only after they have been worked upon and stirred
up by priests and schoolmasters and paid political
agents. The landowners and manufacturers and
business men rarely allow their heart to run away
with their head. They know which side their
bread is buttered on. They worship the golden calf
of the status qiio. In many countries, they have
confessed this to me with frankness. Egypt is no
exception to the general rule.

The Turks tried hard to make an attack upon
Egypt before the British were able to assemble
sufficient troops for the defense of the Canal and
for overhauling the Egyptians. General Maxwell
felt it wise to recall the Egyptian garrisons and the
initial British forces that had been sent to the Turk-
ish frontier. They fell back to the Canal, leaving
to the Turks the task of operating in the desert of
the Isthmus and the mountainous and roadless
Peninsula. The Turks reached the Canal with
twelve thousand men on February 2, 19 15, and tried
to force their way across at several points. They

430

EGYPT A BRITISH PROTECTORATE

believed that if they once got into Egypt a popular
movement would sweep the British out of the coun-
try. But the guns of French and British warships,
moored in the Canal, prevented the execution of this
project. The risk had been too great, however,
for the lesson not to be learned. Egypt was for-
tunately on the way from Australasia to the battle-
fields of Europe. During 191 5, it was made the
training ground for Australians and New Zealanders,
the half-way station for British and Indian troops
on their way to and from India, and the base
for the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia operations.
Thus several hundred thousand men could be kept
in the country all (the time, without immobilizing
them.

When the Turks fortified El Arish and Akaba, and
began to build their railway to the Egyptian fron-
tier, they spread the report broadcast in Egypt that
they were coming back in force in 191 6 to deliver
the captive province from the yoke of the infidel.
In spite of a rigid censorship and an extensively
organized secret service, news of the humiliating
disasters inflicted upon the British by the Turks at
Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia, and of the failure of
the Salonika expedition to save Serbia, reached every
village of Egypt. As prestige means everything to
the Orientals, and as the British knew that their
hold on Egypt was solely that of force, the beginning
of 1 91 6 brought to the Suez Canal an army organiza-
tion separate from that of the Army of Occupation.
A new general arrived, with his own staff, and a
system of defense was organized that would make it

431

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

impossible for the Turks to reach the Canal a second
time. I had the privilege of visiting these defenses.
When the attack against Verdun called me back to
France, I left a disappointed lot of Tommies and
Colonials. There was some fighting on the western
front against the Senussi; but the Canal remained
farther from "the front" than Paris. During the
spring and summer of 191 6, the British undertook
to clear Egyptian territory, i. e., the Isthmus and
the Peninsula, of the enemy. They did not get the
revenge they longed for, the chance to meet the
Turks when the tables, as far as geographical ad-
vantages were concerned, were turned in British
favor.

The failure of the Turks to accomplish anything
against Egypt counterbalanced the effect in jEgypt
of Gallipoli and Mesopotamia. The mass of the
Egyptians would have welcomed Turks and Ger-
mans, had they invaded Egypt after a successful
battle with the British forces. But they would
have risked nothing until they were certain of the
success of the invaders. Under no circumstances
would the Egyptians have risked an uprising against
the British. The internal security of Egypt depends
upon the defense of the Canal.

The present war was needed to convince the Brit-
ish nation and the British dominions overseas of the
necessity of making Egypt a permanent British
possession. The Suez Canal is the artery binding
India and Australasia to the Mother Country, and
it was fitting that Indians and Australians and New
Zealanders should have an important part in its

432

EGYPT A BRITISH PROTECTORATE

defense. What would have happened had Britain
yielded during the past thirty years to the insistent
demands (the demands of some of her own states-
men) to evacuate Egypt? After the lesson of this
war, only the Britisher, who is a Little Englander
and who wants to see the Empire disbanded, will
argue for giving up Egypt.

The attack on the Suez Canal made clear the
destiny of Egypt, if Britain emerges from the war
the victor. I did not hesitate to ask the Sultan
what he expected would be Britain's attitude towards
maintaining the Protectorate after the war. His
answer was frank and unhesitating. "You need
only to look at the British troops in Egypt, and to
consider where they came from," said His Highness,
"to realize how splendidly this war is proving the
solidarity of the British Empire, and the importance
of the Suez Canal to the British Empire. After the
war, when Britain has demonstrated that she could
hold by countless sacrifice of blood and treasure, in
which the colonies fully cooperated, her great Empire
intact, it is unlikely that the Suez Canal and Egypt
will be less necessary to England than now or than
before the war. I should not have accepted the
Sultanate under British protection, had I not been
loyal to, and sympathetic with, those whom long
and intimate experience have taught me are the
true friends of my people and of my family. I
have consented to work, at the age of sixty-four,
with the English for the regeneration of my coun-
try, and for the fulfillment of the wonderful
dreams for Egypt and her people that have come
28 433

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

to me from my august ancestor, the founder of my
House. "^

Success in securing a ruler from the khedivial
family, and in keeping the country quiet during the
trying periods of the beginning of the war, the Turk-
ish attacks on the Canal, the Senussi raids, and the
Gallipoli and Mesopotamia fiascoes, must not be
interpreted by the British, however, as a sign of the
loyalty of the Egyptians to the Protectorate and of
their satisfaction with the past and present of British
rule. I do not know what Egyptians may say to
British friends and British journalists. It is prob-
able that they are especially guarded in their obser-
vations during war time. But they have spoken
out of their heart to me. Without a single exception.
Christians as well as Moslems, from extreme Anglo-
philes to extreme Anglophobes, the Egyptians are
dissatisfied with the way in which British rule has
developed in Egypt, and sincerely and ardently
desire a change. Sultan, Prime Minister, Cabinet,
and notables, are at one in their demand that Egypt
should have — and have immediately — a very much
larger measure of self-government than has been
allowed to her during the past.

In 191 6, I noticed many changes from the Egypt
of 1909, when Young Turks, Young Persians, and
Young Egyptians had high hopes of establishing a
constitutional regime in Moslem countries. There

^ This interview in full, which was passed for publication by His
Highness, was published in my correspondence to the New York
and Paris editions of the New York Herald and the Philadelphia
Evening Telegraph, January to March, 1916.

434

EGYPT A BRITISH PROTECTORATE

is a difference of attitude toward many problems
affecting national life: disillusionment in political
matters; sadness in educational matters. But on
one point there is no change. The opinion is exactly
the same. The Egyptians resent the pretension of
the British to manage their internal affairs for them.
They want to get rid of the officials who have in-
stalled themselves, not always tactfully, in the
ministries as masters in every branch of administra-
tion. They are like every other nation in the world
in wanting to run their own affairs. They grant
that they may run them badly for a while. But
their argument is unanswerable. They ask you to
point out a single nation in history that has evolved
into a self-governing community without having
gone through a long period of imperfection, mistakes,
and errors, even of revolution and anarchy. The
Egyptians have three serious charges against the
system of ruling Egypt which Lord Cromer laid
down. The impartial observer, with the facts
before him, admits that these charges are amply
substantiated.

I. The British officials in Egypt do not put first
the interests of the country in which they are living,
from which they draw their salaries, and whose Sultan
they are supposed to be serving.

The system of having the internal affairs of a na-
tion managed by men whose allegiance is to the sover-
eign of another nation and who take their orders, not
from the Sultan and his Cabinet, but from a foreign
official, is pernicious in the extreme, and bound to
have disastrous results in the long run. Until it is

435

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

changed, no reasonable man can blame the Egyptians
for saying that they are in the position of a conquered
race, held in bondage by force. Their masters may
take care of them in the best way possible, looking
after their subjects' interests, and giving them bene-
fits that they would not have if they looked after
their own interests. But they are in bondage all the
same. Is it not an Anglo-Saxon maxim that just
government derives its authority from the consent of
the governed?

2. The British officials do not feel and care for
Egypt and the Egyptians as it is essential they should
feel and care to fill properly their positions.

The great majority of the officials have no interest
in the "natives." They dislike them, and speak
disparagingly of them. They tell you frankly 'that
their motive for being in Egypt is to serve British
interests and draw their pay. They resent the fact
that they are disliked, although they make little
effort to be liked ; are impatient with the folly of the
natives for not knowing a good thing (the British
administration) when they see it; and are angry at
what they term Egyptian ingratitude. The few who
have given their lives to Egypt, and have actually
shown proof of self-sacrifice and devotion, are
grieved over the lack of appreciation they receive
from the people. It is hard to get under the skin of
a Britisher. He feels that he is a superior being.
As he is wholly indifferent about your attitude to-
wards him he never bothers his head about what
you are thinking of him. Other nations frequently
speak of a British attitude as ' ' deliberately insulting.

436

EGYPT A BRITISH PROTECTORATE

That is not true. It is farthest from the British
mind to be insulting. The action in question is
instinctive — not thought out or willed. An English-
man of the upper class would be the most surprised
man in the worid if he discovered that you thought he
was not acting considerately and courteously. There
is no more charming thoroughbred in the world than
the English gentleman — to those whom he knows.
Those whom he does not know are nonentities to him,
and if he were to think the matter out, he would
arrive at the conclusion that he does not see why he is
not a nonentity to them also. The reasoning is this :
he does not bother me. Why should I bother him ?

One afternoon in Shepheard's Hotel, an officer who
belonged to a London regiment and whose accent
was South England to perfection, was disconcerted
and provoked when I asked him a question about
Melbourne. "How did you know that I was an
Australian?" he asked. "By the way you walked
through the hall," I answered. "You looked at
people with evident interest as you came toward me.
Had your Oxford accent been innate and not acquired
you would have seen no one in the hall." The
British official in the African colonies is generally a
gentleman, with the temperamental limitations of his
class. He voices the mental attitude of Great Bri-
tain in her dealings with other nations. He never
considers for one moment the fact that other in-
dividuals than himself, and other races than his own,
have, and have a right to, amour propre.

With untutored savages and with peasants, the
British attitude goes. Only when there is the ele-

437

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

ment of injustice — as at Denshawai — do the unedu-
cated classes rebel against it. But the upper class
Egyptians, who have blood and traditions and educa-
tion, hate like poison the way most Englishmen
treat them. They tell me that they do not blame the
Englishman for his views and his temperament.
But they do blame him for forcing those views and
that temperament upon them in their own country.

3. As the civil service has developed, the British
Government has not been able to send a uniformly high
class of officials to Egypt. The Egyptians are made to
accept in many official positions men whose mental
caliber would not enable them to Jill similar positions
in Great Britain.

This is undoubtedly true. I have seen numerous
examples of it. The Egyptian civil service has in it
many splendid men. But there are others who are
decidedly second rate. The Egyptians are very
quick to recognize the second-rate man. If a man
has marked ability and splendid training, or is a
thoroughbred, and if there is confidence in his in-
tegrity and in his sense of justice, respect and even
admiration will be given to him. He may be dis-
liked ; but his authority will be acknowledged. It is
a lamentable injustice and abuse of power, however,
to put over a weaker nation, in positions of superior
authority, men whose judgment and training are
inferior to those to whom they give orders. There
is a striking case of this at the present time in one
of the Egyptian ministries. The adviser in question
has many warm supporters among the British in
Egypt, but, when I put the question straight, I

438

EGYPT A BRITISH PROTECTORATE

never found one who would not admit that in Eng-
land this adviser could not possibly obtain a position
such as the one in which the Egyptians are compelled
to defer to his judgment and his decisions. And it is
a position second to none, from the Egyptian stand-
point, in importance in uplifting their nation!

I have tried to show in this volume how much the
British Empire owes to the class of men England, of
all nations, is alone able to send abroad in great
number for colonial military and administrative
positions. But the supply, as the case of Egypt
shows, was not unlimited before the war. ' It is un-
fortunately the very class that has suJEfered most
heavily during the past two years. The British
Government cannot hope to replace soon the men
who have fallen in Flanders, Gallipoli, and Meso-
potamia.

It would seem to the outside observer, then, not
only that the British should be very slow to assume
new and extensive colonial responsibilities, but also
that they should endeavor, wherever possible, to
retrench in the using of the best element of the
British nation. Never has there been a demand far
in excess of the supply, because the upper class has
placed self-imposed restrictions upon its field of
activity. A new condition will confront the British
Government after the war.

My space is too limited to discuss the international
problem that Great Britain has to face in regularizing
her position in Egypt. Since fifteen Governments
have by treaty a privileged position in Egypt, it will
be necessary to treat with them all to secure their

439

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

consent to the abolition of the capitulations and to
the establishment of the Protectorate. The negotia-
tions to this end may demand in some cases the offer-
ing of compensations. But they ought not to be
difficult. British administration of justice, British
handling of finances, and British principles of equal
tariffs and the open door are sufficient guarantee that
the new status quo, far from injuring foreign residents
or merchants, will be distinctly to their advantage.

The great problem is that of the internal govern-
ment of Egypt. Great Britain will have the acquies-
cence and support of the Egyptians in leaving in her
hands entirely the foreign relations of Egypt and all
matters relating to the Canal and to the zone between
the Canal and the Ottoman Empire. For it is freely
recognized by all that British Imperial interests
demand, and have a right to demand, that the Suez
Canal be under British control. But no Egyptians,
as far as I have been able to ascertain, are going to
support the present humiliating system of internal
administration. Since they are unable to overthrow
it, they may have to continue to tolerate it. One
hopes, however, that British statesmen will see that
the interest of the Empire is best served by letting
the Egyptians have the same chance that their own
forebears had of working out political salvation.

440

CHAPTER XXII

THE CREATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
UNION

ONE summer afternoon, when I was indulging
in my favorite recreation of rummaging in
the stalls of the second-hand booksellers along
the Seine quays in Paris, I came across a little duo-
decimo volume of less than three hundred pages,
which bore the title : Woman, Her Past, Her Present^
and Her Future. Even to an eighteenth-century
author, who Hved long before the days of feminism,
the project of telling all about women in one little
book must have appeared ambitious, unless he were
a bachelor or a monk. I was amused at the temerity
or ignorance of the writer. I feel that I am laying
myself open to a similar criticism in trying to discuss
the South African Union in one small chapter of a
book covering all of Africa. But some mention must
be made, even if it be of an incomplete and summary
character, of the formation of a great European state
out of territories colonized by white men. Only in
South Africa has Europe been able to become in-
digenous, racially and politically.

In his farewell speech, when he resigned the High
Commissionership of the South African colonies,

441

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Lord Milner called upon the people to be faithful to
the idea of imperial unity, which alone would solve
the most difficult and persistent problem of South
Africa. "The Dutch can never own perfect al-
legiance to Great Britain," he said, "but the British
and Dutch aHke can unite in loyal devotion to an
Empire state in which Britain and South Africa are
partners. The true Imperialist is also the best
South African." These remarkable words, uttered
by a man who never failed to see clearly into the
heart of a problem, expressed the conviction that
came to moderate Dutch and moderate British
after the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were
granted responsible government.

The work of the Colonial Convention, assembled to
agree upon the form of union and the constitution,
extended over eighteen months. There were many
particular interests to be considered, and several
crises arose, which threatened to wreck the project
altogether. Both Natal and the Transvaal showed
an uncompromising spirit, and a perfect willingness
to refuse to come in, if what they called their rights
and interests were not taken into account. Cape
Colony had a negro franchise. The Orange Free
State, being very markedly Boer, held out on the educa-
tion question. In the end, however, the four colonies
were able to agree. Their decision was hastened by
the railway question and the tariff war, of which
we have spoken in a previous chapter. Rhodesia
stayed out. The conditions of union were formu-
lated by the colonies themselves, and presented to
the Home Government merely for sanction, and not

442

THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION

for decision or revision. All these conditions, except
the question of the inclusion of the native protecto-
rates, were sine qua non. This was clearly impressed
upon the Imperial Parliament, when the Bill for
union was presented. Delegates representing the
different elements and parties in South Africa were
present in the House of Lords and the House of
Commons when the Bill was read. Some of the provi-
sions were distasteful to Parliament. Opposition was
strong, however, only against the provision which ex-
cluded from the Union Parliament and governing func-
tions persons who were not "of European descent."
Only because the Imperial Parliament was given
clearly to understand that striking out this provision
would wreck the Union were the Liberals induced to
allow it to stand. The native franchise stood for the
province of Cape Colony. But even that could be
taken away by two-thirds vote of the Commonwealth
Parliament. As changes in the constitution were
subject to the veto of the King, the Radicals were,
persuaded that this franchise was not in jeopardy./*
The "Union of South Africa" was formed by Royal]
Proclamation on December 2, 1909, and Herbert 1
Gladstone, raised to the peerage, was appointed as
first Governor.

From this moment. South Africa became a self- '
governing dominion of the British Empire, like f
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Direct author-
ity of the Crown remained only in the protectorates,
of which we have spoken previously; but they were
eventually to be transferred to the Union. Seven
years after the close of the Boer War, Boer and Briton

443

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

/- were united in a common effort, with common
privileges and responsibilities, to work out the desti-
nies of European civilization in South Africa. The
Union is the most remarkable achievement of
I British statesmanship in the history of the Empire.
It was possible only because the Home Government
had the courage to grant responsible government to
the former Boer republics, and the wisdom to refuse
to override the decisions of the colonies in regard to
their particular interests and their common interests.
It proves the peculiar genius of Anglo-Saxondom
for creating and fostering democratic institutions.
' The British are very far from being' democrats from
/ the social point of view. Politically, they have estab-
I lished the only real democracy that exists in the
/ world to-day.

I One finds ever3rwhere in Africa a refutation of the
^ argument so often heard in the United States against
. government ownership of railways. Great financial
benefit has come to almost every European colony
in Africa where the Government has from the begin-
ning exploited the railways, or has later taken them
over from private corporations. Especially is this
' true in South Africa. Cape Colony and Natal, as
well as the two Dutch republics, own their railways.
When the Union was formed, common state owner-
ship and state management was instituted without
a hitch. There were no private interests, influencing
legislators, to be considered. The South African
railways are free from concessions. Even the re-
freshment privilege, which used to be farmed out,
has been taken over by the State. Capital for rail-

444

THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION

way construction is raised by increase of the state
debt, and purely public considerations dictate rail-
way extension. Not only are the railways in the
South African Union self-supporting, as in the Sudan
and almost everywhere else in Africa ; but after inter-
est charges on the capital invested and expenses of
management are paid, the State has a very large
surplus for the purposes of the general budget. A
study of the statistics of the various lines reveals the
advantage of the common wealth to the Common-
wealth. The Cape and Free State railways are run
at a loss. The coal and Rand lines of the Transvaal
pay the deficit. This enables the State to maintain
existing and to develop new lines on a sound eco-
nomic basis. When the country that is being opened
up by the railways is developed, the new lines will
become self-supporting, and the financial advantage
will accrue to the State. Some of them, whose con-
struction was dictated in the beginning by political
considerations, would have been built by private
capital only under conditions that would later have
proved onerous to the State. As it is, the people
will possess the values they have themselves created.
Inhabitants of the Transvaal, who view the railway
question from a selfish local point of view, complain
that they are being mulcted to afford the Cape
Colony and Free State people the luxury of better
railway service than their present resources and
earning capacity give them the right to expect. If
living were only from day to day, the complaint
would be just. But the Transvaal enjoys reciprocal
advantages from its membership in the Union.

445

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

There is unhampered access to the sea for the land-
locked colony. Food products, wood, and other
materials necessary for the Transvaal's development
are received without the duties that might have been
imposed, had the members of the Union continued
their separate existence.
/' Since the union, South Africa has not made much
I progress in solving the negro question. Between the
I census of 1904 and 191 1, the native population in-
/ creased more rapidly than the white. The Euro-
peans passed from 1,117,000 to 1,276,000; natives
from 4,059,000 to 4,697,000. If the protectorates
had been included, the proportion of whites to blacks
in South Africa would have been less than fifteen
per cent. Without the protectorates, it is scarcely
more than twenty per cent. The policy advocated
by General Hertzog and a large portion of the
Afrikanders to establish distinct zones of settlement
for natives, wholly aside from the formidable storm
of protest that would have greeted such a measure in
England, was hardly a practicable suggestion. The
Crown lands, though large in extent, are mostly
barren and far from railways. A bill to segregate
the blacks in this way was presented to the Union
Parliament in 19 14. It had the weakness of all
attempts on the part of white men to "give" natives
a portion of what they have taken from them.
It failed to provide either sufficient land or the right
sort of land, and would have been as crying an in-
justice as the disgraceful — I might better say con-
temptible— Indian reservation bills of the United
States. It was also open to the grave suspicion of

446

THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION

being a measure inspired by the Boer farmers to get
cheap labor: for had the bill passed, the blacks of
many regions, especially in the Orange River, would
have been at the mercy of the farmers. The supply
of mining and agricultural labor in other parts of the
Union would have been depleted. From the point
of view of safety, also, segregation of natives seems
unwise in a country where they are in so great a
numerical superiority to colonists and increasing
more rapidly than colonists. One feels that the
South Africans are safe without having to keep on
foot a large military and police force only because
the blacks are scattered. ^

The negro problem in South Africa is unfortunately '
developing in the same way that it has developed in j
the American Southern States. With the advance of i
civilization and the disappearance of slavery, giving
to the blacks freedom of movement and the right to
vote, social antagonism, with its evils and its dis-
tressing manifestations, has arisen. When negroes >
come into the enjoyment of economic and political ^
equality, they feel keenly the withholding of thei
social equality that it is not in the nature of the white ^
man to grant. The advocacy of segregation on a
wholesale scale is the logical development of local
segregation. Custom, sanctioned by law, enforces (
separate transportation facilities, separate schools, '
separate residence quarters, separate hotels, and sepa-
rate restaurants. To the educated and refined
negroes, travel is hell. How can they help suffering

^ Rhodesia was very hostile to this bill, fearing its passage would
result in a wholesale exodus northward of blacks and poor whites.

447

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

from being made pariahs? Others, who through no
fault of their own have not white blood in their veins,
are driven by their social ostracism to become
criminals. When one studies this problem from the
psychological point of view, the frequency of the
unspeakable crime is not surprising. Adequate pro-
tection of the white woman is the nightmare of South
Africa fully as much as of the American Southern
States. When Lord Gladstone revised the death
sentence in a Rhodesian rape case, he found that
white men who lived in communities where they were
outnumbered or equalled by negroes would never
admit the possibility of extenuating circumstances in
a crime of this sort. His ignorance or lack of appre-
ciation of local conditions led him to commit an
unpardonable blunder. There was a howl of in-
dignation from one end of South Africa to the
other.
) European civilization has brought also to South
( Africa the war between capital and labor, which has
; developed in exactly the same way as in all states
where there is universal manhood suffrage. As we
have explained in describing the problems of South
Africa before the union, the early days of the labor
movement on the Rand were not very successful, be-
cause there was no unemployment, and because the
native labor question, with its social side, complicated
the problem. Later, the white men engaged in min-
ing grew to the number of nearly fifty thousand, and
there were a hundred and fifty thousand European
industrial workers scattered throughout the Union.
The emigrants to the Transvaal from England were

448

THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION

almost all of them strong trades-union men, and
brought their ideas and their propaganda with them,
although British imperialism, even in the new country,
was anathema to them. They fraternized with the
Boers who had drifted from the farms to the cities. In-
ternational socialism took no account of racial antago-
nism between Briton and Boer. In the last general
election the Labor party returned four members to
the Union Parliament. There have been strikes in I
South Africa, and very serious labor riots. The (
police and military had to be called out in Johannes- i
burg in 1913, and there was street fighting- that re- '
suited in considerable loss of life. Seventy per cent,
of the rioters were Afrikanders, but all the leaders
were English. Most of them, like Bain and Crawford,
had been in America, and brought to the' solution of
South African labor problems methods they learned
in Colorado and West Virginia.

From the first days of the Union, General Botha
has been the commanding figure in South Africa,
and General Smuts has been the loyal coadjutor of
General Botha. The Boers formed a majority of
the electorate in the Cape, the Orange Free State,
and the Transvaal. They form a majority- of the
electorate in the Union. It is clear, then, that from
the moment the Boer War disenfranchisements were
terminated in the Cape, and the two former republics
were granted self-government, there was no hope of
an imperial policy except by the aid of the Boers
themselves. Had the Boers all been recalcitrant and
unwilling to consider that they had anything to give
to or receive from the British Empire, self-govern-
29 449

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

merit would inevitably have led to civil war and the
revoking of the constitutions, or complete separation
from Great Britain. ^ But General Botha as Premier
of the Transvaal, and Mr. Merriman as Premier of
the Cape Colony, formed Boer parties that were
favorable to a South African Union under the British
flag, and to reconciliation with the British element
in the colonies.

^ Lord Gladstone offered General Botha the premier-
ship of the Union of South Africa until a general election
' could be held. A coalition ministry was proposed,
with the inclusion of Dr. Jameson and some of the
British party, but General Botha was keen enough to
realize that if he took the English into his bosom, he
would estrange much of the Boer support he needed
to carry out the reconciliation program he had in mind.
So he made General Smuts Minister of the Interior,
and included General Hertzog, who represented the
extreme Boer party of the Orange Free State. Gen-
eral Botha stated that his program would be: the
unification of the white population, sympathetic
treatm.ent of natives and colored persons, the preven-

* The Dutch Reformed Church has a membership of nearly seven
hundred thousand, more than half the total population of European
descent in South Africa and Rhodesia combined. The official
census figures of 1904 and 191 1 show that the population of the Orange
Free State increased more than five times as fast as the population
of Cape Colony and Natal. The Transvaal increased over four
times as fast. The Boers have much larger families than the British.
Their distribution, also, is stronger. They are not congregated in
cities. They have lands and permanent sources of wealth. Unfor-
tunately, the alarmingly large class of "poor whites" has a large
Anglo-Saxon element in it.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION

tion of Asiatic immigration, a broad and conciliatory-
educational policy, and everything that would tend
to a rapid economic development.

In the general election on September 15, 1910, '
General Botha's Nationalist party, comprised wholly/
of Boers, carried 67 out of 121 seats. So he had|
a majority over the British, the irreconcilable^
Boers, and the labor members combined. We can-/
not go into the political history of the next few years.
General Botha was greatly helped in keeping down
racial animosity by the splendid attitude of Dr.
Jameson, who had the political wisdom- and the
patriotism to continue to support unwaveringly
General Botha after the coalition ministry project
was refused by Botha. Dr. Jameson had to resist
the pressure of his political friends, and to stand the
criticism of the British section of the press. It is
not too much to say that Dr. Jameson's policy was
almost as important a factor in making the Union
successful as General Botha's. These two men were
imbued with the spirit of "live and let live. " They
had rare moral courage in the midst of the passion
and prejudice and blindness of many of their political
associates.

In 1913, the split that had long been expected V
among the Boers was made definite by the with-
drawal of General Hertzog from the Botha Minis-
try. A new party was formed, which called itself
the National party. General Botha's moderate
Boers preferred the title of South African party.
Although General Hertzog, who was at one time a'
judge in the Free State, has always remained a fanati-

451

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

cal Afrikander and has never abandoned the early
Krugerism in his attitude toward the uitlanders, he
has unconsciously — perhaps involuntarily — devel-
oped by his intimate contact with the English social
graces and a breadth of vision. It is impossible to
believe that his fanatical opposition to the imperial
deal reflects his own sober judgment. The benefit
that South Africa receives from British sovereignty,
the inevitable triumph of English over Taal, and the
impossibility of reviving the old pastoral simplicity
of Boer life must certainly be realized by a man of his
keen intellectual gifts. What one honestly believes,
and the position one assumes in public for sentimental
and political reasons, are often radically different.
General Hertzog, unlike General Christian De Wet,
did not involve himself in the rebellion of 1914.
But he was outspoken in his opposition to a South
African campaign against the German colonies, to
the Enemy Trading Bill, and to proposals to interne
German subjects in the Union and put their property
under sequestration.

In the general election of 191 5, General Botha lost
thirteen seats, and continues to hold office only by
the support of the British party. The political situa-
tion is very much involved at present, owing to the
unusual external and internal problems aroused by
the war. At present, General Botha is between two
fires. Many Boers believe that he is too British, and
is sacrificing the interests of South Africa to those of
a decadent and disappearing Empire. Most of the
British tell him that he has not the backbone to be
loyal in the sense they have of that word. Recently,

452

THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION

in desperation, when he was being pressed to disre-
gard the Boer opposition to the measure to increase
the pay given to South African contingents in the
Imperial army, General Botha turned to the British
members of his Parliament, and cried, "You ought
not to press me! You know I am standing on
the brink of a volcano. " If they have any sense, the
British in South Africa will not press too hard the
man to whom they owe the fact that their flag is
still waving throughout the Union.

453

CHAPTER XXIII

THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND
ITS AFTERMATH

/ A T a special session of the Union Parliament on

ZA September 14, 19 14, a resolution was passed

I by ninety-two to twelve declaring that the

House was whole-heartedly determined "to take all
/measures necessary for defending the interests of

the Union and for cooperating with his Majesty's

Imperial Government to maintain the security and
/ integrity of the Empire. " But even the loyal Dutch

of the Commonwealth were for the most part opposed
I to an expedition into German Southwest Africa.

They felt, for they knew their countrymen; that it
' was asking too much of the Boers to call upon them
' to be aggressively British, and to fight, when they
' were not being molested, for the interests of the

Empire of which they were an unwilling part. Their

fears were immediately justified.

General Beyers, Commander-General of the Union
/Defense Force, resigned the day after the close of the
j special session of Parliament. His letter of resigna-
' tion expressed surprise at Great Britain's newly

awakened anxiety to protect small nations. As a

Boer, it was impossible for him to believe that the

454

THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA

reasons given for British interference to save Belgium
were anything else than hypocritical cant.

When Beyers was called a traitor by the English
section of the press, Boer loyalists, although they
considered the tone of Beyers's letter a bit strong,
declared that he was a man whose honesty could not
be doubted, and that he had acted from the purest
motives. It is difficult to judge the working of the
mind of a man who believes he is a patriot. For the
sake of his country, almost any man lies and dis-
simulates, exonerating himself on the ground of
patriotism. Beyers probably thought he was doing
what was right. But certainly his action would have
been less open to suspicion of bad faith had he
resigned the post which bound him to British alle-
giance before the British troops had been withdrawn
for service in Europe, and before he had taken part
in the councils that planned the campaign against
German Southwest Africa. General Smuts, in
accepting the resignation of Beyers, pointed out that
the plan of operations decided upon had been
recommended by Beyers, and that there was no hint
given by Beyers, when the campaign was discussed, of
his opposition to a campaign against the Germans or
of his intention to resign. General Smuts denounced
General Beyers also for having communicated the
letter of resignation to the press before it was given
to the Government, and for his insinuation that the
loan of £7,000,000 granted to South Africa by
the Imperial Parliament was a bribe to induce the
Commonwealth to take part in the war.

The campaign against the Germans, which is
455

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

described in another place, had already begun when
Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz, who commanded the
force in the northwest of Cape Colony, rebelled.
On October 8th, Maritz refused to acknowledge an
order relieving him of his command, and imprisoned
the men who brought the order. Their commander,
Major Bouwer, who was sent back with an ultimatum
from Maritz, reported that the traitor had German
guns and a German force at his command, and was
sending as prisoners into German Southwest Africa
all the Union officers and men who refused to de-
nounce their allegiance to Great Britain. Martial
law was immediately proclaimed throughout the
Commonwealth.

There is no doubt that the great majority of the
Boers of the Orange Free State, and possibly a good
half of those in the Transvaal and the Afrikander
districts of Cape Colony, were potential rebels.
British authority in the Commonwealth depended
upon the loyalty of the more important of the Afri-
kander leaders, and particularly upon General Botha
and General Smuts. It is not too much to say that
if these two men had adopted the same attitude as
General Hertzog, South Africa would have thrown
off British allegiance, or at least would have made
impossible the expedition against German South-
west Africa.

Maritz's action, on the other hand, would have
had no serious results were it not for the defection
of General Beyers and General Christian De Wet.
For his commando was routed and fled into German
territory in less than three weeks. But at that

456

THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA

moment rebellion broke out in the Orange Free
State and in Western Transvaal, De Wet command-
ing in the former and Beyers in the latter.

On October 21st, General Christian De Wet made
a speech at Verde, a town in the north of the Free
State, in which he declared that though he had
"signed the Vereeniging Treaty and sworn to be
faithful to the British flag, the Boers had been so
downtrodden by the miserable and pestilential
English that they could endure it no longer. His
Majesty King Edward VII. had promised to protect
them and had failed to do so. " When De Wet and
Beyers took the field, they were joined by three
members of the Union Parliament, and by Mr. Wessel
Wessels, a member of the Defense Cou)icil of the
Union. Preachers of great influence in the Dutch
Church went through the country calling upon the
people to take arms against the British. Among the
Dutch clergy a statement was circulated in which
Maritz was warmly defended. In this statement one
finds a sentence which furnishes food for thought
to those in England to-day who are cursing the
memory of Sir Roger Casement and failing to lay
any blame whatever upon Sir Edward Carson for
what has happened recently in Ireland

"Next year (19 15) it will be twenty years since
Jameson made his raid on the Transvaal to steal our
coiintry, to kill our Government, to destroy our
existence as a people, and in addition our nationality
forever, and in aU that time we have never had the
good fortune to meet a single Englishman or English-
woman who condemned the raid, not to speak of

457

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

detestation and of making Jameson out to be what
Maritz is now being made out to be. "

The manifesto of the rebelHon was signed by
Beyers, De Wet, Maritz, Wessels, Pienaar, and
Fourie. It has not been pu^bHshed in the press, and
is worth quoting, to indicate what the rebels had in
mind

"When we iSubscribed to the Treaty of 'Vereeniging
and laid down our arms, we were a crushed and beaten
people, driven to the verge of starvation and despair
by the dishonorable tactics of a vigorous and power-
ful enemy — our resources exhausted and our homes
destroyed — but we accepted the inevitable, and were
content to forego our nationhood and oyr liberties
for the sake of the future of our people. We were
prepared to keep our allegiance to Great Britain, as
long as we could do so v/ith honor to ourselves and
without ingratitude to our friends. Now, however,
we are called upon to choose between this doubtful
claim upon our loyalty to a relentless conqueror, and
our gratitude to a friendly nation, which extended its
sympathy and help in the time of danger. We are
being betrayed into this act of base ingratitude
either by the folly or treachery of our own Govern-
ment. Was it not enough to ask us to forget the
terrible scenes we witnessed a few years ago, either
as men on the field of battle, fighting for our hard-
won freedom, or as youths flying with our despairing
women-folk from our burning homesteads, or in the
concentration camps seeing them dying in thousands
around us, but must we now be compelled to take up
arms against a nation that gave us a helping hand in
our troubles, and plunge our people into the horrors
of an extremely doubtful European War? For our
part we are prepared to shed the last drop of blood

458

THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA ]

rather than be guilty of such cowardly baseness, and
we call on all those who love honor and friendship
and gratitude to assist us in resisting it. We have no
wish to shed the blood of the people of South Africa,
English or Dutch — far from it — but we must em-
phatically declare that the members of the present
Government have betrayed their trust, and no longer
represent the real feelings of the people of South
Africa. We most emphatically declare it to have
been a gross libel on the honor of his countrymen for
General Botha to lead the Imperial Government to
believe that the Afrikander people were willing to
enter into active and unprovoked hostilities against
the German nation, with which they had no possible
quarrel, and to which, indeed, they are closely united
by ties of blood, friendship, and of gratitude. It was
clearly his duty to inform the Imperial Government
that, while it could rely upon their passive loyalty
and obedience, it was too much to expect that they
would willingly and openly invade German territory.
The consequence, therefore, of the present civil strife
must rest, morally, at any rate, on his shoulders and
those of his Government. For ourselves, we shall
not lay down our arms until the Government is
removed from office, and all idea of invading German
territory is frankly abandoned. We are fully aware
of the gravity of our position, but no other course
consistent with honor was open to us, and we leave
our motives to be finally judged by the honorable
instinct of all men. Expediency may demand that
we be regarded and treated as rebels, but justice and
truth will always proclaim our conduct as inspired
by the truest patriotism. We do not desire to set
up a Republic or any other form of Government,
against the wishes of the majority of our fellow-
citizens. All we ask is that the people as a whole be
allowed to say whether or not they wish to declare
war against Germany, or any other nation. We wish

459

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

to govern ourselves in our own way without fraud
or coercion from anyone, and we call upon the
people to assist us in attaining that ideal. "

The rebellion was crushed by the energy and
decision of General Botha and General Smuts, who
put unhesitatingly all the weight of their influence
with the moderate section of the Afrikanders and of
their military skill and organizing ability into the
task. General Smuts recalled part of the little army
that had been sent to occupy the coast towns of
German Southwest Africa, and succeeded in raising
in three weeks thirty thousand armed volu,nteers,
most of them Boers. General Hertzog and ex-
President Steyn, whose allegiance was doubtful,
realized immediately that the rebellion would not
succeed, and did everything in their power to open
up negotiations between the Government and the
rebels. But General Smuts, master of the situation
when he saw that the rebels could not muster more
than ten thousand armed men and had to depend
upon a junction with the Germans for ammunition,
cannon, and reinforcements, declared that he could
not treat with rebels. They must be run to the
ground and forced to surrender unconditionally.

So prompt was the action of the loyalist forces that
the rebels were never able to form a junction of their
own commandos, much less to get in touch with the
Germans. Only a few hundred men with General
Kemp were able to reach German territory. Within
seven weeks all the Boers in arms, except those who
got away with Kemp, were killed, captured, or sur-

460

THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

rendered voluntarily. General Beyers was drowned
in trying to cross the Vaal River on December 9th.
At the end of December the last rebels were dispersed.
About seven thousand in all had surrendered or were
captured.

On the day the rebellion was announced, a promi-
nent Transvaal Boer said: ''Without organization,
arms, ammunition, or supplies; without a known
grievance or cause, or definite aim; without a com-
mon plan or an acknowledged leader; they move,
like the ants, the locusts, and the springbok, as if an
unknown law of nature compelled it. Who can
understand the Boers? They are my people, but
they beat me!"^ On the whole, the observation of
this British sympathizer (probably an official) was
just. In one particular, however, he was wrong.
There was a "known grievance." There was a
"cause. " There was a "definite aim" — not definite
from the military point of view, but certainly definite
politically. I have taken the pains to read through a
great deal of polemical literature on this subject.
There is still much confusion, much contradiction of
fact, and too little perspective to get a comprehen-
sive idea of what happened in South Africa only two
years ago. But certain facts do stand forth uncon-
tradicted. And, in looking at the rebellion of 19 14
from the point of view of what preceded it and what

^ I am indebted to an anonymous writer in the Round Table
(London) for March and September, 191 5, and June, 19 16, for valu-
able articles on the background and consequences of the rebellion.
They are admirably and sanely written, as are all the articles of this
indispensable review.

461

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

has followed it, there is possibihty of forming a
judgment that may not need radical revision.
I' It has not been proved either that the rebellion
/ was inspired by German agents, or that it was an
j organized attempt to regain independence. If it
had been the former, the trials of the ringleaders
would certainly have brou^ght out the fact. If it had
been the latter, much more enthusiasm for the cause
could have been aroused in South Africa by a plain
statement when the first commandos took the field.
It was not well enough and wisely enough organized
a movement to be considered separatist in character.
More than this, it is exceedingly doubtful that men
like De Wet and Kemp and Beyers — or any other
important Boer, in fact — were interested, or would
risk anything, for a movement to regain independ-
ence. Influential Boers did not want a restoration
of the old order. They knew that any movement for
independence would be prejudicial to their own in-
terests as well as to those of the Boer nation. Had
the movement been organized by German agents or
by plotters against the British Crown, it certainly
would have been postponed until a more favorable
momient.

The prevalent view in South Africa is that the
leaders drew blindly ignorant followers after them
in the hope that their movement would lead to the
downfall of the Botha-Smuts regime, and the coming
to power of a real Afrikander Cabinet. They counted
on Botha and Smuts not getting enough Boer support
to oppose them. After they had actually taken arms,
they would have been willing to stop the movement

462

THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA

without a single shot being fired if Botha and Smuts
had signified their intention to resign, and go before
the country in a general election.

To a certain extent, this interpretation is true.
But English writers have not been willing to come
out squarely with a statement of the issue the Hert-
zog-Steyn party wanted referred to the country.
The rebels were the extremists and hotheads of the
opposition to Botha and Smuts. The issue was this :
no aggressive campaign should be undertaken against
German Southwest Africa, especially by an army
drafted into service, without consulting the. country.
The proposal of the Imperial Government that South
Africa undertake the conquest of the neighboring
German colony with Commonwealth forces, accepted
by General Botha, was the one and sole cause of the
rebellion. General Botha knew that the Boers did
not want to fight. He decided to draft an army. A
portion of the Boers resisted. They called it "an
armed protest" and not "a rebellion."

As we have seen elsewhere, ever since the forma-
tion of the Commonwealth, the unadulterated Afri-
kanders, while accepting the British "yoke," stood
squarely against the Imperialists in maintaining that
their ideal was a South African Commonwealth,
united with the British Empire only as a matter of
convenience. They were willing to Hve in harmony
with their fellow-citizens of British origin in the
development of a Commonwealth, and to give al-
legiance to the British Crown, so long as the British
did not attempt to use South Africa for serving
general British interests. The Imperialists, on the

463

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

other hand, maintained that South Africa was now
an integral part of the British Empire, and that all
should be loyal to the "mother country." But
England was not the mother country of the Boers !

The outbreak of the European War brought the
test. Was South Africa also at war with Germany?
Did allegiance mean the necessity of the Boers taking
up arms to attack a nation against whom they had
no grievance and with whom they were united by
traditional ties of blood and sympathy? Only if the
Germans invaded South Africa, and not before that
time, ought they to be called upon to fight. What
interest had they in the quarrel between England
and Germany? What advantage would come to
them from shedding their blood to conquer the Ger-
man colony ? The fate of German Southwest Africa
did not interest them, and anyway it would be de-
cided upon the battlefields of Europe, and not by
anything they might do or by any sacrifice they
might make. This was the opinion of a great major-
ity of the Boers. Had it not been the opinion of a
great majority, the Government would not have been
afraid to put the issue before the country in a
general election.

Immediately after the rebellion was put down, the
question arose as to the punishment to be meted out
to the rebels. On November ii, 1914, General
Botha stated that all who surrendered voluntarily
before November 21st would not be criminally pro-
secuted at the instance of the Government, except
those who had taken a leading part in the rebellion
or who had committed acts in violation of the rules

464

THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA

of civilized warfare. On December loth, the Prime
Minister declared:

"Let us remember that this has been a quarrel
in our own South African household, that all of
us will have to continue to live together in that
household in the future, and while we do our
duty in seeing that never again shall there be a
recurrence of this criminal folly, let us be on our
guard against all vengeful policies and language, and
cultivate a spirit of tolerance, forbearance, and
merciful oblivion of the errors and misdeeds of those
misguided people, many of whom took up arms
without any criminal intention. While just and fair
punishment should be meted out, let us also re-
member that now, more than ever, it is for the people
of South Africa to practice the wise policy of forgive
and forget."

On December 20th, he reiterated his plea to the
British element to try to understand how the Boers
must feel.

"For the loyalist Boers," he said, "it has been
an unhappy, indeed a tragic ordeal, to have to
hunt down and fire upon men — some of them
their relatives, many of them their friends — who
were once their comrades in arms. The Dutch
loyalists regard the whole rebellion as a lamentable
business, upon which the curtain should be ri;ng
down with as little declamation, as little controversy,
as little recrimination as possible. The loyal com-
mandos have had a hard task to perform. They
have performed it. The cause of law and order has
been, and will be, vindicated. Let that be enough.
This is no time for exultation. Let us spare one
30 465

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

another's feelings! Remember, we have to live
together in this land long after the war is ended!"

It would have been well if General Botha's wise
words had been heeded. But racial animosity was
strong — stronger than it had ever been since the
days of the Boer War. South Africans of British
extraction, unable to put themselves in the other
man's place, clamored for drastic punishment. They
declared that the loyalist Boers had done only their
duty, and that the rebels must be tried and executed.
They insinuated that the loyalist Boers had, during
the course of the campaign, carried their feeling for
the rebels so far, that they tried to do as little killing
as possible, with the result that the lives of many
British loyalists, fighting for the flag, were needlessly
sacrificed.

The rebels who had been Government officials or
who held positions in the National Defense forces
were tried by court martial and dealt with according
to the law. One of the signers of the proclamation,
Fourie, was executed on December 21st. The
punishment of the others was left to Parliament,
which met on February 26, 19 15. For the leaders
it was decided that, after being tried for high treason
before a competent court, and found guilty, imprison-
ment with or without hard labor for life, or for a term
of years, or a fine not exceeding £5000 might be
imposed. The rank and file of those who had not
taken advantage of the amnesty offer of November
2 1st were dealt with by a general clause imposing
certain civil disqualifications for a period of ten years.

466

THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA

But they were not disenfranchised. General Botha
was extemely anxious not to lay himself open to the
charge made so tellingly against Dr. Jameson in Cape
Colony after the Boer War, that he used the punish-
ment of disenfranchisement to reduce the electoral
power of his opponents.

The curtain would have been rung down very
quietly on the rebellion, and its aftermath, from an
internal point of view, might not have increased the
racial antagonism already existing, had it not been
for the outcry raised in Parliament and in the loyalist
press throughout the Union against these very wise
measures. General Botha found himself denounced
by the English loyalists for having been afraid to
fulfil his duty in punishing the rebels; while his Boer
opponents continued to declare that he had sold
himself to the English by acknowledging that there
had been a rebellion at all!

From the standpoint of immediate Imperial policy,
the cooperation of South Africa in the conquest of
German Southwest Africa and German East Africa
was a great success. Had the rebellion not occurred,
the expedition to Southwest Africa, composed as it
originally was almost wholly of soldiers of British
extraction (for General Botha at the very beginning
of the rebellion found himself compelled to withdraw
the obligation to serve, knowing that it could not be
enforced), would have been a long-drawn-out affair,
if not a failure. As it was, the loyalist Boer com-
mandos, who put down the rebellion, furnished a
splendid army for Southwest Africa, and have been
since a factor in the conquest of East Africa. Accord-

467

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

ing to the Round Table, nearly seventy thousand
men were under arms against the rebels and in the
Southwest African campaign. Twent^^-four thou-
sand are in British East Africa in the autumn of 191 6.
Seven thousand five hundred joined Kitchener's
army at their own expense, and eleven thousand are
serving in France and Egypt and Macedonia with
the overseas contingents. The proportion of Boers
in the British army to-day is naturally not nearly as
great as that of volunteers of British extraction.
But it means a lot to the British Empire that young
Boers are serving voluntarily in her army.
j From the ulterior standpoint, one may have at this
time misgivings about the wisdom of using South
African troops for the conquest of the German
colonies. Conquered as they have been by South
African blood. Great Britain is not free to use them
as pawns for bargaining in the Peace Conference.
This may cause considerable embarrassment at the
end of the war. Sufficient to the day, however, is the
evil thereof.

In South Africa, since the rebellion, there have
been disquieting events to prove that anti-British
feeling is still strong. In the general election of
October 20, 191 5, General Botha's strong majority
dwindled to half. The radical Boers, who call
themselves the Nationalist Party, won twenty-seven
seats. General Botha has a majority now only with
Unionist (British loyaHst) support. When the
Enemy Trading Bill came before Parliament, Gen-
eral Hertzog stated bluntly that his part German
ancestry did not permit him to view Germany as an

468

THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Englishman would. The Nationalists, and some of
General Botha's followers as well, fought this bill
tooth and nail. They fought equally a bill to raise
the pay of volunteers fighting overseas to the amount
given by Canada and Australia, although this had
been insisted upon by the entire English-speaking
section of the electorate at the polls, and was sup-
ported by the labor members. General Botha's own
party was so much in sympathy with the Nationalists
on the question of refusing to burden the South
African taxpayer more than was absolutely essential
to pay the men who were fighting Britain's battle,
that General Botha could not press the matter. He
declared to the Unionists, when they tried to get his
support for the measure, ''You have no right to
press us. I assure you, we are standing on the brink
of a volcano, and you know it. "

When Lord Kitchener's tragic end was reported,
there was much satisfaction in the Transvaal. In
the Orange Free State, some towns held public
celebrations.

Racial strife and antipathy will not cease in South
Africa as long as one element in the population de-
sires to have the relation of the Commonwealth to
Great Britain that of a colony to the mother country.
This will never be. But it is possible for Boer and
Briton to live in harmony side by side and to fuse
eventually into one race — a race markedly Anglo-
Saxon — if Great Britain is content to have her flag
wave there as a symbol rather than as a reality.

469

CHAPTER XXIV
THE CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES

rr-i

\ •' I ^HE successive declarations of war during the
first few days of August, 1914, left the four
German colonies in Africa, and the Germans
in other parts of Africa, in a hopeless situation. The
mastery of the sea was assured to the enemies of
Germany when Great Britain decided to join them.
There was no help, then, from the outside. Togo-
land and Kamerun were completely surrounded by
colonies of the Allies. In Southwest Africa Germany
had Portugal on the north, and in East Africa on the
south. On the other frontiers were the enemy.
From the very beginning, Portugal, the ally and de-
pendent of Great Britain, was a constant threat to
these two colonies. There were many thousands of
German subjects living outside of German territory
in other African colonies. They had refuge only for
a year in Italian colonies. There was nowhere else
in Africa where they were unmolested, except in
Abyssinia and Liberia, and the wee colonies of Spain.
But even in Spanish Morocco and internationalized
Tangier the Germans were not safe.

In the new French Protectorate of Morocco, at the
very beginning of the war, conspiracies of German

470

CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES

consuls and merchants were discovered. Those who
could get away fled into the Riff and to Spain. The
rest were interned. Some, against whom complicity
in plots could be proved, were tried before French
courts-martial and shot. In Tripoli, German con-
sular officials and others whom the Italian authorities
claimed were military officers in disguise were found
to be in relations with Arab "rebels." Some were
imprisoned, and others expelled. There was no v
immunity for Germans in French and British and Bel- /
gian colonies. In some parts they were treated with ^
leniency at first. But the news of German successes i
and German excesses in Europe, coupled with the
desire to put out of the way commercial rivals, led '
to imprisonment in concentration camps and forcible /
liquidation and sequestration of business interests j
everywhere.

There were very many old established German
residents in the South African Commonwealth, and
some in Rhodesia. Among them were men who had
contributed in a most important way to the develop-
ment of South Africa, In fact, the older German
firms had been the invaluable coadjutors of Cecil
Rhodes in the last two decades of the nineteenth
century. The Boers were very friendly to the Ger-
mans, and even after the rebellion and the South-
west Africa campaign public sentiment would not
allow bona fide German residents of the Common-
wealth to be molested. The sinking of the Lusitania,
however, led to disgraceful riots in Johannesburg and
elsewhere. Germans were maltreated, and their
homes and business places looted and destroyed.

471

THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA

The British element in the Commonwealth agitated
in Parliament, after the passage of an Enemy Trading
Bill, for the internment of all Germans and the se-
questration of their properties. Only the return of
a Parliament in the general election of 191 6 in which
General Botha's moderate Boers were caught without
a majority between British and Boer fanatics has
saved the Germans from experiencing a fate similar
to that of those in British Crown Colonies.

I The Germans of Egypt were not more immune,
owing to the peculiar status of the country, than were

/ the Germans of Morocco. They were interned in con-
centration camps. Their extensive business interests

/ were put into the hands of receivers appointed by the
British authorities, and forcibly liquidated.

From the very first day of the war, Germany had
no hopes for Togoland, whose geographical position
put the colony at the mercy of France and Britain.
There were less than two hundred Germans in the
colony, who had military training, and they could
muster only a thousand natives. The British sent a
force from the Gold Coast to occupy Lome on August
6, 1914. At the same moment, a French army
invaded Togoland from Dahomey. The Germans
offered to capitulate, if given honors of war. Un-
conditional surrender was demanded. The Germans
retired into the interior to Kamina, where the most
powerful wireless station in Africa, which could com-
municate with Berlin, had just been completed. On
August 22 d, the Germans attacked the combined
French and British forces between Atakpame and
the coast. Beaten back, they destroyed the wireless

472

CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES

station, and surrendered on August 28th. The con-
quest of Togoland was completed in the first month
of the war.

In the other three colonies, the Germans expected ^
to be able, not only to resist successfully, but to make
things hot for their enemies throughout Africa. In '
Southwest Africa they relied upon a Boer rebellion.
In Kamerun, they expected to arouse the adjacent /
French Sudan and Northern Nigeria against France
and Great Britain. In East Africa, they expected ^
aid from Arabia, Egypt, and the Sudan. But the
disloyalty of the Boers in South Africa, as we have
seen in the last chapter, did not materialize into a
serious danger for the Commonwealth. And the )
Germans were all wrong in their calculation of the
effect the alliance with Turkey and the proclamation /
of the Holy War would have upon Islam in North
and Central Africa. Not for a moment was French ,
or British authority seriously menaced in any
African colony. One might put the statement a ,
little more strongly. Far from being embarrassed by
holding Moslem colonies and protectorates in Africa,
France and Great Britain have found in these pos-
sessions a source of strength and great aid in prosecut-
ing the war. African Moslems have constituted a ^
very precious element in the French armies in Europe.

Giving tit for tat and a little more, Great Britain '
has turned the tables on the Turks and Germans who
counted her possession of Egypt a military weakness,
and has used Egypt to wean away the Shereef of '
Mecca from his allegiance to Turkey.

What fighting France and Italy have had to do in
473

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Morocco and Tripoli was in no sense a repercussion
of the European War, but the continuation of mili-
tary operations of the ante-bellum period. In all
I Africa, only the Sultan of Darfur responded to the
^ Khalif 's call to the Holy War. He waited nearly two
1 years, and when he was getting ready to make trouble
r in the Sudan, he was quickly suppressed by a small
' expeditionary corps from Kliartum. ^ The only
other fighting in Africa, outside of that involved in
the conquest of the German colonies, was on the
western and eastern frontiers of Egypt. On the
west, the Senussi, who had been carrying on 4, very
successful campaigns against the Italians in the
Tripolitaine, attacked the British at the end of 191 5.
They occupied Solium, and advanced at several
points towards the Nile valley from the Libyan
Desert. But they were very soon driven out of
Egyptian territory, and suffered heavily. In the
east, the Turks advanced across the Isthmus of Suez,
1 and attacked the Canal in March, 191 5. The at-
' tempt was unsuccessful. In 191 6, the British kept a
I large army on the Canal, which they had fortified
I very carefully.^ At the time of this writing, the

^ See above, pp. 19 (note) and 341.

* I had the privilege of visiting the British army on the Suez Canal
in January and February, 1916. In the latter month, the system of
defenses had been worked out sufficiently for the visitor to get a good
idea of the plan and a firm conviction that the Germano-Turks would
never attack successfully the Canal. The General Staff detailed an
officer to show me the first lines to the east of the Canal, and allowed
me to see the maps they had made of the Isthmus. Whatever fault
there had been in 191 5, it is sure that a year later the British were
in a position not to be caught napping again.

474

CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES

British forces have cleared the Turks out of the
Isthmus, and are waiting only for the progress of the
Arab rebellion against Turkey to cooperate with
the Shereef of Mecca in the occupation of Palestine.

German Southwest Africa was quite unprepared
to repel an invasion. The Germans had no army in
the colony. Since the Herero War, peace had reigned
and the Germans had devoted themselves to eco-
nomic development. In spite of absurd stories that
have been written to the contrary, the armed forces
of the colony were only large enough to do police
duty, and their supply of arms and ammunition did
not enable them to offer serious resistance to the
overwhelming forces General Botha was able to
bring against them. The situation had possibilities
for the Germans, only if the Boer rebellion had been
successful, or if all the Boers had refused to bear arms
against them. : 'The Southwest African campaign
demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt either
that Germany was not expecting a war with Great
Britain, or that, in case of war, there was no intention
to stir up the Boers. This statement may be con-
tested. But it is difficult to see how a General Staff
such as the German one has proved itself to be would
not have been organizing and preparing thoroughly
for years in Southwest Africa, if Southwest Africa
had been in the plan of future military operations.

The operations of General Botha are uninteresting :
for when an army of fifty thousand, well equipped
for every possible need, goes after an army of five
thousand in a country where supplies are lacking and
munitions once used cannot be renewed, what is there

475

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

to write about? The Commonwealth forces were
not very well handled, for they allowed the Germans
to escape time after time. When the capital, Wind-
huk, was occupied on May 1 2th, after the Common-
wealth forces had been four months in the field, the
Germans retired to the north. When they were
followed to Grootfontein, and there was nothing to
retire to except bush, and no food to be found along
the only line of retreat, the Germans, to the number
of thirty-five hundred, surrendered on July 9, 1915.
The Germans, against overwhelming odds, main-
tained their force practically complete. One does
not know whether to credit German skill or to dis-
credit the skill of General Sir Duncan Mackenzie,
who seemed totally unable to get any good out of all
the advantages he possessed.
. In Kamerun and East Africa, while the odds in the
way of supplies were equally great against the Ger-

/ mans, they were not overwhelmed by a huge army
as in Southwest Africa. So they were able to get the

/ best out of skill and resourcefulness, courage and
endurance. The bitterest enemy of the Germans
must acknowledge that their defense in Kamerun

I and East Africa stamps the officers who conducted
the troops in these two colonies as the very best sort
of sportsmen. In Kamerun the Germans held out
for a year and a half, and then succeeded in avoiding
capture. In East Africa, after more than two years

' of being cut off from the outside world, they are
still in the field, with a navy and four armies against
them.

As there were not many German troops in Kam-
476

CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES .

erun, and the British in Nigeria beHeved they would
be received by the Kamerun natives as Hberators,
they counted on a six weeks' campaign to destroy or
capture the German forces in Kamerun. On August
25, 1 9 14, a Nigerian force crossed the frontier. In
the following week two other British columns in-
vaded Kamerun. The Germans brought up their
mobile native troops with lightning rapidity, and
drove back into Nigerian territory the invaders. On
the coast, owing to the protection of warships, French
and British troops were able to effect landings at the
ports. At the mouth of the Kamerun River, Duala,
the capital, was occupied, and forty thousand tons of
German shipping captured. The war continued
throughout the whole year of 191 5, all three of the
belligerents employing black troops. When the
Allies were able to bring up their heavy guns against
a fortified post, the Germans had no chance whatever.
But they held out each time until the Allies had ex-
pended an enormous amount of invaluable ammuni-
tion, and destroyed the buildings and supplies that
could not be moved. Never once were their ene-
mies able to surround them. Their three thousand
black soldiers, led by two hundred and fifty white
officers, completely baffled the efforts of Major-Gen-
eral Dobell's eight thousand British, French, and
Belgian soldiers. When their ammunition gave out,
they had so manoeuvered their retreat as to be able
to cross to safety into Rio Muni, the little Spanish
enclave in Kamerun.

Admirable as the Kamerun campaign was, from
the German point of view, it was rivalled by that in

477

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

East Africa. The Wangoni rebellion, in 1906, had
taught the Germans in East Africa what the British
and French had long known, the value of recruiting
and training native soldiers. The mistake of the
Herero rebellion in Southwest Africa was not re-
peated. White troops were recalled, and some
natives from German New Guinea introduced to in-
corporate with East African levies. During the eight
years between 1906 and 1 9 14, the Germans in East
Africa paid great attention to native troops, and
built up a splendid army. When war was declared
in 1 914, they did not wait to be invaded. They
crossed into the Belgian Congo, attacked posts in
Rhodesia, and threatened the British East African
frontier. On the lakes, there was naval warfare.
Until the Home Governments of their enemies were
able to give serious attention to the problem of the
conquest of East Africa, the Germans were fairly
evenly matched with their neighbors. For there
were not many troops in British East Africa and
Uganda, and practically none in Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, save what were absolutely essential for
police purposes. There were twenty thousand black
troops in the Belgian Congo. But the Belgian
authorities felt they had their hands full in looking
after their own territories, and were content to re-
main on the defensive.

At the beginning of 1915, three companies of
British Indian infantry, who were holding the post of
Jasin in German territory, were surrounded by Ger-
man black troops, who forced them to surrender,
after an attempt at relief had failed. It was, on a

478

CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES

very small scale of course, a prelude to Kut-el-Amara.
The Indians were sacrificed to the rashness of their
British officers, who were betrayed by overconfidence
and disdain of the enemy into an unjustified forward
movement that ended in humiliation. At the end of
1 91 5, the Germans were in possession of the whole of
the East Africa colony, coast line and boundaries as
well as interior. It was decided to call upon the
South Africans to conquer the colony, and General
Smith Dorrien was appointed to command the
invasion. Early in 19 16, the British General re-
signed his command "for reasons of health" — the
polite and invariable formula — and was succeeded
by General Botha. Germany's declaration of war
upon Portugal brought another enemy into the
field. ,

The reports from East Africa during the spring and
summer of 191 6 were very vague. But each official
bulletin brought the news of a new success for the '
combined South African, Rhodesian, Portuguese,
Belgian, Indian, and British armies. On September ,
4th, Dar-es-Salaam was captured, and on the i8th, '
the two last footholds of the Germans on the coast ^^
fell into the hands of the British. The whole line of
railway across the colony was occupied before the
end of September. It is probable that when this
book goes to press, the conquest of the last German
colony in Africa will have been completed. As
there is no neutral territory to which they can retire,
the Germans will be compelled to surrender.

The story of the Great War in Africa has demon-
strated two things, one of which was not expected by

479

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

the Germans, and the other of which was not expected
by their enemies.

J The collapse of their hopes of Islamic uprisings, or
rather a coordinated Islamic movement in North

/ and Central Africa, is a severe blow to Germany and
her allies. By the same token, it is a remarkable
testimony to the hold France and Great Britain
have over the natives under their flags.

I The ability of German officers in Kamerun and
East Africa to command the loyalty of their native

* troops and the cooperation of the inhabitants of
these two colonies is a big surprise to France and

' Great Britain, and disproves the thesis that the na-
tives of the portions of Africa over which Germany

'' ruled were eager to welcome British and French

/ liberators.

In conclusion, by the test of this cataclysm, which
has brought half of Europe against the other half,
one can affirm the stability of European institutions
in Africa, and the lack of desire or power of the in-
habitants of any part of Africa to change the political
status under which they have been brought during
the last two decades.

480

CHAPTER XXV

AFRICAN PROBLEMS FOR THE PEACE
CONFERENCE

IF one maintains that the attitude of tHe Powers
towards the problems that come before the
Peace Conference depends upon the military
position of the two groups of belligerents at the time
the armistice is signed, he can see no use in discuss-
ing peace problems. For there will be no peace
problems. The victors will refuse to consider
problems. They will impose conditions on the time-
honored basis of '' Vce victisl" It will be a peace
in which superior force is the decisive factor, not
only the combined superior force of one group of
belligerents over the other, but the comparative
superior force of the states in the victorious group.
If peace is made on this basis, the war will have been
fought in vain.

Europe will remain an armed camp. The victors I
will need standing armies to maintain their terms. '
The vanquished will hope to reverse the decision
of force by building up bigger armies than they ever '
had before and by diplomatic intrigue. France did |
this after 1815 and 1870, Russia after 1854 and (
31 481

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

\1878, and Austria-Hungary after 1859 and 1866.
Great Britain all the while was guided by the sole

j consideration of throwing in her sword to prevent

, any continental Power from becoming strong enough

, to menace her world supremacy.

But in this war, from the very beginning, France
and Great Britain have made the issue a moral one.
They appeal to the whole world for sympathy and
for support on the ground that they took up the sword
for the sake of humanity. Premier Viviani, in the
Chamber of Deputies, and Prime Minister Asquith,
in the House of Commons, solemnly declared in
the name of France and Great Britain that these
two Powers were not fighting for territorial aggran-
dizement, but for the principles of international
law and the freedom of small nations. Germany,
on the other hand, was convicted before the court
of world opinion of being the aggressor and actually
starting the war, and of attacking Belgium wholly
without provocation, although she had assumed the
international obligation to maintain Belgian neutral-
ity. Russia's recent record was worse than that
of Germany, and her cruelties in the initial cam-
paigns fully as shocking. Neutral public opinion
throughout the whole world, however, sustained
unhesitatingly the cause of the Entente Allies.
There was deep sympathy with the wrongs inflicted
upon little Belgium and little Serbia. There was
disgust of German methods of beginning and con-
ducting the war. But most of all, neutral public
opinion rallied to the Entente Allies because of
belief in the sincerity of the appeals made for its

482

UNSETTLED AFRICAN PROBLEMS

sympathy on the ground of fighting the battle of
humanity.

The small neutrals in Europe are at the mercy
of the combatants. Whatever they may think,
the expression of their thoughts is muzzled by geo-
graphical and economic conditions. Even if they
were free to translate thought into action, the force
they could muster would not count for much on sea
or on land. The South American states are de-
pendent upon foreign capital, foreign products,
foreign markets, and foreign steamship lines. They
must acquiesce in the general international decisions
of the United States and Europe. The three large
South American coimtries, Brazil, Chile, and Argen-
tina, have combined only about ten per cent, of the
population of European origin that the United
States possesses. In wealth and resources as well
as , in population, the important neutral is the
United States. By institutions and by blood, it is
natural that the overwhelming majority of Ameri-
cans should sympathize with France and Great
Britain.

But one cannot insist too strongly upon the point
that the people of the United States do not hate — ■
do not even dislike — the people of Germany. What
they do hate is the picture of Germany that has been
held up before them during the war — a nation, gone
mad by lust for power and blood and destruction,
blindly upholding a ruler and statesmen who have
upset the peace of the world, trampled upon small
nations, and violated the principles of humanity in
order to dominate the world. In sharp relief to

483

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

this picture is that of the Entente Allies, nobly
struggUng to save the world from Prussian militar-
ism, sacrificing themselves to defend humanity,
and pledged to a peace that will establish the world
upon a new basis of justice and freedom for all
mankind.

As long as the pictures remain as they are, the
Entente Allies are assured of American sympathy.
If they are the victors, and go to the Peace Confer-
ence to fulfil the pledges of their statesmen, with
the intention of establishing peace on a durable
basis, they will have American cooperation and
American support. As this cooperation and sup-
port will be a precious asset, it is the duty of Ameri-
can writers, who have loyally supported from the
very beginning the cause of the Allies, to present
and to discuss problems of the future Peace Confer-
ence in a spirit of frankness.

In international relations, the African settlement
is going to be as important and as significant for the
future as have been the African developments.
The history of Africa in the last generation, and
especially in the decade immediately preceding the
war, shows the vital part of European rivalry in
Africa in forming the alliances and in stirring up
the friction that made a European War inevitable.
Unless the African settlement is made upon a basis
of broad statesmanship, the peace treaty will con-
tain embers of a fire unquenched, ready to break
out again when fresh fuel is thrown upon it.

The great question is this: Will Germany be ex-
cluded from Africa, or will she be readmitted to

484

UNSETTLED AFRICAN PROBLEMS

cooperate in the development of the continent on a
basis that will give satisfaction to the abilities and
necessities and aspirations of the German people?

The partisan, in the heat of the conflict, opens his
eyes in amazement and indignation at this question.
He denounces you as a pro-German. If you con-
vince him that you are sincere in your friendship,
he asks how you can be so naive as to expect the
AUies to return to Germany what they have taken
from her. "We have Germany at our mercy. She
is beaten. She and aU her partners must pay the
price of their crime against civilization.' Do you
not believe in punishment?"

This reasoning is precisely that of Germany in
1870. Germany declared to the world that she
was not fighting the French, but was mercifully
ridding them of their War Lord, who was trying to
lead France along the path followed by the first
Napoleon. But the lust of pillage and conquest
caught the Germans with the first victories. The
resistance of France maddened them. They told
the neutral world they could not afford to be kept
in continual jeopardy by the militarist ambitions of
France. They must annex territory (which had
once been German) to protect themselves against
French aggression. The memory was still aHve of
the invasion of Germany by the first Napoleon, and
they burned to wipe out the humiliation of Jena and
Napoleon's entry to Berlin. They had to bring
France to her knees and punish her. The punish-
ment was a boomerang. Instead of securing the
tranquillity of the next generation, the Treaty of

485

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

Frankfort has brought disaster upon the children
of those who imposed it upon France.

Aside from the argument of punishment, the only-
justification of France and Great Britain for re-
taining the German colonies would be: economic ne-
cessity of keeping the colonies; or the claim that
Germany had forfeited her right to them, through
barbarous treatment of the natives or incapacity to
administer and develop the colonies. A survey of
the distribution of African territory, and the history
of the last decade of European colonization in Africa,
are sufficient to make invalid both these grounds.^
Even were there reasonable doubt here, is not the
heavy loss of men and money during the present
war going to retard the administrative and economic
development of the colonies France and Great
Britain already possess? Is it wise to assume new
obligations?

If the Entente Allies have in mind the destruction
of Prussian militarism, this can be best accomplished
by giving Germany a large part in the development
of Africa. The student of German politics during

^ The reports of British consuls in the German colonies, and of
governors and other officials of adjacent British colonies, from
1906 to 1 9 13, are high in their praise of German efficiency and Ger-
man courtesy, and of the fact that British trade and traders received
fair treatment. Commerce was far easier and more profitable for
British in German than in French and Portuguese colonies. Several
officers of the British army, speaking since the present war began,
have assured me that in boundary commissions and other common
tasks, they got along better with the German officers than with
those of any other nation in Africa. "They are really more our
sort, you know," was the candid confession.

486

UNSETTLED AFRICAN PROBLEMS

the past fifteen years is convinced that sufficient
popular support for army and navy credits was
gained by the German Weltpolitik advocates only
because they were able to convince the electorate
of the necessity of colonies, both for excess popula-
tion and for markets, and that the rivals of Germany
were doing all in their power to grab what was left
of the world and to prevent Germany from getting
her "place in the sun." The population and re-
sources of Germany increased marvelously since the
accession of the present Kaiser. The advocacy of
a policy of estabHshing overseas dominions, where
great markets for exports could be developed, raw
materials grown, emigrants saved to Deutschtum,
and German KuUur and language spread, was re-
sisted for many years by the German electorate.
But in recent years imperialism, fostered by these i
arguments, has become no less attractive to the i
Germans than to the French and British. ^ National
instinct is the same the world over.

^ Englishmen think exactly as Germans do. In a visit to New
Zealand in 19 16, Sir Rider Haggard declared: "We are anxious to
see that the men who leave Great Britain . . . remain somewhere
within the shadow of the British flag, and do not settle in the United
States or Argentine or some other foreign country . . . the Empire
cannot afford to lose these people. . . . No expense is too great
and no thought too high to give to the problem of how to retain
within the Empire our own citizens." Commenting on this state-
ment the Auckland Star said: "The material progress and strength
necessary for safety depend upon man-power, and the Empire
must see that that power is conserved by every possible means.
Emigration to places beyond the Empire must be vigorously dis-
couraged. . . . The point to be emphasized now is that men and
women desirous of a change must be kept within the Empire."
The Round Table for September, 19 16, remarks that Sir Rider

487

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

The Germans bubbled over. Perhaps they ought
not to have done so. But could they have helped
it ? Where did they have a good chance to expend
the newly-created excess of national energy and
national pride and national creative longing ? When
a bottle is overflowing, and you try to keep in the
cork, the bottle breaks, and the hand that pressed
down the cork gets hit by flying pieces of glass. A
repetition of the act is folly. Here is the kernel of
the European problem.

After an unsuccessful war, if their eyes are opened
to the unwelcome truth that they have been deluded
by their leaders into fighting a policy of encircle-
ment that had no truth in it, the German people
will themselves make short work of the Kaiserism,
JunkerivSm, and Prussian militarism we abhor. But
I ' if their colonies are taken from them, and they are
shut off from trading with Africa and Asia and Aus-
tralasia, they will find in the peace terms of their
} enemies ample justification for having fought the war,
( and will give their Kaiser and his statesmen and
( generals credit for having done their best to avert the
j conspiracy whose existence will have been proved
. in their eyes by the fact of its success. Instead of
being chastened and repentant, they will be defiant.
Instead of mourning the useless sacrifice of fathers
, and sons, of husbands and brothers, the dead will be
I martyrs of a sacred cause, whose memory will keep
alive the determination to devote energies and brains,

Haggard's appeal is curiously like those made by Froude in 1870
in his articles on England and her colonies in volume ii. of SJiort
Studies on Great Subjects.

488

UNSETTLED AFRICAN PROBLEMS

and to consecrate the new generation, to the build- \
ing up of a new war machine. The enemies of ^
Germany could not prevent this. You can knock ^
a man down. But if you want to keep him down,
you must sit on him, and keep sitting on him. He
who imposes his will upon another by force generally
becomes the victim of his victory.

There is another extremely important considera-
tion that should convince statesmen of the wisdom
of welcoming Germany to a more important part
than she has yet had in the development of European
civilization in Africa. There are ninety million /
Germans in Central Europe. If they are barred |
from overseas development, they will own Poland in \
spite of the efforts of the Poles and Russians, and '
they will be masters of the Balkan Peninsula and |
Asia Minor. Many Germans have been opposed '
to the colonies, and are glad now that their country
has been put out of Africa, for the very reason that
all the energies and resources of Germany might be
redirected to the Drang nach Osten. The only way (
to prevent Germany from remaining, even after a -,
crushing defeat, the greatest military and political ;
factor in Europe is to give her an outlet — an ample >
outlet — in Africa. The policy of trying at every '
turn to forestall the hesitating development of
German colonial enterprise was highly successful
in Africa and elsewhere. It gave to Great Britain
and France larger colonial empires and commercial
and political advantages, of which the Occidental
Powers have made excellent use. It obstructed
German "intrigues" in Asiatic Turkey and Persia.

489

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

It prevented Germany from establishing coaling-
stations and naval ports. But it is exacting now
a fearful toll of French and British lives. Were the
gains worth the price that is being paid? One
doubts seriously whether they were gains — or even
diplomatic advantages. A river, deflected from one
j channel, finds another. If it does not, it bursts over
I the dam, and gets back into the old channel. It does
not stop running. The natural economic laws at

iwork in the world cannot be set aside by diplomatic
combinations. You cannot get rid of a fact by re-
fusing to see it. From the physical as well as the
intellectual standpoint the Germans are the most
powerful ethnic group in Europe. They are un-
rivaled in their energy, their discipline, and their
commercial and scientific ability. In number, they
equal, if they do not surpass, the Russians. Their
geographical position is the strongest of the European
races. Damn them if you will; but there they are.

The United States is vitally interested in a wise
and politic settlement of the European War. We
have potent reasons, aside from resentment over
the Belgian invasion, the nefarious activity of sub-
marines, and the intrigues on American soil, to wish
for the destruction of Prussian militarism and the
return of the German people to the rest of the world's
way of looking at things. We have no faith in
Russia. Her attitude toward Poland and toward
the Jews is as abominable as it was before the war.
The only explanation of the failure of liberal public
opinion in France and Great Britain to come out
generously and impressively in favor of Poles and

490

UNSETTLED AFRICAN PROBLEMS

Jews is that political blackmail — unofficial, perhaps,
but none the less powerful — has kept London and
Paris newspapers silent. The alliance of Russia
and Japan fills us with the gravest misgivings about
the future of China. The time is not far distant
when duty and interest may impose upon us inter-
vention in the Far East. An unbridgeable chasm |
between the Occidental Powers and Germany will
lead to an alliance of Germany with Russia and Japan i
to dominate Asia. This is not prophecy. On your I "
chessboard, you can point out moves and combina-/;
tions of moves from study of and experience in otherl
games. You cannot, of course, foresee what movei'
the player will make. But you can tell him what \
will happen if he makes the move.

The siu-est means of establishing the security of
Europe against Prussian militarism is to take away
from the reactionary elements in Germany the
arguments by which they have won and hold the
support of the German electorate. A regenerated,
democratic Germany, cooperating with the rest of
Europe and with America in the work of developing
and civilizing the world, will be born out of this war,
if internationalism, instead of nationalism, and the
higher interests of humanity, instead of the particu-
lar interests of the strongest, are the ruling factors
of the Peace Conference.

The happiness of our children, in a world where
peace and harmony reign, depends much upon the
new map of Africa.

491

INDEX

Abbas Hilmi, Khedive of Egypt,
399-400 ; character and oppor-
tunities, 421, 423; deposed,
424

Abdul Aziz, Sultan of Morocco,
362 et seq., 378 et seq.; agrees
to abdicate, 383

Abyssinia, 96-105; Italy and,
97, 99; Emperor Menelik,
97, 99, 102, 103; Dr. Rosen
Kaiser's envoy to, 99-100;
German and Austrian com-
mercial treaties, 100; French
and British convention,
loo-ioi; death of Emperor
Menelik, 103; civil war in,
103; future of, 104

Adowa, battle of, 1896, 4;
defeat at crushing blow to
Italian colonial aspirations
in East Africa, 118

Africa, European development
of, possible only with increase
of transportation facilities and
production, 31; islands of,
31-42; Boer war marks a step
forward in making it a white
man's country, 50-51; colo-
nial adventures of Italy in,
1 1 5-1 29; Spanish colonies in,
115 n.; Germany's entrance
into, 173-174; stability of
European institutions in, 480

African problems for the Peace
Conference, 481-491 ; will Ger-
many be excluded from Africa
at end of European War?,
484-486 ; considerations in
favor of giving Germany a
part in development of Africa,
486-490; American interest in
a wise settlement, 490-491

Afrikander Congress at Wor-
cester, December, 1900, 44

Agadir incident, 388

Albert, King of Belgium, visits
Congo, 162

Albert Nyanza, Lake, unavail-
able for irrigating the Sudan,
20

Algeciras, European rivalry in
Morocco before, 355-373;
Conference of 1906, 373, 374,
et seq.

Algeria and Tunis, the nucleus
of the French African Empire,
130-146; French enter Algeria
in 1830, 132; French occu-
pation of Tunis sanctioned,
133; Tunis and Morocco the
keys to France's house in
Africa, 134 and n.; Tunis
invaded, 134; Algeria con-
quered during reign of Louis
Philippe, 135; French govern-
ment of, 135 et seq.; Algeria
did not prosper till inhabi-
tants were given voice in
government, 137-138; Alge-
rian trade with France and
commercial development, 138-
139; education in Algeria,
139-140; extension of Algerian
territory, 141; Tunis invaded
and French Protectorate es-
tablished, 141; early economic
progress of Tunis, 142; politi-
cal advantages to French of
holding Tunis, 143-144; crux
of French problem in northern
Africa, 144-146

Ali, Sultan, of Darfur, 19 and n.

Anglo-French agreement of 1899,
18; of 1904, 18, 368, 369

493

INDEX

Angola, or Portuguese West

Africa, 257-263
Ashanti, revolt of, 282-283
Atbara, railway to, 11
Atbara River, bridge over, 11

Basutoland, 83

Belgians in the Congo, 147-172;
see also Congo

Bernard, Colonel, Financial
Secretary at Khartum, 9-10

Beyers, General, 70; a leader in
rebellion in South African
Union, 454 et seq.; drowned,
461

Bismarck, telegram to German
Consul at Cape Town, 174

Boers, result of the Boer War
a benefit to, 50-51; oppose
introduction of Chinese labor
in South Africa, 61-62; agi-
tate for responsible govern-
ment, 67-68; demand that
Orange Free State be given
responsible government at
same time as Transvaal, 69;
determined that franchise
shall not be granted to
natives and coolies, 72; con-
flict over use of Taal in South
African schools, 74-76 ; opposed
to attacking German South-
west Africa, 454; potential
rebels, 456; form most ^of
army of General Smuts which
crushes rebellion in South
African Union, 460; attitude
of, towards Great Britain and
in European War, 463-464;
in conquest of German South-
west and East Africa and in
overseas contingents, 467-
468; see also Boer War, Trans-
vaal, South Africa, and Orange
Free State.

Boer War, last years of, 43-49;
British disappointment at pro-
longation of, 43; Afrikander
Congress denounces British
conduct of, 44; French public
opinion hostile to Great Brit-

ain, 44; Kaiser Wilhelm's
refusal to receive President
Kruger checkmates Boer
hopes of aid from Europe, 44;
martial law proclaimed in
Cape Colony, 44; _ Lord
Kitchener's proclamation of
August 7, 1 90 1, 45; concentra-
tion camps, 46-47 and n.;
"National Scouts" in, 47-48;
defeat of Lord Methuen the
last Boer victory, 48; Boer
independence out of the ques-
tion, 48; Vereeniging Confer-
ence, May 15, 1902, 48-49;'
terms of peace, 49-50; British
loss in, 50; result of war a
benefit to Boers and the whole
world, 50-51

Botha, General, 66, 70; influence
in South African Union, 449
et seq.; aids in crushing re-
bellion in South African
Union, 460

British in East Africa and
Uganda, 206-227

British East Africa, boundaries,
206 ; frontiers established, 211;
administration, 212; pacifica-
tion and economic develop-
ment, 212-214; native dis-
turbances, 214-215; mission-
ary work, 215-216; white
colonization, 217 ef seq.; con-
flict between settlers and
chartered company, 218 et seq.;
opposition to Jews and Asiat-
ics, 219-221; to limited lease-
hold of land grants, 221-223;
to favoritism toward natives,
223-225; to government with-
out representation, 225-226;
settlers in the European War,
227

British West Africa, 276-298;
four colonies in, 276-277; see
Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold
Coast Colony, and Nigeria.

Bu Hamara, revolt of, in
Morocco, 366-369; death of,
384 n.

494

INDEX

Cairo, convention signed Janu-
ary 9, 1899, at, 5-6

Canary Islands, 32

Cape Colony, see South Africa
and South African Union

Cape to Cairo Railway, 196

Cape Verde Islands, 252-253

Casement, Roger, report on the
Congo, 1 51-152

Central Africa, see Nyasaland
and Rhodesia

Central Africa, French in, 335-

354 . .

Chad, Lake, environing colonies,

335

Chad Military Region, 338, 340
Chamberlain, Joseph, decides
to visit South Africa, 53; his
problems and action there,
53 et seq.; result of his visit,
57; proposed Transvaal war
"contribution," 64-66; pro-
mise and warning to Boers,

Chinese labor in South Africa,
61-63

Churchill, Winston, on Uganda,
207-208

Concentration camps, in Boer
War, 46; mortality in, 46 and
n.

Congo, the, Belgians in, 147-
172; Congo Free State es-
tablished, 147; area and
boundaries, 147-148; history
for first ten years of twentieth
century a sad and revolting
page of history, 149; question
of Belgium's fitness for
stewardship of, 150 et seq.;
report of Mr. Casement on,
151-152; Lord Cromer on,
152-153; indignation in Bel-
gium at Casement and
Cromer reports, 154; Com-
mission of Inquiry appointed,
155; its report, 155-156; King
Leopold cedes Congo Free
State to Belgium, 157; atti-
tude of Great Britain and
Germany towards the trans-
fer, 158-159; Belgian promises

not believed in England, 160;
death of King Leopold raises
hopes of awakening of Belgian
conscience, 162; visit of King
Albert to Congo, 162; condi-
tions improving, 163; native
right to land ownership, 163-
164; railway construction,
165-167; products of, 168-
169; administration and
finance, 169-171; future of,
in connection with adjust-
ments at end of European
War, 171-172

Congo Free State, see Congo

Congo, French, 338

Congo River, 147 et seq.

Congress, Afrikander, 44

Conquest of German African
colonies, 470-480

Cromer, Lord, 2; on necessity
to Egypt of reclamation of
the Sudan, 4; financial policy
for the Sudan, 6-7; points
out need of railway from Nile
to Red Sea, 1 1 ; on slave trade
in the Sudan, 12; on Belgian
misgovernment of Congo, 152-
I53_; in Egypt, 397-398 et seq.;
native judgment of his ad-
ministration, 408-409

Cyrenaica, Turkey withdraws
opposition to Italian occupa-
tion, 123; Italian progress in,
in 1913, 127

Dahomey, 312, 313, 317-320

De Brazza, M., investigation of
conditions in French Congo
territories, 343-345

Delagoa Bay, failure of British
effort to claim, 265

Delarey, General, defeats Lord
Merthuen in Boer War, 48

Dernberg, Dr., on conditions in
German East Africa, 240

De Wet, urges continuance of
Boer War, 49; leader in re-
bellion in South African
Union, 457 et seq.

Djibouti, 107

495

INDEX

Dulmadoba, British defeat at,
113

East Africa, see British East
Africa, German East Africa,
Portuguese East Africa

Education in Algeria, 139-140

Educational facilities in the
Sudan, 16-18

Egypt, necessity to, of reclama-
tion of the Sudan, 4; conven-
tion with Great Britain,
January 19, 1899, 5-6; loans
to the Sudan, 8-9; under the
last of the Khedives, 391-
420; necessity to Great Brit-
ain of control of Suez Canal,
393; British enter, 394; inter-
national status of, 395; real
control in British hands, 396;
economic progress, 398;
"Young Moslem," move-
ment, 401; Islamic agitation,
402; Nationalist propaganda,
402 et seq., 410-413; change in
Anglo-French relations, 404-
405; Turkish boundary dis-
pute, 406; native judgment of
Lord Cromer's administration,
408-409; Sir Eldon Gorst
succeeds Lord Cromer as
Consul-General, 409; Copts
secede from Nationalists, 412;
Colonel Roosevelt's speech,
413-414; action of the Copts,
414-417; death of Sir Eldon
Gorst, 418; Lord Kitchener
succeeds him, 418; strength-
ens Britain's hold in Egypt,
419-420; character and oppor-
tunities of Khedive Abbas
Hilmi, 421-423; Khedive de-
posed, 424 ; entrance of Turkey
into European War creates
new situation in Egypt, 425;
troops sent to, 426; made a
British Protectorate, 428;
Turkish attack upon, 430;
military protection strength-
ened, 431-432; value of, to
Great Britain, 432-433; des-
tiny of, 433; dissatisfaction

496

with British rule in, 434-439;
internal government the real
problem in, 440

Elgin, Lord, orders suspension of
Chinese labor importation in
South Africa, 69

El Obeid, railway extended to,
9, 12

Eritrea, 119

European War, outlook in
Sudan at opening of, 24-25;
Morocco a principal cause of,
37^-377 y African problems for
the Peace Conference, 481-
491; issues in, and neutral
attitude towards combatants,
482, et seq.; American interest
in a wise settlement of, 490-
491

Fashoda, Marchand expedition

to, 18 _
Fashoda incident, 336
Fez occupied by French, 385
France, and Sudan boundary
disputes, 18-19; African
islands of, 33 ; efforts to secure
Morocco, 358 et seq.; gets
Morocco, 374-390; occupa-
tion of Morocco begins, 380-
381; negotiations with Spain
and Germany over Morocco,
385 et seq.; Morocco placed
under protection of, 389
French African Empire, see

Algeria and Tunis
French Equatorial Africa, 338
French in Central Africa, 335-
354; distribution of territories
in Central Africa, 335; con-
quests and territorial adjust-
ments, 336-337; Chad MiH-
tary Region, 338, 340; Gabun,
338-339; Middle Congo Col-
ony, 338, 339; Ubangi-Shari-
Chad Colony, 338, 339; mal-
administration of Congo terri-
tories, 342 et seq.; abuses of
Ccnccssionnaire system, 343,
et 'seq.;_ de Brazza investi-
gating commission and its
report, 343-345 ; effect of reve-

INDEX

French in Central Africa — Con^d.
lations of de Brazza report,
350; effect of Central Africa
on moral sense of the white
man, 351-352; qualities neces-
sary for administrative officers,
352; reasons for respective
personnel of French army and
colonial service, 353-354

French in West Africa and
the Sahara, 312-334; Gabun,
312, 313; Dahomey, 312, 313,
3i7-32o;Guinea, 312, 313, SH!
Ivory Coast, 312, 313, 314-
316, 319; Senegal, 312, 313,
322; Senegambia, 313, 324;
the "open door" principle
and German effort to gain
commerce of French colonies,
319-321; cotton culture, 322;
economic difficulties and terri-
torial adjustments, 323; Sene-
gal-Niger Colony, 324-325;
British and German colonies
disturb the continuity of
French territory and influence,
325-327; colonizing difficul-
ties, 327-328; economic
progress, 328-329; West
Africa a training school for
army officers and a reser-
voir of troops, 329-330; fron-
tiers delimited, 330; pacifica-
tion of the Sahara, 331-332;
economic and labor problems,
332-334

Gabun, 312, 313, 338-339

Gambia, 276-277

Garstin, Sir William, and irriga-
tion in the Sudan, 20-21

German African colonies, con-
quest of, 470-480

German East Africa, 228-243;
most important of German
colonies, 228-229; boundaries,
229-230; German East
Africa Company and de-
velopment of its territories,
230-231; German colonial
expansion in Central Africa
prevented, 232; claim that

Germany acquired African
colonies by trickery un-
founded, 232-233 ; German
pioneers in East Africa
discouraged at home, 234
et seq.; railway development,
234-237; administrative or-
ganization of the colony
started, 237; rigid bureau-
cracy a handicap, 238; Ger-
man idea of treatment of
Mohammedanism, 238-240;
Dr. Dernberg on conditions in,
240; increase in trade, 241;
German pubUc opinion cham-
pions cause of natives, 241-
242; abolition of serfdom
demanded, 242; resistance of
colony to British invasion,
243; conquest of, 476-479

German East Africa Company,
231

German Southwest Africa, 173-
188; boundaries, 173; entrance
of Germany into Africa, 173-
174; German method of
colonization, 174-175; Ger-
man development hampered
by British possession of Wal-
fisch Bay, 176; agriculture
difficult, 176; Land Bank
established, 177; metals in,
178; diamond fields, 178-180;
German administrative and
colonization plans, 180-182;
native uprisings, 183-185;
transformation effected by
war, 1 86 ; increase of colonists,
186; crisis of 19 10, 187; con-
quered by the South African
Commonwealth army in 19 15,
188, 475-476

German West Africa, 299-311;
see Togoland, Kamerun

Germans in Africa, hopeless
situation of, at opening of
European War, 470; treat-
ment of, in British, French,
and other colonies, 470 et seg^.

Germany, and the Congo ques-
tion, 158 et seq.; Rhodes
believes harmony with, essen-

497

INDEX

Germany — Continued.

tial to Great Britain's peace
and to accomplishment of
plans in Africa, 246-248;
unpublished treaty with Great
Britain in 1898, regarding
Africa, 247; and Great Brit-
ain drift apart, 248; declares
war on Portugal, 275; working
against France in Morocco,
356 ei seg^.; intervention in
Morocco, 372 ; negotiations
with France as to Morocco,
385 et seq.

Gladstone, Lord Herbert, first
Governor of South African
Union, 443 et seq.

Gold Coast Colony (British),
276; Ashanti revolt, 282-283;
Northern Territories added
to, 283; valuable market for
British trade, 284; mining
wealth, 284-285; Togoland
conquered, 285

Gordon College, 14-15

Gorst, Sir Eldon, report for 1909,
23-24; Consul-General of
Egypt, 409; death of, 418

Great Britain, in the Sudan, i-
30; drops the Sudan, i;
vision of reconquest of the
Sudan, 2 ; problems of colonial
administrators, 2-3 ; im-
possibility of direct protec-
torate over Sudan, 4-5; con-
vention with Egypt regarding
Sudan, January 19, 1899, 5-6;
guarantees interest on loan
for Sudan, 9; and Sudan
boundaries, 18-19; African
islands of, 32-33; dictates
terms of peace at end of Boer
War, 49; loss in Boer War, 50;
policy in Somaliland, 106-
114; and the Congo question,
151 et seq.; Portugal in vassal-
age to, 244-245; Rhodes sees
peace and prosperity for, and
accomplishment of African
plans, only in harmony with
Germany, 246-247; unpub-
lished treaty with Germany in

1898 regarding Africa, 247;
and Germany drift apart, 248 ;
agreement with France in
1904, 248; agreement with
Russia in 1907,248; alarm in,
over possibility of Germany
getting coaling stations and
naval bases in Portuguese
colonies, 249-250; willing to
fight to maintain her world
supremacy, 251; working
against France in Morocco,
356 et seq.; enters Egypt, 394;
holds real control of Egypt,
396; economic progress of
Egypt under, 398; deposes
Khedive of Egypt, 424; makes
Egypt a British Protectorate,
428; South African Union
most remarkable achievement
of British statesmanship, 444;
see also under names of
British African colonies.

Grey, Sir Edward, and affairs of
the Congo, 158, 160

Guinea, 253-254

Guinea (French), 312, 313, 314

Hafid, Sultan of Morocco, nego-
tiations with France, 383 et
seq. ; signs treaty with France,

389

Hertzog, General, head of ex-
treme Boer party in South
Africa, 450 et seq.

Het Volk, Boer political party,
70-71

Het Volk, Pretoria newspaper,
70 n.

Hobbhouse, Miss, on concen-
tration camps, 46

Hohenlohe, Prince, on treatment
of Mohammedanism, 238-239

Hussein Kamel, becomes Sultan
of Egypt, 428; on destiny of
Egypt, 433

Ignorance of uncivilized peoples,
13 n.

Indian colonist rights and In-
dian immigration in South
Africa, 63-64

498

INDEX

Irrigation in the Sudan, 20-21
Islands of Africa, 31-42
Italy and Abyssinia, 97, 99
Italy, colonial adventures of, in
Africa, 1 15-129; Risorgimento
literature of, 116; Italians
settle in northern Africa, 116;
occupy strip of Red Sea coast
and enter Somaliland, 117-
118; battle of Adowa, 1896,
118; concentrates attention in
Tripoli, 120; annexes African
province of Turkey, 123; war
with Turkey, 124; treaty of
Ouchy, 125; progress in Cyre-
naica in 1913, 127; value of
Tripoli, 127-128; repercus-
sion of European War proves
that Italy had not conquered
Tripoli, 129
Ivory Coast Colony (French),
312, 313, 314-316, 319

Jameson, Dr., leader of Im-
perialist or Progressive Oppo-
sition in South Africa, 53;
effect of his policy on success
of South African Union, 451

Kaiser Wilhelm, see Wilhelm II.

Kamerun (German colony) ,
boundaries of, 299-300 ;
acquired by Germany, 304;
extension of colony, 305-306;
products, 306; maladminis-
tration, 307-308; railway and
telegraphic communication,
310; education in, 311; con-
quest of, 476-477

Khalifa, escapes from Omdur-
man, 21; killed, 21

Khartum, railway connection
with, 11; King's Day at, 27

Kitchener, Lord, 2, 4, 6, 11;
opens Gordon College, 14;
proclamation of August 7,
1 90 1, 45; declines to consider
proposals of Vereeniging Con-
ference, 48; leaves South
Africa, 50; Consul-General in
Egypt, 418

Kruger, President, reception in
Paris, 44; Kaiser Wilhelm
refuses to receive, 44

Labor problems in South Africa,
58-63

Ladysmith, relief of, 43

Leopold II. of Belgium and
Congo Free State, 147, 150,
151, 155, 156, 157, 159; death
of, 1909, 162

Liberia, 93-96

Livingstone, David, explorer,
and Central Africa, 189-190

Lorenzo IMarques, and contro-
versy over Transvaal traf&c,
78-82

Madagascar, history and de-
velopment of, 38-42

Mafeking, relief of, 43

Mahdism in the Sudan, 21-24

Manning, Sir William, report on
Somaliland, III

Marchand expedition, 18

Mauritania, 313, 324

Menelik, Emperor of Abyssinia,
97, 99, 102, 103

Methuen, Lord, defeated and
taken prisoner in Boer War,
48

Meux, Lady, will of, 102 n.

Middle Congo Colony, 338, 339

Milner, Lord, 47; declines to
consider proposal of Vereen-
iging Conference, 48; becomes
Governor of Transvaal, 50;
proposition to solve political
problems in South Africa, 54;
opposes Transvaal war "con-
tribution," 66; prosperity of
Transvaal largely due to, 91;
advocates idea of imperial
unity in South Africa, 442

Mohammedanism, German idea
of treatment of, 238-240

Morocco, one of keys to France's
house in Africa, 134 and n.;
European rivalry in, before
Algeciras, 355-373; influence
of Moroccan affairs on world
war, 355; French efforts to

499

INDEX

Morocco — Continued.

secure, 358 et seq.; crisis in,
begins in 1901, 362; revolt of
Bu Hamara, 366 et seq.; Anglo-
French Agreement of 1904,
368, 369; first German inter-
vention in, 372; Conference of
Algeciras arranged, 373; Act
of Conference futile, 374 et
seq.; acquired by France,
374-390; a principal cause of
the European War, 376-377;
French occupation begins,
380-381; Abdul Aziz ab-
dicates, 383; tactics of Sultan
Hafid, 383 et seq.; French
occupy Fez, 385 ; independence
over, 385; French negotia-
tions with Spain and Germany,
385 et seq.; treaty signed
placing the country under
French protection, 389; paci-
fication of, 389-390

Mullah Mohammed Abdullah,
rise of power of, in Somaliland,
109; British policy regarding,
no; again becomes active,
III et seq.

Mustafa Kamel and Nationalist
agitation in Egypt, 402 et seq.

Nadji Bey, 123-124

Natal, the problem of, 82-89;

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